UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


GIFT  OF* 


Received  ^^7          >  ifytf  • 

i 


Accession  No.  &     3  3  tf      -    Cla&sNc. 


NOTES 


ON 


RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS 


BY 


CHARLES  FRANCIS  ADAMS,  JR. 

AUTHOR  OF  "RAILROADS:  THEIR  ORIGIN  AND  PROBLEMS.' 


NEW   YORK 

G.     P.    PUTNAM'S    SONS 

l82    FIFTH   AVENUE 
1879 


COPYRIGHT 

1879 

By  G.  P.  PUTNAM>S  SONS 
67)  35 


By  the  same  Author. 


Railroads  and  Railroad  Questions.  i2mo,  cloth,  $i  25. 
The  volume  treats  of  "  The  Genesis  of  the  Railroad  System,"  "Ac- 
cidents," and  the  "  Present  Railroad  Problem."  The  author  has 
made  himself  the  acknowledged  authority  on  this  group  of  subjects. 
If  his  book  goes  only  to  those  who  are  interested  in  the  ownership, 
the  use,  or  the  administration  of  railroads,  it  is  sure  of  a  large  cir- 
cle of  readers. 

"A  most  interesting  and  important  work." — Railway  World. 

"Characterized  by  broad,  progressive,  liberal  ideas." — Railway 
Review. 

"  The  entire  conclusions  are  of  great  value." — N.Y.  Journal  of 
Commerce. 


PREFACE.  - 

This  volume  makes  no  pretence  whatever  of  being 
either  an  exhaustive  or  a  scientific  study  of  the  subject  to 
which  it  relates.  It  is,  on  the  contrary,  merely  what  its 
title  signifies, — a  collection  of  notes  on  railroad  accidents. 
In  the  course  of  ten  years  service  as  one  of  the  railroad 
commissioners  of  Massachusetts,  I  was  called  upon  officially 
to  investigate  two  very  serious  disasters, — that  at  Revere 
in  1871,  and  that  at  Wollaston  in  1878, — besides  many 
others  less  memorable.  In  connection  with  these  official 
duties  I  got  together  by  degrees  a  considerable  body  of 
information,  which  I  was  obliged  to  extract  as  best  I 
could  from  newspapers  and  other  contemporaneous 
sources.  I  have  felt  the  utmost  hesitation  in  publishing 
so  crude  and  imperfect  a  performance,  but  finally  decide 
to  do  so  for  the  reason  that,  so  far  as  I  know,  there  is 
nothing  relating  to  this  subject  in  print  in  an  accessible 
form,  and  it  would,  therefore,  seem  that  these  notes  may 
have  a  temporary  value. 

During  my  term  of  public  service,  also,  there  have  been 
four  appliances,  either  introduced  into  use  or  now  strug- 
gling for  American  recognition,  my  sense  of  the  value  of 


VI  PREFACE. 

which,  in  connection  with  the  railroad  system,  to  both 
the  traveling  and  general  public,  I  could  not  easily  over- 
state. These  appliances  are  the  MILLER  PLATFORM  and 
BUFFER,  the  WESTINGHOUSE  BRAKE,  and  the  INTER- 
LOCKING and  ELECTRIC  SIGNAL  SYSTEMS.  To  bring 
these  into  more  general  use  through  reports  on  railroad 
accidents  as  they  occurred  was  one  great  aim  with  me 
thoughout  my  official  life.  I  am  now  not  without  hopes 
that  the  printing  of  this  volume  may  tend  to  still  further 
familiarize  the  public  with  these  inventions,  and  thus 
hasten  their  more  general  adoption. 

C.  F.  A.  JR. 
Quincy^  October  i,  1879. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER.  PAGE. 

I  THE  DEATH  OF  MR.  HUSKISSON        .         .         3 

II  THE  ANGOLA  AND  SHIPTON  ACCIDENTS    .       12 

III  THE  WOLLASTON  ACCIDENT         .  .  .          2O 

IV  ACCIDENTS.  AND  CONSERVATISM         .         .       27 
V  TELESCOPING  AND  THE  MILLER  PLATFORM      43 

VI  THE  VERSAILLES  ACCIDENT       ...       58 

VII  TELEGRAPHIC  COLLISIONS          ...      66 

VIII  OIL-TANK  ACCIDENTS        .        .        .        .72 

IX  DRAW-BRIDGE  DISASTERS          ...      82 

X  THE  NORWALK  ACCIDENT          ...      89 

XI    BRIDGE  ACCIDENTS 98 

XII  THE  PROTECTION  OF  BRIDGES     .            .            .Ill 

XIII  CAR-COUPLINGS  IN  DERAILMENTS      .        .117 

XIV  THE  REVERE  CATASTROPHE      .        .        .125 
XV  REAR-END  COLLISIONS       .        .        .        .144 


iv 


CONTENTS. 


XVI     NOVEL  APPLIANCES 153 

XVII       THE  AUTOMATIC  ELECTRIC    BLOCK  SYSTEM  159 

XVIII     INTERLOCKING 182 

XIX     THE  WESTINGHOUSE  BRAKE       .         .         .  199 

XX       THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  BRAKES       .             .             .  2l6 

XXI       THE     RAILROAD     JOURNEY    RESULTING    IN 

DEATH 230 

XXII       THE  RAILROAD  DEATH-RATE       .           .  .             .  241 

XXIII     AMERICAN  AS  COMPARED   WITH  FOREIGN 

RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS             .            .            .  250 


NOTES 


O  N 


RAILROAD    ACCIDENTS 


IT  is  a  melancholy  fact  that  there  are  few  things 
of  which  either  nature  or  man  is,  as  a  rule,  more 
lavish  than  human  life; — provided  always  that  the 
methods  used  in  extinguishing  it  are  customary  and 
not  unduly  obtrusive  on  the  sight  and  nerves.  As 
a  necessary  consequence  of  this  wastefulness,  it  fol- 
lows also  that  the  results  which  ordinarily  flow 
from  the  extinguishment  of  the  individual  life  are 
pitiably  small.  Any  person  curious  to  satisfy  him- 
self as  to  the  truth  of  either  or  both  of  these  propo- 
sitions can  do  so  easily  enough  by  visiting  those 
frequent  haunts  in  which  poverty  and  typhoid  lurk 
in  company ;  or  yet  more  easily  by  a  careful  study 
of  the  weekly  bills  of  mortality  of  any  great  city. 
Indeed,  compared  with  the  massive  battalions  daily 
sacrificed  in  the  perpetual  conflict  which  mankind 
seems  forever  doomed  to  wage  against  intemperance, 
bad  sewerage  and  worse  ventilation,  the  victims  of 
regular  warfare  by  sea  and  land  count  as  but  single 
spies.  The  worst  of  it  is,  too,  that  if  the  blood  of  the 
martyrs  thus  profusely  spilled  is  at  all  the  seed  of 


2  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

the  church,  it  is  a  seed  terribly  slow  of  germination. 
Each  step  in  the  slow  progress  is  a  Golgotha. 

In  the  case  of  railroad  disasters,  however,  a  striking 
exception  is  afforded  to  this  rule.  The  victims  of 
these,  at  least,  do  not  lose  their  lives'without  great 
and  immediate  compensating  benefits  to  mankind. 
After  each  new  "  horror,"  as  it  is  called,  the  whole 
world  travels  with  an  appreciable  increase  of  safety. 
Both  by  public  opinion  and  the  courts  of"  law  the 
companies  are  held  to  a  most  rigid  responsibility. 
The  causes  which  led  to  the  disaster  are  anxiously 
investigated  by  ingenious  men,  new  appliances  are 
invented,  new  precautions  are  imposed,  a  greater 
and  more  watchful  care  is  inculcated.  And  hence 
it  has  resulted  that  each  year,  and  in  obvious  con- 
sequence of  each  fresh  catastrophe,  travel  by  rail  has 
become  safer  and  safer,  until  it  has  been  said,  and 
with  no  inconsiderable  degree  of  truth  too,  that  the 
very  safest  place  into  which  a  man  can  put  himself 
is  the  inside  of  a  first-class  railroad  carriage  on  a 
train  in  full  motion. 

The  study  of  railroad  accidents  is,  therefore,  the 
furthest  possible  from  being  a  useless  one,  and  a 
record  of  them  is  hardly  less  instructive  than  inter- 
esting. If  carried  too  far  it  is  apt,  as  matter  for 
light  reading,  to  become  somewhat  monotonous ; 
though,  none  the  less,  about  these,  as  about  every- 
thing else,  there  is  an  almost  endless  variety.  Even  in 
the  forms  of  sudden  death  on  the  rail,  nature  seems 
to  take  a  grim  delight  in  an  infinitude  of  surprises. 


SEPTEMBER   15,   1830. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE   DEATH    OF   MR.    HUSKISSON. 

WITH  a  true  dramatic  propriety,  the  ghastly 
record,  which  has  since  grown  so  long,  began  with 
the  opening  of  the  first  railroad, — literally  on  the 
very  morning  which  finally  ushered  the  great 
system  into  existence  as  a  successfully  accom- 
plished fact,  the  eventful  i$th  of  September,  1830, 
— the  day  upon  which  the  Manchester  &  Liverpool 
railroad  was  formally  opened.  That  opening  was 
a  great  affair.  A  brilliant  party,  consisting  of  the 
directors  of  the  new  enterprise  and  their  invited 
guests,  was  to  pass  over  the  road  from  Liverpool 
to  Manchester,  dine  at  the  latter  place  '  and  re- 
turn to  Liverpool  in  the  afternoon.  Their  num- 
ber was  large  and  they  filled  eight  trains  of  car- 
riages, drawn  by  as  many  locomotives.  The  Duke 
of  Wellington,  then  prime  minister,  was  the  most 
prominent  personage  there,  and  he  with  his  party 
occupied  the  state  car,  which  was  drawn  by  the  lo- 


4  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

comotive  Northumbrian,  upon  which  George  Ste- 
phenson  himself  that  day  officiated  as  engineer. 
The  road  was  laid  with  double  tracks,  and  the  eight 
trains  proceeded  in  two  parallel  columns,  running 
side  by  side  and  then  again  passing  or  falling 
behind  each  other.  The  Duke's  train  gaily  led  the 
race,  while  in  a  car  of  one  of  the  succeeding  trains 
was  Mr.  William  Huskisson,  then  a  member  of  Par- 
liament for  Liverpool  and  eminent  among  the  more 
prominent  public  men  of  the  day  as  a  financier  and 
economist.  He  had  been  very  active  in  promoting 
the  construction  of  the  Manchester  &  Liverpool 
road,  and  now  that  it  was  completed  he  had  exert- 
ed himself  greatly  to  make  its  opening  a  success 
worthy  an  enterprise  the  far-reaching  consequences 
of  which  he  was  among  the  few  to  appreciate.  All 
the  trains  had  started  promptly  from  Liverpool,  and 
had  proceeded  through  a  continued  ovation  until  at 
eleven  o'clock  they  had  reached  Parkside,  seventeen 
miles  upon  their  journey,  where  it  had  been  arrang- 
ed that  the  locomotives  were  to  replenish  their  sup- 
plies of  water.  As  soon  as  the  trains  had  stopped, 
disregarding  every  caution  against  their  so  doing, 
the  excited  and  joyous  passengers  left  their  car- 
riages and  mingled  together,  eagerly  congratulating 
one  another  upon  the  unalloyed  success  of  the  oc- 
casion. Mr.  Huskisson,  though  in  poor  health  and 
somewhat  lame,  was  one  of  the  most  excited  of  the 
throng,  and  among  the  first  to  thus  expose  himself. 
Presently  he  caught  the  eye  of  the  Duke  of  Welling- 


THE  DUKE  AND  MR.  HUSKISSON.  5 

ton,  standing  at  the  door  of  his  carriage.     Now  it  so 
happened  that  for  some  time  previous  a  coolness  had 
existed  between  the  two  public  men,  the  Duke  hav- 
ing as  premier,  with  the  military  curtness  for  which 
he  was  famed,  dismissed    Mr.   Huskisson  from  the 
cabinet  of  which  he  had  been  a  member,  without,  as 
was  generally  considered,  any  sufficient  cause,  and 
in  much  the  same  way  that  he  might  have  sent  to 
the   right-about  some  member  of    his  staff   whose 
performance  of  his  duty  was  not  satisfactory  to  him. 
There  had  in  fact  been  a  most  noticeable  absence 
of  courtesy  in  that  ministerial  crisis.     The  two  now 
met  face  to  face  for  the  first  time  since  the  breach 
between  them  had  taken  place,  and  the  Duke's  man- 
ner evinced  a  disposition  to  be  conciliatory,  which 
was  by  no   means   usual  with  that  austere  soldier. 
Mr.  Huskisson  at  once  responded  to  the  overture, 
and,  going  up  to  the  door  of  the  state  carriage,  he 
and  his  former  chief  shook  hands  and  then  entered 
into  conversation.     As  they  were  talking,  the  Duke 
seated   in  his  car  and  Mr.  Huskisson  standing  be- 
tween the  tracks,  the  Rocket  locomotive — the  same 
famous  Rocket  which  a  year  previous  had  won  the 
five  hundred  pounds  prize,  and  by  so  doing  estab- 
lished forever  the  feasibility  of  rapid  steam  locomo- 
tion— came  along  upon  the  other  track  to  take  its 
,  place  at  the  watering  station.     It  came  up  slowly 
and  so  silently  that  its  approach  was  hardly  noticed  ; 
until,  suddenly,  an  alarm  was  given,  and,  as  every 
one  immediately  ran  to  resume  his  place,  some  com- 


P  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

motion  naturally  ensued.  In  addition  to  being 
lame,  Mr.  Huskisson  seemed  also  under  these  cir- 
cumstances to  be  quite  agitated,  and,  instead  of 
quietly  standing  against  the  side  of  the  carnage  and 
allowing  the  Rocket  to  pass,  he  nervously  tried  to 
get  around  the  open  carriage  door,  which  was  swing- 
ing out  across  the  space  between  the  two  tracks  in 
such  a  way  that  the  approaching  locomotive  struck 
it,  flinging  it  back  and  at  the  same  time  throwing 
Mr.  Huskisson  down.  He  fell  on  his  face  in  the 
open  space  between  the  tracks,  but  with  his  left  leg 
over  the  inner  of  the  two  rails  upon  which  the 
Rocket  was  moving,  so  that  one  of  its  wheels  ran 
obliquely  up  the  limb  to  the  thigh,  crushing  it 
shockingly.  As  if  to  render  the  distressing  circum- 
stances of  the  catastrophe  complete,  it  so  happened 
that  the  unfortunate  man  had  left  his  wife's  side 
when  he  got  out  of  his  carriage,  and  now  he  had  been 
flung  down  before  her  eyes  as  he  sought  to  reenter 
it.  He  was  immediately  raised,  but  he  knew  that 
his  hurt  was  mortal  and  his  first  exclamation  was, 
"  I  have  met  my  death !  "  He  was  at  once  placed 
on  one  of  the  state  carriages,  to  which  the  North- 
umbrian locomotive  was  attached,  and  in  twenty-five 
minutes  was  carried  to  Eccles,  a  distance  of  seven- 
teen miles,  where  medical  assistance  was  obtained. 
He  was  far  beyond  its  reach,  however,  and  upon 
the  evening  of  the  same  day,  before  his  companions 
of  the  morning  had  completed  their  journey,  he  was 
dead.  Some  time  after  this  accident  a  great  public 


BRO  UGH  AM  A  T  LIVERPOOL.  7 

dinner  was  given  at  Liverpool  in  honor  of  the  new 
enterprise.  Brougham  was  then  at  the  height  of  an 
unbounded  popularity  and  just  taking  the  fatal  step 
of  his  life,  which  led  him  out  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons to  the  wool-sack  and  the  Lords.  Among  the 
excursionists  of  the  opening  day  he  had  on  the 
i6th,  occasion  to  write  a  brief  note  to  Macvey 
Napier,  editor  of  the  Edingburgh  Review,  in  which  he 
thus  alluded  to  the  fatal  accident  which  had  marred 
its  pleasure  : — "  I  have  come  to  Liverpool  only  to 
see  a  tragedy.  Poor  Huskisson  is  dead,  or  must  die 
before  to-morrow.  He  has  been  killed  by  a  steam 
carriage.  The  folly  of  seven  hundred  people  going 
fifteen  miles  an  hour,  in  six  carriages,  exceeds  belief. 
But  they  have  paid  a  dear  price."  He  was  one 
of  the  guests  at  the  subsequent  dinner,  and  made  a 
speech  in  which  there  was  one  passage  of  such  ex- 
quisite oratorical  skill,  that  to  read  it  is  still  a  pleas- 
ure. In  it  he  at  once  referred  to  the  wonders  of  the 
system  just  inaugurated,  and  to  the  catastrophe 
which  had  saddened  its  opening  observances. 
"  When/'  he  said,  "  I  saw  the  difficulties  of  space, 
as  it  were,  overcome;  when  I  beheld  a  kind  of 
miracle  exhibited  before  my  astonished  eyes  ;  when 
I  saw  the  rocks  excavated  and  the  gigantic  power 
of  man  penetrating  through  miles  of  the  solid  mass, 
and  gaining  a  great,  a  lasting,  an  almost  perennial 
conquest  over  the  powers  of  nature  by  his  skill  and 
industry ;  when  I  contemplated  all  this,  was  it  pos- 
sible for  me  to  avoid  the  reflections  which  crowded 


8  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

into  my  mind,  not  in  praise  of  man's  great  success, 
not  in  admiration  of  the  genius  and  perseverance 
he  had  displayed,  or  even  of  the  courage  he  had 
shown  in  setting  himself  against  the  obstacles  that 
matter  afforded  to  his  course — no !  but  the  melan- 
choly reflection,  that  these  prodigious  efforts  of  the 
human  race,  so  fruitful  of  praise  but  so  much  more 
fruitful  of  lasting  blessings  to  mankind,  have  forced 
a  tear  from  my  eye  by  that  unhappy  casualty  which 
deprived  me  of  a  friend  and  you  of  a  represen- 
tative ! " 

Though  wholly  attributable  to  his  own  careless, 
ness,  the  death  of  so  prominent  a  character  as  Mr. 
Huskisson,  on  such  an  occasion,  could  not  but  make 
a  deep  impression  on  the  public  mind.  The  fact 
that  the  dying  man  was  carried  seventeen  miles  in 
twenty-five  minutes  in  search  of  rest  and  medical 
aid,  served  rather  to  stimulate  the  vague  apprehen- 
sion which  thereafter  for  a  time  associated  itself  with 
the  new  means  of  transportation,  and  converted  it 
into  a  dangerous  method  of  carriage  which  called 
for  Ho  inconsiderable  display  of  nerve  on  the  part  of 
those  using  it.  Indeed,  as  respects  the  safety  of 
travel  by  rail  there  is  an  edifying  similarity  between 
the  impressions  which  prevailed  in  England  forty- 
five  years  ago  and  those  which  prevail  in  China  now ; 
for,  when  as  recently  as  1875  ft  was  proposed  to  in- 
troduce railroads  into  the  Celestial  Empire,  a  vigor- 
ous native  protest  was  fulminated  against  them,  in 
which,  among  other  things  scarcely  less  astounding, 


THE  PERIOD  OF  IMMUNITY.  9 

it  was  alleged  that  "  in  all  countries  where  railroads 
exist  they  are  considered  a  very  dangerous  mode  of 
locomotion,  and,  beyond  those  who  have  very  urgent 
business  to  transact,  no  one  thinks  of  using  them." 

On  this  subject,  however,  of  the  dangers  incident 
to  journeys  by  rail,  a  writer  of  nearly  half  a  century 
back,  who  has  left  us  one  of  the  earliest  descriptions 
of  the  Manchester  &  Liverpool  road,  thus  reassured 
the  public  of  those  days,  with  a  fresh  quaintness  of 
style  which  lends  a  present  value  to  his  words : 
"  The  occurrence  of  accidents  is  not  so  frequent  as 
might  be  imagined,  as  the  great  weight  of  the  car- 
riages "  (they  weighed  about  one-tenth  part  as  much 
as  those  now  in  use  in  America)  "  prevents  them 
from  easily  starting  off  the  rails  ;  and  so  great  is  the 
momentum  acquired  by  these  heavy  loads  moving 
with  such  rapidity,  that  they  easily  pass  over  con- 
siderable obstacles.  Even  in  those  melancholy  acci- 
dents where  loss  of  life  has  been  sustained,  the 
bodies  of  the  unfortunate  sufferers,  though  run  over 
by  the  wheels,  have  caused  little  irregularity  in  the 
motion,  and  the  passengers  in  the  carriages  have  not 
been  sensible  that  any  impediment  has  been  encoun- 
tered on  the  road." 

Indeed,  from  the  time  of  Mr.  Huskisson's  death, 
during  a  period  of  over  eleven  years,  railroads  en- 
joyed a  remarkable  and  most  fortunate  exemption 
from  accidents.  During  all  that  time  there  did  not 
occur  a  single  disaster  resulting  in  any  considerable 
loss  of  life ;  an  immunity  which  seems  to  have  been 


10  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

due  to  a  variety  of  causes.  Those  early  roads  were, 
in  the  first  place,  remarkably  well  and  thoroughly 
built,  and  were  very  cautiously  operated  under  a 
light  volume  of  traffic.  The  precautions  then  taken 
and  the  appliances  in  use  would,  it  is  true,  strike  the 
modern  railroad  superintendent  as  both  primitive 
and  comical ;  for  instance,  they  involved  the  running 
of  independent  pilot  locomotives  in  advance  of  all 
night  passenger  trains.  Through  all  the  years  be- 
tween 1830  and  1841,  nevertheless,  not  a  single  really 
serious  railroad  disaster  had  to  be  recorded.  This 
happy  exemption  was,  however,  quite  as  much  due 
to  good  fortune  as  to  anything  else,  as  was  well  il- 
lustrated in  the  first  accident  at  all  serious  in  its 
character,  which  occurred, — an  accident  in  its  every 
circumstance,  except  loss  of  life,  almost  an  exact 
parallel  to  the  famous  Revere  disaster  which  hap- 
pened nearly  forty  years  later  in  Massachusetts.  It 
chanced  on  the  Manchester  &  Liverpool  Railway  on 
December  23,  1832.  The  second-class  morning  train 
had  stopped  at  the  Rainhill  station  to  take  in  pas- 
sengers, when  those  upon  it  heard  through  the  dense 
fog  another  train,  which  had  left  Manchester  forty- 
five  minutes  later;  coming  towards  them  at  a  high 
rate  of  speed.  When  it  first  became  visible  it  was 
but  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  off,  and  a  collision 
was  inevitable.  Those  in  charge  of  the  stationary 
train,  however,  succeeded  in  getting  it  under  a  slight 
headway,  and  in  so  much  diminished  the  shock  of 
the  collision  ;  but,  notwithstanding,  the  last  five  car- 
riages  were  injured,  the  one  at  the  end  being  totally 


LUCK.  II 

demolished.  Though  quite  a  number  of  the  passen- 
gers were  cut  and  bruised,  and  several  were  severely 
hurt,  one  only,  strange  to  say,  was  killed. 

Indeed,  the  luck — for  it  was  nothing  else — of  those 
earlier  times  was  truly  amazing.  Thus  on  this  same 
Manchester  &  Liverpool  road,  as  a  first-class  train 
on  the  morning  of  April  17,  1836,  was  moving  at  a 
speed  of  some  thirty  miles  an  hour,  an  axle  broke 
under  the  first  passenger  coach,  causing  the  whole 
train  to  leave  the  track  and  throwing  it  down  the 
embankment,  which  at  that  point  was  twenty  feet 
high.  The  cars  were  rolled  over,  and  the  passen- 
gers in  them  tumbled  about  topsy-turvey ;  nor,  as 
they  were  securely  locked  in,  could  they  even  ex- 
tricate themselves  when  at  last  the  wreck  of  the 
train  reached  firm  bearings.  And  yet  no  one  was 
killed.  Here  the  corporation  was  saved  by  one 
chance  in  a  thousand,  and  its  almost  miraculous  good 
fortune  has  since  received  numerous  and  terrible 
illustrations.  Among  these  two  are  worthy  of  a 
more  than  passing  mention.  They  happened  one  in 
America  and  one  in  England,  though  with  some  in- 
terval of  time  between  them,  and  are  curious  as  il- 
lustrating very  forcibly  the  peculiar  dangers  to  which 
those  travelling  by  rail  in  the  two  countries  are  sub- 
jected under  almost  precisely  similar  circumstances. 
The  American  accident  referred  to  was  that  popu- 
larly known  on  account  of  its  exceptionally  harrow- 
ing details  as  the  "Angola  horror,"  of  December  18, 
1867,  while  the  English  accident  was  that  which  oc- 
curred at  Shipton-on-Cherwell  on  December  24, 1874. 


12  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE    ANGOLA    AND    SHIPTON    ACCIDENTS. 

On  the  day  of  the  Angola  accident  the  eastern 
bound  express  train  over  the  Lake  Shore  road, 
as  it  was  then  called,  consisted  of  a  locomotive, 
four  baggage,  express  and  mail  cars,  an  emigrant 
and  three  first-class  passenger  coaches.  It  was 
timed  to  pass  Angola,  a  small  way  station  in  the 
extreme  western  part  of  New  York,  at  1.30  P.M., 
without  stopping ;  but  on  the  day  in  question  it  was 
two  hours  and  forty-five  minutes  late,  and  was  con- 
sequently running  rapidly.  A  third  of  a  mile  east 
of  the  station  there  is  a  shallow  stream,  known  as 
Big  Sister  creek,  flowing  in  the  bottom  of  a  ravine 
the  western  side  of  which  rises  abruptly  to  the  level 
of  the  track,  while  on  the  eastern  side  there  is  a 
gradual  ascent  of  some  forty  or  fifty  rods.  This 
ravine  was  spanned  by  a  deck  bridge  of  160  feet  in 
length,  at  the  east  end  of  which  was  an  abutment 
of  mason  work  some  fifty  feet  long  connecting  with 


"  THE  ANGOLA  HORROR"  13 

an  embankment  beyond.  It  subsequently  appeared 
that  the  forward  axle  in  the  rear  truck  of  the  rear 
car  was  slightly  bent.  The  defect  was  not  percep- 
tible to  the  eye,  but  in  turning  round  the  space  be- 
tween the  flanges  of  the  wheels  of  that  axle  varied 
by  three-fourths  of  an  inch.  As  long  as  the  car  was 
travelling  on  an  unbroken  track,  or  as  long  as  the 
wheels  did  not  strike  any  break  in  the  track  at  their 
narrowest  point,  this  slight  bend  in  the  axle  was  of 
no  consequence.  There  was  a  frog  in  the  track, 
however,  at  a  distance  of  600  feet  east  of  the  An- 
gola station,  and  it  so  happened  that  a  wheel  of  the 
defective  axle  struck  this  frog  in  such  a  way  as  to 
make  it  jump  the  track.  The  rear  car  was  instantly 
derailed.  From  the  frog  to  the  bridge  was  some 
1 200  feet.  With  the  appliances  then  in  use  the 
train  could  not  be  stopped  in  this  space,  and  the 
car  was  dragged  along  over  the  ties,  swaying  vio- 
lently from  side  to  side.  Just  before  the  bridge 
was  reached  the  car  next  to  the  last  was  also  thrown 
from  the  track,  and  in  this  way,  and  still  moving  at 
considerable  speed,  the  train  went  onto  the  bridge. 
It  was  nearly  across  when  the  last  car  toppled  off 
and  fell  on  the  north  side  close  to  the  abutment. 
The  car  next  to  the  rear,  more  fortunate,  was 
dragged  some  270  feet  further,  so  that  when  it 
broke  loose  it  simply  slid  some  thirty  feet  down 
the  embankment.  Though  this  car  was  badly 
wrecked,  but  a  single  person  in  it  was  killed.  His 
death  was  a  very  singular  one.  Before  the  car 


14  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

separated  from  the  train,  its  roof  broke  in  two  trans- 
versely ;  through  the  fissure  thus  made  this  unfor- 
tunate passenger  was  partly  flung,  and  it  then  in- 
stantly closed  upon  him. 

The  other  car  had  fallen  fifty  feet,  and  remained 
resting  on  its  side  against  the  abutment  with  one 
end  inclined  sharply  downward.  It  was  mid-winter 
and  cold,  and,  as  was  the  custom  then,  the  car  was 
heated  by  two  iron  stoves,  placed  one  at  each  end, 
in  which  wood  was  burned.  It  was  nearly  full  of 
passengers.  Naturally  they  all  sprang  from  their 
seats  in  terror  and  confusion  as  their  car  left  the 
rails,  so  that  when  it  fell  from  the  bridge  and  vio- 
lently struck  on  one  of  its  ends,  they  were  precipi- 
tated in  an  inextricable  mass  upon  one  of  the  over- 
turned stoves,  while  the  other  fell  upon  them  from 
above.  A  position  more  horrible  could  hardly  be 
imagined.  Few,  if  any,  were  probably  killed  out- 
right. Some  probably  were  suffocated  ;  the  great- 
est number  were  undoubtedly  burned  to  death.  Of 
those  in  that  car  three  only  escaped ;  forty-one  are 
supposed  to  have  perished. 

This  was  a  case  of  derailment  aggravated  by  fire. 
It  is  safe  to  say  that  with  the  improved  appliances 
since  brought  into  use,  it  would  be  most  unlikely  to 
now  occur  under  precisely  the  same  circumstances 
on  any  well-equipped  or  carefully  operated  road. 
Derailments,  of  course,  by  broken  axles  or  wheels 
are  always  possible,  but  the  catastrophe  at  Angola 
was  primarily  due  to  the  utter  inability  of  those  on 


THE  STOVE  PERIL.  1 5 

the  train  to  stop  it,  or  even  greatly  to  check  its  speed 
within  any  reasonable  distance.  Before  it  finally 
stood  still  the  locomotive  was  half  a  mile  from  the 
frog  and  1,500  feet  from  the  bridge.  Thus,  when  the 
rear  cars  were  off  the  track,  the  speed  and  distance 
they  were  dragged  gave  them  a  lateral  and  violently 
swinging  motion,  which  led  to  the  final  result. 
Though  under  simila  ^circumstances  now  this  might 
not  happen,  there  is  no  reason  why,  circumstances 
being  varied  a  little,  the  country  should  not  again 
during  any  winter  day  be  shocked  by  another  Angola 
sacrifice.  Certainly,  so  far  as  the  danger  from  fire  is 
concerned,  it  is  an  alarming  fact  that  it  is  hardly  less 
in  1879  than  it  was  in  1867.  This  accumulative 
horror  is,  too,  one  of  the  distinctive  features  of 
American  railroad  accidents.  In  other  countries 
holocausts  like  those  at  Versailles  in  1842  and  at 
Abergele  in  1868  have  from  time  to  time  taken  place. 
They  are,  however,  occasioned  in  other  ways,  and,  as 
their  occurrence  is  not  regularly  challenged  by  the 
most  risky  possible  of  interior  heating  apparatus, 
are  comparatively  infrequent.  The  passenger  coaches 
used  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic,  with  their  light 
wood-work  heavily  covered  with  paint  and  varnish, 
are  at  best  but  tinder-boxes.  The  presence  in  them 
of  stoves,  hardly  fastened  to  the  floor  and  filled  with 
burning  wood  and  coal,  involves  a  degree  of  risk 
which  no  one  would  believe  ever  could  willingly  be 
incurred,  but  for  the  fact  that  it  is.  No  invention 
yet  appears  to  have  wholly  met  the  requirements  of 


1 6  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

the  case.  That  they  will  be  met,  and  the  fearful 
possibility  which  now  hangs  over  the  head  of  every 
traveller  by  rail,  that  he  may  suddenly  find  himself 
doomed  without  possibility  of  escape  to  be  roasted 
alive,  will  be  at  least  greatly  reduced  hardly  admits 
of  question. 

Turning  now  from  the  American  to  the  English 
accident,  it  is  singular  to  note  how  under  very  similar 
circumstances  much  the  same  fatality  resulted  from 
wholly  different  causes.  It  happened  on  the  day 
immediately  preceding  Christmas,  and  every  train 
which  at  that  holiday  season  leaves  London  is 
densely  packed,  for  all  England  seems  then  to  gather 
away  from  its  cities  to  the  country  hearths.  Ac- 
cordingly, the  ten  o'clock  London  express  on  the 
Great  Western  Railway,  when  it  left  Oxford  that 
morning,  was  made  up  of  no  less  than  fifteen  passen- 
ger carriages  and  baggage  vans,  drawn  by  two  power- 
ful locomotives  and  containing  nearly  three  hundred 
passengers.  About  seven  miles  north  of  Oxford,  as 
the  train,  moving  at  a  speed  of  some  thirty  to  forty 
miles  an  hour,  was  rounding  a  gentle  curve  in  the  ap- 
proach to  the  bridge  over  the  little  river  Cherwell,  the 
tire  of  one  of  the  wheels  of  the  passenger  coach  next 
behind  the  locomotive  broke,  throwing  it  off  the  track. 
For  a  short  distance  it  was  dragged  along  in  its 
place ;  but  almost  immediately  those  in  charge  of 
the  locomotives  noticed  that  someting  was  wrong, 
and,  most  naturally  and  with  the  very  best  of  in- 
tensions, .they  instantly  did  the  very  worst  thing 


SHIP  TON-ON-CHER  WELL.  1 7 

which  under  the  circumstances  it  was  in  their  power 
to  do, — they  applied  their  brakes  and  reversed  their 
engines ;  their  single  thought  was  to  stop  the  train. 
With  the  train  equipped  as  it  was,  however,  had 
these  men,  instead  of  crowding  on  their  brakes  and 
reversing  their  engines,  simply  shut  off  their  steam 
and  by  a  gentle  application  of  the  brakes  checked 
the  speed  gradually  and  so  as  to  avoid  any  strain  on 
the  couplings,  the  carriages  would  probably  have  held 
together  and  remained  upon  the  road-bed.  Instead 
of  this,  however,  the  sudden  checking  of  the  two 
ponderous  locomotives  converted  them  into  an  anvil, 
as  it  were,  upon  which  the  unfortunate  leading  car- 
riage already  off  the  rails  was  crushed  under  the 
weight  and  impetus  of  those  behind  it.  The  train  in- 
stantly zig-zagged  in  every  direction  under  the  press- 
ure, the  couplings  which  connected  it  together  snap- 
ping, and  the  carriages,  after  leaving  the  rails  to  the 
right  and  left  and  running  down  the  embankment  of 
about  thirteen  feet  in  height,  came  to  a  stand-still  at 
last,  several  of  them  in  the  reverse  order  from  that 
which  they  had  held  while  in  the  train.  The  first 
carriage  was  run  over  and  completely  destroyed ; 
the  five  rear  ones  were  left  alone  upon  the  road-bed, 
and  of  these  two  only  were  on  the  rails ;  of  the  ten 
which  went  down  the  embankment,  two  were  de- 
molished. In  this  disaster  thirty-four  passengers 
lost  their  lives, -and  sixty-five  others,  besides  four 
employes  of  the  company,  were  injured. 

At  the  time  it  occurred  the  Shipton  accident  was 


1 8  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

the  subject  of  a  good  deal  of  discussion,  and  both  the 
brake  system  and  method  of  car  construction  in  use 
on  English  roads  were  sharply  criticised.  It  was 
argued,  and  apparently  with  much  reason,  that  had 
the  "  locomotives  and  cars  been  equipped  with  the 
continuous  train-brakes  so  generally  in  use  in  America, 
the  action  of  the  engine  drivers  would  have  checked 
at  the  same  instant  the  speed  of  each  particular  car, 
and  probably  any  serious  accident  would  have  been 
averted."  Yet  it  required  another  disaster,  not  so 
fatal  as  that  at  Shipton-on-Cherwell  but  yet  suffi- 
ciently so,  to  demonstrate  that  this  was  true  only  in 
a  limited  degree, — to  further  illustrate  and  enforce 
the  apparently  obvious  principle  that,  no  matter 
how  heavy  the  construction  may  be,  or  what  train- 
brake  is  in  use,  to  insure  safety  the  proportion  be- 
tween the  resisting  strength  of  car  construction  and 
the  train-weight  momentum  to  which  it  may  be  sub- 
jected must  be  carefully  preserved. 

On  this  point  of  the  resisting  power  of  modern 
car  construction,  indeed,  it  seemed  as  if  a  result  had 
been  reached  which  did  away  with  the  danger  of 
longitudinal  crushing.  Between  1873  and  1878  a 
series  of  accidents  had  occurred  on  the  American 
roads  of  which  little  was  heard  at  the  time  for  the 
simple  reason  that  they  involved  no  loss  of  life, — 
they  belonged  in  the  great  category  of  possible 
disasters  which  might  have  happened,  had  they  not 
been  prevented.  Trains  going  in  opposite  direct- 
ions and  at  full  speed  had  come  in  collision 


MOMENTUM  vs.  RESISTING  STRENGTH.         19 

while  rounding  curves ;  trains  had  run  into  earth- 
slides,  and  had  been  suddenly  stopped  by  derail- 
ment ;  in  every  such  case,  however,  the  Westinghouse 
brake  and  the  Miller  car  construction  had,  when  in 
use,  proved  equal  to  the  emergency  and  the  passen- 
gers on  the  trains  had  escaped  uninjured.  The 
American  mechanic  had  accordingly  grown  firm  in 
his  belief  that,  so  far  as  any  danger  from  the  crush- 
ing of  cars  was  concerned, — unless  indeed  they  were 
violently  thrown  down  an  embankment  or  precipita- 
ted into  an  abyss, — the  necessary  resisting  strength 
had  been  secured  and  the  problem  practically  solved. 
That  such  was  not  the  case  in  America  in  1878  any 
more  than  in  England  in  1875,  except  within  cer- 
trin  somewhat  narrow  limits,  was^  unexpectedly 
proven  by  a  disaster  which  occurred  at  Wollaston 
near  Boston,  on  the  Old  Colony  road,  upon  the 
evening  of  October  8,  1878. 


20  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE    WOLLASTON    ACCIDENT. 

A  LARGE  party  of  excursionists  were  returning  from 
a  rowing  match  on  a  special  train  consisting  of  two 
locomotives  and  twenty-one  cars.  There  had  been 
great  delay  in  getting  ready  for  the  return,  so  that 
when  it  neared  Wollaston  the  special  was  much  be- 
hind the  time  assigned  for  it.  Meanwhile  a  regular 
freight  train  had  left  Boston,  going  south  and  occu- 
pying the  outward  track.  At  Wollaston  those  in 
charge  of  this  train  had  occasion  to  stop  for  the 
purpose  of  taking  up  some  empty  freight  cars,  which 
were  standing  on  a  siding  at  that  place;  and  to 
reach  this  siding  it  was  necessary  for  them  to  cross 
the  inward  track,  temporarily  disconnecting  it. 
The  freight  train  happened  to  be  short-handed, 
and  both  its  conductor  and  engineer  supposed  that 
the  special  had  reached  Boston  before  they  had 
started  out.  Accordingly,  in  direct  violation  of  the 
rules  of  the  road  and  with  a  negligence  which  ad- 


RUNNING   THE  RISK.  21 

mitted  of  no  excuse,  they  disconnected  the  inward 
track  in  both  directions  and  proceeded  to  occupy 
it  in  the  work  of  shunting,  without  sending  out 
any  signals  or  taking  any  precautions  to  protect 
themselves  or  any  incoming  train.  It  was  after 
dark,  and,  though  the  switches  were  supplied  with 
danger  signals,  these  were  obscured  by  the  glare  of 
the  locomotive  head-light.  Under  these  circum- 
stances the  special  neared  the  spot.  What  ensued 
was  a  curious  illustration  of  those  narrow  escapes 
through  which,  by  means  of  improved  appliances  or 
by  good  luck,  railroad  accidents  do  not  happen ;  and 
an  equally  curious  illustration  of  those  trifling  de- 
rangements which  now  and  again  bring  them  about. 
In  this  case  there  was  no  collision,  though  a  freight- 
train  was  occupying  the  inward  track  in  front  of  the 
special.  There  should  have  been  no -derailment, 
though  the  track  was  broken  at  two  points.  There 
would  have  been  no  accident,  had  there  been  no  at- 
tempt made  to  avert  one.  Seeing  the  head-light  of 
the  approaching  special,  while  yet  it  was  half  a  mile 
off,  the  engineer  of  the  freight  train  realizing  the 
danger  had  put  on  all  steam,  and  succeeded,  though 
by  a  very  narrow  margin,  in  getting  his  locomotive 
and  all  the  cars  attached  to  it  off  of  the  inward 
track  and  onto  the  outward,  out  of  the  way  of  the 
special.  The  inward  track  was  thus  clear,  though 
broken  at  two  points.  The  switches  at  those  points 
were,  however,  of  the  safety  pattern,  and,  if  they  were 
left  alone  and  did  their  work,  the  special  would 


22  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

simply  leave  the  main  track  and  pass  into  the 
siding,  and  there  be  stopped.  Unfortunately  the 
switches  were  not  left  alone.  The  conductor  of  the 
freight  train  had  caught  sight  of  the  head-light  of 
the  approaching  locomotive  at  about  the  same  time 
as  the  engineer  of  that  train.  He  seems  at  once  to 
have  realized  the  possible  consequences  of  his  reck- 
less neglect  of  precautions,  and  his  one  thought  was 
to  do  something  to  avert  the  impending  disaster. 
In  a  sort  of  dazed  condition,  he  sprang  from  the 
freight  car  on  which  he  was  standing  and  ran  to  the 
lever  of  the  siding  switch,  which  he  hastened  to 
throw.  He  apparently  did  not  have  time  enough 
within  perhaps  five  seconds.  Had  he  succeeded  in 
throwing  it,  the  train  would  have  gone  on  to  Boston, 
those  upon  it  simply  knowing  from  the  jar  they  had 
received  in  passing  over  the  first  frog  that  a  switch 
had  been  set  wrong.  Had  he  left  it  alone,  the  special 
would  have  passed  into  the  siding  and  there  been 
stopped.  As  it  was,  the  locomotive  of  the  special 
struck  the  castings  of  the  switch  just  when  it  was 
half  thrown — at  the  second  when  it  was  set  neither 
the  one  way  nor  the  other — and  the  wreck  followed. 
It  was  literally  the  turning  of  a  hand. 

As  it  approached  the  point  where  the  disaster 
occurred  the  special  train  was  running  at  a  moderate 
rate  of  speed,  not  probably  exceeding  twenty  miles 
an  hour.  The  engineer  of  its  leading  locomotive  also 
perceived  his  danger  in  time  to  signal  it  and  to  reverse 
his  engine  while  yet  700  feet  from  the  point  where 


NOT  THE  A  UTQMA  TIC  BRAKE.  2$ 

derailment  took  place.  The  train-brake  was  neces- 
sarily under  the  control  of  the  engineer  of  the 
second  locomotive,  but  the  danger  signal  was  im- 
mediately obeyed  by  him,  his  locomotive  reversed 
and  the  brake  applied.  The  train  was,  however, 
equipped  with  the  ordinary  Westinghouse,  and  not 
the  improved  automatic  or  self-acting  brake  of  that 
name.  That  is,  it  depended  for  its  efficiency  on  the 
perfectness  of  its  parts,  and,  in  case  the  connecting 
tubes  were  broken  or  the  valves  deranged,  the  brake- 
blocks  did  not  close  upon  the  wheels,  as  they  do 
under  the  later  improvements  made  by  Westing- 
house  in  his  patents,  but  at  best  remained  only  par- 
tially set,  or  in  such  positions  as  they  were  when 
the  parts  of  the  brake  were  broken.  As  is  perfectly 
well  understood,  the  original  Westinghouse  does 
not  work  quickly  or  effectively  through  more  than  a 
.certain  number  of  cars.  Twelve  is  generally  re- 
garded as  the  limit  of  practical  simultaneous  action. 
The  700  feet  of  interval  between  the  point  where 
the  brakes  were  applied  and  that  where  the  accident 
occurred, — a  distance  which,  at  the  rate  at  which 
the  train  was  moving,  it  could  hardly  have  passed 
over  in  less  than  twenty-two  seconds, — should  have 
afforded  an  ample  space  within  which  to  stop  the 
train.  When  the  derailment  took  place,  however, 
it  was  still  moving  at  a  considerable  rate  of  speed. 
Both  locomotives,  the  baggage  car  and  six  follow- 
ing passenger  cars  left  the  rails.  The  locomotives, 
after  going  a  short  distance,  swung  off  to  the  left 


24  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

and  toppled  over,  presenting  an  insuperable  barrier 
to  the  direct  movement  of  the  cars  following. 

Those  cars  were  of  the  most  approved  form  of 
American  construction,  but  here,  as  at  Shipton,  the 
violent  application  of  the  train-brakes  and  reversal 
of  the  locomotives  had  greatly  checked  the  speed 
of  the  forward  part  of  the  train,  while  the  whole 
rear  of  it,  comparatively  free  from  brake  pressure, 
was  crowding  heavily  forward.  Including  its  living 
freight,  the  entire  weight  of  the  train  could  not 
have  been  less  than  500  tons.  There  was  no  slack 
between  its  parts  ;  no  opportunity  to  give.  It  was 
a  simple  question  of  the  resisting  power  of  car 
construction.  Had  the  train  consisted  of  ten  cars 
instead  of  twenty-two  a  recent  experience  of  a  not 
dissimilar  accident  on  this  very  road  affords  sufficient 
evidence  of  how  different  the  result  would  have 
been.  On  the  occasion  referred  to, — October  13, 
1876, — a  train  consisting  of  two  locomotives  and 
fourteen  cars,  while  rounding  a  curve  before  the 
Randolph  station  at  a  speed  of  thirty  miles  an  hour 
came  in  sudden  collision  with  the  locomotive  of  a 
freight  train  which  was  occupying  the  track,  and 
while  doing  so,  in  that  case  also  as  at  Wollaston, 
had  wholly  neglected  to  protect  it.  So  short  was 
the  notice  of  danger  that  the  speed  of  the  passenger 
train  could  not  at  the  moment  of  collision  have 
been  less  than  twenty  miles  an  hour.  The  freight 
train  was  at  the  moment  fortunately  backing,  but 
none  the  less  it  was  an  impassable  obstacle.  The 


HAMMER  AND  ANVIL.  2$ 

three  locomotives  were  entirely  thrown  from  the 
track  and  more  or  less  broken  up,  and  three  cars  of 
the  passenger  train  followed  them,  but  the  rest  of  it 
remained  in  line  and  on  the  rails,  and  was  so  entirely 
uninjured  that  it  was  not  found  necessary  to  with- 
draw one  of  the  cars  from  service  for  even  a  single 
trip.  Mot  a  passenger  was  hurt.  This  train  con- 
sisted of  fourteen  cars :  but  at  Wollaston,  the  four- 
teen forward  cars  were,  after  the  head  of  the  train 
was  derailed,  driven  onward  not  only  by  their 
own  momentum  but  also  by  the  almost  unchecked 
momentum  of  eight  other  cars  behind  them.  The 
rear  of  the  train  did  not  leave  the  rails  and  was  free- 
ly moving  along  them.  By  itself  it  must  have 
weighed  over  200  tons.  The  result  was  inevitable. 
Something  had  to  yield  ;  and  the  six  forward  cars 
were  accordingly  either  thrown  wholly  to  the  one 
side  or  the  other,  or  crushed  between  the  two  loco- 
motives and  the  rear  of  the  train.  Two  of  them  in 
fact  were  reduced  into  a  mere  mass  of  fragments. 
The  disaster  resulted  in  the  death  of  19  persons, 
while  a  much  greater  number  were  injured,  more 
than  50  seriously.  In  this  as  in  most  other  railroad 
disasters  the  surprising  thing  was  that  the  list  of 
casualties  was  not  larger.  Looking  at  the  position 
of  the  two  cars  crushed  into  fragments  it  seemed  al- 
most impossible  that  any  person  in  them  could  have 
escaped  alive.  Indeed  that  they  did  so  was  largely 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  season  for  car-warming  had 
not  yet  arrived,  while,  in  some  way  impossible  to 


26  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

explain,  all  four  of  the  men  in  charge  of  the  locomo- 
tives, though  flung  violently  through  the  air  into  the 
trees  and  ditch  at  the  side  of  the  road  were  neither 
stunned  nor  seriously  injured.  They  were  conse- 
quently able,  as  soon  as  they  could  gather  them- 
selves up,  to  take  the  measures  necessary  to  ex- 
tinguish the  fires  in  their  locomotives  which  other- 
wise would  speedly  have  spread  to  the  ctibris  of  the 
train.  Had  they  not  done  so  nothing  could  have 
saved  the  large  number  of  passengers  confined  in  the 
shattered  cars. 


OF   THF, 


THE  EMPHASIS  OF  DEATH. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

ACCIDENTS   AND    CONSERVATISM. 

THE  four  accidents  which  have  been  referred  to, 
including  that  of  April  17, 1836,  upon  the  Manchester 
&  Liverpool  road,  belong  to  one  class.  Though  they 
covered  a  period  of  forty-two  years  they  were  all 
due  to  the  same  cause,  the  sudden  derailment  of  a 
portion  of  the  train,  and  its  subsequent  destruction 
because  of  the  insufficient  control  of  those  in  charge 
of  it  over  its  momentum.  In  the  three  earlier  cases 
the  appliances  in  use  were  much  the  $ame,  for  be- 
tween 1836  and  1874  hardly  any  improvement  as  re- 
spects brakes  had  either  forced  its  own  way,  or  been 
forced  by  the  government,  into  general  acceptance 
in  Great  Britain.  The  Wollaston  disaster,  on  the 
other  hand,  revealed  a  weak  point  in  an  improved 
appliance ;  the  old  danger  seemed,  indeed,  to  take  a 
sort  of  pleasure  in  baffling  human  ingenuity.  The 
Shipton  accident,  however,  while  one  of  the  most 
fatal  which  ever  occurred  was  also  one  of  the  most 


RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

fruitful  in  results.  This,  and  the  accident  of  April 
17,  1836,  upon  the  Manchester  &  Liverpool  road 
were  almost  precisely  similar,  though  no  less  than 
thirty-eight  years  intervened  between  them.  In  the 
case  of  the  first,  however,  no  one  was  killed  and 
consequently  it  was  wholly  barren  of  results;  for 
experience  has  shown  that  to  bring  about  any  con- 
siderable reform,  railroad  disasters  have,  as  it  were, 
to  be  emphasized  by  loss  of  life.  This,  however, 
implies  nothing  more  than  the  assertion  that  those 
responsible  for  the  management  of  railroads  do  not 
differ  from  other  men, — that  they  are  apt,  after  some 
hair-breadth  escape,  to  bless  their  fortunate  stars  for 
the  present  good  rather  than  to  take  anxious  heed 
for  future  dangers. 

At  the  time  the  Shipton  accident  occurred  the 
success  of  the  modern  train-brake,  which  places  the 
speed  of  each  of  the  component  parts  of  the  train 
under  the  direct  and  instantaneous  control  of  him 
who  is  in  charge  of  the  locomotive,  had  for  years 
been  conceded  even  by  the  least  progressive  of 
American  jg:^-oad  managers.  The  want  of  such  a 
brake  and  th*e  absence  of  proper  means  of  commu- 
nication between  the  parts  of  the  train  had  directly 
and  obviously  caused  the  murderous  destructiveness 
of  the  accident.  Yet  in  the  investigation  which  en- 
sued it  appeared  that  the  authorities  of  the  Great 
Western  Railway,  being  eminently  "  practical  men," 
still  entertained  as  respected  the.  train-brake  "  very 
grave  doubts  of  the  wisdom  of  adopting  [it]  at 


BRITISH  CONSER  VA  TISM.  29 

all ;  "  while  at  the  same  time,  as  respected  a  means 
of  communication  between  the  parts  of  the  train,  it 
appeared  that  the  associated  general  managers  of 
the  leading  railways  "  did  not  think  that  any  [such] 
means  of  communication  was  at  all  required,  or 
likely  to  be  useful  or  successful." 

Though  quite  incomprehensible,  there  is  at  the 
same  time  something  superb  in  such  an  exhibition 
of  stolid  conservatism.  It  is  British.  It  is,  however, 
open  to  but  one  description  of  argument,  the  -ultima 
raltkvi  railroad  logic.  So  long  as  luck  averted  the 
loss  of  life  in  railroad  disasters,  no  occasion  would 
ever  have  been  seen  for  disturbing  time-honored 
precautions  or  antiquated  appliances.  Wriile,  how 
ever,  a  disaster  like  that  of  December  24,  1874, 
might  not  convince,  it  did  compel :  in  spite  of  pro- 
fessed "  grave  doubts,"  incredulity  and  conservatism 
vanished,  silenced,  at  least,  in  presence  of  so  frightful 
a  row  of  corpses  as  on  that  morning  made  ghastly 
the  banks  of  the  Cherwell.  The  general,  though 
painfully  slow  and  reluctant,  introduction  of  train- 
brakes  upon  the  railways  of  Great  Britain  may  be 
said  to  have  dated  from  that  event. 

In  the  matter  of  communication  between  those  in 
the  train  and  those  in  charge  of  it,  the  Shipton  corp- 
ses chanced  not  to  be  witnesses  to  the  precise  point. 
Accordingly  their  evidence  was,  so  to  speak,  ruled 
out  of  the  case,  and  neither  the  utility  nor  the  suc- 
cess of  any  appliance  for  this  purpose  was  held  to  be 
yet  proven.  What  further  proof  would  be  deemed 


30  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

conclusive  did  not  appear,  but  the  history  of  the 
discussion  before  and  since  is  not  without  value. 
There  is,  indeed,  something  almost  ludicrously  char- 
acteristic in  the  manner  with  which  those  interested 
in  the  railway  management  of  Great  Britain  strain 
at  their  gnats  while  they  swallow  their  camels.  They 
have  grappled  with  the  great  question  of  city  travel 
with  a  superb  financial  and  engineering  sagacity, 
which  has  left  all  other  communities  hopelessly  dis- 
tanced ;  but,  while  carrying  their  passengers  under 
and  over  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  Thames  and 
among  the  chimney  pots  of  densest  London  to  leave 
them  on  the  very  steps  of  the  Royal  Exchange,  they 
have  never  been  able  to  devise  any  satisfactory 
means  for  putting  the  traveller,  in  case  of  a  disaster 
to  the  carriage  in  which  he  happens  to  be,  in  com- 
munication with  the  engine-driver  of  his  train.  An 
English  substitute  for  the  American  bell-cord  has 
for  more  than  thirty  years  set  the  ingenuity  of 
Great  Britain  at  defiance. 

As  long  ago  as  the  year  1857,  m  consequence  of 
two  accidents  to  trains  by  fires,  a  circular  on  this  sub- 
ject was  issued  to  the  railway  companies  by  the 
Board  of  Trade,  in  which  it  was  stated  that  "  from 
the  beginning  of  the  year  1854,  down  to  the  present 
time  (December,  1857)  there  have  been  twenty-six 
cases  in  which  either  the  accidents  themselves  or 
some  of  the  ulterior  consequences  of  the  accidents 
would  probably  have  been  avoided  had  such  a  means 


THE  BELL-CORD.  31 

of  communication  existed."  *  As  none  of  these  acci- 
dents had  resulted  in  any  considerable  number  of 
funerals  the  railway  managers  wholly  failed  to  see 
the  propriety  of  this  circular,  or  the  necessity  of  tak- 
ing any  steps  in  consequence  of  it.  As,  however, 
accidents  from  this  cause  were  still  reported,  and 
with  increasing  frequency,  the  authorities  in  July, 
1864,  again  bestirred  themselves  and  issued  another 
circular  in  which  it  was  stated  that  "  several  instan- 
ces have  occurred  of  carriages  having  taken  fire,  or 
having  been  thrown  off  the  rails,  the  passengers  in 
which  had  no  means  of  making  their  perilous  situa- 
tion known  to  the  servants  of  the  company  in 
charge  of  the  train.  Recent  occurrences  also  of  a 
criminal  nature  in  passenger  railway  trains  have  ex- 
cited among  the  public  a  very  general  feeling  of 
alarm."  The  last  reference  was  more  particularly  to 
the  memorable  Briggs  murder,  which  had  taken 
place  only  a  few  days  before  on  July  Qth,  and  was 
then  absorbing  the  public  attention  to  the  almost 
entire  exclusion  of  everything  else. 

*  The  bell-cord  in  America,  notwithstanding  the  theoretical  objec- 
tions which  have  been  urged  to  its  adoption  in  other  countries,  has 
proved  such  a  simple  and  perfect  protection  against  dangers  from  in- 
ability to  communicate  between  portions  of  trains  that  accidents  from 
this  cause  do  not  enter  into  the  consideration  of  American  railroad 
managers.  Yet  they  do,  now  and  again,  occur.  For  instance,  on 
February  28,  1874,  a  passenger  coach  in  a  west-bound  accommodation 
train  of  the  Great  Western  railroad  of  Canada  took  fire  from  the  fall- 
ing of  a  lamp  in  the  closet  at  its  forward  end.  The  bell-cord  was 
for  some  reason  not  connected  with  the  locomotive,  and  the  train 
ran  two  miles  before  it  could  be  stopped.  The  coach  in  question  was 
entirely  destroyed  and  eight  passengers  were  either  burned  or  suffo- 
cated, while  no  less  than  thirteen  others  sustained  injuries  in  jump- 
ing from  the  train. 


32  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

As  no  better  illustration  than  this  can  be  found  of 
the  extreme  slowness  with  which  the  necessity  for 
new  railroad  appliances  is  recognized  in  cases  where 
profit  is  not  involved,  and  of  the  value  of  wholesale 
slaughters,  like  those  at  Shipton  and  Angola,  as  a 
species  of  motive  force  in  the  direction  of  progress,  a 
digression  on  the  subject  of  English  accidents  due  to 
the  absence  of  bell-cords  may  be  not  without  value. 
In  the  opinion  of  the  railway  managers  the  cases 
referred  to  by  the  Board  of  Trade  officials  failed  to 
show  the  existence  of  any  necessity  for  providing 
means  of  communication  between  portions  of  the 
train.  A  detailed  statement  of  a  few  of  the  cases 
thus  referred  to  will  not  only  be  found  interesting 
in  itself,  but  it  will  give  some  idea  of  the  description 
of  evidence  which  is  considered  insufficient.  The 
circumstances  of  the  Briggs  murder,  deeply  interest- 
ing as  they  were,  are  too  long  for  incidental  state- 
ment ;  this,  however,  is  not  the  case  with  some  of 
the  other  occurrences.  For  instance,  the  Board  of 
Trade  circular  was  issued  on  July  3Oth  ;  on  July  /th, 
a  year  earlier,  the  following  took  place  on  the  Lon- 
don &  North  Western  road. 

Two  gentlemen  took  their  seats  at  Liverpool  in 
one  of  the  compartments  of  the  express  train  to 
London.  In  it  they  found  already  seated  an  elderly 
lady  and  a  large,  powerfully  built  man,  apparently 
Irish,  respectably  dressed,  but  with  a  lowering,  sus- 
picious visage.  Though  one  of  the  two  gentlemen 
noticed  this  peculiarity  as  he  entered  the  carriage, 


A  STRUGGLE  FOR  LIFE.  33 

he  gave  no  thought  to  it,  but,  going  on  with  their 
conversation,  he  and  his  friend  took  their  seats,  and 
in  a  few  moments  the  train  started.  Scarcely  was  it 
out  of  the  station  when  the  stranger  changed  his 
seat,  placing  himself  on  the  other  side  of  the  car- 
riage, close  to  the  window,  and  at  the  same  time,  in 
a  menacing  way,  incoherently  muttering  something 
to  himself.  The  other  passengers  looked  at  him, 
but  felt  no  particular  alarm,  and  for  a  time  he  re- 
mained quietly  in  his  seat.  He  then  suddenly  sprang 
up,  and,  with  a  large  clasp-knife  in  his  hand,  rushed 
at  one  of  the  gentlemen,  a  Mr.  Warland  by  n&me, 
and  struck  him  on  the  fopehead,  the  knife  sliding 
along  the  bone  and  inflicting  a  frightful  flesh  wound. 
As  he  was  in  the  act  of  repeating  the  blow,  Warland's 
companion  thrust  him  back  upon  the  seat.  This 
seemed  to  infuriate  him,  and  starting  to  his  feet  he 
again  tried  to  attack  the  wounded  man.  A  frightful 
struggle  ensued.  It  was  a  struggle  for  life,  in  a  nar- 
row compartment  feebly  lighted,  for  it  was  late  at 
night,  on  a  train  running  at  full  speed  and  with  no 
stopping  place  for  eighty  miles.  The  passengel:  who 
had  not  been  hurt  clutched  the 'maniac  by  the  throat 
with  one  hand  and  grasped  his  knife  with  the  other, 
but  only  to  feel  the  blade  drawn  through  his  fingers, 
cutting  them  to  the  bone.  The  unfortunate  elderly 
woman,  the  remaining  occupant  of  the  compartment, 
after  screaming  violently  in  her  terror  for  a  few  mo- 
ments, fainted  away  and  fell  upon  the  floor.  The 
struggle  nevertheless  went  on  among  the  three  men, 


34  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

until  at  last,  though  blinded  with  blood  and  weak 
from  its  loss,  the  wounded  Mr.  Warland  got  behind 
his  assailant  and  threw  him  down,  in  which  posi- 
tion the  two  succeeded  in  holding  him,  he  striking 
and  stabbing  at  both  of  them  with  his  knife,  shout- 
ing loudly  all  the  time,  and  desperately  endeavoring 
to  rise  and  throw  them  off.  They  finally,  'how- 
ever, got  his  knife  away  from  him,  and  then  kept 
him  down  until  the  train  at  last  drew  up  at  Cam- 
dentovfh  station.  When  the  ticket  collector  open- 
ed the  compartment  door  at  that  place  he  found 
the- four  passengers  on  the  floor,  the  woman  sense- 
less and  two  of  the  men  holding  the  third,  while 
the  faces  and  clothing  of  all  of  them,  together 
with  seats,  floor,  windows  and  sides  of  the  carriage 
were  covered  with  blood  or  smeared  with  finger 
marks. 

The  assailant  in  this  case,  as  it  subsequently  ap- 
peared upon  his  commitment  for  an  assault,  was 
a  schoolmaster  who  had  come  over  from  Ireland 
to  a  competitive  examination.  He  was  insane,  of 
course,  but  before  the  magistrate  he  made  a  state- 
ment which  had  in  it  something  quite  touching ; 
he  said  that  he  saw  the  two  gentlemen  talking 
together,  and,  as  he  thought,  making  motions  to 
wards  him  ;  he  believed  them  to  be  thieves  who 
intended  to  rob  him,  and  so  he  thought  that  he 
could  not  do  better  than  defend  himself,  "  if  only 
for  his  dear  little  ones  at  home." 

This  took  place  before  the  Board  of  Trade  circular 


ASSAULTS  AND  INDECENCIES.  35 

was  issued,  but,  as  if  to  give  emphasis  to  it,  a  few 
days  only  after  its  issue,  in  August,  1864,  there  was 
a  not  dissimilar  occurrence  in  a  third  class  carriage 
between  London  and  Peterborough.  The  running 
distance  was  in  this  case  eighty  miles  without  a  stop, 
and  occupied  generally  an  hour  and  fifty  minutes, — 
the  rate  being  iorty-three  miles  an  hour.  In  the 
compartment  in  question  were  five  passengers,  one 
of  whom,  a  tall  powerful  fellow,  was  dressed  like  a 
sailor.  The  train  was  hardly  out -of  London  when 
this  man,  after  searching  his  pockets  for  a  moment, 
cried  out  that  he  had  been  robbed  of  his  purse  con- 
taining £17,  and  began  violently  to  shout  and  ges- 
ticulate. He  then  tried  to  clamber  through  the  win- 
dow, getting  his  body  and  one  leg  out,  and  when  his 
fellow  passengers,  catching  hold  of  his  other  leg,  suc- 
ceeded in  hauling  him  back,  he  turned  savagely  upon 
them  and  a  desperate  struggle  ensued.  At  last  he 
was  gotten  down  by  main  force  and  bound  to  a  seat. 
Meanwhile,  notwithstanding  the  speed  at  which  they 
were  running,  the  noise  of  the  struggle  was  heard  in 
the  adjoining  compartments,  and  almost  frantic 
efforts  were  made  to  stop  the  train.  Word  was 
passed  from  carriage  to  carriage  for  a  short  distance, 
but  it  proved  impossible  to  communicate  with  the 
guard,  or  to  do  anything  but  thoroughly  alarm  the 
passengers.  These  merely  knew  that  something  was 
the  matter, — what,  they  could  only  imagine, — and 
so  the  run  to  Peterborough  was  completed  amid 
shouts  of  "  stop  the  train,"  interspersed  with  frantic 


36  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

female  shrieks.     The  man  was  suffering  from  delir- 
ium tremens. 

About  a  year  later,  in  December,  186$,  a  similar 
case  occurred  which,  however,  had  in  it  strong  ele- 
ments of  the  ludicrous.  A  clergyman,  laboring 
under  great  indignation  and  excitement,  and  with- 
out the  slightest  sense  of  the  ridiculous,  recounted 
his  experience  in  a  communication  to  the  Times. 
He  had  found  himself  alone  in  a  compartment  of  an 
express  train  in  which  were  also  a  young  lady  and  a 
man,  both  total  strangers  to  him.  Shortly  after  the 
train  started  the  man  began  to  give  unmistakable 
indications  of  something  wrong.  He  made  no 
attempt  at  any  violence  on  either  of  his  fellow  pas-- 
sengers,  but  he  was  noisy,  and  presently  he  proceeded 
to  disrobe  himself  and  otherwise  to  indulge  in  antics 
which  were  even  more  indecent  than  they  were  ex- 
traordinary. The  poor  clergyman, — a  respected  in- 
cumbent of  the  established  church  returning  to  the 
bosom  of  his  family, —  was  in  a  most  distressing 
situation.  At  first  he  attempted  remonstrance. 
This,  however,  proved  worse  than  unavailing,  and 
there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  have  recourse  to  his 
umbrella,  behind  the  sheltering  cover  of  which  he 
protected  the  modesty  of  the  young  lady,  while 
over  its  edges  he  himself  from  time  to  time  effected 
observations  through  an  apparently  interminable 
journey  of  forty  and  more  miles. 

These  and  numerous  other  cases  of  fires,  murders, 
assaults  and  indecencies  had  occurred  and  filled  the 


A  BURGLAR'S  PLUNGE.  37 

columns  of  the  newspapers,  without  producing  the 
slightest  effect  on  the  managers  of  the  railway  com- 
panies. No  attention  was  paid  by  them  to  the 
Board  of  Trade  circulars.  At  last  Parliament  took 
the  matter  up  and  in  1868  an  act  was  passed,  making 
compulsory  some  "  efficient  means  of  communication 
between  the  passenger  and  the  servants  of  the  com- 
pany in  charge  "  of  railroad  trains.  Yet  when  six 
years  later  in  1874  the  Shipton  accident  occurred, 
and  was  thought  to  be  in  some  degree  attributable 
to  the  absence  of  the  very  means  of  communication 
thus  made  compulsory,  it  appeared,  as  has  been  seen, 
that  the  associated  general  managers  did.  not  yet 
consider  any  such  means  of  communication  either 
required  or  likely  to  be  useful. 

Meanwhile,  as  if  in  ironical  comment  on  such 
measured  utterances,  occurrences  like  the  following, 
which  took  place  as  recently  as  the  early  part  of 
1878,  from  time  to  time  still  meet  the  eye  in  the 
columns  of  the  English  press : — 

"  A  burglar  was  being  taken  in  a  third-class  carriage 
from  London  to  Sheffield.  When  about  twelve  miles 
from  Sheffield  he  asked  that  the  windows  might  be 
opened.  This  was  no  sooner  done  than  he  took  a  dive 
out  through  the  aperture.  One  of  the  warders  succeeded 
in  catching  him  by  a  foot,  and  for  two  miles  he  hung  head 
downward  suspended  by  one  foot  and  making  terrific 
struggles  to  free  himself.  In  vain  he  wriggled,  for  al- 
though his  captors  were  unable  to  catch  the  other  foot, 
both  held  him  as  in  a  vise.  But  he  wore  spring-sided 
boots,  and  the  one  on  which  his  fate  seemingly  depended 
came  off.  The  burglar  fell  heavily  on  the  foot-board  of 


38  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

the  carriage  and  rolled  off  on  the  railway.  Three  miles 
further  on  the  train  stopped,  and  the  warders  went  back 
to  the  scene  of  the  escape.  Here  they  found  him  in  the 
snow  bleeding  from  a  wound  on  the  head.  During  the 
time  he  was  struggling  with  the  warders  the  warder  who 
had  one  hand  free  and  the  passengers  of  the  other  com- 
partments who  were  witnessing  the  scene  from  the  windows 
of  the  train  were  indefatigable  in  their  efforts  tq  attract 
the  attention  of  the  guards  by  means  of  the  communica- 
tion cord,  but  with  no  result.  For  two  miles  the  unfortu- 
nate man  hung  head  downward,  and  for  three  miles  further 
the  train  ran  until  it  stopped  at  an  ordinary  resting  place." 

A  single  further  example  will  more  than  sufficient- 
ly illustrate  this  instance  of  British  railroad  conserva- 
tism, and  indicate  the  tremendous  nature  of  the 
pressure  which  has  been  required  to  even  partially 
force  the  American  bell-cord  into  use  in  that  coun- 
try. One  day,  in  the  latter  part  of  1876,  a  Mr.  A.  J. 
Ellis  of  Liverpool  had  occasion  to  go  to  Chester. 
On  his  way  there  he  had  an  experience  with  a  lunatic, 
which  he  subsequently  recounted  before  a  magistrate 
as  follows : — 

"On  Friday  last  I  took  the  10.35  A.M.,  train  from  Lime 
Street  in  a  third-class  carriage,  my  destination  being 
Chester.  At  Edge  Hill  Station  the  prisoner  and  another 
man,  whom  I  afterward  understood  to  be  the  prisoner's 
father,  got  into  the  same  compartment,  no  one  else  being 
in  the  same  compartment.  The  other  person  was  much 
under  the  influence  of  drink  when  he  entered,  and  was 
very  noisy  during  the  journey.  The  prisoner  had  the  ap- 
pearance of  having  been  drinking,  but  was  quiet.  I  sat 
with  my  back  to  the  engine,  on  the  getting-out  side  of  the 
carriage  ;  prisoner  was  sitting  on  the  opposite  side,  with 
his  right  arm  to  the  window,  and  the  other  person  was 


A  RIDE   WITH  A  MANIA  C.  39 

sitting  on  the  same  side  as  prisoner,  about  the  middle  of 
the  seat.  I  was  engaged  reading,  and  did  not  exchange 
words  with  the  prisoner. 

"  After  we  had  passed  over  Runcorn  bridge  and  through 
the  station,  I  perceived  -the  prisoner  make  a  start,  and 
looking  toward  him  saw  a  white-hatted  knife  in  his  hand, 
about  five  inches  long,  with  the  blade  open.  He  held  it 
in  his  right  hand  in  a  menacing  manner.  Drawing  his 
left  hand  along  the  edge  of  the  blade,  he  said,  "  This  will 

have  to  go  into  some ."     At  that  moment  he  looked 

at  me  across  the  carriage  ;  he  was  on  his  feet  in  an  instant, 

and  looking  across  to  me,  he  said,   "  You ,  this  will 

have  to  go  into  you,"  and  made  a  bound  toward  me.  The 
other  jumped  up  and  tried  to  prevent  him.  The  prisoner 
threw  him  away  ;  he  made  a  plunge  at  my  throat.  I 
caught  his  wrist  just  as  he  advanced,  and  struggled  with 
him,  still  holding  fast  to  his  wrist  with  both  hands.  We 
fell  over  and  under  one  another  two  or  three  times,  and 
eventually  he  overpowered  me.  I  had  fallen  on  my  side 
on  the  seat,  but  still  retained  my  hold  upon  his  wrist. 
While  lying  in  that  position  he  held  the  knife  down  to 
within  an  inch  of  my  throat.  I  called  to  the  other  man 
to  hold  the  prisoner's  hand  back  which  contained  the 
knife,  and  by  that  means  he  saved  my  life.  I  was  growing 
powerless,  and  as  the  other  man  restrained  the  prisoner 
from  using  the  knife,  I  jerked  myself  from  his  grasp,  and 
knocked  the  knife  out  of  the  prisoner's  hand  with  my  left 
hand. 

"  The  prisoner  eluded  the  grip  of  his  father,  and  falling 
on  his  knees  began  to  seek  for  his  knife.  Failing  to  find 
the  knife,  he  was  instantly  on  his  feet,  and  made  a  spring 
upon  me.  If  I  recollect  aright,  he  threw  his  arms  around 
my  neck,  and  in  this  manner  we  struggled  together  up 
and  down  the  carriage  for  some  minutes,  during  which 
time  he  got  my  left  thumb  (with  a  glove  on  at  the  time) 
in  his  mouth,  and  bit  it.  Still  retaining  my  thumb  in  his 
mouth,  the  other  man  struck  him  under  the  chin,  when  he 
released  it,  and  fell  on  his  knees  seeking  the  knife,  which 


OF   THE 

CTNIVERSTTV 


40  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

he  did  not  find.  He  was  immediately  on  his  feet,  and 
again  made  a  spring  upon  me.  We  had  then  a  very  long 
and  desperate  struggle,  when  he  overpowered  me  and 
pinned  me  in  a  corner  of  the  compartment.  At  last  he 
got  my  right  thumb  into  his  mouth,  holding  my  hand  to 
steady  it  with  both  his  hands  while  he  bit  it.  With  a 
great  effort  he  then  bit  my  thumb  off,  clean  to  the  bone. 
I  had  no  glove  on  that  hand.  I  called  to  the  other  man 
to  help  me,  but  he  seemed  stupefied.  He  called  two  or 
three  times  to  the  prisoner,  '  Leave  the  poor  man  alone. 
The  poor  man  has  done  thee  no  harm.'  Though  sitting 
within  nine  inches  of  my  knees  he  rendered  me  no  help. 

"  When  the  prisoner  bit  my  thumb  off,  he  held  it  in  his 
mouth  ;  he  pushed  his  head  through  the  glass,  spat  the 
thumb  into  his  hand  and  flung  it  out  through  the  window. 
I  then  stood  up  and  put  my  left  hand  in  my  pocket,  took 
out  my  purse  and  cried  out :  '  If  it  is  money  you  want 
take  all  I  have.'  He  made  a  grab  at  the  purse  and  flung 
it  through  the  window,  on  the  same  side  as  the  thumb 
was  thrown  out.  From  this  act  I  inferred  that  I  was  strug- 
gling with  a  maniac.  I  retreated  to  the  other  end  of  the 
compartment,  holding  the  other  man  between  me  and  the 
prisoner,  but  he  passed  the  other  man  by  jumping  over 
the  seat  and  again  got  hold  of  me.  Then  he  forced  his 
head  through  the  other  window,  breaking  the  glass,  and, 
loosing  me  for  a  moment,  with  his  fists  smashed  the  re- 
maining glass  in  the  window.  Addressing  me  he  said  : 

'  You ,  you  will  have  to  go  over  ;  '  at  the  same  time 

he  flung  both  his  arms  around  my  waist.  I  put  my  leg 
behind  his  and  threw  him  on  his  back.  I  called  upon  the 
other  man  to  help  me  and  he  did  so. 

"  We  held  him  down  for  some  time,  but  he  overpowered 
us  and  flung  us  back  some  distance.  He  then  laid  hold 
of  my  travelling  rug  and  threw  it  through  the  window. 
Laying  his  hand  on  the  bottom  of  the  window  he  cried 
out,  'Here  goes,'  and  made  a'leap  through  the  window. 
I  and  the  other  man  instantly  laid  hold  of  his  legs  as  he 


THE  MOTE  AND    THE  BEAM.  41 

was  falling  over.  I  got  my  four  fingers  into  his  right 
shoe,  and,  his  father  assisting  me,  we  held  him  through 
the  window,  hanging  head  downward  for  about  half  a 
mile.  I  then  fainted,  and  as  I  was  losing  my  hold  on  his 
heels  I  have  some  faint  recollection  that  the  prisoner's 
father  lost  his  hold  at  the  same  time,  and  I  can't  say 
what  happened  afterward.  As  I  was  coming  to  myself 
the  train  was  stopping,  and  I  heard  the  other  man  say, 
'Oh,  my  son,  my  son.'  When  the  train  stopped  I  walked 
from  the  carriage  to  the  station,  and  Dr.  Robinson,  who 
was  sent  for,  came  in  about  an  hour  and  amputated  my 
thumb  further  back." 

While  thus  referring,  however,  to  this  instance  of 
British  railroad  conservatism,  which  with  a  stolid 
indifference  seems  to  ignore  the  teachings  of  every 
day  life  and  to  meet  constantly  recurring  experi- 
ence with  a  calm  defiance,  it  will  not  do  for  the 
American  railroad  manager  to  pride  himself  too 
much  on  his  own  greater  ingenuity  and  more  amen- 
able disposition.  The  Angola  disaster  has  been  re- 
ferred to,  as  well  as  that  at  Shipton.  If  the  absence 
of  the  bell-cord  had  indeed  any  part  in  the  fatality  of 
the  latter,  the  presence  in  cars  crowded  with  passen- 
gers of  iron  pots  full  of  living  fire  lent  horrors  before 
almost  unheard  of  to  the  former.  The  methods  of 
accomplishing  needed  results  which  are  usual  to  any 
people  are  never  easily  changed,  whether  in  Europe 
or  in  America;  but  certainly  the  disasters  which 
have  first  and  last  ensued  from  the  failure  to  devise 
any  safe  means  of  heating  passenger  coaches  in  this 
country  are  out  of  all  proportion  to  those  which  can 
be  attributed  in  England  to  the  absence  of  means  of 


42  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

communication  between  the  passengers  on  trains  and 
those  in  charge  of  them.  There  is  an  American 
conservatism  as  well  as  an  English  ;  and  when  it 
comes  to  a  question  of  running  risks  it  would  be 
strange  indeed  if  the  greater  margin  of  security  were 
found  west  of  the  Atlantic.  The  security  afforded 
by  the  bell-cord  assuredly  has  not  as  yet  in  this 
country  off-set  the  danger  incident  to  red-hot  stoves. 


THE  FIRST  CA  TA  STROPHE.  43 


,        CHAPTER  V. 

TELESCOPING    AND    THE    MILLER   PLATFORM. 

THE  period  of  exemption  from  wholesale  railroad 
slaughters  referred  to  in  a  previous  chapter  and 
which  fortunately  marked  the  early  days  of  the 
system,  seems  to  have  lasted  some  eleven  years. 
The  record  of  great  catastrophes  opened  on  the 
Great  Western  railway  of  England,  and  it  opened 
also,  curiously  enough,  upon  the  24th  of  Decem- 
ber, a  day  which  seems  to  have  been  peculiarly  un- 
fortunate in  the  annals  of  that  corporation,  seeing 
that  it  was  likewise  the  date  of  the  Shipton-on- 
Cherwell  disaster.  Upon  that  day,  in  1841,  a  train, 
while  moving  through  a  thick  fog  at  a  high  rate  of 
speed,  came  suddenly  in  contact  with  a  mass  of 
earth  that  had  slid  down  upon  the  track  from  the 
slope  of  the  cutting.  Instantly  the  whole  rear  of 
the  train  was  piled  up  on  the  top  of  the  first  car- 
riage, which  happened  to  be  crowded  with  passen- 
gers, eight  of  whom  were  killed  on  the  spot  while 


44     .  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

seventeen  others  were  more  or  less  injured.  The 
coroner's  jury  returned  a  verdict  of  accidental  death, 
and  at  the  same  time,  as  if  to  give  the  corporation 
a  forcible  hint  to  look  closer  to  the  condition  of  its 
roadway,  a  "  deodand  "  of  one  hundred  pounds  was 
levied  on  the  locomotive  and  tender.  This  practice, 
by  the  way,  of  levying  a  deodand  in  cases  of  rail- 
road accidents  resulting  in  loss  of  life,  affords  a  cu- 
rious illustration  of  how  seldom  those  accidents 
must  have  occurred.  The  mere  mention  of  it  now 
as  ever  having  existed  sounds  almost  as  strange  and 
unreal  as  would  an  assertion  that  the  corporations 
had  in  their  earlier  days  been  wont  to  settle  their 
differences  by  wager  of  battle.  Like  the  wager  of 
battle,  the  deodand  was  a  feature  of  the  English 
common  law  derived  from  the  feudal  period.  It  was 
nothing  more  nor  less  than  a  species  of  fine,  every- 
thing through  the  instrumentality  of  which  accidental 
death  occurred  being  forfeited  to  the  crown :  or,  in 
lieu  of  the  thing  itself,  its  supposed  money  value  as 
assessed  by  a  coroner's  jury.*  Accordingly,  down  to 
somewhere  about  the  year  1847,  when  the  practice 
was  finally  abolished  by  act  of  Parliament,  we  find 

*  "  Deodand.  By  this  is  meant  whatever  personal  chattel  is  the 
immediate  occasion  of  the  death  of  any  reasonable  creature  :  which  is 
forfeited  to  the  king,  to  be  applied  to  pious  uses,  and  distributed  in 
alms  by  his  high  almoner  ;  though  formerly  destined  to  a  more  su- 
perstitious purpose.  *  *  *  Wherever  the  thing  is  in  motion,  not 
only  that  part  which  immediately  gives  the  wounds  (as  the  wheel 
which  runs  over  his  body,)  but  all  things  which  move  with  it  and  help 
to  make  the  wound  more  dangerous,  (as  the  cart  and  loading,  which 
increase  the  pressure  of  the  wheel)  are  forfeited." — Blackstone,  Book 
I,  Chap.  8,  XVI. 


THE  DEODAND.  45 

in -all  cases  of  English  railroad  accidents  resulting 
in  death,  mention  of  the  deodand  assessed  by  coro- 
ner's juries  on  the  locomotives.     These  appear  to 
have  been  arbitrarily  fixed,  and  graduated  in  amount 
as  the    circumstances    of    the    particular    accident 
seemed  to  excite  in   greater  or  less  degree  the  sym- 
pathies or  the  indignation  of  the  jury.     In  Novem- 
ber, 1838,  for  instance,  a  locomotive  exploded  on  the 
Manchester  &   Liverpool  road,  killing  its  engineer 
and   fireman :  and   for  this   escapade  a  deodand  of 
twenty  pounds  was  assessed  upon  it  by  the  coroner's 
jury;  while  upon  another  occasion,  in   1839,  where 
the  locomotive  struck  and  killed  a  man  and  horse  at 
a  street  crossing,  the  deodand  was  fixed  at  no  less  a 
sum  than  fourteen  hundred  pounds,  the  full  value  of 
the  engine.     Yet  in  this  last  case  there  did  not  ap- 
pear to  be  any  circumstances  rendering  the  corpora- 
tion liable  in  civil  damages.     The  deodand  seems  to 
have  been  looked  upon  as  a  species  of  rude  penalty 
imposed   on   the   use    of    dangerous  appliances, — a 
sharp  reminder  to  the  corporations  to  look  closely 
after  their  locomotives  and   employe's.      As,  how- 
ever,  accidents   increased    in    frequency  it   became 
painfully  apparent  that  "  crowner's  'quest  law  "  was 
not  in  any  appreciable  degree  better  calculated  to 
command  the  public  respect  in  the  days  of  Victoria 
than  in  those  of  Elizabeth,  and  the  ancient  usage 
was  accordingly  at  last  abolished.      Certainly  the 
position  of  railroad  corporations  would  now  be  even 
more  hazardous  than  it  is,  if,  after  every  catastrophe 


46  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

resulting  in  death,  the  coroner's  jury  of  the  vicinage 
enjoyed  the  power  of  arbitrarily  imposing  on  them 
such  additional  penalty  not  exceeding  the  value  of 
a  locomotive,  in  addition  to  all  other  liabilities,  as 
might  seem  to  it  proper  under  the  circumstances  of 
the  case. 

Recurring,  however,  to  the  accident  of  December 
24,  1 86 1  $  the  numerous  casualties  in  that  case  were 
due^fcf  the  crushing  of  the  rolling  stock  which  was 
not  strong  enough  to  resist  the  shock  of  the  sudden 
stop.  Under  these  circumstances  the  light,  short 
English  carriages  rode  over  each  other  and  were 
broken  to  pieces ;  under  similar  circumstances  the 
longer  and  heavier  cars  then  in  use  in  America  would 
have  "  telescoped ;  "  that  is,  the  platformsb  etween 
the  cars  would  have  been  broken  off  and  the  forward 
end  of  each  car  riding  slightly  up  on  its  broken 
coupling  would  have  shot  in  over  the  floor  of  the 
car  before  it,  sweeping  away  the  studding  and  other 
light  wood-work  and  crushing  stoves,  seats  and 
passengers  into  one  inextricable  mass,  until,  if  the 
momentum  was  sufficiently  great,  the  several  ve- 
hicles in  the  train  would  be  enclosed  in  each  other 
somewhat  like  the  slides  of  a  partially  shut  tele- 
scope. 

Crushing  in  other  countries  and  telescoping  in 
America  were  formerly  the  greatest,  if  not  the  worst, 
dangers  to  which  travel  by  rail  was  liable.  As  re- 
spects crushing  there  is  little  to  be  said.  It  is  a 
mere  question  of  proportions, — resisting  strength 


TELESCOPING.  47 

opposed  to  momentum.  So  long  as  trains  go  at 
great  speed  it  is  inevitable  that  they  will  occasion- 
ally be  brought  to  a  dead-stand  by  running  upon 
unexpected  obstacles.  The  simple  wonder  is  that 
they  do  this  so  infrequently.  When,  however,  now 
-and  again,  they  are  thus  brought  to  a  dead-stand 
the  safety  of  the  passenger  depends  and  can  de- 
pend on  nothing  but  the  strength  of  the  car  in 
which  he  is  sitting  as  measured  by  the  force  of  the 
shock  to  which  it  is  subjected.  This  matter  has 
already  been  referred  to  in  connection  with  the 
Shipton  and  Wollaston  accidents,*  the  last  of 
which  was  a  significant  reminder  to  all  railroad 
managers  that  no  matter  how  strongly  or  with  how 
careful  a  regard  to  scientific  principles  cars  may  be 
constructed,  just  so  long  as  they  are  made  by 
human  hands  it  is  easy  to  load  on  weight  sufficient, 
when  combined  with  only  a  moderate  momentum, 
to  crush  them  into  splinters. 

Telescoping,  however,  was  an  incident  of  crush- 
ing, and  a  peculiarly  American  incident,  which  is 
not  without  a  certain  historical  interest ;  for  the  par- 
ticular feature  in  car  construction  which  led  directly 
to  it  and  all  its  attendant  train  of  grisly  horrors 
furnishes  a  singular  and  instructive  illustration  of 
the  gross  violations  of  mechanical  principles  into 
which  practical,  as  opposed  to  educated,  mechanics 
are  apt  constantly  to  fall, — and  in  which,  when 
once  they  have  fallen,  they  steadily  persist.  The 

*  Ante  pp.  18-19. 


48  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

original  idea  of  the  railroad  train  was  a  succession 
of  stage  coaches  chained  together  and  hauled  by  a 
locomotive.  The  famous  pioneer  train  of  August 
9,  1831,  over  the  Mohawk  Valley  road  was  liter- 
ally made  up  in  this  way,  the  bodies  of  stage 
coaches  having  been  placed  on  trucks,  which  "  were 
coupled  together  with  chains  or  chain-links,  leaving 
from  two  to  three  feet  slack,  and  when  the  loco- 
motive started  it  took  up  the  slack  by  jerks,  with 
sufficient  force  to  jerk  the  passengers,  who  sat  on 
seats  across  the  tops  of  the  coaches,  out  from  under 
their  hats,  and  in  stopping  they  came  together  with 
such  force  as  to  send  them  flying  from  their  seats." 
On  this  trip,  it  will  be  remembered,  the  train  pres- 
ently came  to  a  stop,  when  the  passengers  upon  it, 
with  true  American  adaptability,  set  their  wits  at 
once  to  the  work  of  devising  some  means  of 
remedying  the  unpleasant  jerks.*  "  A  plan  was 
soon  hit  upon  and  put  in  execution.  The  three 
links  in  the  couplings  of  the  cars  were  stretched  to 
their  utmost  tension,  a  rail,  from  a  fence  in  the 
neighborhood,  was  placed  betw*een  each  pair  of 
cars  and  made  fast  by  means  of  the  packing  yarn 
from  the  cylinders."  Here  was  the  incipient  idea 
of  couplers  and  buffers  improvised  by  practical 
men,  and  for  a  third  of  a  century  it  remained  al- 
most unimproved  upon,  except  by  the  introduction 
of  a  spring  upon  which  coupler  and  buffer  played. 
The  only  other  considerable  change  made  in  the 

*  Railroads  :  their  Origin  and  Problems,  p.  49. 


A  PRACTICAL  BLUNDER.  49 

earlier  days  of  car  construction  was  by  no  means 
an  improvement,  inasmuch  as  it  introduced  the  new 
and  wholly  unnecessary  danger  of  telescoping. 

The  original  passenger  cars,  however  frail  and 
light  they  may  have  been,  were  at  least,  when 
shackled  together  in  a  train,  continuous  in  their 
bearings  on  each  other, — that  is,  their  sills  and  floor 
timbers  were  all  on  a  level  and  in  line,  so  that,  if  the 
cars  were  suddenly  pressed  together,  they  met  in 
such  a  way  as  to  resist  the  pressure  to  the  extent  of 
their  resisting  power,  and  the  floor  of  one  did  not 
quietly  slide  under  or  over  that  of  another.  The 
bodies  of  these  cars  were  about  thirty-two  inches 
from  the  rails.  This  was  presently  found  to  be  too 
low.  In  raising  the  bodies  of  the  cars,  however, 
the  mechanics  of  those  days  encountered  a  prac- 
tical difficulty.  The  couplings  of  the  cars  built  on 
the  new  model  were  higher  than  those  of  the  old. 
They  at  once  met,  and,  as  they  thought,  no  less 
ingeniously  then  successfully  overcame  this  diffi- 
culty, by  placing  the  couplings  and  draw-heads  of 
their  new  cars  below  the  line  of  the  sills.  This 
necessitated  putting  the  platform  which  sustained 
the  coupling  also  beneath  the  sills,  and  in  doing 
that  they  disregarded,  without  the  most  remote 
consciousness  of  the  fact,  a  fundamental  law  of 
mechanics,  With  a  possible  pressure,  both  sudden 
and  heavy  to  be  resisted,  the  line  of  resistance  was 
no  longer  the  line  of  greatest  strength.  During 
thirty  years  this  stupid  blunder  remained  uncor- 


50  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

reeled.  It  was  as  if  the  builders  during  that  period 
had  from  force  of  habit  insisted  upon  always  using 
as  supports  pillars  which  were  curved  or  bent 
instead  of  upright.  At  the  close  of  those  thirty 
years  also  the  railroad  mechanics  had  become  so 
thoroughly  educated  into  their  false  methods  that 
it  took  yet  other  years  and  a  series  of  frightful 
disasters,  the  significance  of  which  they  seemed 
utterly  unable  to  take  in,  before  they  could  be  in- 
duced to  abandon  those  methods. 

The  two  great  dangers  of  telescoping  and.  os- 
cillation were  directly  due  to  this  system  of  car 
construction  and  of  train  coupling, — and  telescop- 
ing and  oscillation  were  probably  the  cause  of  one- 
half  at  least  of  the  loss  of  life  and  the  injuries  to 
persons  incident  to  the  first  thirty  years  of  Amer- 
ican railroad  experience.  The  badly  built  and 
loosely  connected  coaches  of  every  train  going  at 
any  considerable  rate  of  speed  used  then  to  swing 
and  roll  about  and  hammer  against  each  other  after 
a  fashion  which  made  the  infrequent  occurrence  of 
serious  disaster  the  only  fair  subject  for  surprise. 
In  case  of  a  sudden  stoppage  or  partial  derailment, 
the  train  stopped  or  went  on,  not  as  a  whole,  but  as 
a  succession  of  parts,  while  the  low  platforms  and 
slack  couplings  fearfully  increased  the  danger; — for, 
if  the  train  held  together,  the  cars  in  stopping  were 
likely  to  break  off  the  platforms,  making  of  what 
remained  of  them  a  sort  of  inclined  plane  over 
which  the  car-bodies  rode  into  each  other  at  differ- 


MILLERS  PLA  TPORM  AND  B  UPPER.  5 1 

ent  levels;  or,  if  the  couplings,  as  was  more 
probable,  held  and  the  train  did  not  part,  the  sway- 
ing and  swinging  of  the  loosely  connected  cars  was 
almost  sure  to  throw  them  from  the  track  and 
break  them  in  pieces.  The  invention  through 
which  this  difficulty  was  at  last  overcome,  simple 
and  obvious  as  it  was,  is  fairly  entitled,  so  far  as 
America  at  least  is  concerned,  to  be  classed  among 
the  four  or  five  really  noticeable  advances  which 
have  of  late  years  been  made  in  railroad  appliances. 
It  contributed  unmistakably  and  essentially  to  the 
safety  of  every  traveller.  Known  as  the  Miller 
platform  and  buffer,  from  the  name  of  the  inventor, 
it  was,  like  all  good  work  of  the  sort,  a  simple  and 
intelligent  recurrence  to  correct  mechanical  prin- 
ciples. Miller  went  to  work  to  construct  cars  in 
such  a  way  as  to  cause  them  to  .  come  in  contact 
with  each  other  in  the  line  of  their  greatest  resist- 
ing power,  while  in  coupling  them  together  in  trains 
he  introduced  both  tension  and  compression ; — that 
is  he,  in  plain  language,  brought  the  ends  of  the 
heavy  longitudinal  floor  timbers  of  the  separate 
cars  exactly  on  a  line  and  directly  bearing  on  each 
other,  and  then  forced  them  against  each  other 
until  the  heavy  spring  buffers  which  played  on 
those  floor  timbers  were  compressed,  when  the 
couplers  sprung  together  and  the  train  then  stood 
practically  one  solid  body  from  end  to  end.  It 
could  no  more  swing  or  crush  than  a  single  car 
could  swing  or  crush.  It  then  only  remained  to 


52  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

increase  the  weight  and  to  perfect  the  construction 
of  the  vehicles  to  insure  all  the  safety  in  this  re- 
spect of  which  travel  by  rail  admitted. 

Simple  as  these  improvements  were,  and  appar- 
ently obvious  as  the  mechanical  principles  on  which 
they  were  based  now  seem,  the  opposition  for  years 
offered  to  them  by  practical  master-mechanics  and 
railroad  men  would  have  been  ludicrous  had  it  not 
been  exasperating.  There  was  hardly  a  railroad  in 
the  country  whose  officers  did  not  insist  that  their 
method  of  construction  was  exceptional,  it .  was 
true,  but  far  better  than  Miller's.  It  was  main- 
tained that  the  slack  couplings  were  necessary  in 
order  to  enable  the  locomotives  to  start  the  trains, 
— that  a  train  made  up  without  the  slack,  on  Mil- 
ler's plan,  could  not  be  set  in  motion,  and  that  if  it 
was  set  in  motion  it  must  twist  apart  at  every  sharp 
curve  etc.  The  ingenuity  displayed  in  thus  invent- 
ing theoretical  objections  to  the  appliance  far  ex- 
ceeded that  required  for  inventing  it,  and  indeed 
no  one  who  has  not  had  official  experience  of  it 
can  at  all  realize  the  objecting  capacity  of  the 
typical  practical  mechanic  whose  conceit  as  a  rule 
is  measured  by  his  ignorance,  while  his  stupidity  is 
unequalled  save  by  his  obstinacy.  Even  when 
Miller's  invention  for  one  reason  or  another  was 
not  adopted,  the  principles  upon  which  that  in- 
vention was  founded, — the  principles  of  tension, 
cohesion  and  direct  resistance, — at  last  forced  their 
way  into  general  acceptance.  The  long-urged  ob- 


THE  "IMPOSSIBLE "  IN  PRACTICE.  53 

jection  that  the  thing  was  practically  impossible 
was  slowly  abandoned  in  face  of  the  awkward  but 
undeniable  fact  that  it  was  done  every  day,  and 
many  times  a  day.  Consequently,  as  the  result  of 
much  patient  arguing,  duly  emphasized  by  the 
regular  recurrence  of  disaster,  it  is  not  too  much  to 
assert  that  for  weight,  resisting  power,  perfection  of 
construction  and  equipment  and  the  protection 
they  afford  to  travellers,  the  standard  American 
passenger  coach  is  now  far  in  advance  of  any  other. 
As  to  comfort,  convenience,  taste  in  ornamentation, 
etc.,  these  are  so  much  matters  of  habit  and  edu- 
cation that  it  is  unnecessary  to  discuss  them.  They 
do  not  affect  the  question  of  safety. 

A  very  striking  illustration  of  the  vast  increase  of 
safety  secured  through  this  improved  car  construc- 
tion was  furnished  in  an  accident,  which  happened  in 
Massachusetts  upon  July  15,  1872.  As  an  express 
train  on  the  Boston  &  Providence  road  was  that  day 
running  to  Boston  about  noon  and  at  a  rate  of  speed 
of  some  forty  miles  an  hour,  it  came  in  contact  with 
a  horse  and  wagon  at  a  grade  crossing  in  the  town 
of  Foxborough.  The  train  was  made  up  of  thor- 
oughly well-built  cars,  equipped  with  both  the  Miller 
platform  and  the  Westinghouse  train-brake.  There 
was  no  time  in  which  to  check  the  speed,  and  it  thus 
became  a  simple  question  of  strength  of  construc- 
tion, to  be  tested  in  an  unavoidable  collision.  The 
engine  struck  the  wagon,  and  instantly  destroyed  it. 
The  horse  had  already  cleared  the  rails  when  the 


54  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

wagon  was  struck,  but,  a  portion  of  his  harness  get- 
ting caught  on  the  locomotive,  he  was  thrown  down 
and  dragged  a  short  distance  until  his  body  came  in 
contact  with  the  platform  of  a  station  close  to  the 
spot  of  collision.  The  body  was  then  forced  under 
the  cars-,  having  been  almost  instantaneously  rolled 
and  pounded  up  into  a  hard,  unyielding  mass.  The 
results  which  ensued  were  certainly  very  singular. 
Next  to  the  locomotive  was  an  ordinary  baggage 
and  mail  car,  and  it  was  under  this  car,  and  between 
its  forward  and  its  hind  truck,  that  the  body  of  the 
horse  was  forced ;  coming  then  directly  in  contact 
with  the  truck  of  the  rear  wheels,  it  tore  it  from  its 
fastenings  and  thus  let  the  rear  end  of  the  car  drop 
upon  the  track.  In  falling,  this  end  snapped  the 
coupling  by  its  weight,  and  so  disconnected  the 
train,  the  locomotive  going  off  towards  Boston  drag- 
ging this  single  car,  with  one  end  of  it  bumping 
along  the  track.  Meanwhile  the  succeeding  car  of 
the  train  had  swept  over  the  body  of  the  horse  and 
the  disconnected  truck,  which  were  thus  brought  in 
contact  with  its  own  wheels,  which .  in  their  turn 
were  also  torn  off;  and  so  great  was  the  momentum 
that  in  this  way  all  of  the  four  passenger  cars  which 
composed  that  part  of  the  train  were  successively 
driven  clean  off  their  rolling  gear,  and  not  only  did 
they  then  slide  off  the  track,  but  they  crossed  a  rail- 
road siding  which  happened  to  be  at  that  point, 
went  down  an  embankment  three  or  four  feet  in 
height,  demolished  a  fence,  passed  into  an  adjoining 


1854  AND  1874.  55 

field,  and  then  at  last,  after  glancing  from  the  stump 
of  a  large  oak-tree,  they  finally  came  to  a  stand-still 
some  two  hundred  feet  from  the  point  at  which  they 
had  left  the  track.  There  was  not  in  this  case  even 
an  approach  to  telescoping;  on  the  contrary,  each  car 
rested  perfectly  firmly  in  its  place  as  regarded  all  the 
others,  not  a  person  was  injured,  and  when  the  wheel- 
less  train  at  last  became  stationary  the  astonished 
passengers  got  up  and  hurried  through  the  doors, 
the  very  glass  in  which  as  well  as  that  in  the  win- 
dows was  unbroken.  Here  was  an  indisputable 
victory  of  skill  and  science  over  accident,  showing 
most  vividly  to  what  an  infinitesimal  extreme  the 
dangers  incident  to  telescoping  may  be  reduced. 

The  vast  progress  in  this  direction  made  within 
twenty  years  can,  however,  best  perhaps  be  illustrated 
by  the  results  of  two  accidents  almost  precisely  simi- 
lar in  character,  which  occurred,  the  one  on  the  Great 
Western  railroad  of  Canada,  in  October,  1854,  the 
other  on  the  Boston  &  Albany,  in  Massachusetts,  in 
October,  1874.  In  the  first  case  a  regular  train  made 
up  of  a  locomotive  and  seven  cars,  while  approach- 
ing Detroit  at  a  speed  of  some  twenty  miles  an  hour, 
ran  into  a  gravel  train  of  fifteen  cars  which  was 
backing  towards  it  at  a  speed  of  some  ten  miles  an 
hour.  The  locomotive  of  the  passenger  train  was 
thrown  completely  off  the  track  and  down  the  em- 
bankment, dragging  after  it  a  baggage  car.  At  the 
head  of  the  passenger  portion  of  the  train  were  two 
second-class  cars  filled  with  emigrants  ;  both  of  these 


$6  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

were  telescoped  and  demolished,  and  all  their  un- 
fortunate occupants  either  killed  or  injured.  The 
front  of  the  succeeding  first-class  car  was  then  crushed 
in,  and  a  number  of  those  in  it  were  hurt.  In  all,  no 
less  than  forty-seven  persons  lost  their  lives,  while 
sixty  others  were  maimed  or  severely  bruised.  So 
much  for  a  collision  in  October,  1854.  In  October, 
1874,  on  the  Boston  &  Albany  road,  the  regular  New 
York  express  train,  consisting  of  a  locomotive  and 
seven  cars,  while  going  during  the  night  at  a  speed 
of  forty  miles  an  hour,  was  suddenly,  near  the  Brim- 
field  station,  thrown  by  a  misplaced  switch  into  a 
siding  upon  which  a  number  of  platform  freight  cars 
were  standing.  The  train  was  thoroughly  equipped, 
having  both  Miller  platform  and  Westinghouse  brake. 
The  six  seconds  which  intervened,  in  the  darkness, 
between  notice  of  displacement  and  the  collision  did 
not  enable  the  engineer  to  check  perceptibly  the 
speed  of  his  train,  and  when  the  blow  came  it  was  a 
simple  question  of  strength  to  resist.  The  shock 
must  have  been  tremendous,  for  the  locomotive  and 
tender  were  flung  off  the  track  to  the  right  and  the 
baggage  car  to  the  left,  the  last  being  thrown  across 
the  interval  between  the  siding  and  the  main  track 
and  resting  obliquely  over  the  latter.  The  forward 
end  of  the  first  passenger  coach  was  thrown  beyond 
the  baggage  car  up  over  the  tender,  and  its  rear 
end,  as  well  as  the  forward  end  of  the  succeeding 
coach,  was  injured.  As  in  the  Foxborough  case, 
several  of  the  trucks  were  jerked  out  from  under 


1854  AND  1874.  57 

the  cars  to  which  they  belonged,  but  not  a  person 
on  the  train  was  more  than  slightly  bruised,  the 
cars  were  not  disconnected,  nor  was  there  even 
a  suggestion  of  telescoping. 


RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE    VERSAILLES   ACCIDENT. 

GOING  back  once  more  to  the  early  days,  a  third 
of  a  century  since,  before  yet  the  periodical  recur- 
rence of  slaughter  had  caused  either  train-brake  or 
Miller  platform  to  be  imagined  as  possibilities,  be- 
fore, indeed,  there  was  yet  any  record  of  what  we 
would  now  consider  a  regular  railroad  field-day,  with 
its  long  train  of  accompanying  horrors,  including  in 
the  grisly  array  death  by  crushing,  scalding,  drown- 
ing, burning,  and  impalement, — going  back  to  the 
year  1840,  or  thereabouts,  we  find  that  the  railroad 
companies  experienced -a  notable  illustration  of  the 
truth  of  the  ancient  adage  that  it  never  rains  but  it 
pours ;  for  it  was  then  that  the  long  immunity  was 
rudely  broken  in  upon.  After  that  time  disasters 
on  the  rail  seemed  to  tread  upon  one  another's  heels 
in  quick  and  frightful  succession.  Within  a  few 
months  of  the  English  catastrophe  of  December 
24,  1841,  there  happened  in  France  one  of  the  most 


MA  Y  8,  1842.  59 

famous  and  most  horrible  railroad  slaughters  ever 
recorded.  It  took  place  on  the  8th  of  May,  1842. 
It  was  the  birthday  of  the  king,  Louis  Philippe,  and, 
in  accordance  with  the  usual  practice,  the  occasion 
had  been  celebrated  at  Versailles  by  a  great  display 
of  the  fountains.  At  half  past  five  o'clock  these  had 
stopped  playing,  and  a  general  rush  ensued  for  the 
trains  then  about  to  leave  for  Paris.  That  which 
went  by  the  road  along  the  left  bank  of  the  Seine 
was  densely  crowded,  and  so  long  that  two  loco- 
motives were  required  to  draw  it.  As  it  was  mov- 
ing at  a  high  rate  of  speed  between  Bellevue  and 
Meudon,  the  axle  of  the  foremost  of  these  two  lo- 
comotives broke,  letting  the  body  of  the  engine  drop 
to  the  ground.  It  instantly  stopped,  and  the  second 
locomotive  was  then  driven  by  its  impetus  on  top  of 
the  first,  crushing  its  engineer  and  fireman,  while  the 
contents  of  both  the  fire-boxes  were  scattered  over 
the  roadway  and  among  the  debris.  Three  carriages 
crowded  with  passengers  were  then  piled  on  top  of 
this  burning  mass  and  there  crushed  together  into 
each  other.  The  doors  of  these  carriages  were 
locked,  as  was  then  and  indeed  is  still  the  custom 
in  Europe,  and  it  so  chanced  that  they  had  all  been 
newly  painted  They  blazed  up  like  pine  kindlings. 
Some  of  the  carriages  were  so  shattered  that  a  por- 
tion of  those  in  them  were  enabled  to  extricate  them- 
selves, but  the  very  much  larger  number  were  held 
fast ;  and  of  these  such  as  were  not  so  fortunate  as  to 
be  crushed  to  death  in  the  first  shock  perished  hope- 


60  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

lessly  in  the  flames  before  the  eyes  of  a  throng  of 
lookers-on  impotent  to  aid.  Fifty-two  or  fifty-three 
persons  were  supposed  to  have  lost  their  lives  in 
this  disaster,  and  more  than  forty  others  were  in- 
jured ;  the  exact  number  of  the  killed,  however, 
could  never  be  ascertained,  as  the  piling-up  of  the 
cars  on  top  of  the  two  locomotives  had  made  of 
the  destroyed  portion  of  the  train  a  veritable  holo- 
caust of  the  most  hideous  description.  Not  only 
did  whole  families  perish  together, — in  one  case  no 
less  than  eleven  members  of  the  same  family  shar- 
ing a  common  fate, — but  the  remains  of  such  as 
were  destroyed  could  neither  be  identified  nor  sepa- 
rated. In  one  case  a  female  foot  was  alone  recog- 
nizable, while  in  others  the  bodies  were  calcined  and 
and  fused  into  an  indistinguishable  mass.  The 
Academy  of  Sciences  appointed  a  committee  to  in- 
quire whether  Admiral  D'Urville,  a  distinguished 
French  navigator,  was  among  the  victims.  His 
body  was  thought  to  be  found,  but  it  was  so  terribly 
mutilated  that  it  could,  be  recognized  only  by  a 
sculptor,  who  chanced  some  time  before  to  have 
taken  a  phrenological  cast  of  the  skull.  His  wife 
and  only  son  had  perished  with  him. 

It  is  not  easy  now  to  conceive  the  excitement  and 
dismay  which  this  catastrophe  caused  throughout 
France.  The  railroad  was  at  once  associated  in 
the  minds  of  an  excitable  people  with  novel  forms 
of  imminent  death.  France  had  at  best  been  lag- 
gard enough  in  its  adoption  of  the  new  invention, 


THE  RETURN  FROM  THE  FETE.  6 1 

9 

and  now  it  seemed  for  a  time  as  if  the  Versailles  dis- 
aster was  to  operate  as  a  barrier  in  the  way  of  all 
further  railroad  development.  Persons  availed  them- 
selves of  the  steam  roads  already  constructed  as 
rarely  as  possible,  and  then  in  fear  and  trembling, 
while  steps  were  taken  to  substitute  horse  for  steam 
power  on  other  roads  then  in  process  of  construction. 

The  disaster  was,  indeed,  one  well  calculated  to 
make  a  deep  impression  on  the  popular  mind,  for  it 
lacked  almost  no  attribute  of  the  dramatic  and  ter- 
rible. There  were  circumstances  connected  with  it, 
too,  which  gave  it  a  sort  of  moral  significance, — con- 
trasting so  suddenly  the  joyous  return  from  the 
country/^  in  the  pleasant  afternoon  of  May,  with 
what  De  Quincey  has  called  the  vision  of  sudden 
death.  It  contained  a  whole  homily  on  the  familiar 
text.  As  respects  the  number  of  those  killed  and 
injured,  also,  the  Versailles  accident  has  not  often 
been  surpassed  ;  perhaps  never  in  France.  In  this 
country  it  was  surpassed  on  one  occasion,  among 
others,  under  circumstances  very  similar  to  it. 
*This  was  the  accident  at  Camphill  station,  about 
twelve  miles  from  Philadelphia,  on  July  17,  1856, 
which  befell  an  excursion  train  carrying  some  eleven 
hundred  children,  who  had  gone  out  on  a  Sunday- 
school  picnic  in  charge  of  their  teachers  and  friends. 

It  was  the  usual  story.  The  road  had  but  a  single 
track,  and  the  train,  both  long  and  heavy,  had  been 
delayed  and  was  running  behind  its  schedule  time. 
The  conductor  thought,  however,  that  the  next  sta- 


62  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

tion  could  yet  be  reached  in  time  to  meet  and  there 
pass  a  regular  train  coming  towards  him.     It  may 
have  been  a  miscalculation  of  seconds,  it  may  have 
been  a  difference  of  watches,  or  perhaps  the  regular 
train  was  slightly  before  its  time  ;  but,  however  it 
happened,  as  the  excursion  train,  while  running  at 
speed,  was  rounding  a  reverse  curve,  it  came   full 
upon  the  regular  train,  which  had  just  left  the  sta- 
tion.    In  those  days,  as  compared  with  the  present, 
the  cars  were  but  egg-shells,  and  the  shock  was  ter- 
rific.    The  locomotives  struck  each  other,  and,  after 
rearing  themselves  up  for  an  instant,  it  is  said,  like 
living  animals,  fell  to  the  ground   mere  masses  of 
rubbish.     In  any  case  the  force   of  the  shock  was 
sufficient  to  hurl  both  engines  from  the  track  and  lay 
them  side  by  side  at  right  angles  to,  and  some  dis- 
tance from  it.     As  only  the  excursion  train  happened 
to  be  running  at  speed,  it  alone  had  all  the  impetus 
necessary  for  telescoping  ;  three  of  its  cars  accord- 
ingly closed  in  upon  each  other,  and  the  children  in 
them  were  crushed ;  as  in  the  Versailles  accident, 
two   succeeding  cars  were    driven  upon   this  mass, 
and  then  fire  was  set  to  the  whole  from  the  ruins 
of  the  locomotives.     It  would  be  hard  to  imagine 
anything   more  thoroughly    heart-rending,    for   the 
holocaust  was  of  little  children  on  a  party  of  plea, 
sure.     Five  cars  in  all  were  burned,  and    sixty-six 
persons  perished  ;  the  injured  numbered  more  than 
a  hundred.* 

*A  collision  very  similar  to  that  at  Camphill  occurred  upon  the 


THE  CAMPHILL   COLLISION.  63 

Of  this  disaster  nothing  could  be  said  either  in) 
excuse  or  in  extenuation  ;  itwas  not   only  one   oJL 
the  worst  description,   but  it  was  one  of  that  de- 
scription the  occurrence  of  which  is  most  frequent.    \fe 
An  excursion  train,  while  running  against  time  on  a      ~LC£ 
single-track  road,  came  in  collision  with  a  regular 
train.     The  record  is  full  of  similar   disasters,    too 
numerous  to  admit  of  specific  reference.     Primarily 
of  course,  the  conductors  of  the  special  trains  are  as 
a  rule  in  fault  in  such  cases.     He  certainly  was  at 
Camphill,  and  felt  himself  to  be  so,  for  the  next  day 
he  committed  suicide  by  swallowing  arsenic.     But 
in  reality  in  these  and  in  all  similar   cases, — both  j 
those   which   have   happened    and    those   hereafter  ' 
surely  destined  to  happen, — the  full   responsibility 

Erie  railway  at  a  point  about  20  miles  west  of  Port  Jervis  on  the  after- 
noon of  July  15,  1864.  The  train  in  this  case  consisted  of  eighteen 
cars,  in  which  were  some  850  Confederate  soldiers  on  their  way 
under  guard  to  the  prisoner's  camp  at  Elmira.  A  coal  train  consist- 
ing of  50  loaded  cars  from  the  hanch  took  the  main  line  at  Lacka- 
waxea.  The  telegraph  operator  there  informed  its  conductor  that  the 
track  was  clear,  and,  while  rounding  a  sharp  reversed  curve,  the  two 
trains  came  together,  the  one  going  at  about  twelve  and  the  other  at 
some  twenty  miles  an  hour.  Some  60  of  the  soldiers,  besides  a 
number  of  train  hands  were  killed  on  the  spot,  and  120  more  were 
seriously  injured,  some  of  them  fatally. 

This  disaster  occurred  in  the  midst  of  some  of  the  most  important 
operations  of  the  Rebellion  and  excited  at  the  time  hardly  any  notice. 
There  was  a  suggestive  military  promptness  in  the  subsequent  pro- 
ceedings. "  T.  J.  Ridgeway,  Esq.,  Associate  Judge  of  Pike  County, 
was  soon  on  the  spot,  and,  after  consultation  with  Mr.  Riddle  [the 
superintendent  of  the  Erie  roacl]  and  the  officer  in  command  of  the 
men,  a  jury  was  impanneled  and  an  inquest  held  ;  after  which  a 
large  trench  was  dug  by  the  soldiers  and  the  railway  employes,  76 
feet  long,  8  feet  wide  and  6  feet  deep,  in  which  the  bodies  were  at 
once  interred  in  boxes,  hastily  constructed — one  being  allotted  to 
four  rebels,  and  one  to  each  Union  soldier."  There  were  sixteen  of 
the  latter  killed. 


64  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

does  not  rest  upon  the  unfortunate  or  careless  sub- 
ordinate ; — nor  should  the  weight  of  punishment 
be  visited  upon  him.  It  belongs  elsewhere.  At  this 
late  day  no  board  of  directors,  nor  president,  nor 
superintendent  has  any  right  to  operate  a  single 
track  road  without  the  systematic  use  of  the  tele- 
graph in  connection  with  its  train  movements. 
That  the  telegraph  can  be  used  to  block,  as  it 
is  termed,  double-track  roads,  by  dividing  them 
into  sections  upon  no  one  of  which  two  trains  can 
be  running  at  the  same  time,  is  matter  of  long  and 
daily  experience.  There  is  nothing  new  or  experi- 
mental about  it.  It  is  a  system  which 'has  been 
forced  on  the  more  crowded  lines  of  the  world  as  an 
alternative  to  perennial  killings.  *  That  in  the  year 
1879  excursion  trains  should  rush  along  single-track 
roads  and  hurl  themselves  against  regular  trains, 
just  as  was  done  twenty-three  years  ago  at  Camphill, 
would  be  deemed  incredible  were  not  exactly  simi- 
lar accidents  still  from  time  to  time  reported.  One 
occurred  near  St.  Louis,  for  instance,  on  July  4, 
1879.  Tne  simple  fact  is  that  to  now  operate  single- 
track  roads  without  the  constant  aid  of  the  tele- 
graph, as  a  means  of  blocking  them  for  every  irreg- 
ular train,  indicates  a  degree  of  wanton  careless- 
ness, or  an  excess  of  incompetence,,  for  which  ade- 
quate provision  should  be  made  in  the  criminal 
law.  Nothing  but  this  appeal  to  the  whipping- 
post, as  it  were,  seems  to  produce  the  needed 
mental  activity;  for  it  is  difficult  to  realize  the 


THE  STIMULUS  OF  PROSECUTION.  65 

stupid  conservatism  of  ordinary  men  when  brought 
to  the  consideration  of  something  to  which  they 
are  not  accustomed.  On  this  very  point  of  control- 
ling the  train  movement  of  single-track  roads  by- 
telegraph,  for  instance,  within  a  very,  recent  period 
the  superintendent  of  a  leading  Massachusetts  road 
gravely  assured  the  railroad  commissioners  of  that 
state,  that  he  considered  it  a  most  dangerous  reli- 
ance which  had  occasioned  many  disasters,  and  that 
he  had  no  doubt  it  would  be  speedily  abandoned 
as  a  practice  in  favor  of  the  old  time-table  and 
running-rules  system,  from  which  no  deviations 
would  be  allowed.  This  opinion  was  expressed^ 
also,  after  the  Revere  disaster  of  1871,  it  might 
have  been  supposed,  had  branded  into  the  record  of 
the  state  the  impossibility  of  safely  running  any 
crowded  railroad  in  a  reliance  upon  the  schedule.* 
Such  men  as  this,  however,  are  not  accessible  to 
argument  or  the  teachings  of  experience,  and  the 
gentle  stimulant  of  a  criminal  prosecution  seems 
to  be  the  only  thing  left. 

*  Chapter  XIV,  XVI. 


66  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

TELEGRAPHIC    COLLISIONS. 

AND  yet,  even  with  the  wires  in  active  use,  col- 
lisions will  occasionally  take  place.  They  have 
sometimes,  indeed,  even  been  caused  by  the  tele- 
graph, so  that  railroad  officials  at  two  adjacent  sta- 
tions on  the  same  road,  having  launched  trains  at 
each  other  beyond  recall,  have  busied  themselves 
while  waiting  for  tidings  of  the  inevitable  collision 
in  summoning  medical  assistance  for  those  sure  soon 
to  be  injured.  In  such  cases,  however,  the  mishap 
can  almost  invariably  be  traced  to  some  defect  in  the 
system  under  which  the  telegraph  is  used  ; — such  as 
a  neglect  to  exact  return  messages  to  insure  accu- 
racy, or  the  delegating  to  inexperienced  subordinates 
the  work  which  can  be  properly  performed  only  by 
a  principal.  This  was  singularly  illustrated  in  a  ter- 
rible collision  which  took  place  at  Thorpe,  between 
Norwich  and  Great  Yarmouth,  on  the  Great  Eastern 
Railway  in  England,  on  the  loth  of  September, 


THE  COLLISION  A  T  THORPE.  67 

1874.  The  line  had  in  this  place  but  a  single  track, 
and  the  mail  train  to  Norwich,  under  the  rule,  had 
to  wait  at  a  station  called  Brundell  until  the  arrival 
there  of  the  evening  express  from  Yarmouth,  or  un- 
til it  received  permission  by  the  telegraph  to  pro- 
ceed. On  the  evening  of  the  disaster  the  express 
train  was  somewhat  behind  its  time,  and  the  in- 
spector wrote  a  dispatch  directing  the  mail  to  come 
forward  without  waiting  for  it.  This  dispatch  he 
left  in  the  telegraph  office  unsigned,  while  he  went 
to  attend  to  other  matters.  Just  then  the  express 
train  came  along,  and  he  at  once  allowed  it  to  pro- 
ceed. Hardly  was  it  under  way  when  the  unsigned 
dispatch  occurred  to  him,  and  the  unfortunate  man 
dashed  to  the  telegraph  office  only  to  learn  that  the 
operator  had  forwarded  it.  Under  the  rules  of  the 
company  no  return  message  was  required.  A  second 
dispatch  was  instantly  sent  to  Brundell  to  stop  the 
mail ;  the  reply  came  back  that  the  mail  was  gone. 
A  collision  was  inevitable. 

The  two  trains  were  of  very  equal  weight,  the 
one  consisting  of  fourteen  and  the  other  of  thirteen 
carriages.  They  were  both  drawn  by  powerful 
locomotives,  the  drivers  of  which  had  reason  for 
putting  on  an  increased  speed,  believing,  as  each  had 
cause  to  believe,  that  the  other  was  waiting  for  him. 
The  night  was  intensely  dark  and  it  was  raining 
heavily,  so  that,  even  if  the  brakes  were  applied,  the 
wheels  would  slide  along  the  slippery  track.  Under 
these  circumstances  the  two  trains  rushed  upon  each 


68  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

other  around  a  slight  curve  which  sufficed  to  conceal 
their  head-lights.  The  combined  momentum  must 
have  amounted  to  little  less  than  sixty  miles  an  hour, 
and  the  shock  was  heard  through  all  the  neighboring 
village.  The  smoke-stack  of  the  locomotive  draw- 
ing the  mail  train  was  swept  away  as  the  other  lo- 
comotive seemed  to  rush  on  top  of  it,  while  the  car- 
riages of  both  trains  followed  until  a  mound  of 
locomotives  and  shattered  cars  was  formed  which 
the  descending  torrents  alone  hindered  from  becom- 
ing a  funeral  pyre.  So  sudden  was  the  collision 
that  the  driver  of  one  of  the  engines  did  not  appa- 
rently have  an  opportunity  to  shut  off  the  steam, 
and  his  locomotive,  though  forced  from  the  track 
and  disabled,  yet  remained  some  time  in  operation 
in  the  midst  of  the  wreck.  In  both  trains,  very  for- 
tunately, there  were  a  number  of  empty  cars  between 
the  locomotives  and  the  carriages  in  which  the  pas- 
sengers were  seated,  and  they  were  utterly  demol- 
ished ;  but  for  this  fortunate  circumstance  the 
Thorpe  collision  might  well  have  proved  the  most 
disastrous  of  all  railroad  accidents.  As  it  was,  the 
men- on  both  the  locomotives  were  instantly  killed, 
together  with  seventeen  passengers,  and  four  other 
passengers  subsequently  died  of  their  injuries  ;  mak- 
ing a  total  of  twenty-five  deaths,  besides  fifty  cases 
of  injury. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  conceive  of  a  more  violent 
collision  than  that  which  has  just  been  described ; 
and  yet,  as  curiously  illustrating  the  rapidity  with 


THE  TYRONE  COLLISION-.  69 

which  the  force  of  the  most  severe  shock  is  ex- 
pended, it  is  said  that  two  gentlemen  in  the  last 
carriage  of  one  of  the  trains,  finding  it  at  a  sudden 
standstill  close  to  the  place  to  which  they  were  going, 
supposed  it  had  stopped  for  some  unimportant  cause 
and  concluded  to  take  advantage  of  a  happy  chance 
which  left  them  almost  at  the  doors  of  their  homes. 
They  accordingly  got  out  and  hurried  away  in  the 
rain,  learning  only  the  next  morning  of  the  catas- 
trophe in  which  they  had  been  unconscious  par- 
ticipants. 

The  collision  at  Thorpe  occurred  in  September, 

1874.  Seven  months  later,  on  the  4th  of  April, 

1875,  there  was  an  accident  similar  to  it  in  almost 
every  respect,  except    fatality,  on    the  Burlington 
&  Missouri  road  in  Iowa.     In  this  case  the  opera- 
tor at  Tyrone  had  telegraphic  orders  to  hold  the 
east-bound  passenger  express  at  that  point  to  meet 
the    west-bound    passenger    express.      This    order 
he  failed  to  deliver,  and  the  train  accordingly  at 
once  went  on  to  the   usual   passing   place   at   the 
next  station.     It  was  midnight  and  intensely  dark, 
with  a  heavy  mist  in  the  air  .which  at  times  thick- 
ened to  rain.     Both  of  the  trains  approaching  each 
other  were  made  up  in  the  way  usual  with  through 
night  trains  on  the  great  western    lines,  and  con- 
sisted of  locomotives,  baggage  and  smoking  cars, 
behind  which  were  the  ordinary  passenger  cars  of 
the  company  followed  by  several   heavy  Pullman 
sleeping  coaches.    Those  in  charge  of  the  east-bound 


70  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

train,  knowing  that  it  was  behind  time,  were  run- 
ning it  rapidly,  so  as  to  delay  as  little  as  possible  the 
west-bound  train,  which,  having  received  the  order 
to    pass  at  Tyrone  was  itself   being  run  at  speed. 
Both  trains  were  thus  moving  at  some  thirty-five 
miles  an  hour,  when  suddenly  in  rounding  a  sharp 
curve  they  came  upon  each  other.     Indeed  so  close 
were  they  that  the  west-bound  engineer  had  no  time 
in  which  to  reverse,  but,  jumping  straight  from  the 
gangway,  he  afterwards  declared   that  the  locomo- 
tives came  together  before  he  reached  the  ground. 
The  engineer  of  the  east-bound  train  succeeded  both 
in  reversing  his  locomotive  and  in  applying  his  air- 
brake, but  after  reversal  the  throttle  flew  open.   The 
trains  came  together,  therefore,  as  at  Thorpe,  with 
their  momentum  practically  unchecked,  and    with 
such    force   that  the  locomotives   were   completely 
demolished,  the  boilers  of  the  two,  though  on  the 
same  line   of  rails,  actually,  in  some  way,  passing 
each  other.     The  baggage-cars  were  also  destroyed, 
and  the  smoking  cars  immediately  behind  them  were 
more  or  less  damaged,  but  the  remaining  coaches 
of  each  train  stood   upon  the  tracks  so  wholly  un- 
injured that  four  hours  later,  other  locomotives  hav- 
ing been  procured   but  the  track  being  still  blocked, 
the  passengers  were  transferred  from  one  set  of  cars 
to  the  other,  and  in  them  were  carried  to  their  des- 
tinations.    So  admirably  did   Miller's  construction 
serve  its  purpose  in  this  case,  that,  while  the  super- 
intendent of  the  road,  who  happened  to  be  in  the 


THE  MILLER  PLATFORM.  71 

rear  sleeping  car  of  one  of  the  trains,  merely  re- 
ported that  he  "  felt  the  shock  quite  sensibly,"  pas- 
sengers in  the  rear  coaches  of  the  other  train  hardly 
felt  it  at  all. 

At  Tyrone  the  wrecks  of  the  trains  caught  fire 
from  the  stoves  thrown  out  of  the  baggage  cars  and 
from  the  embers  from  the.  fire-boxes  of  the  loco- 
motives, but  the  flames  were  speedily  extinguished. 
Of  the  train  hands  three  were  killed  and  two  in- 
jured, but  no  passenger  was  more  than  shaken  or 
slightly  bruised.  This  was  solely  due  to  strength 
of  car  construction.  Heavy  as  the  shock  was, — so 
heavy  that  in  the  similar  case  at  Thorpe  the  car- 
riages were  crushed  like  nut-shells  under  it, — the 
resisting  power  was  equal  to  it.  The  failure  of  ap- 
pliances at  one  point  in  the  operation  of  the  road 
was  made  good  by  their  perfection  at  another. 


RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

OIL-TANK    ACCIDENTS. 

SIMILAR  in  some  of  its  more  dramatic  features  to 
the  Versailles  accident,  though  originating  from  a 
wholly  different  cause,  was  the  Abergele  disaster, 
which  at  the  time  occupied  the  attention  of  the 
British  public  to  the  exclusion  of  everything  else. 
It  occurred  in  1868,  and  to  the  "  Irish  mail,"  per. 
haps  the  most  famous  train  which  is  run  in  England, 
if,  indeed,  not  in  the  world.  Leaving  London  shortly 
after  7  A.M.,  the  Irish  mail  was  then  timed  to  make 
the  distance  to  Chester,  166  miles,  in  four  hours  and 
eighteen  minutes,  or  at  the  rate  of  40  miles  an  hour. 
For  the  next  85  miles,  completing  the  run  to  Holy- 
head,  the  speed  was  somewhat  increased,  two  hours 
and  five  minutes  only  being  allowed  for  it.  Aber- 
gele is  a  point  on  the  sea-coast  of  Wales,  nearly 
midway  between  Chester  and  Holyhead.  On  the 
day  of  the  accident,  August  20,  1868,  the  Irish 
mail  left  Chester  as  usual.  It  was  made  up  of  thir- 


THE  ABERGELE  ACCIDENT.  73 

teen  carriages  in  all,  which  were  occupied,  as  the 
carriages  of  that  train  usually  were,  by  a  large  num- 
ber of  persons  whose  names  at  least  were  widely 
known.      Among  these,  on  this  particular  occasion, 
was  the  Duchess  of  Abercorn,  wife  of  the  then  Lord 
Lieutenant  of  Ireland,  with  five  children.    Under  the 
running  arrangements  of  the  London  &  North  West- 
ern road  a  freight,  or  as   it   is   there  called  a  goods 
train,  left  Chester  half  an  hour  before  the  mail,  and 
was  placed  upon  the  siding  at  Llanddulas,  a  station 
about  a  mile  and  a  half  beyond  Abergele,  to  allow 
the  mail  to  pass.     From  Abergele  to  Llanddulas  the 
track  ascended  by  a  gradient  of  some  sixty  feet  to 
the  mile.      On  the  day  of  the  accident  it  chanced 
that  certain  wagons   between  the    engine  and  the 
rear  end  of  the  goods  train  had  to  be  taken  out  to 
be  left  at  Llanddulas,  and  in   doing  this  it  became 
necessary  to  separate  the  train  and  to  leave  five  or 
six  of  the  last  wagons  in  it  standing  on  the  tracks  of 
the  main  line,  while   those  which  were  to  be  left 
were   backed   onto  a  siding.     The  employe,  whose 
duty  it   was,   neglected    to    set    the    brakes  on  the 
wagons  thus  left  standing,  and  consequently  when 
the    engine    and    the    rest    of    the    train    returned 
for  them,   the  moment  they  were  touched  and  be- 
fore a  coupling  could  be  effected,  the  jar  set  them 
in  motion  down  the  incline  towards  Abergele.  They 
started  so   slowly  that  a  brakeman  of  the  train  ran 
after  them,  fully  expecting  to  catch  and  stop  them, 
but  as  they  went   down   the  grade  they  soon  out- 


74  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

stripped  him  and  it  became  clear  that  there  was 
nothing  to  check  them  until  they  should  meet  the 
Irish  mail,  then  almost  due.  It  also  chanced  that 
the  cars  thus  set  in  motion  were  oil  cars. 

The   track  of  the  North  Western   road  between 
Abergele  and  Llanddulas  runs  along  the  sides  of  the 
picturesque  Welsh   hills,  which  rise  up  to  the  south, 
while  to  the  north  there  stretches  out  a  wide  ex- 
panse of  sea.      The  mail  train  was  skirting  the  hills 
and  laboring  up  the  grade  at  a  speed  of  thirty  miles 
an  hour,  when  its  engineer  suddenly  became  aware 
of  the  loose  wagons  coming  down  upon  it  around 
the    curve,   and   then  but   a   few   yards   off.      See- 
ing that  they  were  oil   cars  he   almost   instinctively 
sprang  from  his  locomotive,  and  was  thrown  down 
by  the   impetus  and  rolled  to  the  side  of  the  road- 
bed.    Picking  himself  up,  bruised  but  not  seriously 
hurt,  he  saw  that  the   collision  had  already  taken 
place,  that  the  tender  had   ridden  directly  over  the 
engine,  that  the  colliding  cars  were  demolished,  and 
that  the  foremost  carnages  of  the  train  were  already 
on  fire.     Running  quickly  to  the   rear  of  the  train 
he  succeeded  in   uncoupling  six  carriages  and  a  van, 
which  were  drawn  away  from  the  rest,  before  the 
flames   extended  to  them,  by  an  engine  which  most 
fortunately  was  following  the  train.     All  the  other 
carriages   were   utterly  destroyed,  and  every  person 
in  them  perished. 

The  Abergele  was  probably  the  solitary  instance 
of  a  railroad  accident   in  which  but  a  single  sur- 


DEATH  WITHOUT  A  STRUGGLE.  75 

vivor  sustained  any  injury.  There  was  no  maim- 
ing. It  was  death  or  entire  escape.  The  collision 
was  not  a  particularly  severe  one,  and  the  engineer 
of  the  mail  train  especially  stated  that  at  the  mo- 
ment it  occurred  the  loose  cars  were  still  moving 
so  slowly  that  he  would  not  have  sprung  from  his 
engine  had  he  not  seen  that  they  were  loaded  with 
oil.  The  very  instant  the  collision  took  place,  how- 
ever, the  fluid  seemed  to  ignite  and  to  flash  along 
the  train  like  lightning,  so  that  it  was  impossible  to 
approach  a  carriage  when  once  it  caught  fire.  The 
fact  was  that  the  oil  in  vast  quantities  was  spilled ' 
upon  the  track  and  ignited  by  the  fire  of  the  loco- 
motive, and  then  the  impetus  of  the  mail  train  forced 
all  of  its  leading  carriages  into  the  dense  mass  of 
smoke  and  flame.  All  those  who  were  present,  con- 
curred in  positively  stating  that  not  a  cry,  nor  a 
moan,  nor  a  sound  of  any  description  was  heard 
from  the  burning  carriages,  nor  did  any  one  in  them 
apparently  make  an  effort  to  escape. 

The  most  graphic  description  of  this  extraordin- 
ary and  terrible  catastrophe  was  that  given  by  the 
Marquis  of  Hamilton,  the  eldest,  son  of  the  Duke  of 
Abercorn  whose  wife  and  family,  fortunately  for 
themselves,  occupied  one  of  those  rear  carriages 
which  were  unshackled  and  saved.  In  this  account 
the  Marquis  of  Hamilton  said  : — "  We  were  startled 
by  a  collision  and  a  shock  which,  though  not  very 
severe,  were  sufficient  to  throw  every  one  against 
his  opposite  neighbor.  I  immediately  jumped  out 


?  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

of  the  carriage,  when  a  fearful  sight  met  my  view. 
Already  the  whole  of  the  three  passengers'  carnages 
in  front  of  ours,  the  vans,  and  the  engine  were  en- 
veloped in  dense  sheets  of  flame  and  smoke,  rising 
fully  twenty  feet  high,  and  spreading  out  in  every 
direction.  It  was  the  work  of  an  instant.  No  words 
can  convey  the  instantaneous  nature  of  the  explo- 
sion and  conflagration.  I  had  actually  got  out  al- 
most before  the  shock  of  the  collision  was  over,  and 
this  was  the  spectacle  which  already  presented  itself. 
Not  a  sound,  not  a  scream,  not  a  struggle  to  escape, 
not  a  movement  of  any  sort  was  apparent  in  the 
doomed  carriages.  It  was  as  though  an  electric 
flash  had  at  once  paralyzed  and  stricken  every  one 
of  their  occupants.  So  complete  was  the  absence  of 
any  presence  of  living  or  struggling  life  in  them  that 
as  soon  as  the  passengers  from  the  other  parts  of 
the  train  were  in  some  degree  recovered  from  their 
first  shock  and  consternation,  it  was  imagined  that 
the  burning  carriages  were  destitute  of  passengers ; 
a  hope  soon  changed  into  feelings  of  horror  when 
their  contents  of  charred  and  mutilated  remains  were 
discovered  an  hour  afterward.  From  the  extent, 
however,  of  the  flames,  the  suddenness  of  the  conflag- 
ration, and  the  absence  of  any  power  to  extricate 
themselves,  no  human  aid  would  have  been  of  any 
assistance  to  the  sufferers,  who,  in  all  probability, 
were  instantaneously  suffocated  by  the  black  and 
fetid  smoke  peculiar  to  paraffine,  which  rose  in  vol- 
umes around  the  spreading  flames." 


THE   VICTIMS'  JEWELRY.  // 

Though  the  collision  took  place  before  one  o'clock, 
in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  a  large  gang  of  men  who 
were  kept  throwing  water  on  the  tracks,  the  perfect 
sea  of  flame  which  covered  the  line  for  a  distance  of 
some  forty  or  fifty  yards  could  not  be  extinguished 
until  nearly  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening ;  for  the 
petroleum  had  flowed  down  into  the  ballasting  of 
the  road,  and  the  rails  themselves  were  red-hot.  It 
was  therefore  small  occasion  for  surprise  that,  when 
the  fire  was  at  last  gotten  under,  the  remains  of 
those  who  lost  their  lives  were  in  some  cases  wholly 
undistinguishable,  and  in  others  almost  so.  Among 
the  thirty-three  victims  of  the  disaster  the  body  of 
no  single  one  retained  any  traces  of  individuality ; 
the  faces  of  all  were  wholly  destroyed,  and  in  no 
case  were  there  found  feet,  or  legs,  or  anything  at 
all  approaching  to  a  perfect  head.  Ten  corpses 
were  finally  identified  as  those  of  males,  and  thir- 
teen as  those  of  females,  while  the  sex  of  ten  others 
could  not  be  determined.  The  body  of  one  pas- 
senger, Lord  Farnham,  was  identified  by  the  crest 
on  his  watch  ;  and,  indeed,  no  better  evidence  of 
the  wealth  and  social  position  of  the  victims  of  this 
accident  could  have  been  asked  for  than  the  collec- 
tion of  articles  found  on  its  site.  It  included  dia- 
monds of  great  size  and  singular  brilliancy ;  rubies, 
opals,  emeralds,  gold  tops  of  smelling-bottles, 
twenty-four  watches,  of  which  but  two  or  three 
were  not  gold,  chains,  clasps  of  bags,  and  very 
many  bundles  of  keys.  Of-  these  the  diamonds 


73  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

alone  had  successfully  resisted  the  intense  heat  of 
the  flame  ;  the  settings  were  nearly  all  destroyed. 

Of  the  causes  of  this  accident  little  need  or  can 
be  said.  No  human  appliances,  no  more  ingenious 
brakes  or  increased  strength  of  construction,  could 
have  averted  it  or  warded  off  its  consequences  once 
it  was  inevitable.  It  was  occasioned  primarily  by 
two  things,  the  most  dangerous  and  the  most  dim- 
cult  to  reach  of  all  the  many  sources  of  danger 
against  which  those  managing  railroads  have  un- 
sleepingly  to  contend  : — a  somewhat  defective  disci- 
pline, aggravated  by  a  little  not  unnatural  care- 
lessness. The  rule  of  the  company  was  specific 
that  all  the  wagons  of  every  goods  train  should  be 
out  of  the  way  and  the  track  clear  at  least  ten 
minutes  before  a  passenger  train  was  due ;  but  in 
this  case  shunting  was  going  actively  on  when  the 
Irish-mail  was  within  a  mile  and  a  half.  A  careless 
brakeman  then  forgot  for  once  that  he  was  leaving 
his  wagons  close  to  the  head  of  an  incline ;  a  blow 
in  coupling,  a  little  heavier  perhaps  than  usual, 
sufficed  to  set  them  in  motion ;  and  they  happened 
to  be  loaded  with  oil. 

A  catastrophe  strikingly  similar  to  that  at  Aber- 
gele  befell  an  express  train  on  the  Hudson  River 
railroad,  upon  the  night  of  the  6th  of  February, 
1871.  The  weather  for  a  number  of  days  preceding 
the  accident  had  been  unusually  cold,  and  it  is  to 
the  suffering  of  employes  incident  to  exposure,  and 
the  consequent  neglect  of  precautions  on  their  part, 


THE  NEW  HAMBURG  DISASTER.  79 

that  accidents  are  peculiarly  due.     On  this  night  a 
freight  train  was  going  south,  all  those  in  charge  of 
which  were  sheltering  themselves  during  a  steady 
run   in  the  caboose  car  at  its  rear  end.     Suddenly, 
when  near  a  bridge  over  Wappinger's  Creek,  not  far 
from  New  Hamburg,  they  discovered  that   a  car  in 
the  centre  of  the  train  was  off  the  track.     The  train 
was  finally  stopped  on  the  bridge,  but  in  stopping  it 
other  cars  were  also  derailed,  and  one  of  these,  bear- 
ing on  it  two  large  oil  tanks,  finally  rested  obliquely 
across  the  bridge  with  one  end  projecting  over  the  up 
track.     Hardly  had  the  disabled  train  been  brought 
to  a  stand-still,  when,  before  signal  lanterns  could  in 
the  confusion  incident  to  the  disaster  be  sent  out, 
the   Pacific  express   from  New  York,  which  was  a 
little   behind   its  time,  came   rapidly  along.     As  it 
approached   the  bridge,  its  engineer  saw  a  red  lan- 
tern swung,  and  instantly  gave   the  signal  to  apply 
the   brakes.      It   was  too   late   to   avoid  the  collis- 
ion ;  but  what  ensued  had  in  it,  so  far  as  the   engi- 
neer was  concerned,  an  element  of  the  heroic,  which 
his   companion,    the    fireman    of  the   engine,   after- 
wards described  on  the  witness  stand  with  a  direct- 
ness and  simplicity  of  language  which  exceeded  all 
art.      The   engineer's   name  was   Simmons,  and  he 
was    familiarly   known    among   his   companions    as 
"  Doc."     His  fireman,  Nicholas  Tallon,  also  saw  the 
red  light  swung  on  the  bridge,  and  called  out  to  him 
that  the  draw  was   open.     In  reply  Simmons  told 
him  to  spring  the  patent  brake,  which  he  did,  and 


80  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

by  this  time  they  were  alongside  of  the  locomotive 
of  the  disabled  train  and  running  with  a  somewhat 
slackened  speed.  Tallon  had  now  got  out  upon  the 
step  of  the  locomotive,  preparatory  to  springing  off, 
and  turning  asked  his  companion  if  he  also  pro- 
posed to  do  the  same  : — " '  Doc  '  looked  around  at  me 
but  made  no  reply,  and  then  looked  ahead  again, 
watching  his  business ;  then  I  jumped  and  rolled 
down  on  the  ice  in  the  creek ;  the  next  I  knew  I 
heard  the  crash  and  saw  the  fire  and  smoke."  The 
next  seen  of  "  Doc  "  Simmons,  he  was  dragged  up 
days  afterwards  from  under  his  locomotive  at  the 
bottom  of  the  river.  But  it  was  a  good  way  to  die. 
He  went  out  of  the  world  and  of  the  sight  of  men 
with  his  hand  on  the  lever,  making  no  reply  to  the 
suggestion  that  he  should  leave  his  post,  but  "  look- 
ing ahead  and  watching  his  business." 

Dante  himself  could  not  have  imagined  a  greater 
complication  of  horrors  than  then  ensued :  liquid 
fire  and  solid  frost  combined  to  make  the  work  of 
destruction  perfect.  The  shock  of  the  collision 
broke  in  pieces  the  oil  car,  igniting  its  contents  and 
flinging  them  about  in  every  direction.  In  an  in- 
stant bridge,  river,  locomotive,  cars,  and  the  glitter- 
ing surface  of  the  ice  were  wrapped  in  a  sheet  of 
flame.  At  the  same  time  the  strain  proved  too  se- 
vere for  the  trestlework,  which  gave  way,  precipitat- 
ing the  locomotive,  tender,  baggage  cars,  and  one 
passenger  car  onto  the  ice,  through  which  they  in- 
stantly crushed  and  sank  deep  out  of  sight  beneath 


LIQUID  FIRE  AND  SOLID  FROST.  8 1 

the  water.  Of  the  remaining  seven  cars  of  the  pas- 
senger train,  two,  besides  several  of  the  freight  train, 
were  destroyed  by  fire,  and  shortly,  as  the  supports 
of  the  remaining  portions  of  the  bridge  burned 
away,  the  superstructure  'fell  on  the  half-submerged 
cars  in  the  water  and  buried  them  from  view. 

Twenty-one  persons  lost  their  lives  in  this  disaster, 
and  a  large  number  of  others  were  injured  ;  but  the 
loss  of  life,  it  will  be  noticed,  was  only  two-thirds  of 
that  at  Abergele.  The  New  Hamburg  catastrophe 
also  differed  from  that  at  Abergele  in  that,  under  its 
particular  circumstances,  it  was  far  more  preventa- 
ble, and,  indeed,  with  the  appliances  since  brought 
into  use  it  would  surely  be  avoided.  The  modern 
train-brake  had,  however,  not  then  been  perfected, 
so  that  even  the  hundred  rods  at  which  the  signal 
was  seen  did  not  afford  a  sufficient  space  in  which  to 
stop  the  train. 


82  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 


CHAPTER   IX. 

DRAW-BRIDGE    DISASTERS. 

It  is  difficult  to  see  how  on  double  track  roads, 
where  the  occurrence  of  an  accident  on  one  line  of 
tracks  is  always  liable  to  instantly  "  foul "  the  other 
line,  it  is  possible  to  guard  against  contingencies 
like  that  which  occurred  at  New  Hamburg.  At  the 
time,  as  is  usual  in  such  cases,  the  public  indignation 
expended  itself  in  vague  denunciation  of  the  Hudson 
River  Railroad  Company,  because  the  disaster  hap- 
pened to  take  place  upon  a  bridge  in  which  there 
was  a  draw  to  permit  the  passage  of  vessels.  There 
seemed  to  be  a  vague  but  very  general  impression 
that  draw-bridges  were  dangerous  things,  and,  be- 
cause other  accidents  due  to  different  causes  had 
happened  upon  them,  that  the  occurrence  of  this 
accident,  from  whatever  cause,  was  in  itself  sufficient 
evidence  of  gross  carelessness.  The  fact  was  that 
not  even  the  clumsy  Connecticut  rule,  which  compels 
the  stopping  of  all  trains  before  entering  on  any 


THE  "FOULING"  OF  TRACKS.  83 

draw-bridge,  would  have  sufficed  to  avert  the  New 
Hamburg  disaster,  for  the  river  was  then  frozen  and 
the  draw  was  not  in  use,  so  that  for  the  time  being 
the  bridge  was  an  ordinary  bridge  ;  and  not  even  in 
the  frenzy  of  crude  suggestions  which  invariably 
succeeds  each  new  accident  was  any  one  ever  found 
ignorant  enough  to  suggest  the  stopping  of  all  trains 
before  entering  upon  every  bridge,  which,  as  rail- 
roads generally  follow  water-courses,  would  not  in- 
frequently necessitate  an  average  of  one  stop  to 
every  thousand  feet  or  so.  Only  incidentally  did  the 
bridge  at  New  Hamburg  have  anything  to  do  with 
the  disaster  there,  the  essence  of  which  lay  in  the 
sudden  derailment  of  an  oil  car  immediately  in  front 
of  a  passenger  train  running  in  the  opposite  direction 
and  on  the  other  track.  Of  course,  if  the  derailment 
had  occurred  long  enough  before  the  passenger  train 
came  up  to  allow  the  proper  signals  to  be  given,  and 
this  precaution  had  been  neglected,  then  the  disaster 
would  have  been  due,  not  to  the  original  cause,  but 
to  the  defective  discipline  of  the  employes.  Such 
does  not  appear  to  have  been  the  case  at  New  Ham- 
burg, nor  was  that  disaster  by  any  means  the  first 
due  to  derailment  and  the  throwing  of  cars  from  one 
track  in  front  of  a  train  passing  upon  the  other ; — 
nor  will  it  be  the  last.  Indeed,  an  accident  hardly 
less  destructive,  arising  from  that  very  cause,  had 
occurred  only  eight  months  previous  in  England, 
and  resulted  in  eighteen  deaths  and  more  than  fifty 
cases  of  injury. 


84  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

A   goods   train   made   up   of  a   locomotive    and 
twenty-nine  wagons  was  running  at  a  speed  of  some 
twenty  miles  an  hour  on  the  Great  Northern  road, 
between  Newark  and  Claypole,  about  one  hundred 
miles  from  London,  when  the  forward  axle  under 
one  of  the  wagons  broke.     As  a  result  of  the  derail- 
ment which  ensued  the  train  became   divided,  and 
presently  the  disabled  car  was  driven  by  the  pressure 
behind  it  out  of  its  course  and  over  the  interval,  so 
that  it  finally  rested  partly  across  the  other  track. 
At  just  this  moment  an  excursion  train  from  London, 
made  up  of  twenty-three  carriages  and  containing 
some   three  hundred    and    forty   passengers,    came 
along  at  a  speed  of  about  thirty-five  miles  an  hour. 
It  was  quite  dark,  and   the  engineer  of  the  freight 
train  waved  his  arm  as  a  signal  of  danger ;  one  of 
the  guards,  also,  showed  a  red  light  with  his  hand 
lantern,  but  his  action  either  was  not  seen  or  was 
misunderstood,  for  without  any  reduction  of  speed 
being   made   the     engine   of    the    excursion    train 
plunged  headlong  into  the  disabled  goods  wagon. 
The  collision  was  so  violent  as  to  turn  the  engine 
aside  off  the  track  and  cause  it  to  strike  the  stone 
pier  of  a  bridge  near  by,  by  which  it  was  flung  com- 
pletely around    and  then  driven    up   the   slope    of 
the    cutting,   where   it    toppled    over  like    a    rear- 
ing horse  and    fell  back  into   the   roadway.      The 
tender  likewise   was   overturned ;   but  not   so    the 
carriages.    They  rushed  along  holding  to  the  track, 
and  the  side  of  each  as  it  passed  was  ripped  and 


SCIENTIFIC  INVESTIGATION.  85 

torn  by  the  projecting  end  of  the  goods  wagon.  Of 
the  twenty-three  carriages  and  vans  in  the  train 
scarcely  one  escaped  damage,  while  the  more  for- 
ward ones  were  in  several  cases  lifted  one  on  top  of 
the  other  or  forced  partly  up  the  slope  of  the  cut- 
ting, whence  they  fell  back  again,  crushing  the  pas- 
sengers beneath  them. 

This  accident  occurred  on  the  2ist  of  June,  1870; 
it  was  very  thoroughly  investigated  by  Captain 
Tyler  on  behalf  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  with  the  ap- 
parent conclusion  that  it  was  one  which  could  hardly 
have  been  guarded  against.  The  freight  cars,  the 
broken  axle  of  which  occasioned  the  disaster,  did  not 
belong  to  the  Great  Northern  company,  and  the 
wheels  of  the  train  had  been  properly  examined  by 
viewing  and  tapping  at  the  several  stopping-places; 
the  flaw  which  led  to  the  fracture  was,  however,  of 
such  a  nature  that  it  could  have  been  detected  only 
by  the  removal  of  the  wheel.  It  did  not  appear 
that  the  employe's  of  the.  company  had  been  guilty 
of  any  negligence  ;  and  it  was  difficult  to  avoid  the 
conclusion  that  the  accident  was  due  to  one  of  those 
defects  to  which  the  results  of  even  the  most  per- 
fect human  workmanship  must  ever  remain  liable, 
and  this  had  revealed  itself  under  exactly  those  con- 
ditions which  must  involve  the  most  disastrous  con- 
sequences. 

The  English  accident  did,  however,  establish  one 
thing,  if  nothing  else  ;  it  showed  the  immeasurable 
superiority  of  the  system  of  investigation  pursued 


86  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

in  the  case  of  railroad  accidents  in  England  over 
that  pursued  in  this  country.  There  a  trained  ex- 
pert after  the  occurrence  of  each  disaster  visits  the 
spot  and  sifts  the  affair  to  the  very  bottom,  locating 
responsibility  and  pointing  out  distinctly  the  meas- 
ures necessary  to  guard  against  its  repetition.  Here 
the  case  ordinarily  goes  to  a  coroner's  jury,  the 
findings  of  which  as  a  rule  admirably  sustain  the 
ancient  reputation  of  that  august  tribunal.  It  is 
absolutely  sad  to  follow  the  course  of  these  in- 
vestigations, they  are  conducted  with  such  an  en- 
tire disregard  of  method  and  lead  to  such  inade- 
quate conclusions.  Indeed,  how  could  it  be  other- 
wise?— The  same  man  never  investigates  two  acci- 
dents, and,  for  the  one  investigation  he  does  make, 
he  is  competent  only  in  his  own  esteem. 

Take  the  New  Hamburgh  accident  as  an  example. 
Rarely  has  any  catastrophe  merited  a  more  careful 
investigation,  and  few  indeed  have  ever  called  forth 
more  ill-considered  criticism  or  crude  suggestions. 
Almost  nothing  of  interest  respecting  it  was  elicited 
at  the  inquest,  and  now  no  reliable  criticism  can  be 
ventured  upon  it.  The  question  of  responsibility  in 
that  case,  and  of  prevention  thereafter,  involved 
careful  inquiry  into  at  least  four  subjects  : — First, 
the  ownership  and  condition  of  the  freight  car,  the 
fractured  axle  of  which  occasioned  the  disaster,  to- 
gether with  the  precautions  taken  by  the  company, 
usually  and  in  this  particular  case,  to  test  the 
wheels  of  freight  cars  moving  over  its  road,  espe- 


THE  DRA  W-BRIDGE  FRENZY.  87 

pecially  during  times  of  severe  cold. — Second,  the 
conduct  of  those  in  charge  of  the  freight  train  imme- 
diately preceding  and  at  the  time  of  the  accident ; 
was  the  fracture  of  the  axle  at  once  noticed  and 
were  measures  taken  to  stop  the  train,  or  was  the 
derailment  aggravated  by  neglect  into  the  form  it 
finally  took? — Third,  was  there  any  neglect  in  sig- 
naling the  accident  on  the  part  of  those  in  charge  of 
the  disabled  train,  and  how  much  time  elapsed  be- 
tween the  accident  and  the  collision  ? — Fourth, 
what,  if  any,  improved  appliances  would  have  en- 
abled those  in  charge  of  either  train  to.  have  averted 
the  accident  ? — and  what,  if  any,  defects  either  in  the 
rules  or  the  equipment  in  use  were  revealed? 

No  satisfactory  conclusion  can  now  be  arrived  at 
upon  any  of  these  points,  though  the  probabilities 
are  that  with  the  appliances  since  introduced  the 
train  might  have  been  stopped  in  time.  In  this  case, 
as  in  that  at  Claybridge,  the  coroner's  jury  returned 
a  verdict  exonerating  every  one  concerned  from  re- 
sponsibility, and  very  possibly  they  were  justified  in 
so  doing;  though  it  is  extremely  questionable 
whether  Captain  Tyler  would  have  arrived  at  a  sim- 
ilar conclusion.  Trrere  is  a  strong  probability  that 
the  investigation  went  off,  so  to  speak,  on  a  wholly 
false  issue,— turned  on  the  draw-bridge  frenzy  in- 
stead of  upon  the  question  of  care.  So  far  as  the 
verdict  declared  that  the  disaster  was  due  to  a  col- 
lision between  a  passenger  train  and  a  derailed  oil 
car,  and  not  to  the  existence  of  a  draw  in  the  bridge 


88  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

on  which  it  happened  to  occur,  it  was,  indeed,  en- 
titled to  respect,  and  yet  it  was  on  this  very  point 
that  it  excited  the  most  criticism.  Loud  commen- 
dation was  heard  through  the  press  of  the  Con- 
necticut law,  which  had  been  in  force  for  twenty 
years,  and,  indeed,  still  is  in  force  there,  under  which 
all  trains  are  compelled  to  come  to  a  full  stop  before 
entering  on  any  bridge  which  has  a  draw  in  it, — a 
law  which  may  best  be  described  as  a  useless  nui- 
sance. Yet  the  grand  jury  of  the  Court  of  Oyer 
and  Terminer  of  New  York  city  even  went  so  far  as 
to  recommend,  in  a  report  made  by  it  on  the  23d  of 
February,  1871, — sixteen  days  after  the  accident, — 
the  passage  by  the  legislature  then  in  session  at  Al- 
bany of  a  similar  legal  absurdity.  Fortunately  bet- 
ter counsels  prevailed,  and,  as  the  public  recovered 
its  equilibrium,  the  matter  was  allowed  to  drop. 

The  Connecticut  law  in  question,  however,  orig- 
inated in  an  accident  which  at  the  time  had  startled 
and  shocked  the  community  as  much  even  as  that  at 
Versailles  did  before  or  that  at  Abergele  has  since 
done.  It  occurred  to  an  express  train  on  the  New 
York  &  New  Haven  road  at  Norwalk,  in  Connecti- 
cut, on  the  6th  of  May,  1853. 


MA  Y  6,  1853.  89 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE    NORWALK    ACCIDENT. 

THE  railroad  at  Norwalk  crosses  a  small  inlet  of 
Long  Island  Sound  by  means  of  a  draw-bridge,  which 
is  approached  from  the  direction  of  New  York  around 
a  sharp  curve.  A  ball  at  the  mast-head  was  in  1853 
the  signal  that  the  draw  was  open  and  the  bridge 
closed  to  the  passage  of  trains.  The  express  passen- 
ger train  for  Boston,  consisting  of  a  locomotive  and 
two  baggage  and  five  passenger  cars,  containing  about 
one  hundred  and  fifty  persons,  left  New  York  as  usual 
at  eight  o'clock  that  morning.  The  locomotive  was 
not  in  charge  of  its  usual  engine-driver  but  of  a 
substitute  named  Tucker ;  a  man  who  some  seven 
years  before  had  been  injured  in  a  previous  collision 
on  the  same  road,  for  which  he  did  not  appear  to 
have  been  in  any  way  responsible,  but  who  had  then 
given  up  his  position  and  gone  to  California,  whence 
he  had  recently  returned  and  was  now  again  an  ap- 
plicant for  an  engineer's  situation.  This  was  his 


QO  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

third  trip  over  the  road,  as  substitute.  In  approach- 
ing the  bridge  at  Norwalk  he  apparently  wholly  ne- 
glected to  look  for  the  draw-signal.  He  was  running 
his  train  at  about  the  usual  rate  of  speed,  and  first 
became  aware  that  the  draw  was  open  when  within 
four  hundred  feet  of  it  and  after  it  had  become 
wholly  impossible  to  stop  the  train  in  time.  He  im- 
mediately whistled  for  brakes  and  reversed  his  engine, 
and  then,  without  setting  the  brake  on  his  tender, 
both  he  and  the  fireman  sprang  off  and  escaped  with 
trifling  injuries.  The  train  at  this  time  did  not  ap- 
pear to  be  moving  at  a  speed  of  over  fifteen  miles  an 
hour.  The  draw  was  sixty  feet  in  width  ;  the  water 
in  the  then  state  of  the  tide  was  about  twelve  feet 
deep,  and  the  same  distance  below  the  level  of  the 
bridge.  Although  the  speed  of  the  train  had  been 
materially  reduced,  yet  when  it  came  to  the  opening 
it  was  still  moving  with  sufficient  impetus  to  send 
its  locomotive  clean  across  the  sixty  foot  interval 
and  to  cause  it  to  strike  the  opposite  abutment 
about  eight  feet  below  the  track  ;  it  then  fell 
heavily  to  the  bottom.  The  tender  lodged  on 
top  of  the  locomotive,  bottom  up  and  resting 
against  the  pier,  while  on  top  of  this  again  was 
the  first  baggage  car.  The  second  baggage  car, 
which  contained  also  a  compartment  for  smokers, 
followed,  but  in  falling  was  canted  over  to  the 
north  side  of  the  draw  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  be 
wholly  submerged,  so  that  most  of  those  in  it  were 
saved.  The  first  passenger  car  next  plunged  into 


THE  BELCEIL  DRAW-BRIDGE.  QI 

the  opening;  its  forward  end  crushed  in,  as  it  fell 
against  the  baggage  car  in  front  of  it,  while  its  rear 
end  dropped  into  the  deep  water  below  ;  and  on  top 
of  it  came  the  second  passenger  car,  burying  the 
passengers  in  the  first  beneath  the  debris,  and  itself 
partially  submerged.  The  succeeding  or  third  pas- 
senger car,  instead  of  following  the  others,  broke  in 
two  in  the  middle,  the  forward  part  hanging  down 
over  the  edge  of  the  draw,  while  the  rear  of  it  rested 
on  the  track  and  stayed  the  course  of  the  remainder 
of  the  train.  Including  those  in  the  smoking  com- 
partment more  than  a  hundred  persons  were  plunged 
into  the  channel,  of  whom  forty-six  lost  their  lives, 
while  some  thirty  others  were  more  or  less  severely 
injured.  The  killed  were  mainly  among  the  passen- 
gers in  the  first  car ;  for,  in  falling,  the  roof  of  the 
second  car  was  split  open,  and  it  finally  rested  in 
such  a  position  that,  as  no  succeeding  car  came  on 
top  of  it,  many  of  those  in  it  were  enabled  to  extri- 
cate themselves ;  indeed,  more  than  one  of  the  pas- 
sengers in  falling  were  absolutely  thrown  through 
the  aperture  in  the  roof,  and,  without  any  volition  on 
their  part,  were  saved  with  unmoistened  garments. 

Shocking  as  this  catastrophe  was,  it  was  eclipsed 
in  horror  by  another  exactly  similar  in  character, 
though  from  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  case 
it  excited  far  less  public  notice,  which  occurred 
eleven  years  later  oh  the  Grand  Trunk  railway  of 
Canada.  In  this  case  a  large  party  of  emigrants, 
over  500  in  number  and  chiefly  Poles,  Germans  and 


92  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

Norwegians  of  the  better  class,  had  landed  at  Que- 
bec and  were  being  forwarded  on  a  special  train  to 
their  destination  in  the  West.  With  their  baggage 
they  rilled  thirteen  cars.  The  Grand  Trunk  on 
the  way  to  Montreal  crosses  the  Richelieu  river  at 
Belceil  by  an  iron  bridge,  in  the  westernmost  span 
of  which  was  a  draw  over  the  canal,  some  45  feet 
below  it  Both  by  law  and  under  the  running  rules 
of  the  road  all  trains  were  to  come  to  a  dead  stand 
on  approaching  the  bridge,  and  to  proceed  only 
when  the  safety  signal  was  clearly  discerned.  This 
rule,  however,  as  it  appeared  at  the  subsequent  in- 
quest, had  been  systematically  disobeyed,  it  hav- 
ing been  considered  sufficient  if  the  train  was 
"  slowed  down."  In  the  present  case,  however — the 
night  of  June  29,  1864, — though  the  danger  signal 
was  displayed  and  in  full  sight  for  a  distance  of 
1, 600  feet,  the  engine-driver,  unfamiliar  with  the  road 
and  its  signals,  failed  to  see  it,  and,  without  slowing 
his  train  even,  ran  directly  onto  the  bridge.  He  be- 
came aware  of  the  danger  when  too  late  to  stop.  The 
draw  was  open  to  permit  the  passage  of  a  steamer 
with  six  barges  in  tow,  one  of  which  was  directly  un- 
der the  opening.  The  whole  train  went  through  the 
draw,  sinking  the  barge  and  piling  itself  up  in  the 
water  on  top  of  it.  The  three  last  cars,  falling  on 
the  accumulated  wreck,  toppled  over  upon  the  west 
embankment  and  were  thus  less  injured  than  the 
others.  The  details  of  the  accident  were  singularly 
distressing.  "  As  soon  as  possible  a  strong  cable  was 


JUNE  29,   1864.  93 

attached  to  the  upper  part  of  the  piling,  and  by  this 
means  two  cars,  the  last  of  the  ill-fated  train,  were 
dragged  onto  the  wharf  under  the  bridge.  Their 
removal  revealed  a  horrible  sight.  A  shapeless  blue 
mass  of  hands  and  heads  and  feet  protruded  among 
the  splinters  and  frame-work,  and  gradually  resolved 
itself  into  a  closely-packed  mass  of  human  beings, 
all  ragged  and  bloody  and  dinted  from  crown  to  foot 
with  blue  bruises  and  weals  and  cuts  inflicted  by  the 
ponderous  iron  work,  the  splinters  and  the  enormous 
weight  of  the  train.  *  *  *  A  great  many  of 
the  dead  had  evidently  been  asleep ;  the  majority  of 
them  had  taken  off  their  boots  and  coats  in  the 
endeavor  to  make  themselves  as  comfortable  as  pos- 
sible. They  lay  heaped  upon  one  another  like  sacks, 
dressed  in  the  traditional  blue  clothing  of  the  Ger- 
man people.  *  *  *  A  child  was  got  at  and  re- 
moved nine  hours  after  the  accident,  being  uninjured 
in  its  dead  mother's  arms." 

The  accident  happened  at  2  A.M,  and  before  sun- 
down of  the  next  day  86  bodies  had  been  taken  out 
of  the  canal ;  others  were  subsequently  recovered, 
and  yet  more  died  from  their  hurts.  The  injured 
were  numbered  by  hundreds.  It  was  altogether  a 
disaster  of  the  most  appalling  description,  in  exten- 
uation of  which  nothing  was  to  be  said.  It  befell, 
however,  a  body  of  comparatively  friendless  emi- 
grants, and  excited  not  a  tithe  of  the  painful  interest 
which  yet  attaches  to  the  similar  accident  to  the 
Boston  express  at  Norwalk. 


94  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

These  terrible  disasters  were  both  due,  not  alone 
to  the  carelessness  of  the  two  engine-drivers,  but 
to  the  use  of  a  crude  and  inadequate  system  of  sig- 
nals. It  so  happened,  however,  that  the  legislature 
of  Connecticut  was  unfortunately  in  session  at  the 
time  of  the  Norwalk  disaster,  and  consequently  the 
public  panic  and  indignation  took  shape  in  a  law 
compelling  every  train  on  the  railroads  of  that 
state  to  come  to  a  dead  stand-still  before  enter- 
ing upon  any  bridge  in  which  there  was  a  draw. 
This  law  is  still  in  force,  and  from  time  to  time,  as 
after  the  New  Hamburg  catastrophe,  an  unreason- 
ing clamor  is  raised  for  it  in  other  states.  In 
point  of  fact  it  imposes  a  most  absurd,  unnecessary 
and  annoying  delay  on  travel,  and  rests  upon  the 
Connecticut  statute  book  a  curious  illustration  of 
what  usually  happens  when  legislators  undertake 
to  incorporate  running  railroad  regulations  into  the 
statutes-at-large.  It  is  of  a  par  with  another  law, 
which  has  for  more  than  twenty-five  years  been  in 
force  in  Connecticut's  sister  state  of  Massachusetts, 
compelling  in  all  cases  where  the  tracks  of  different 
companies  cross  each  other  at  a  level  the  trains  of 
each  company  t-o  stop  before  reaching  the  crossing, 
and  then  to  pass  over  it  slowly.  The  danger  of 
collision  at  crossings  is  undoubtedly  much  greater 
than  that  of  going  through  open  draws.  Precau- 
tions against  danger  in  each  case  are  unquestion- 
ably proper  and  they  cannot  be  too  perfect,  but  to 
have  recourse  to  stopping  either  in  the  one  case  or 


AN  INADEQUATE  PROTECTION.  95 

the  other  simply  reveals  an  utter  ignorance  of  the 
great  advance  which  has  been  made  in  railroad  sig- 
nals and  the  science  of  interlocking.  In  both  these 
cases  it  is,  indeed,  entitled  to  just  about  the  same 
degree  of  respect  as  would  be  a  proposal  to  recur 
to  pioneer  engines  as  a  means  of  preventing  acci- 
dents to  night  trains. 

The  machinery  by  means  of  which  both  draws 
and  grade  crossings  can  be  protected,  will  be  re- 
ferred to  in  another  connection,*  meanwhile  it  is 
a  curious  fact  that  neither  at  grade  crossings  nor 
at  draws  has  the  mere  stopping  of  trains  proved 
a  sufficient  protection.  Several  times  in  the  ex- 
perience of  Massachusetts'  roads  have  those  in 
charge  of  locomotives,  after  stopping  and  while 
moving  at  a  slow  rate  of  speed,  actually  run  them- 
selves into  draws  with  their  eyes  open,  and  after- 
wards been  wholly  unable  to  give  any  satisfactory 
explanation  of  their  conduct.  But  the  insufficiency 
of  stopping  as  a  reliable  means  of  prevention  was 
especially  illustrated  in  the  case  of  an  accident  which 
occurred  upon  the  Boston  &  Maine  railroad  on  the 
morning  of  the  2ist  of  November,  1862,  when  the 
early  local  passenger  train  was  run  into  the  open 
draw  of  the  bridge  almost  at  the  entrance  to  the 
Boston  station.  It  so  happened  that  the  train  had 
stopped  at  the  Charlestown  station  just  before  going 
onto  the  bridge,  and  at  the  time  the  accident 
occurred  was  moving  at  a  speed  scarcely  faster  than 

*  Chapters  XVII  and  XVIII. 


96  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

a  man  could  walk;  and  yet  the  locomotive  was 
entirely  submerged,  as  the  water  at  that  point  is 
deep,  and  the  only  thing  which  probably  saved  the 
train  was  that  the  draw  was  so  narrow  and  the  cars 
were  so  long  that  the  foremost  one  lodged  across 
the  opening,  and  its  forward  end  only  was  beneath 
the  water.  At  the  rate  at  which  the  train  was  mov- 
ing the  resistance  thus  offered  was  sufficient  to  stop 
it,  though,  even  as  it  was,  no  less  than  six  persons 
lost  their  lives  and  a  much  larger  number  were  more 
or  less  injured.  Here  all  the  precautions  imposed 
by  the  Connecticut  law  were  taken,  and  served  only 
to  reveal  the  weak  point  in  it.  The  accident  was 
due  to  the  neglect  of  the  corporation  in  not  having 
the  draw  and  its  system  of  signals  interlocked  in 
such  a  way  that  the  movement  of  the  one  should 
automatically  cause  a  corresponding  movement  of 
the  other  ;  and  this  neglect  in  high  quarters  made  it 
possible  for  a  careless  employ^  to  open  the  draw  on 
a  particularly  dark  and  foggy  morning,  while  he 
forgot  at  the  same  time  to  shift  his  signals.  An 
exactly  similar  instance  of  carelessness  on  the 
part  of  an  employe  resulted  in  the  derailment  of  a 
train  upon  the  Long  Branch  line  of  the  Central 
Road  of  New  Jersey  at  the  Shrewsbury  river  draw 
on  August  9,  1877.  In  this  case  the  safety  signal 
was  shown  while  the  draw  fastening  had  been  left 
unsecured.  The  jar  of  the  passing  train  threw  the 
draw  slightjy  open  so  as  to  disconnect  the  tracks ; 
thus  causing  the  derailment  of  the  train,  which  sub- 


INTERLOCKING.  97 

sequently  plunged  over  the  side  of  the  bridge.  For- 
tunately the  tide  was  out,  or  there  would  have  been 
a  terrible  loss  of  life ;  as  it  was,  some  seventy  per- 
sons were  injured,  five  of  whom  subsequently  died. 
This  accident  also,  like  that  on  the  Boston  &  Maine 
road  in  1862,  very  forcibly  illustrated  the  necessity 
of  an  interlocking  apparatus.  The  safety  signal  was 
shown  before  the  draw  was  secured,  which  should 
have  been  impossible. 

Prior  to  the  year  1873  there  is  no  consecutive  re- 
cord of  this  or  any  other  class  of  railroad  accidents 
occurring  in  America,  but  during  the  six  years  1873-8 
there  occurred  twenty-one  cases  of  minor  disaster  at 
draws,  three  only  of  them  to  passenger  trains.  Al- 
together, excluding  the  Shrewsbury  river  accident, 
these  resulted  in  the  death  of  five  employe's  and  in- 
jury to  one  other.  No  passenger  was  hurt.  In 
Great  Britain  not  a  single  case  of  disaster  of  any 
description  has  been  reported  as  occurring  at  a  draw- 
bridge since  the  year  1870,  when  the  present  system 
of  official  Board  of  Trade  reports  was  begun.  The 
lesson  clearly  to  be  drawn  from  a  careful  investiga- 
tion of  all  the  American  accidents  reported  would 
seem  to  be  that  a  statute  provision  making  compul- 
sory the  interlocking  of  all  draws  in  railroad  bridges 
with  a  proper  and  infallible  system  of  signals  might 
have  claims  on  the  consideration  of  an  intelligent 
legislature  ;•  not  so  an  enactment  which  compels  the 
stopping  of  .trains  at  points  where  danger  is  small, 
and  makes  no  provision  as  respects  other  points 
where  it  is  great. 


98  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

BRIDGE    ACCIDENTS. 

GREAT  as  were  the  terrors  inspired  by  the  Nor- 
walk  disaster  in  those  comparatively  early  days  of 
railroad  experience,  and  deep  as  the  impression  on 
the  public  memory  must  have  been  to  leave  its 
mark  on  the  statute  book  even  to  the  present  time, 
that  and  the  similar  disaster  at  the  Richelieu  river 
are  believed  to  have  been  the  only  two  of  great 
magnitude  which  have  occurred  at  open  railroad 
draws.  That  this  should  be  so  is  well  calculated 
to  excite  surprise,  for  the  draw-bridge  precautions 
against  accident  in  America  are  wretchedly  crude 
and  inadequate,  amounting  as  a  rule  to  little  more 
than  the  primitive  balls  and  targets  by  day  and  lan- 
terns by  night,  without  any  system  of  alarms  or  in- 
terlocking. Electricity  as  an  adjunct  to  human  care, 
or  a  corrective  rather  of  human  negligence,  is  almost 
never  used  ;  and,  in  fact,  the  chief  reliance  is  still 
on  the  vigilance  of  engine-drivers.  But,  if  acci- 


ASH  TABULA  BRIDGE.  99 

dents  at  draws  have  been  comparatively  rare  and 
unattended  with  any  considerable  loss  of  life,  it 
has  been  far  otherwise  with  the  rest  of  the  struc- 
tures of  which  the  draw  forms  a  part.  Bridge  acci- 
dents in  fact  always  have  been,  and  will  probably 
always  remain,  incomparably  the  worst  to  which 
travel  by  rail  is  exposed.  It  would  be  impossible 
for  corporations  to  take  too  great  precautions 
against  them,  and  that  the  precautions  taken  are 
very  great  is  conclusively  shown  by  the  fact  that, 
with  thousands  of  bridges  many  times  each  day 
subjected  to  the  strain  of  the  passage  at  speed  of 
heavy  trains,  so  very  few  disasters  occur.  When 
they  do  occur,  however,  the  lessons  taught  by  them 
are,  though  distinct  enough,  apt  to  be  in  one  im- 
portant respect  of  a  far  less  satisfactory  character 
than  those  taught  by  collisions.  In  the  case  of 
these  last  the  great  resultant  fact  speaks  for  itself. 
The  whole  community  knows  when  it  sees  a  block 
system,  or  a  stronger  car  construction,  or  an  im- 
proved train  brake  suddenly  introduced  that  the 
sacrifice  has  not  been  in  vain — that  the  lesson  has 
been  learned.  It  is  by  no  means  always  so  in  the 
case  of  accidents  on  bridges.  With  these  the  cause 
of  disaster  is  apt  to  be  so  scientific  in  its  nature  that 
it  cannot  even  be  described,  except  through  the  use 
of  engineering  terms  which  to  the  mass  of  readers 
are  absolutely  incomprehensible.  The  simplest  of 
railroad  bridges  is  an  inexplicable  mystery  to  at 
least  ninety-nine  persons  out  of  each  hundred. 


100  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

Even  when  the  cause  of  disaster  is  understood,  the 
precautions  taken  against  its  recurrence  cannot  be 
seen.  From  the  nature  of  the  case  they  must  con- 
sist chiefly  of  a  better  material,  or  a  more  sci- 
entific construction,  or  an  increased  watchfulness 
on  the  part  of  officials  and  subordinates.  This, 
however,  is  not  apparent  on  the  surface,  and,  when 
the  next  accident  of  the  same  nature  occurs,  the 
inference,  as  inevitable  as  it  is  usually  unjust,  is 
at  once  drawn  that  the  one  which  preceded  it  had 
been  productive  of  no  results.  The  truth  of  this 
was  strongly  illustrated  by  the  two  bridge  acci- 
dents which  happened,  the  one  at  Ashtabula,  Ohio, 
on  the  29th  of  December,  1876,  and  the  other 
at  Tariffville,  Connecticut,  on  the  I5th  of  January, 
1878. 

There  has  been  no  recent  disaster  which  combined 
more  elements  of  horror  or  excited  more  widespread 
public  emotion  than  that  at  Ashtabula  bridge.  It 
was,  indeed,  so  terrible  in  its  character  and  so  heart- 
rending in  its  details,  that  for  the  time  being  it  fairly 
divided  the  attention  of  the  country  with  that  dis- 
pute over  the  presidential  succession,  then  the  sub- 
ject uppermost  in  the  minds  of  all.  A  blinding  north- 
easterly snow-storm,  accompanied  by  a  heavy  wind, 
prevailed  throughout  the  day  which  preceded  the 
accident,  greatly  impeding  the  movement  of  trains. 
The  Pacific  express  over  the  Michigan  Southern  & 
Lake  Shore  road  had  left  Erie,  going  west,  consider- 
ably behind  its  time,  and  had  been  started  only  with 


DECEMBER  29,  1876.  TO  I 

great  difficulty  and  with  the  assistance  of  four  loco- 
motives. It  was  due  at  Ashtabula  at  about  5.30 
o'clock  P.M.,  but  was  three  hours  late,  and,  the  days 
being  then  at  their  shortest,  when  it  arrived  at  the 
bridge  which  was  the  scene  of  the  accident  the  dark- 
ness was  so  great  that  nothing  could  be  seen  through 
the  driving  snow  by  those  on  the  leading  locomotive 
even  for  a  distance  of  50  feet  ahead.  The  train  was 
made  up  of  two  heavy  locomotives,  four  baggage, 
mail  and  express  cars,  one  smoking  car,  two  ordinary 
coaches,  a  drawing-room  car  and  three  sleepers,  be- 
ing in  all  two  locomotives  and  eleven  cars,  in  the 
order  named,  containing,  as  nearly  as  can  be  ascer- 
tained, 190  human  beings,  of  whom  170  were  pas- 
sengers. Ashtabula  bridge  is  situated  only  about 
1,000  feet  east  of  the  station  of  the  same  name,  and 
spans  a  deep  ravine,  at  the  bottom  of  which  flows  a 
shallow  stream,  some  two  or  three  feet  in  depth, 
which  empties  into  Lake  Erie  a  mile  or  two  away. 
The  bridge  was  an  iron  Howe  truss  of  150  feet  span, 
elevated  69  feet  above  the  bottom  of  the  ravine,  and 
supported  at  either  end  by  solid  masonwork  abut- 
ments. It  had  been  built  some  fourteen  years.  As 
the  train  approached  the  bridge  it  had  to  force  its 
way  through  a  heavy  snow-drift,  and,  when  it  passed 
onto  it,  it  was  moving  at  a  speed  of  some  twelve  or 
fourteen  miles  an  hour.  The  entire  length  of  the 
bridge  afforded  space  only  for  two  of  the  express 
cars  at  most  in  addition  to  the  locomotives,  so  that 
when  the  wheels  of  the  leading  locomotive  rested 


IO2  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

on  the  western  abutment  of  the  bridge  nine  of  the 
eleven  cars  which  made  up  the  train,  including  all 
those  in  which  there  were  passengers,  had  yet  to 
reach  its  eastern  end.  At  the  instant  when  the 
train  stood  in  this  position,  the  engineer  of  the 
leading  locomotive  heard  a  sudden  cracking  sound 
apparently  beneath  him,  and  thought  he  felt  the 
bridge  giving  way.  Instantly  pulling  the  throttle 
valve  wide  open,  his  locomotive  gave  a  spring  for- 
ward and,  as  it  did  so,  the  bridge  fell,  the  rear  wheels 
of  his  tender  falling  with  it.  The  jerk  and  impetus 
of  the  locomotive,  however,  sufficed  to  tear  out  the 
coupling,  and  as  his  tender  was  dragged  up  out  of  the 
abyss  onto  the  track,  though  its  rear  wheels  did  not 
get  upon  the  rails,  the  frightened  engineer  caught 
a  fearful  glimpse  of  the  second  locomotive  as  it 
seemed  to  turn  and  then  fall  bottom  upwards  into 
the  ravine.  The  bridge  had  given  way,  not  at 
once  but  by  a  slowly  sinking  motion,  which  be- 
gan at  the  point  where  the  pressure  was  heaviest, 
under  the  two  locomotives  and  at  the  west  abut- 
ment. There  being  two  tracks,  and  this  train  being 
on  the  southernmost  of  the  two,  the  southern  truss 
had  first  yielded,  letting  that  side  of  the  bridge 
down,  and  rolling,  as  it  were,  the  second  locomo- 
tive and  the  cars  immediately  behind  it  off  to  the 
left  and  quite  clear  of  a  straight  line  drawn  be- 
tween the  two  abutments ;  then  almost  imme- 
diately the  other  truss  gave  way  and  the  whole 
bridge  fell,  but  in  doing  so  swung  slightly  to  the 


SNOW  AND  FIRE.  103 

right.  Before  this  took  place  the  entire  train  with 
the  exception  of  the  last  two  sleepers  had  reached 
the  chasm,  each  car  as  it  passed  over  falling  nearer 
than  the  one  which  had  preceded  it  to  the  east 
abutment,  and  finally  the  last  two  sleepers  came, 
and,  without  being  deflected  from  their  course  at 
all,  plunged  straight  down  and  fell  upon  the  wreck 
of  the  bridge  at  its  east  end.  It  was  necessarily 
all  the  work  of  a  few  seconds. 

At  the  bottom  of  the  ravine  the  snow  lay  waist 
deep  and  the  stream  was  covered  with  ice  some 
eight  inches  in  thickness.  Upon  this  were  piled  up 
the  fallen  cars  and  engine,  the  latter  on  top  of  the 
former  near  the  western  abutment  and  upside  down. 
All  the  passenger  cars  were  heated  by  stoves.  At 
first  a  dead  silence  seemed  to  follow  the  successive 
shocks  of  the  falling  mass.  In  less  than  two  min- 
utes, however,  the  fire  began  to  show  itself  and 
within  fifteen  the  holocaust  was  at  its  height.  As 
usual,  it  was  a  mass  of  human  beings,  all  more  or 
less  stunned,  a  few  killed,  many  injured  and  help- 
less, and  more  yet  simply  pinned  down  to  watch,  in 
the  possession  as  *full  as  helpless  of  all  their  fac- 
ulties, the  rapid  approach  of  the  flames.  The  num- 
ber of  those  killed  outright  seems  to  have  been  sur- 
prisingly small.  In  the  last  car,  for  instance,  no  one 
was  lost.  This  was  due  to  the  energy  and  presence 
of  mind  of  the  porter,  a  negro  named  Steward,  who, 
when  he  felt  the  car  resting  firmly  on  its  side,  broke 
a  window  and  crawled  through  it,  and  then  passed 


104  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

along  breaking  the  other  windows  and  extricating  the 
passengers  until  all  were  gotten  out.  Those  in  the 
other  cars  were  far  less  fortunate.  Though  an  im- 
mediate alarm  had  been  given  in  the  neighboring 
town,  the  storm  was  so  violent  and  "the  snow  so 
deep  that  assistance  arrived  but  slowly.  Nor  when 
it  did  arrive  could  much  be  effected.  The  essential 
thing  was  to  extinguish  the  flames.  The  means  for 
so  doing  were  close  at  hand  in  a  steam  pump  be- 
longing to  the  railroad  company,  while  an  abundance 
of  hose  could  have  been  procured  at  another  place 
but  a  short  distance  off.  In  the  excitement  and 
agitation  of  the  moment  contradictory  orders  were 
given,  even  to  fordidding  the  use  of  the  pump,  and 
practically  no  effort  to  extinguish  the  fire  was  made. 
Within  half  an  hour  of  the  accident  the  flames  were 
at  their  height,  and  when  the  next  morning  dawned 
nothing  remained  in  the  ravine  but  a  charred  and 
undistinguishable  mass  of  car  trucks,  brake-rods, 
twisted  rails  and  bent  and  tangled  bridge  iron, 
with  the  upturned  locomotive  close  to  the  west 
abutment. 

In  this  accident  some  eighty  persons  are  supposed 
to  have  lost  their  lives,  while  over  sixty  others  were 
injured.  The  exact  number  of  those  killed  can 
never  be  known,  however,  as  more  than  half  of 
those  reported  were  utterly  consumed  in  the  fire  ; 
indeed,  even  of  the  bodies  recovered  scarcely  one 
half  could  be  identified.  Of  the  cause  of  the  disas- 
ter much  was  said  at  the  time  in  language  most  un- 


A   STOVE-DISASTER  AS    WELL.  10$ 

necessarily  scientific  ; — but  little  was  required  to  be 
said.  It  admitted  of  no  extenuation.  An  iron 
bridge,  built  in  the  early  days  of  iron-bridges, — that 
which  fell  under  the  train  at  Ashtabula,  was  faulty 
in  its  original  construction,  and  the  indications  of 
weakness  it  had  given  had  been  distinct,  but  had 
not  been  regarded.  That  it  had  stood  so  long  and 
that  it  should  have  given  way  when  it  did,  were 
equally  matters  for  surprise.  A  double  track  bridge, 
it  should  naturally  have  fallen  under  the  combined 
pressure  of  trains  moving  simultaneously  in  oppo- 
site directions.  The  strain  under  which  it  yielded 
was  not  a  particularly  severe  one,  even  taken  in  con- 
nection with  the  great  atmospheric  pressure  of  the 
storm  then  prevailing.  It  was,  in  short,  one  of  those 
disasters,  fortunately  of  infrequent  occurrence,  with 
which  accident  has  little  if  any  connection.  It  was 
due  to  original  inexperience  and  to  subsequent  ig- 
norance or  carelessness,  or  possibly  recklessness  as 
criminal  as  it  was  fool-hardy. 

Besides  being  a  bridge  accident,  this  was  also  a 
stove  accident, — in  this  respect  a  repetition  of  An- 
gola. One  of  the  most  remarkable  features  about 
it,  indeed,  was  the  fearful  rapidity  with  which  the 
fire  spread,  and  the  incidents  of  its  spread  detailed 
in  the  subsequent  evidence  of  the  survivors  were 
simply  horrible.  Men,  women  and  children,  full  of 
the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  were  caught  and 
pinned  fast  for  the  advancing  flames,  while  those 
who  tried  to  rescue  them  were  driven  back  by  the 


106  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

heat  and  compelled  helplessly  to  listen  to  their 
shrieks.  It  is,  however,  unnecessary  to  enter  into 
these  details,  for  they  are  but  the  repetition  of  an 
experience  which  has  often  been  told,  and  they  do 
but  enforce  a  lesson  which  the  railroad  companies 
seem  resolved  not  to  learn.  Unquestionably  the 
time  in  this  country  will  come  when  through  trains 
will  be  heated  from  a  locomotive  or  a  heating-car. 
That  time,  however,  had  not  yet  come.  Mean- 
while the  evidence  would  seem  to  show  that  at 
Ashtabula,  as  at  Angola,  at  least  two  lives  were 
sacrificed  in  the  subsequent  fire  to  each  one  lost  in 
the  immediate  shock  of  the  disaster.* 

But  a  few  days  more  than  a  year  after  the  Ashta- 
bula accident  another  catastrophe,  almost  exactly 
similar  in  its  details,  occurred  on  the  Connecticut 
Western  road.  It  is  impossible  to  even  estimate 
the  amount  of  overhauling  to  which  bridges 
throughout  the  country  had  in  the  meanwhile  been 
subjected,  or  the  increased  care  used  in  their  exami- 


*  The  Angola  was  probably  the  most  impressively  horrible  of  the 
many  "stove  accidents."  That  \vhich  occurred  near  Prospect,  N.  Y., 
upon  the  Buffalo,  Corry  &  Pittsburgh  road,  on  December  24,  1872, 
should  not,  however,  be  forgotten.  In  this  case  a  trestle  bridge  gave 
way  precipitating  a  passenger  train  some  thirty  feet  to  the  bottom  of  a 
ravine,  where  the  cars  caught  fire  from  the  stoves.  Nineteen  lives 
were  lost,  mostly  by  burning.  The  Richmond  Switch  disaster  of 
April  19,  1873,  on  the  New  York,  Providence  &  Boston  road  was  of 
the  same  character.  Three  passengers  only  were  there  burned  to 
death,  but  after  the  disaster  the  flames  rushed  "through  the  car  as 
quickly  as  if  the  wood  had  been  a  lot  of  hay, '  and,  after  those  who 
were  endeavoring  to  release  the  wounded  and  imprisoned  men  were 
driven  away,  their  cries  were  for  some  time  heard  through  the  smoke 
and  flame. 


THE  TARIFFVILLE  BRIDGE.  1 07 

nation.  All  that  can  be  said  is  that  during  the  year 
1877  no  serious  accident  due  to  the  inherent  weak- 
ness of  any  bridge  occcurred  on  the  70,000  miles  of 
American  railroad.  Neither,  so  far  as  can  be  ascer- 
tained, was  the  Tariffville  disaster  to  be  referred  to 
that  cause.  It  happened  on  the  evening  of  January 
15,  1878.  A  large  party  of  excursionists  were  re- 
turning from  a  Moody  and  Sankey  revival  meeting 
on  a  special  train,  consisting  of  two  locomotives 
and  ten  cars.  Half  a  mile  west  of  Tariffville  the 
railroad  crosses  the  Farmington  river.  The  bridge 
at  this  point  was  a  wooden  Howe  truss,  with 
two  spans  of  163  feet  each.  It  had  been  in  use 
about  seven  years  and,  originally  of  ample 
strength  and  good  construction,  there  is  no  evi- 
dence that  its  strength  had  since  been  unduly  im- 
paired by  neglect  or  exposure.  It  should,  there- 
fore, have  sufficed  to  bear  twice  the  strain  to  which 
it  was  now  subjected.  Exactly  as  at  Ashtabula, 
however,  the  west  span  of  the  bridge  gave  way 
under  the  train  just  as  the  leading  locomotives 
passed  onto  the  tressel-work  beyond  it :  the  ice 
broke  under  the  falling  wreck,  and  the  second  loco- 
motive with  four  cars  were  precipitated  into  the 
river.  The  remaining  cars  were  stopped  by  the 
rear  end  of  the  third  car,  resting  as  it  did  on 
the  centre  pier  of  the  bridge,  and  did  not  leave 
the  rails.  The  fall  to  the  surface  of  the  ice  was 
about  ten  feet.  There  was  no  fire  to  add  to  the 
horrors  in  this  case,  but  thirteen  persons  were 


108  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

crushed   to     death    or    drowned,    and    thirty-three 
others  injured.* 

Naturally  the  popular  inference  was  at  once 
drawn  that  this  was  a  mere  repetition  of  the 
Ashtabula  experience, — that  the  fearful  earlier  les- 
son had  been  thrown  away  on  a  corporation  either 
unwilling  or  not  caring  to  learn.  The  newspapers 
far  and  wide  resounded  with  ill  considered  de- 
nunciation, and  the  demand  was  loud  for  legislation 
of  the  crudest  conceivable  character,  especially  a 
law  prohibiting  the  passage  over  any  bridge  of  two 
locomotives  attached  to  one  passenger  train.  The 
fact,  however,  seems  to  be  that,  except  in  its  super- 
ficial details,  the  Tariffville  disaster  had  no  features 
in  common  with  that  at  Ashtabula ;  as  nearly  as 
can  be  ascertained  it  was  due  neither  to  the  weak- 


*  Of  the  same  general  character  with  the  Tariffville  and  Ashtabula 
accidents  were  those  which  occurred  on  November  I,  1855,  upon  the 
Pacific  railroad  of  Missouri  at  the  bridge  over  the  Gasconade,  and 
on  July  27,  1875,  upon  the  Northern  Pacific  at  the  bridge  over  the 
Mississippi  near  Brainerd.  In  the  first  of  these  accidents  the  bridge 
gave  way  under  an  excursion  train,  in  honor  of  the  opening  of  the 
road,  and  its  chief  engineer  was  among  the  killed.  The  train  fell 
some  thirty  feet,  and  22  persons  lost  their  lives  while  over  50  suffered 
serious  injuries. 

At  Brainerd  the  train, — a  "mixed"  one, — went  down  nearly  80 
feet  into  the  river.  The  locomotive  and  several  cars  had  passed  the 
span  which  fell,  in  safety,  but  were  pulled  back  and  went  down  on 
top  of  the  train.  There  were  but  few  passengers  in  it,  of  whom  three 
were  killed.  In  falling  the  caboose  car  at  the  rear  of  the  train,  in 
which  most  of  the  passengers  were,  struck  on  a  pier  and  broke  in  two, 
leaving  several  passengers  in  it.  In  the  case  of  the  Gasconade,  the 
disaster  was  due  to  the  weakness  of  the  bridge,  which  fell  under  the 
weight  of  the  train.  There  is  some  question  as  to  the  Brainerd  ac- 
cident, whether  it  was  occasioned  by  weakness  of  the  bridge  or  the 
derailment  upon  it  of  a  freight  car. 


JANUARY  15,   1878.  109 

ness  nor  to  the  overloading  of  the  bridge.  Though 
the  evidence  subsequently  given  is  not  absolutely 
conclusive  on  this  point,  the  probabilities  would 
seem  to  be  that,  while  on  the  bridge,  the  second 
locomotive  was  derailed  in  some  unexplained  way 
and  consequently  fell  on  the  stringers  which  yielded 
under  the  sudden  blow.  The  popular  impression, 
therefore,  as  to  the  bearing  which  the  first  of  these 
two  strikingly  similar  accidents  had  upon  the  last 
tended  only  to  bring  about  results  worse  than  use- 
less. The  bridge  fell,  not  under  the  steady  weight 
of  two  locomotives,  but  under  the  sudden  shock 
incident  to  the  derailment  of  one.  The  remedy, 
therefore,  lay  in  the  direction  of  so  planking  or 
otherwise  guarding  the  floors  of  similar  bridges  that 
in  case  of  derailment  the  locomotives  or  cars  should 
not  fall  on  the  stringers  or  greatly  diverge  from  the 
rails  so  as  to  endanger  the  trusses.  On  the  other 
hand  the  suggestion  of  a  law  prohibiting  the  passage 
over  bridges  of  more  than  one  locomotive  with  any 
passenger  train,  while  in  itself  little  better  than  a 
legal  recognition  of  bad  bridge  building,  also  served 
to  divert  public  attention  from  the  true  lesson  of 
the  disaster.  Another  newspaper  precaution,  very 
favorably  considered  at  the  time,  was  the  putting 
of  one  locomotive,  where  two  had  to  be  used,  at  the 
rear  end  of  the  train  as  a  pusher,  instead  of  both  in 
front.  This  expedient  might  indeed  obviate  one 
cause  of  danger,  but  it  would  do  so  only  by  substi- 
tuting for  it  another  which  has  been  the  fruitful 


110  RA ILROAD  A  CCIDENTS. 

source  of  some  of  the  worst  railroad  disasters  on 
record.* 

*  "  The  objectionable  and  dangerous  practice  also  employed  on 
some  railways  of  assisting  trains  up  inclines  by  means  of  pilot  en- 
gines in  the  rear  instead  of  in  front,  has  led  to  several  accidents  in 
the  past  year  and  should  be  discontinued." — General  Report  to  the 
Board  of  Trade  upon  the  Accidents  on  the  Railways  of  Great  Britain 
in  1878,  /.  15. 


BRIDGE  GUARDS.  Ill 


CHAPTER   XII. 

THE    PROTECTION    OF    BRIDGES. 

LONG,  varied  and  terrible  as  the  record  of  bridge 
disasters  has  become,  there  are,  nevertheless,  certain 
very  simple  and  inexpensive  precautions  against 
them,  which,  altogether  too  frequently,  corporations 
do  not  and  will  not  take.  At  As.htabula  the  bridge 
gave  way.  There  was  no  derailment  as  there  seems 
to  have  been  at  Tariffville.  The  sustaining  power 
of  a  bridge  is,  of  course,  a  question  comparatively 
difficult  of  ascertainment.  A  fatal  weakness  in  this 
respect  may  be  discernable  only  to  the  eye  of  a 
trained  expert.  Derailment,  however,  either  upon 
a  bridge  or  when  approaching  it,  is  in  the  vast 
majority  of  cases  a  danger  perfectly  easy  to  guard 
against.  The  precautions  are  simple  and  they  are 
not  expensive,  yet,  taking  the  railroads  of  the  United 
States  as  a  whole,  it  may  well  be  questioned  whether 
the  bridges  at  which  they  have  been  taken  do  not 
constitute  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule.  Not 


1 1 2  RAILROAD  A  CCIDENTS. 

only  is  the  average  railroad  superintendent  accus- 
tomed to  doing  his  work  and  running  his  road  under 
a  constant  pressure  to  make  both  ends  meet,  which, 
as  he  well  knows,  causes  his  own  daily  bread  to  de- 
penci  upon  the  economies  he  can  effect ;  but,  while 
he  finds  it  hard  work  at  best  to  provide  for  the 
multifarious  outlays,  long  immunity  from  disaster 
breeds  a  species  of  recklessness  even  in  the  most 
cautious  : — and  yet  the  single  mishap  in  a  thousand 
must  surely  fall  to  the  lot  of  some  one.  Many 
years  ago  the  terrible  results  which  must  soon  or 
late  be  expected  wherever  the  consequences  of  a 
derailment  on  the  approaches  to  a  bridge  are  not 
securely  guarded  against,  were  illustrated  by  a  dis- 
aster on  the  Great  Western  railroad  of  Canada,  which 
combined  many  of  the  worst  horrors  of  both  the 
Norwalk  and  the  New  Hamburg  tragedies;  more 
recently  the  almost  forgotten  lesson  was  enforced 
again  on  the  Vermont  &  Massachusetts  road,  upon 
the  bridge  over  the  Miller  River,  at  Athol.  The 
accident  last  referred  to  occurred  on  the  i6th  of 
June,  1870,  but,  though  forcible  enough  as  a  re- 
minder, it  was  tame  indeed  in  comparison  with  the 
Des  Jardines  Canal  disaster,  which  is  still  remem- 
bered though  it  happened  so  long  ago  as  the  i/th 
of  March,  1857. 

The  Great  Western  railroad  of  Canada  crossed 
the  canal  by  a  bridge  at  an  elevation  of  about  sixty 
feet.  At  the  time  of  the  accident  there  were  some 
eighteen  feet  of  water  in  the  canal,  though,  as  is 


THE  DES  JARDINES  CANAL.  1 1  3 

usual  in  Canada  at  that  season,  it  was  covered  by 
ice  some  two  feet  in  thickness.  On  the  afternoon 
of  the  i /th  of  March  as  the  local  accommodation 
train  from  Hamilton  was  nearing  the  bridge,  its  loco- 
motive, though  it  was  then  moving  at  a  very  slow 
rate  of  speed,  was  in  some  way  thrown  from  the 
track  and  onto  the  timbers  of  the  bridge.  These 
it  cut  through,  and  then  falling  heavily  on  the  string- 
pieces  it  parted  them,  and  instantly  pitched  head- 
long down  upon  the  frozen  surface  of  the  canal  be- 
low, dragging  after  it  the  tender,  baggage  car  and 
two  passenger  cars,  which  composed  the  whole  train. 
There  was  nothing  whatever  to  break  the  fall  of 
sixty  feet ;  and  even  then  two  feet  of  ice  only  inter- 
vened between  the  ruins  of  the  train  and  the  bottom 
of  the  canal  eighteen  feet  below.  Two  feet  of  solid 
ice  will  afford  no  contemptible  resistance  to  a  falling 
body ;  the  locomotive  and  tender  crushed  heavily 
through  it  and  instantly  sank  out  of  sight.  In  fall- 
ing the  baggage  car  struck  a  corner  of  the  tender  and 
was  thus  thrown  some  ten  yards  to  one  side,  and  was 
followed  by  the  first  passenger  car,  which,  turning  a 
somersault  as  it  went,  fell  on  its  roof  and  was  crush- 
ed to  fragments,  but  only  partially  broke  through 
the  ice,  upon  which  the  next  car  fell  endwise,  and 
rested  in  that  position.  That  every  human  being 
in  the  first  car  was  either  crushed  or  drowned  seems 
most  natural ;  the  only  cause  for  astonishment  is 
found  in  the  fact  that  any  one  should  have  survived 
such  a  catastrophe, — a  tumble  of  sixty  feet  on  ice 


114  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

as  solid  as  a  rock !  Yet  of  four  persons  in  the  bag- 
gage car  three  went  down  with  it,  and  not  one  of 
them  was  more  than  slightly  injured.  The  engineer 
and  fireman,  and  the  occupants  of  the  second  pas- 
senger car,  were  less  fortunate.  The  former  were 
found  crushed  under  the  locomotive  at  the  bottom 
of  the  canal ;  while  of  the  latter  ten  were  killed,  and 
not  one  escaped  severe  injury.  Very  rarely  indeed  in 
the  history  of  railroad  accidents  have  so  large  a 
portion  of  those  on  the  train  lost  their  lives  as  in 
this  case,  for  out  of  ninety  persons  sixty  perished, 
and  in  the  number  was  included  every  woman  and 
child  among  the  passengers,  with  a  single  excep- 
tion. 

There  were  two  circumstances  about  this  disaster 
worthy  of  especial  notice.  In  the  first  place,  as- 
well  as  can  now  he  ascertained  in  the  absence  of 
any  trustworthy  record  of  an  investigation  into 
causes,  the  accident  was  easily  preventable.  It 
appears  to  have  been  immediately  caused  by  the 
derailment  of  a  locomotive,  however  occasioned, 
just  as  it  was  entering  on  a  swing  draw-bridge. 
Thrown  from  the  tracks,  there  was  nothing  in  the 
flooring  to  prevent*  the  derailed  locomotive  from 
deflecting  from  its  course  until  it  toppled  over  the 
ends  of  the  ties,  nor  were  the  ties  and  the  flooring 
apparently  sufficiently  strong  to  sustain  it  even 
while  it  held  to  its  course.  Under  such  circum- 
stances the  derailment  of  a  locomotive  upon  any 
bridge  can  mean  only  destruction  ;  it  meant  it  then, 


BRIDGE  DERAILMENTS.  1 1 5 

it  means  it  now  ;  and  yet  our  country  is  to-day  full 
of  bridges  constructed  in  an  exactly  similar  way. 
To  make  accidents  from  this  cause,  if  not  impossible 
at  least  highly  improbable,  it  is  only  necessary  to 
make  the  ties  and  flooring  of  all  bridges  between  the 
tracks  and  for  three  feet  on  either  side  of  them  suf- 
ficiently strong  to  sustain  the  whole  weight  of  a 
train  off  the  track  and  in  motion,  while  a  third  rail, 
or  strong  truss  of  wood,  securely  fastened,  should 
be  laid  down  midway  between  the  rails  throughout 
the  entire  length  of  the  bridge  and  its  approaches^ 
With  this  arrangement,  as  the  flanges  of  the  wheels 
are  on  the  inside,  it  must  follow  that  in  case  of  de- 
railment and  a  divergence  to  one  side  or  the  other 
of  the  bridge,  the  inner  side  of  the  flange  will  come 
against  the  central  rail  or  truss  just  so  soon  as  the 
divergence  amounts  to  half  the  space  between  the 
rails,  which  in  the  ordinary  gauge  is  two  feet  and 
four  inches.  The  wheels  must  then  glide  along  this 
guard,  holding  the  train  from  any  further  divergence 
from  its  course,  until  it  can  be  checked.  Meanwhile, 
as  the  ties  and  flooring  extend  for  the  space  of  three 
feet  outside  of  the  track,  a  sufficient  support  is  fur- 
nished by  them  for  the  other  wheels.  A  legislative 
enactment  compelling  the  construction  of  all  bridges 
in  this  way,  coupled  with  additional  provisions  for 
interlocking  of  draws  with  their  signals  in  cases  of 
bridges  across  navigable  waters,  would  be  open  to 
objection  that  laws  against  dangers  of  accident  by 
rail  have  almost  invariably  proved  ineffective  when 


I  1 6  RA ILROAD  A  CCIDENTS. 

they  were  not  absurd,  but  in  itself,  if  enforced, 
it  might  not  improbably  render  disasters  like 
those  at  Norwalk  and  Des  Jardines  terrors  of  the 
past. 


CAR-COUPLING. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

CAR-COUPLINGS   IN    DERAILMENTS. 

WHOLLY  apart  from  the  derailment,  which  was 
the  real  occasion  of  the  Des  Jardines  disaster,  there 
was  one  other  cause  which  largely  contributed  to 
its  fatality,  if  indeed  that  fatality  was  not  in  greatest 
part  immediately  due  to  it. 

The  question  as  to  what  is  the  best  method  of 
coupling  together  the  several  individual  vehicles 
which  make  up  every  railroad  train  has  always  been 
much  discussed  among  railroad  mechanics.  The  de- 
cided weight  of  opinion  has  been  in  favor  of  the 
strongest  and  closest  couplings,  so  that  under  no  cir- 
cumstances should  the  train  separate  into  parts. 
Taking  all  forms  of  railroad  accident  together,  this 
conclusion  is  probably  sound.  It  is,  however,  at  best 
only  a  balancing  of  disadvantages, — a  mere  question 
as  to  which  practice  involves  the  least  amount  of 
danger.  Yet  a  very  terrible  demonstration  that  there 
are  two  sides  to  this  as  to  most  other  questions 


Il8  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

was  furnished  at  Des  Jardines.  It  was  the  custom 
on  the  Great  Western  road  not  only  to  couple  the 
cars  together  in  the  method  then  in  general  use,  but 
also,  as  is  often  done  now,  to  connect  them  by  heavy 
chains  on  each  side  of  the  centre  coupling.  Accord- 
ingly when  the  locomotive  broke  through  the  Des 
Jardines  bridge,  it  dragged  the  rest  of  the  train  hope- 
lessly after  it.  This  certainly  would  not  have  hap- 
pened had  the  modern  self-coupler  been  in  use,  and 
probably  would  not  have  happened  had  the  cars 
been  connected  only  by  the  ordinary  link  and  pins ; 
for  the  train  was  going  very  slowly,  and  the  signal 
for  brakes  was  given  in  ample  time  to  apply  them 
vigorously  before  the  last  cars  came  to  the  opening, 
into  which  they  were  finally  dragged  by  the  dead 
weight  before  them  and  not  hurried  by  their  own 
momentum. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  have  not  far  to  go  in  search 
of  scarcely  less  fatal  disasters  illustrating  with  equal 
force  the  other  side  of  the  proposition,  in  the  terri- 
ble consequences  which  have  ensued  from  the  sep- 
aration of  cars  in  cases  of  derailment.  Take,  for 
instance,  the  memorable  accident  of  June  17,  1858, 
near  Port  Jervis,  on  the  Erie  railway. 

As  the  express  train  from  New  York  was  running 
at  a  speed  of  about  thirty  miles  an  hour  over  a  per- 
fectly straight  piece  of  track  between  Otisville  and 
Port  Jervis^shortly  after  dark  on  the  evening  of  that 
day,  it  encountered  a  broken  rail.  The  train  was 
made  up  of  a  locomotive,  two  baggage  cars  and  five 


THE  PORT  JERVIS  DERAILMENT. 

passenger  cars,  all  of  which  except  the  last  passed 
safely  over  the  fractured  rail.  The  last  car  was  ap- 
parently derailed,  and  drew  the  car  before  it  off 
the  track.  These  two  cars  were  then  dragged  along, 
swaying  fearfully  from  side  to  side,  for  a  distance 
of  some  four  hundred  feet,  when  the  couplings 
at  last  snapped  and  they  went  over  the  embank- 
ment, which  was  there  some  thirty  feet  in  height. 
As  they  rushed  down  the  slope  the  last  car  turned 
fairly  over,  resting  finally  on  its  roof,  while  one  of 
its  heavy  iron  trucks  broke  through  and  fell  upon 
the  passengers  beneath,  killing  and  maiming  them. 
The  other  car,  more  fortunate,  rested  at  last  upon 
its  side  on  a  pile  of  stones  at  the  foot  of  the  em- 
bankment. Six  persons  were  killed  and  fifty  severely 
injured;  all  of  the  former  in  the  last  car. 

In  this  case,  had  the  couplings  held,  the  derailed 
cars  would  not  have  gone  over  the  embankment  and 
but  slight  injuries  would  have  been  sustained.  Mod- 
ern improvements  have,  however,  created  safeguards 
sufficient  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  other  acci- 
dents under  the  same  conditions  as  that  at  Port 
Jervis.  The  difficulty  lay  in  "the  inability  to  stop  a 
train,  though  moving  at  only  moderate  speed,  within 
a  reasonable  time.  The  wretched  inefficiency  of  the 
old  hand-brake  in  a  sudden  emergency  received  one 
more  illustration.  The  train  seems  to  have  run 
nearly  half  a  mile  after  the  accident  took  place  be- 
fore it  could  be  stopped,  although  the  engineer  had 
instant  notice  of.  it  and  reversed  his  locomotive. 


120  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

The  couplings  did  not  snap  until  a  distance  "had 
been  traversed  in  which  the  modern  train-brake 
would  have  reduced  the  speed  to  a  point  at  which 
they  would  have  been  subjected  to  no  dangerous 
strain. 

The  accident  ten  years  later  at  Carr's  Rock,  six- 
teen miles  west  of  Port  Jervis,  on  the  same  road,  was 
again  very  similar  to  the  one  just  described :  and 
yet  in  this  case  the  parting  of  the  couplings  alone 
prevented  the  rear  of  the  train  from  dragging  its 
head  to  destruction.  Both  disasters  were  occasioned 
by  broken  rails  ;  but,  while  the  first  occurred  on  a 
tangent,  the  last  was  at  a  point  where  the  road 
skirted  the  hills,  by  a  sharp  curve,  upon  the  outer 
side  of  which  was  a  steep  declivity  of  some  eighty 
feet,  jagged  with  rock  and  bowlders.  It  befell 
the  night  express  on  the  I4th  of  April,  1876.7  ^ 
The  train  was  a  long  one,  consisting  of  the  locomo- 
tive, three  baggage  and  express,  and  seven  passen- 
ger cars,  and  it  encountered  the  broken  rail  while 
rounding  the  curve  at  a  high  rate  of  speed.  Again 
all  except  the  last  car,  passed  over  the  fracture  in 
safety;  this  was  snapped,  as  it  were,  off  the  track 
and  over  the  embankment.  At  first  it  was  dragged 
along,  but  only  for  a  short  distance ;  the  intense 
strain  then  broke  the  coupling  between  the  four 
rear  cars  and  the  head  of  the  train,  and,  the  last  of 
the  four  being  already  over  the  embankment,  the 
others  almost  instantly  toppled  over  after  it  and 
rolled  down  the  ravine.  A  passenger  on  this  por- 


THE  DERAILMENT  AT  CARRES  ROCK.         121 

tion  of  the  train,  described  the  car  he  was  in  "  as 
going  over  and  over,  until  the  outer  roof  was  torn 
off,  the  sides  fell  out,  and  the  inner  roof  was  crushed 
in."  Twenty-four  persons  were  killed  and  eighty 
injured ;  but  in  this  instance,  as  in  that  at  Des 
Jardines,  the  only  occasion  for  surprise  was  that 
there  were  any  survivors. 

Accidents  arising  from  the  parting  of  defective 
couplings  have  of  course  not  been  uncommon,  and 
they  constitute  one  of  the  greatest  dangers  incident 
to  heavy  gradients ;  in  surmounting  inclines  freight 
trains  will,  it  is  found,  break  in  two,  and  their  hinder 
parts  come  thundering  down  the  grade,  as  was  seen 
at  Abergele.  The  American  passenger  trains,  in 
which  each  car  is  provided  with  brakes,  are  much 
less  liable  than  the  English,  the  speed  of  which  is 
regulated  by  brake-vans,  to  accidents  of  this  descrip- 
tion. Indeed,  it  may  be  questioned  whether  in 
America  any  serious  disaster  has  occurred  from  the 
fact  that  a  portion  of  a  passenger  train  on  a  road 
operated  by  steam  got  beyond  control  in  descending 
an  incline.  There  have  been,  however,  terrible 
catastrophes  from  this  cause  in  England,  and  that 
on  the  Lancashire  &  Yorkshire  road  near  Helm- 
shere,  a  station  some  fourteen  miles  north  of  Man- 
chester, deserves  a  prominent  place  in  the  record 
of  railroad  accidents. 

It  occurred  in  the  early  hours  of  the  morning  of 
the  4th  of  September,  1860.  There  had  been  a 
great  fete  at  the  Bellevue  Gardens  in  Manchester  on 


122  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

the  3d,  upon  the  conclusion  of  which  some  twenty- 
five  hundred  persons  crowded  at  once  upon  the  re- 
turn trains.     Of  these  there  were,  on  the  Lancashire 
&  Yorkshire  road,  three ;  the  first  consisting  of  four- 
teen, the  second  of  thirty-one,  and  the  last  of  twenty- 
four  carriages  :  and  they  were  started,  with  intervals 
of  tun  minutes  between  them,  at  about  eleven  o'clock 
at   night.     The   first    train  finished   its  journey  in 
safety.     Not  so    the    second    and    the   third.     The 
Helmshere  station  is  at  the  top  of  a  steep  incline. 
This  the  second  train,  drawn  by  two   locomotives, 
surmounted,  and   then  stopped  for  the  delivery  of 
passengers.     While  these  were  leaving  the  carriages, 
a   snap   as  of    fractured    iron    was   heard,    and   the 
guards,  looking  back,  saw  the  whole  rear  portion  of 
the  train,   consisting  of  seventeen  carriages  and   a 
brake-van,  detached  from  the  rest  of  it  and  quietly 
slipping  down  the  incline.     The   detached  portion 
was  moving  so  slowly  that  one  of  the  guards  suc- 
ceeded in  catching  the  van  and  applying  the  brakes ; 
it  was,  however,  already  too  late.     The  velocity  was 
greater  than  the  brake-power  could  overcome,  and 
the  seventeen  carriages  kept  descending  more  and 
more  rapidly.    Meanwhile  the  third  train  had  reached 
the  foot  of  the  incline  and  begun  to  ascend  it,  when 
its  engineer,  on  rounding  a  curve,  caught  sight  of 
the  descending  carriages.     He  immediatly  reversed 
his  engine,  but  before  he  could  bring  his  train  to  a 
stand  they  were  upon  him.     Fortunately  the  van- 
brakes  of  the  detached  carriages,  though  insufficient 


THE  HELM SHERE  COLLISION.  12$ 

to  stop  them,  yet  did  reduce  their  speed  ;  the  col- 
lision nevertheless  was  terrific.  The  force  of  the 
blow,  so  far  as  the  advancing  train  was  concerned, 
expended  itself  on  the  locomotive,  which  was  de- 
molished, while  the  passengers  escaped  with  a  fright. 
Not  so  those  in  the  descending  carriages.  With 
them  there  was  nothing  to  break  the  blow,  and  the 
two  hindmost  carriages  were  crushed  to  fragments 
and  their  passengers  scattered  over  the  line.  It  was 
shortly  after  midnight,  and  the  excursionists  clam- 
bered out  of  the  trains  and  rushed  frantically  about, 
impeding  every  effort  to  clear  away  the  cttbris  and 
rescue  the  injured,  whose  shrieks  and  cries  were 
incessant.  The  bodies  of  ten  persons,  one  of  whom 
had  died  of  suffocation,  were  ultimately  taken  put 
from  the  wreck,  and  twenty-two  others  sustained 
fractures  of  limbs. 

At  Des  Jardines  the  couplings  were  too  strong ; 
at  Port  Jervis  and  at  Helmshere  they  were  not 
strong  enough ;  at  Carr's  Rock  they  gave  way  not  a 
moment  too  soon.  "  There  are  objections  to  a 
plenum  and  there  are  objections  to  a  vacuum,"  as 
Dr.  Johnson  remarked,  "  but  a  plenum  or  a  vacuum 
it  must  be."  There  are  no  arguments,  however,  in 
favor  of  putting  railroad  stations  or  sidings  upon 
an  inclined  plane,  and  then  not  providing  what  the 
English  call  "  catch-points  "  or  "  scotches  "  to  pre- 
vent such  disasters  as  those  at  Abergele  or  Helfn- 
shere.  In  these  two  instances  alone  the  want  of 
them  cost  over  fifty  lives.  In  railroad  mechanics 


124  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

there  are  after  all  some  principles  susceptible  of 
demonstration.  That  vehicles,  as  well  as  water,  will 
run  down  hill  may  be  classed  among  them.  That 
these  principles  should  still  be  ignored  is  hardly 
less  singular  than  it  is  surprising. 


AUGUST  26,  1871.  125 


CHAPTER   XIV. 

THE    REVERE    CATASTROPHE. 

THE  terrible  disaster  which  occurred  in  front  of 
the  little  station-building  at  Revere,  six  miles  from 
Boston  on  the  Eastern  railroad  of  Massachusetts,  in 
August  1871,  was,  properly  speaking,  not  an  accident 
at  all ;  it  was  essentially  a  catastrophe — the  legitimate 
and  almost  inevitable  final  outcome  of  an  antiquated 
and  insufficient  system.  As  such  it  should  long  re- 
main a  subject  for  prayerful  meditation  to  all  those 
who  may  at  any  time  be  entrusted  with  the  imme- 
diate operating  of  railroads.  It  was  terribly  dra- 
matic, but  it  was  also  frightfully  instructive ;  and 
while  the  lesson  was  by  no  means  lost,  it  yet  admits 
of  further  and  advantageous  study.  For,  like  most 
other  men  whose  lives  are  devoted  to  a  special  call- 
ing, the  managers  of  railroads  are  apt  to  be  very 
much  wedded  to  their  own  methods,  and  attention 
has  already  more  than  once  been  called  to  the  fact 
that,  when  any  new  emergency  necessitates  a  new 


126 


RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 


appliance,  they  not  infrequently,  as  Captain  Tyler 
well  put  it  in  his  report  to  the  Board  of  Trade 
for  the  year  1870,  "  display  more  ingenuity  in  rind- 
ing objections  than  in  overcoming  them." 

The  Eastern  railroad  of  Massachusetts  connects 
Boston  with  Portland,  in  the  state  of  Maine,  by  a 
line  which  is  located  close  along  the  sea-shore.  Be- 
tween Boston  and  Lynn,  a  distance  of  eleven  miles, 
the  main  road  is  in  large  part  built  across  the  salt 
marshes,  but  there  is  a  branch  which  leaves  it  at 
Everett,  a  small  station  some  miles  out  of  Boston, 
and  thence,  running  deviously  through  a  succession 
of  towns  on  the  higher  ground,  connects  with  the 
main  track  again  at  Lynn ;  thus  making  what  is 
known  in  England  as  a  loop-road.  *  At  the  time  of 

the  Revere  accident  this 
i Lynn,  branch  was  equipped  with 
but  a  single  track,  and 
was  operated  wholly  by 
schedule  without  any  re- 
liance on  the  telegraph ; 
and,  indeed,  there  were 
not  even  telegraphic  of- 
fices at  a  number  of  the 
stations  upon  it.  Revere, 
the  name  of  the  station 
where  the  accident  took 
place,  was  on  the  main 
line  about  five  miles  from 
Boston  and  two  miles 
from  Everett, ^where  the 


Freight  tracks 
from  Revere  to 
East  Boston. 


®  Boston 


FLUCTUATIONS  OF  TRAVEL.  I2/ 

Saugus  branch,  as  the  loop-road  was  called,  began. 
The  accompanying  diagram  shows  the  relative  posi- 
tion of  the  several  points  and  of  the  main  and 
branch  lines,  a  thorough  appreciation  of  which  is 
essential  to  a  correct  understanding  of  the  disaster. 
The  travel  over  the  Eastern  railroad  is  of  a  some- 
what exceptional  nature,  varying  in  a  more  than 
ordinary  degree  with  the  different  seasons  of  the 
year.  During  the  winter  months  the  corporation 
had,  in  1871,  to  provide  for  a  regular  passenger 
movement  of  about  seventy-five  thousand  a  week, 
but  in  the  summer  what  is  known  as  the  excursion 
and  pleasure  travel  not  infrequently  increased  the 
number  to  one  hundred  and  ten  thousand,  and  even 
more.  As  a  natural  consequence,  during  certain 
weeks  of  each  summer,  and  more  especially  towards 
the  close  of  August,  it  was  no  unusual  thing  for  the 
corporation  to  find  itself  taxed  beyond  its  utmost 
resources.  It  is  emergencies  of  this  description, 
periodically  occurring  on  every  railroad,  which  al- 
ways subject  to  the  final  test  the  organization  and 
discipline  of  companies  and  the  capacity  of  superin- 
tendents. A  railroad  in  quiet  times  is  like  a  ship  in 
steady  weather;  almost  anybody  can  manage  the 
one  or  sail  the  other.  It  is  the  sudden  stress  which 
reveals  the  undeveloped  strength  or  the  hidden 
weakness  ;  and  the  truly  instructive  feature  in  the 
Revere  accident  lay  in  the  amount  of  hidden  weak- 
ness everywhere  which  was  brought  to  light  under 
that  sudden  stress.  During  the  week  ending  with 


128  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

that  Saturday  evening  upon  which  the  disaster  oc- 
curred the  rolling  stock  of  the  road  had  been  heavily 
taxed,  not  only  to  accommodate  the  usual  tide  of 
summer  travel,  then  at  its  full  flood,  but  also  those 
attending  a  military  muster  and  two  large  camp- 
its  line.  «The  number  of  passengers 
going  over  ir  had  accordingly  risen  from  about  one 
hundred  and  ten  thousand,  the  full  summer  average, 
to  over  one  hundred  and  forty  thousand ;  while  in- 
stead of  the  one  hundred  and  fifty-two  trains  a  day 
provided  for  in  the  running  schedule,  there  were  no 
less  than  one  hundred  and  ninety-two.  It  had  never 
been  the  custom  with  those  managing  the  road  to 
place  any  reliance  upon  the  telegraph  in  directing 
the  train  movement,  and  no  use  whatever  appears  to 
have  been  made  of  it  towards  straightening  out  the 
numerous  hitches  inevitable  from  so  sudden  an  in- 
crease in  that  movement.  If  an  engine  broke  down, 
or  a  train  got  off  the  track,  there  had  accordingly 
throughout  that  week  been  nothing  done,  except 
patient  and  general  waiting,  until  things  got  in 
motion  again  ;  each  conductor  or  station-master  had 
to  look  out  for  himself,  under  the  running  regula- 
tions of  the  road,  and  need  expect  no  assistance 
trom  headquarters.  ThnsT  tooT  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that,  including  the  Saugus  branch, 
ninety-three  of  the  entire  one  hundred  finr| 

by  the  cornjp^nyjyere  supplied 
£k^   ,The  whole  train   move- 


ment, both  of  the  main  line  and  of  the  branches,  in- 


AMERICAN  INDIVID UALIT Y.  1 29 

tricate  in  the  extreme  as  it  was,  thus  depended  solely 
on  a  schedule  arrangement  and  the  watchful  intelli- 
gence of  individual  employes.  Not  unnaturally, 
therefore,  as  the  week  drew  to  a  close  the  confusion 
became  so  great  that  the  trains  reached  and  left  the 
Boston  station  with  an  almost  total  disregard  of  the 
schedule ;  while  towards  the  evening  of  Saturday 
the  employes  of  the  road  at  that  station  directed 
their  efforts  almost  exclusively  to  dispatching  trains 
as  fast  as  cars  could  be  procured,  thus  trying  to  keep 
it  as  clear  as  possible  of  the  throng  of  impatient  trav- 
ellers which  continually  blocked  it  up.  f  Taken  alto- 
gether the  situation  illustrated  in  a  very  striking 
manner  that  singular  reliance  of  the  corporation  on 
the  individuality  and  intelligence  of  its  employe's, 
which  in  another  connection  is  referred  to  as  one  of 
the  most  striking  characteristics  of  American  rail- 
road management,  without  a  full  appreciation  of 
which  it  is  impossible  to  understand  its  using  or 
failing  to  use  certain  appliances. 

According  to  the  regular  schedule  four  trains 
should  have  left  the  Boston  station  in  succession 
during  the  hour  and  a  half  between  6.30  and  eight 
o'clock  P.  M.:  a  Saugus  branch  train  for  Lynn  at 
6.30 ;  a  second  Saugus  branch  train  at  seven  ;  an  ac- 
commodation train,  which  ran  eighteen  miles  over 
the  main  line,  at  7.15  ;  and  finally  the  express  train 
through  to  Portland,  also  over  the  main  line,  at  eight 
o'clock.  The  collision  at  Revere  was  between  these 
last  two  trains,  the  express  overtaking  and  running 


130  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

into  the  rear  01  the  accommodation  train  ;  but  it  was 
indirectly  caused  by  the  delays  and  irregularity  in 
movement  of  the  two  branch  trains.*  It  will  be  no- 
ticed that,  according  to  the  schedule,  both  of  the 
branch  trains  should  have  preceded  the  accommo- 
dation train ;  in  the  prevailing  confusion,  however, 
the  first  of  the  two  branch  trains  did  not  leave  the 
station  until  about  seven  o'clock,  thirty  minutes  be- 
hind its  time,  and  it  was  followed  forty  minutes  la- 
ter, not  by  the  second  branch  train,  but  by  the  ac- 
commodation train,  which  in  its  turn  was  twenty-five 
minutes  late.  Thirteen  minutes  afterwards  the  sec- 
ond Saugus  branch  train,  which  should  have  preced- 
ed, followed  it,  being  nearly  an  hour  out  of  time. 
Then  at  last  came  the  Portland  express,  which  got 
away  practically  on  time,  at  a  few  minutes  after 
eight  o'clock.  All  of  these  four  trains  went  out  over 
the  same  track  as  far  as  the  junction  at  Everett,  but 
at  that  point  the  first  and  third  of  the  four  were  to 
go  off  on  the  branch,  while  the  second  and  fourth 
kept  on  over  the  main  line.  Between  these  last  two 
trains  the  running  schedule  of  the  road  allowed  an 
ample  time-interval  of  forty-five  minutes,  which,  how- 
ever, on  this  occasion  was  reduced,  through  the  de- 
lay in  starting,  to  some  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes. 
No  causes  of  further  delay,  therefore,  arising,  the 
simple  case  was  presented  of  a  slow  accommodation 
train  being  sent  out  to  run  eighteen  miles  in  ad- 
vance of  a  fast  express  train,  with  an  interval  of 
twenty  minutes  between  them. 


COMMON-SENSE  AND  ITS  ABSENCE.  1 3 1 

Unfortunately,  however,  the  accommodation  train 
was  speedily  subjected  to  another  and  very  serious 
delay.  It  has  been  mentioned  that  the  Saugus 
branch  was  a  single  track  road,  and  the  rules^of  the 
company  were  explicit  that  no  outward  train  was  to 
pass  onto  the  branch  at  Everett  until  any  inward 
train  then  due  there  should  have  arrived  and  passed 
off  it.  There  was  no  siding  at  the  junction,  upon 
which  an  outward  branch  train  could  be  temporarily 
placed  to  wait  for  the  inward  train,  thus  leaving  the 
main  track  clear ;  and  accordingly,  under  a  strict 
construction  of  the  rules,  any  outward  branch  train 
while  awaiting  the  arrival  at  Everett  of  an  inward 
branch  train  was  to  be  kept  standing  on  the  main 
track,  completely  blocking  it.  The  outward  branch 
trains,  it  subsequently  appeared,  were  often  delayed 
at  the  junction,  but  no  practical  difficulty  had  arisen 
from  this  cause,  as  the  employe"  in  charge  of  the  sig- 
nals and  switches  there,  exercising  his  common 
sense,  had  been  in  the  custom  of  moving  any  de- 
layed train  temporarily  out  of  the  way  onto  the 
branch  or  the  other  main  track,  under  protection  of 
a  flag,  and  thus  relieving  the  block.  The  need  of  a 
siding  to  permit  the  passage  of  trains  at  this  point 
had  not  been  felt,  simply  because  the  employe"  in 
charge  there  had  used  the  branch  or  other  main 
track  as  a  siding.  On  the  day  of  the  accident  this 
employe"  happened  to  be  sick,  and  absent  from  his 
post.  His  substitute  either  had  no  common  sense 
or  did  not  feel  called  upon  to  use  it,  if  its  use  in- 


1 32  RAILROAD  A  CCIDENTS. 

volved  any  increase  of  responsibility.  Accordingly, 
when  a  block  took  place,  the  simple  letter  of  the 
rule  was  followed  ; — and  it  is  almost  needless  to 
add  that  a  block  did  take  place  on  the  afternoon 
of  August  26th. 

The  first  of  the  branch  trains,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, had  left  Boston  at  about  seven  o'clock,  in- 
stead of  at  6.30,  its  schedule  time.  On  arriving  at 
Everett  this  train  should  have  met  and  passed  an 
inward  branch  train,  which  was  timed  to  leave  Lynn 
at  six  o'clock,  but  which,  owing  to  some  accident  to 
its  locomotive,  and  partaking  of  the  general  confu- 
sion of  the  day,  on  this  particular  afternoon  did  not 
leave  the  Lynn  station  until  7.30  o'clock,  or  one 
hour  and  a  half  after  its  schedule  time,  and  one 
half-hour  after  the  other  train  had  left  Boston.  Ac- 
cordingly, when  the  Boston  train  reached  the  junc- 
tion its  conductor  found  himself  confronted  by  the 
rule  forbidding  him  to  enter  upon  the  branch  until 
the  Lynn  train  then  due  should  have  passed  off  it, 
and  so  he  quietly  waited  on  the  outward  track  of 
the  main  line,  blocking  it  completely  to  traffic.  He 
had  not  waited  long  before  a  special  locomotive,  on 
its  way  from  Boston  to  Salem,  came  up  and  stopped 
behind  him.  This  was  presently  followed  by  the 
accommodation  train.  Then  the  next  branch  train 
came  along,  and  finally  the  Portland  express.  At 
such  a  time,  and  at  that  period  of  railroad  develop- 
ment, there  was  something  ludicrous  about  the  spec- 
tacle. Here  was  a  road  utterly  unable  to  accommo- 


THE  SCHED  ULE  O  UT  OF  JOINT.  1 3  3 

date  its  passengers  with  cars,  while  a  succession  of 
trains  were  standing  idle  for  hours,  because  a  loco- 
motive had  broken  down  ten  miles  off.  The  tele- 
graph was  there,  but  the  company  was  not  in  the 
custom  of  putting  any  reliance  upon  it.  A  simple 
message  to  the  branch  trains  to  meet  and  pass  at  any 
point  other  than  that  fixed  in  the  schedule  would 
have  solved  the  whole  difficulty;  but,  no! — there 
were  the  rules,  and  all  the  rolling  stock  of  the  road 
might  gather  at  Everett  in  solemn  procession,  but, 
until  the  locomotive  at  Lynn  could  be  repaired,  the 
law  of  the  Medes  and  Persians  was  plain ;  and  in 
this  case  it  read  that  the  telegraph  was  a  new-fangled 
and  unreliable  auxiliary.  And  so  the  lengthening 
procession  stood  there  long  enough  for  the  train 
which  caused  it  to  have  gone  to  its  destination  and 
come  back  dragging  the  disabled  locomotive  from 
Lynn  behind  it  to  again  take  its  place  in  the 
block. 

At  last,  at  about  ten  minutes  after  eight  o'clock, 
the  long-expected  Lynn  train  made  its  appearance, 
and  the  first  of  the  branch  trains  from  Boston  im- 
mediately went  off  the  main  line.  The  road  was 
now  clear  for  the  accommodation  train,  which  had 
been  standing  some  twelve  or  fifteen  minutes  in  the 
block,  but  which  from  the  moment  of  again  starting 
was  running  on  the  schedule  time  of  the  Portland  ex- 
press. This  its  conductor  did  not  know.  Every 
minute  was  vital,  and  yet  he  never  thought  to  look 
at  his  watch.  He  had  a  vague  impression  that  he 


134  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

had  been  delayed  some  six  or  eight  minutes,  when 
in  reality  he  had  been  delayed  fifteen  ;  and,  though 
he  was  running  wholly  out  of  his  schedule  time,  he 
took  not  a  single  precaution,  so  persuaded  was  he 
that  every  one  knew  where  he  was. 

The  confusion  among  those  in  charge  of  the  vari- 
ous engines  and  trains  was,  indeed,  general  and 
complete.  As  the  Portland  express  was  about  to 
leave  the  Boston  station,  the  superintendent  of  the 
road,  knowing  by  the  non-arrival  of  the  branch  train 
from  Lynn  that  there  must  be  a  block  at  the  Everett 
junction,  had  directed  the  depot-master  to  caution 
the  engineer  to  look  out  for  the  trains  ahead  of  him. 
The  order,  a  merely  verbal  one,  was  delivered  after 
the  train  had  started,  the  depot-master  walking 
along  by  the  side  of  the  slowly-moving  locomotive, 
and  was  either  incorrectly  transmitted  or  not  fully 
understood  ;  the  engine-driver  supposed  it  to  apply 
to  the  branch  train  which  had  started  just  before 
him,  out  of  both  its  schedule  time  and  schedule 
place.  Presently,  at  the  junction,  he  was  stopped 
by  the  signal  man  of  this  train.  The  course  of 
reasoning  he  would  then  have  had  to  pass  through 
to  divine  the  true  situation  of  affairs  and  to  guide 
himself  safely  under  the  schedule  in  the  light  of 
the  running  rules  was  complicated  indeed,  and  some- 
what as  follows :  "  The  branch  train,"  he  should 
have  argued  to  himself,  "  is  stopped,  and  it  is  stop- 
ped because  the  train  which  should  have  left  Lynn 
at  six  o'clock  has  not  yet  arrived ;  but,  under  the 


FATAL  MISAPPREHENSIONS.  135 

rules,  that  train  should  pass  off  the  branch  before 
the  6.30  train  could  pass  onto  it ;  if,  therefore,  the 
*  wild '  train  before  me  is  delayed  not  only  the  6.30 
but  all  intermediate  trains  must  likewise  be  delayed, 
and  the  accommodation  train  went  out  this  after- 
noon after  the  6.30  train,  so  it,  too,  must  be  in  the 
block  ahead  of  me ;  unless,  indeed,  as  is  usually  the 
case,  the  signal-master  has  got  it  out  of  the  block 
under  the  protection  of  a  flag."  This  line  of  rea- 
soning was,  perhaps,  too  intricate  ;  at  any  rate,  the 
engine-driver  did  not  follow  it  out,  but,  when  he  saw 
the  tail-lights  immediately  before  him  disappear  on 
the  branch,  he  concluded  that  the  main  line  was  now 
clear,  and  dismissed  the  depot-master's  caution  from 
his  mind.  Meanwhile,  as  the  engine-driver  of  this 
train  was  fully  persuaded  that  the  only  other  train 
in  his  front  had  gone  off  on  the  branch,  the  con- 
ductor of  the  accommodation  train  was  equally  per- 
suaded that  the  head-light  immediately  behind  him 
in  the  block  at  the  junction  had  been  that  of  the 
Portland  express  which  consequently  should  be 
aware  of  his  position.  Both  were  wrong. 

Thus  when  they  left  Everett  the  express  was  fairly 
chasing  the  accommodation  train,  and  overtaking  it 
with  terrible  rapidity.  Even  then  no  collision  ought 
to  have  been  possible.  Unfortunately,  however,  the 
road  had  no  system,  even  the  crudest,  of  interval 
signals;  and  the  utter  irregularity  prevailing  in  the 
train  movement  seemed  to  have  demoralized  the 
employes  along  the  line,  who,  though  they  noticed 


136  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

the  extreme  proximity  of  the  two  trains  to  each 
other  as  they  passed  various  points,  all  sluggishly 
took  it  for  granted  that  those  in  charge  of  them 
were  fully  aware  of  their  relative  positions  and 
knew  what  they  were  about.  Thus,  as  the  two 
trains  approached  the  Revere  station,  they  were 
so  close  together  as  to  be  on  the  same  piece  of 
straight  track  at  the  same  time,  and  a  passenger 
standing  at  the  rear  end  of  the  accommodation 
train  distinctly  saw  the  head-light  of  the  express 
locomotive.  The  night,  however,  was  not  a  clear 
one,  for  an  east  wind  had  prevailed  all  day,  driv- 
ing a  mist  in  from  the  sea  which  lay  in  banks  over 
the  marshes,  lifting  at  times  so  that  distant  ob- 
jects were  quite  visible,  and  then  obscuring  them  in 
its  heavy  folds.  Consequently  it  did  not  at  all  fol- 
low, because  the  powerful  reflecting  head-light  of 
the  locomotive  was  visible  from  the  accommodation 
train,  that  the  dim  tail-lights  of  the  latter  were  also 
visible  to  those  on  the  locomotive.  Here  was  an- 
other mischance.  The  tail-lights  in  use  by  the  com- 
pany were  ordinary  red  lanterns  without  reflecting 
power. 

The  station  house  at  Revere  stood  at  the  end  of 
a  tangent,  the  track  curving  directly  before  it.  In 
any  ordinary  weather  the  tail-lights  of  a  train  stand- 
ing at  this  station  would  have  been  visible  for  a  very 
considerable  distance  down  the  track  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Boston,  and  even  on  the  night  of  the  acci- 
dent they  were  probably  visible  for  a  sufficient  dis- 


MISCHANCE  ON  MISCHANCE.  !$/ 

tance  in  which  to  stop  any  train  approaching  at  a 
reasonable  rate  of  speed.  Unfortunately  the  en- 
gineer of  the  Portland  express  did  not  at  once  see 
them,  his  attention  being  wholly  absorbed  in  looking 
for  other  signals.  Certain  freight  train  tracks  to 
points  on  the  shore  diverged  from  the  main  line  at 
Revere,  and  the  engine-drivers  of  all  trains  approach- 
ing that  place  were  notified  by  signals  at  a  masthead 
close  to  the  station  whether  the  switches  were  set 
for  the  main  line  or  for  these  freight  tracks.  A  red 
lantern  at  the  masthead  indicated  that  the  main  line 
was  closed  ;  in  the  absence  of  any  signal  it  was 
open.  In  looking  for  this  signal  as  he  approached 
Revere  the  engine-driver  of  the  Portland  express  was 
simply  attending  closely  to  his  business,  for,  had  the 
red  light  been  at  the  masthead,  his  train  must  at 
once  have  been  stopped.  Unfortunately,  however, 
while  peering  through  the  mist  at  the  masthead  he 
overlooked  what  was  directly  before  him,  until,  when 
at  last  he  brought  his  eyes  down  to  the  level,  to  use 
Ijis  own  words  at  the  subsequent  inquest,  "  the  tail 
lights  of  the  accommodation  train  seemed  to  spring 
'right  up  in  his  face." 

When  those  in  charge  of  the  two  trains  at  almost 
the  same  moment  became  aware  of  the  danger,  there 
was  yet  an  interval  of  some  eight  hundred  feet  be- 
tween them.  The  express  train  was,  however,  mov- 
ing at  a  speed  of  some  twenty-five  or  thirty  miles  an 
hour,  and  was  equipped  only  with  the  old-fashioned 
hand-brake.  In  response  to  the  sharply  given  signal 


138  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

from  the  whistle  these  were  rapidly  set,  but  the  rails 
were  damp  and  slippery,  so  that  the  wheels  failed  to 
catch  upon  them,  and,  when  everything  was  done 
which  could 'be  done,  the  eight  hundred  feet  of  in- 
terval sufficed  only  to  reduce  the  speed  of  the  col- 
liding locomotive  to  about  ten  miles  an  hour. 

In  the  rear  car  of  the  accommodation  train  there 
were  at  the  moment  of  the  accident  some  sixty-five 
or  seventy  human  beings,  seated  and  standing.  They 
were  of  both  sexes  and  of  all  ages;  for  it  was  a 
Saturday  evening  in  August,  and  many  persons  had, 
through  the  confusion  of  the  trains,  been  long  de- 
layed in  their  return  from  the  city  to  their  homes  at 
the  sea-side.  The  first  intimation  the  passengers 
had  of  the  danger  impending  over  them  was  from 
the  sudden  and  lurid  illumination  of  the  car  by  the 
glare  from  the  head-light  of  the  approaching  loco- 
motive. One  of  them  who  survived  the  dis- 
aster, though  grievously  injured,  described  how 
he  was  carelessly  watching  a  young  man  stand- 
ing in  the  aisle,  laughing  and  gayly  chatting 
with  four  young  girls,  who  were  seated,  when 
he  saw  him  turn  and  instantly  his  face,  in  the 
sudden  blaze  of  the  head-light,  assumed  a  look 
of  frozen  horror  which  was  the  single  thing  in  the 
accident  indelibly  impressed  on  the  survivor's  mem- 
ory ;  that  look  haunted  him.  The  car  was  crowded 
to  its  full  capacity,  and  the  colliding  locomotive 
struck  it  with  such  force  as  to  bury  itself  two-thirds 
of  its  length  in  it.  At  the  instant  of  the  crash  a 


THE  COLLISION.  139 

panic  had  seized  upon  the  passengers,  and  a  sort  of 
rush  had  taken  place  to  the  forward  end  of  the  car, 
into  which  furniture,  fixtures  and  human  beings 
were  crushed  in  a  shapeless,  indistinguishable  mass. 
Meanwhile  the  blow  had  swept  away  the  smoke- 
stack of  the  locomotive,  and  its  forward  truck  had 
been  forced  back  in  some  unaccountable  way  until 
it  rested  between  its  driving  wheels  and  the  tender, 
leaving  the  entire  boiler  inside  of  the  passenger  car 
and  supported  on  its  rear  truck.  The  valves  had 
been  so  broken  as  to  admit  of  the  free  escape  of 
the  scalding  steam,  while  the  coals  from  the  fire-box 
were  scattered  among  the  ddbris,  and  coming  in 
contact  with  the  fluid  from  the  broken  car  lamps 
kindled  the  whole  into  a  rapid  blaze.  Neither  was 
the  fire  confined  to  the  last  car  of  the  train.  It  has 
been  mentioned  that  in  the  block  at  Everett  a  loco- 
motive returning  to  Salem  had  found  itself  stopped 
just  in  advance  of  the  accommodation  train.  At 
the  suggestion  of  the  engine-driver  of  that  train  this 
locomotive  had  there  coupled  on  to  it,  and  conse- 
quently made  a  part  of  it  at  Revere.  When  the 
collision  took  place,  therefore,  the  four  cars  of  which 
the  accommodation  train  was  made  up  were  crush- 
ed between  the  weight  of  the  entire  colliding  train 
on  one  side  and  that  of  two  locomotives  on  the 
other.  That  they  were  not  wholly  demolished  was 
due  simply  to  the  fact  that  the  last  car  yielded  to 
the  blow,  and  permitted  the  locomotive  of  the  ex- 
press train  fairly  to  imbed  itself  in  it.  As  it  was, 


14°  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

the  remaining  cars  were  jammed  and  shattered,  and, 
though  the  passengers  in  them  escaped,  the  oil  from 
the  broken  lamps  ignited,  and  before  the  flames 
could  be  extinguished  the  cars  were  entirely  de- 
stroyed. 

This  accident  resulted  in  the  death  of  twenty-nine 
persons,  and  in  rfiore  or  less  severe  injuries  to  fifty- 
seven  others.  No  person,  not  in  the  last  car  of  the 
accommodation  train  was  killed,  and  one  only  was 
seriously  injured.  Of  those  in  the  last  car  more 
than  half  lost  their  lives ;  many  instantly  by  crush- 
ing, others  by  inhaling  the  scalding  steam  which 
poured  forth  from  the  locomotive  boiler  into  the 
wreck,  and  which,  where  it  did  not  kill,  inflicted 
frightful  injuries.  Indeed,  for  the  severity  of  in- 
juries and  for  the  protractedness  of  agony  involved 
in  it,  this  accident  has  rarely,  if  ever,  been  exceeded. 
Crushing,  scalding  and  burning  did  their  work  to- 
gether. 

It  may  with^  perfect  truth  be  said  that  the  dis- 
aster at  Revere  marked  an  epoch  in  the  history  of 
railroad  development  in  New  England.  At  the 
moment  it  called  forth  the  deepest  expression  of 
horror  and  indignation,  which,  as  usual  in  such 
cases,  was  more  noticeable  for  its  force  than  for  its 
wisdom.  An  utter  absence  of  all  spirit  of  justice 
is,  indeed,  a  usual  characteristic  of  the  more  imme- 
diate utterances,  both  from  the  press  and  on  tne 
platform,  upon  occasions  of  this  character.  Writers 
and  orators  seem  always  to  forget  that,  next  co  the 


HASTY  CRITICISM.  141 

immediate  sufferers  and  their  families,  the  unfortu- 
nate officials  concerned  are  the  greatest  losers  by 
railroad  accidents.  For  them,  not  only  reputation 
but  bread  is  involved.  A  railroad  employe"  impli- 
cated in  the  occurrence  of'  an  accident  lives  under 
a  stigma.  And  yet,  from  the  tenor  of  public  com- 
ment it  might  fairly  be  supposed  that  these  offi- 
cials are  in  the  custom  of  plotting  to  bring  dis- 
asters about,  and  take  a  fiendish  delight  in  them. 
Nowhere  was  this  ever  illustrated  more  perfectly 
than  in  Massachusetts  during  the  last  days  of 
August  and  the  early  days  of  September,  1871. 
Grave  men — men  who  ought  to  have  known 
better — indulged  in  language  which  would  have 
been  simply  ludicrous  save  for  the  horror  of  the 
event  which  occasioned  but  could  not  justify  it. 
A  public  meeting,  for  instance,  was  held  at  the 
town  of  Swampscott  on  the  evening  of  the  Monday 
succeeding  the  catastrophe.  The  gentleman  who 
presided  over  it  very  discreetly,  in  his  preliminary 
remarks,  urged  those  who  proposed  to  join  in  the 
discussion  to  control  their  feelings.  Hardly  had  he 
ceased  speaking,  however,  when  Mr.  Wendell  Phil- 
lips was  noticed  among  the  audience,  and  imme- 
diately called  to  the  platform.  His  remarks  were  a 
most  singular  commentary  on  the  chairman's  in- 
junction to  calmness.  He  began  by  announcing 
that  the  first  requisite  to  the  formation  of  a  healthy 
public  opinion  in  regard  to  railroad  accidents,  as 
other  things,  was  absolute  frankness  of  speech,  and 


I42  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

he  then  proceeded  as  follows: — "  So  I  begin  by  say- 
ing that  to  my  mind  this  terrible  disaster,  which  has 
made  the  last  thirty-six  hours  so  sad  to  us  all,  is  a 
deliberate  murder.  I  think  we  should  try  to  get 
rid  in  the  public  mind  of  any  real  distinction  be- 
tween the  individual  who,  in  a  moment  of  passion 
or  in  a  moment  of  heedlessness,  takes  the  life  of  one 
fellow-man,  and  the  corporation  that  in  a  moment 
of  greed,  of  little  trouble,  of  little  expense,  of  little 
care,  of  little  diligence,  takes  lives  by  wholesale.  I 
think  the  first  requisite  of  the  public  mind  is  to  say 
that  there  is  no  accident  in  the  case,  properly  speak- 
ing. It  is  a  murder;  the  guilt  of  murder  rests  some- 
where." 

Mr.  Phillip's  definition  of  the  crime  of  "  deliberate 
murder  "  would  apparently  somewhat  unsettle  the 
criminal  law  as  at  present  understood,  but  he  was 
not  at  all  alone  in  this  bathos  of  extravagance. 
Prominent  gentlemen  seemed  to  vie  with  each  other 
in  their  display  of  ignorance.  Mr.  B.  F.  Butler,  for 
instance,  suggested  his  view  of  the  disaster  and  the 
measure  best  calculated  to  prevent  a  repetition  of  it ; 
which  last  was  certainly  original,  inasmuch  as  he 
urged  the  immediate  raising  of  the  pay  of  all  engine- 
men  until  a  sufficiently  high  order  of  ability  and  edu- 
cation should  be  brought  into  the  occupation  to  ren- 
der impossible  the  recurrence  of  an  accident  which 
was  primarily  caused  by  the  negligence,  not  of  an 
engineer,  but  of  a  conductor.  Another  gentleman 
described  with  much  feeling  his  observations  during 


A  RASH  STATEMENT.  143 

a  recent  tour  in  Europe,  and  declared  that  such  a 
catastrophe  as  that  at  Revere  would  have  been  im- 
possible there.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  official  re- 
ports not  only  showed  that  the  accident  was  one  of 
a  class  of  most  frequent  occurrence,  but  also  that 
sixty-on'e  cases  of  it  had  occurred  in  Great  Britain 
alone  during  the  very  year  the  gentleman  in  ques- 
tion was  journeying  in  Europe,  and  had  occasioned 
over  six  hundred  cases  of  death  or  personal  injury. 
Perhaps,  in  order  to  illustrate  how  very  reckless  in 
statement  a  responsible  gentleman  talking  under  ex- 
citement may  become,  it  is  worth  while  to  quote  in 
his  own  language  Captain  Tyler's  brief  description  of 
one  of  those  sixty-one  accidents  which  "  could  not 
possibly,"  but  yet  did,  occur.  As  miscellaneous 
reading  it  is  amusing. 

"  As  four  London  &  North-Western  excursion  trains 
on  September  2,  1870,  were  returning  from  a  volunteer 
review  at  Penrith,  the  fourth  came  into  collision  at  Pen- 
ruddock  with  the  third  of  those  trains.  An  hundred 
and  ten  passengers  and  three  servants  of  the  company 
were  injured.  These  trains  were  partly  in  charge  of 
acting  guards,  some  of  whom  were  entirely  inexperienced, 
as  well  in  the  line  as  in  their  duties  ;  and  of  engine- 
drivers  and  firemen,  of  whom  one,  at  all  events,  was  very 
much  the  worse  for  liquor.  The  side-lamps  on  the  hind 
van  of  the  third  train  were  obscured  by  a  horse-box, 
which  was  wider  than  the  van.  There  were  no  special 
means  of  protection  to  meet  the  exceptional  contingency 
of  three  such  trains  all  stopping  on  their  way  from  the 
eastward,  to  cross  two  others  from  the  westward,  at  this 
station.  And  the  regulations  for  telegraphing  the  trains 
were  altogether  neglected." 


RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

REAR   END   COLLISIONS. 

THE  annals  of  railroad  accidents  are  full  of  cases 
of  "  rear-end  collision,"  as  it  is  termed.*  Their  fre- 
quency may  almost  be  accepted  as  a  very  accurate 
gauge  of  the  pressure  of  traffic  on  any  given  system 
of  lines,  and  because  of  them  the  companies  are  con- 
tinually compelled  to  adopt  new  and  more  intricate 
systems  of  operation.  At  first,  on  almost  all  roads, 
trains  follow  each  other  at  such  great  intervals  that 
no  precaution  at  all,  other  than  flags  and  lanterns, 
are  found  necessary.  Then  comes  a  succeeding  period 
when  an  interval  of  time  between  following  trains  is 
provided  for,  through  a  system  of  signals  which  at 
given  points  indicate  danger  during  a  certain  num. 

*  In  the  nine  years  1870-8,  besides  those  which  occurred  and  were 
not  deemed  of  sufficient  importance  to  demand  special  inquiry,  86 
cases  of  accidents  of  this  description  were  investigated  by  the  in- 
specting officers  of  the  English  Board  of  Trade  and  reported  upon 
in  detail.  In  America,  732  cases  were  reported  as  occurring  during 
the  six  years  1874-8,  and  138  cases  in  1878  alone. 


THE  BLOCK  SYSTEM.  1 45 

her  of  minutes  after  the  passage  of  every  train. 
Then,  presently,  the  alarming  frequency  of  rear  col- 
lisions demonstrates  the  inadequacy  of  this  system, 
and  a  new  one  has  to  be  devised,  which,  through  the 
aid  of  electricity,  secures  between  the  trains  an  in- 
terval of  space  as  well  as  of  time.  This  last  is  known 
as  the  "  block-system,"  of  which  so  much  has  of 
late  years  been  heard. 

The  block-system  is  so  important  a  feature  in  the 
modern  operation  of  railroads,  and  in  its  present 
stage  of  development  it  illustrates  so  strikingly  the 
difference  between  the  European  and  the  American 
methods,  that  more  particular  reference  will  have 
presently  to  be  made  to  it.*  For  the  present  it  is 
enough  to  say  that  rear-end  collisions  occur  notwith- 
standing all  the  precautions  implied  in  a  thoroughly 
perfected  "  block-system."  There  was  such  a  case 
on  the  Metropolitan  road,  in  the  very  heart  of  Lon- 
don, on  the  29th  of  August,  1873.  It  happened  in 
a  tunnel.  A  train  was  stalled  there,  and  an  unfor- 
tunate signal  officer  in  a  moment  of  flurry  gave 
"  line  clear"  and  sent  another  train  directly  into  it. 

A  much  more  Impressive  disaster,  both  in  its  dra- 
matic features  and  as  illustrating  the  inadequacy 
of  every  precaution  depending  on  human  agency  to 
avert  accident  under  certain  conditions,  was  afforded 
in  the  case  of  a  collision  which  occurred  on  the 
London  &  Brighton  Railway  on  August  25,  1861  ; 
ten  years  almost  to  a  day  before  that  at  Revere. 

*  Chapter  XVII. 


146  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

Like  the  Eastern  railroad,  the  London  Si  Brighton 
enjoyed  an  enormous  passenger  traffic,  which  be- 
came peculiarly  heavy  during  the  vacation  season 
towards  the  close  of  August;  and  it  was  to  the 
presence  of  the  excursion  trains  made  necessary  to 
accomodate  this  traffic  that  the  catastrophes  were 
in  both  cases  due.  In  the  case  of  the  London  & 
Brighton  road  it  occurred  on  a  Sunday.  An  excur- 
sion train  from  Portsmouth  on  that  day  was  to 
leave  Brighton  at  five  minutes  after  eight  A.  M.,  and 
was  to  be  followed  by  a  regular  Sunday  excursion 
train  at  8.15  or  ten  minutes  later,  and  that  again, 
after  the  lapse  of  a  quarter  of  an  hour,  by  a  regular 
parliamentary  train  at  8.30.  These  trains  were  cer- 
tainly timed  to  run  sufficiently  near  to  each  other ; 
but,  owing  to  existing  pressure  of  traffic  on  the  line, 
they  started  almost  simultaneously.  The  Ports- 
mouth excursion,  which  consisted  of  sixteen  car- 
riages, was  much  behind  its  time,  and  did  not  leave 
the  Brighton  station  until  8.28 ;  when,  after  a  lapse 
of  three  minutes,  it  was  followed  by  the  regular  ex- 
cursion train  at  8.31,  and  that  again  by  the  parlia- 
mentary train  at  8.35.  Three  passenger  trains  had 
thus  left  the  station  on  one  track  in  seven  minutes ! 
The  London  and  Brighton  Railway  traverses  the 
chalky  downs,  for  which  that  portion  of  England  is 
noted,  through  numerous  tunnels,  the  first  of  which 
after  leaving  Brighton  is  known  as  the  Patcham 
Tunnel,  about  five  hundred  yards  in  length,  while 
two  and  a  half  miles  farther  on  is  the  Croydon  Tun- 


THE  CROYDON  TUNNEL  COLLISION. 

nel,  rather  more  than  a  mile  and  a  quarter  in  length. 
The  line  between  these  tunnels  was  so  crooked 
and  obscured  that  the  managers  had  adopted  extra- 
ordinary precautions  against  accident.  At  each  end 
of  the  Croydon  Tunnel  a  signal-man  was  stationed, 
with  a  telegraphic  apparatus,  a  clock  and  a  telegraph 
bell  in  his  station.  The  rule  was  absolute  that  when 
any  train  entered  the  tunnel  the  signal-man  at  the 
point  of  entry  was  to  telegraph  "  train  in,"  and  no 
other  train  could  follow  until  the  return  signal  of 
"  train  out  "  came  from  the  other  side.  In  face  of 
such  a  regulation  it  was  difficult  to  see  how  any  col- 
lision in  the  tunnel  was  possible.  When  the  Ports- 
mouth excursion  train  arrived,  it  at  once  entered  the 
tunnel  and  the  fact  was  properly  signaled  to  the  op- 
posite outlet.  Before  the  return  signal  that  this 
train  was  out  was  received,  the  regular  excursion 
train  came  in  sight.  It  should  have  been  stopped 
by  a  self-acting  signal  which  was  placed  about  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  from  the  mouth  of  the  tunnel,  and 
which  each  passing  locomotive  set  at  "  danger," 
where  it  remained  until  shifted  to  "  safety,"  by  the 
signal-man,  on  receipt  of  the  message,  "  train  out/ 
Through  some  unexplained  cause,  "the  Portsmouth 
excursion  train  had  failed  to  act  on  this  signal,  which 
consequently  still  indicated  safety  when  the  Brighton 
excursion  train  came  up.  Accordingly  the  engine- 
driver  at  once  passed  it,  and  went  on  to  the  tunnel 
As  he  did  so,  the  signal-man,  perceiving  some  mis- 
take and  knowing  that  he  had  not  yet  got  his  re- 


148  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

turn  signal  that  the  preceding  train  was  out,  tried  to 
stop  him  by  waving  his  red  flag.  It  was  too  late, 
however,  and  the  train  passed  in.  A  moment  later 
the  parliamentary  train  also  came  in  sight,  and  stop- 
ped at  the  signal  of  danger.  Now  ensued  a  most 
singular  misapprehension  between  the  signal-men, 
resulting  in  a  terrible  disaster.  The  second  train 
had  run  into  the  tunnel  and  was  supposed  by  the 
signal-man  to  be  on  its  way  to  the  other  end  of  it, 
when  he  received  the  return  message  that  the  first 
train  was  out.  To  this  he  instantly  responded  by 
again  telegraphing  "  train  in,"  referring  now  to  the 
second  train.  This  dispatch  the  signal-man  at  the 
opposite  end  conceived  to  be  a  repetition  of  the 
message  referring  to  the  first  train,  and  he  accord- 
ingly again  replied  that  the  train  was  out.  This  re- 
ply, however,  the  other  operator  mistook  as  referring 
to  the  second  train,  and  accordingly  he  signaled 
"  safety,"  and  the  third  train  at  once  got  under  way 
and  passed  into  the  tunnel.  Unfortunately  the  en- 
gineer of  the  second  train  had  seen  the  red  flag 
waved  by  the  signal-man,  and,  in  obedience  to  it, 
stopped  his  locomotive  as  soon  as  possible  in  the 
tunnel  and  began  to  back  out  of  it.  In  doing  so,  he 
drove  his  train  into  the  locomotive  of  the  third  train 
advancing  into  it.  The  tunnel  was  twenty-four  feet 
in  height.  The  engine  of  the  parliamentary  train 
struck  the  rear  carriage  of  the-  excursion  train  and 
mounted  upon  its  fragments,  and  then  on  those  of 
the  carriage  in  front  of  it,  until  its  smoke-stack  came 


THE   WELWYN  TUNNEL  COLLISION  1 49 

in  contact  with  the  roof  of  the  tunnel.  It  rested 
finally  in  a  nearly  upright  position.  The  collision 
had  taken  place  so  far  within  the  tunnel  as  to  be  be- 
yond the  reach  of  daylight,  and  the  wreck  of  the 
trains  had  quite  blocked  up  the  arch,  while  the  steam 
and  smoke  from  the  engines  poured  forth  with  loud 
sound  and  in  heavy  volumes,  filling  the  empty  space 
with  stifling  and  scalding  vapors.  When  at  last  as- 
sistance came  and  the  trains  could  be  separated, 
twenty-three  corpses  were  taken  from  the  ruin's, 
while  one  hundred  and  seventy-six  other  persons 
had  sustained  more  or  less  severe  injuries. 

A  not  less  extraordinary  accident  of  the  same 
description,  unaccompanied,  however,  by  an  equal 
loss  of  life,  occured  on  the  Great  Northern  Railway 
upon  the  loth  of  June,  1866.  In  this  case  the  tube 
of  a  locomotive  of  a  freight  train  burst  at  about  the 
centre  of  the  Welwyn  Tunnel,  some  five  miles  north 
of  Hatfield,  bringing  the  train  to  a  stand-still.  The 
guard  in  charge  of  the  rear  of  the  train  failed  from 
some  cause  to  go  back  and  give  the  signal  for  an 
obstruction,  and  speedily  another  freight  train  from 
the  Midland  road  entered  and  dashed  into  the  rear 
of  the  train  already  there.  Apparently  those  in 
charge  of  these  two  trains  were  in  such  consterna- 
tion that  they  did  not  think  to  provide  against  a 
further  disaster;  at  any  rate,  before  measures  to 
that  end  had  been  taken,  an  additional  freight  train, 
this  time  belonging  to  the  Great  Northern  road, 
came  up  and  plowed  into  the  ruins  which  already 


ISO  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

blocked  the  tunnel.  One  of  the  trains  had  con- 
tained wagons  laden  with  casks  of  oil,  which  speedily 
became  ignited  from  contact  with  the  coals  scattered 
from  the  fire-boxes,  and  there  then  ensued  one  of 
the  most  extraordinary  spectacles  ever  witnessed  on 
a  railroad.  The  tunnel  was  filled  to  the  summit  of 
its  arch  and  completely  blocked  with  the  wrecked 
locomotives  and  wagons.  These  had  ignited,  and 
the  whole  cavity,  more  than  a  half  a  mile  in  length, 
was  converted  into  one  huge  furnace,  belching  forth 
smoke  and  flame  with  a  loud  roaring  sound  through 
its  several  air  shafts.  So  fierce  was  the  fire  that 
no  attempt  was  made  to  subdue  it,  and  eighteen 
hours  elapsed  before  any  steps  could  be  taken  to- 
wards clearing  the  track.  Strange  to  say,  in  this 
disaster  the  lives  of  but  two  persons  were  lost. 

Rear-end  collisions  have  been  less  frequent  in  this 
country  than  in  England,  for  the  simple  reason  that 
the  volume  of  traffic  has  pressed  less  heavily  on  the 
capacity  of  the  lines.  Yet  here,  also,  they  have  been 
by  no  means  unknown.  In  1865  two  occurred,  both 
of  which  were  accompanied  with  a  considerable  loss 
of  life ;  though,  coming  as  they  did  during  the  ex- 
citing scenes  which  marked  the  close  of  the  war  of 
the  Rebellion,  they  attracted  much  less  public 
notice  than  they  otherwise  would.  The  first  of 
these  took  place  in  New  Jersey  on  the  /th  of  March, 
1865,  just  three  days  after  the  second  inauguration 
of  President  Lincoln.  As  the  express  train  from 
Washington  to  New  York  over  the  Camden  &  Am- 


TWO  AMERICAN  COLLISIONS.  l$l 

boy  road  was  passing  through  Bristol,  about  thirty 
miles  from  Philadelphia,  at  half-past-two  o'clock  in 
the  morning,  it  dashed  into  the  rear  of  the  twelve 
o'clock  "  owl  train,"  from  Kensington  to  New  York, 
which  had  been  delayed  by  meeting  an  oil  train  on 
the  track  before  it.  The  case  appears  to  have  been 
one  of  very  culpable  negligence,  for,  though  the  owl 
train  was  some  two  hours  late,  those  in  charge  of  it 
seem  to  have  been  so  deeply  engrossed  in  what  was 
going  on  before  them  that  they  wholly  neglected  to 
guard  their  rear.  The  express  train  accordingly, 
approaching  around  a  curve,  plunged  at  a  high  rate 
of  speed  into  the  last  car,  shattering  it  to  pieces ; 
the  engine  is  even  said  to  have  passed  completely 
through  that  car  and  to  have  imbedded  itself  in 
the  one  before  it.  It  so  happened  that  most  of  the 
sufferers  by  this  accident,  numbering  about  fifty, 
were  soldiers  on  their  way  home  from  the  army 
upon  furlough. 

The  second  of  the  two  disasters  referred  to,  oc- 
curred on  the  i6th  of  August,  1865,  upon  the 
Housatonic  road  of  Connecticut.  A  new  engine  was 
out  upon  an  experimental  trip,  and  in  rounding 
a  curve  it  ran  into  the  rear  of  a  passenger  train, 
which,  having  encountered  a  disabled  freight  train, 
had  coupled  on  to  it  and  was  then  backing  down 
with  it  to  a  siding  in  order  to  get  by.  In  this 
case  the  impetus  was  so  great  that  the  colliding 
locomotive  utterly  destroyed  the  rear  car  of  the 
passenger  train  and  penetrated  some  distance  into 


1 52  RAILROAD  A  CCIDENTS. 

the  car  preceding  it,  where  its  boiler  burst.  For- 
tunately the  train  was  by  no  means  full  of  passen- 
gers ;  but,  even  as  it  was,  eleven  persons  were  killed 
and  some  seventeen  badly  injured. 


THE  RE  VERE  RE  VELA  TION.  1 5  3 


CHAPTER   XVI. 

NOVEL     APPLIANCES. 

)(  THE  great  peculiarity  of  the  Revere  accident,  and 
that  which  gave  a  permanent  interest  to  it,  lay  in  the 
revelation  it  afforded  of  the  degree  in  which  a  sys- 
tem had  outgrown  its  appliances.  At  every  point 
a  deficiency  was  apparent.  The  railroads  of  New 
England  had  long  been  living  on  their  early  reputa- 
tion, and  now,  when  a  sudden  test  was  applied,  it 
was  found  that  they  were  years  behind  the  time. 
In  August,  1871,  the  Eastern  railroad  was  run  as  if 
it  were  a  line  of  stage-coaches  in  the  days  before  the 
telegraph.  )(Not  in  one  point  alone,  but  in  every- 
thing, it  broke  down  under  the  test.  The  disaster 
was  due  not  to  any  single  cause  but  to  a  combina- 
tion of  causes  implicating  not  only  the  machinery 
and  appliances  in  use  by  the  company,  but  its  dis- 
cipline and  efficiency  from  the  highest  official  down 
to  the  meanest  subordinate.  In  the  first  place  the 
capacity  of  the  road  was  taxed  to  the  utmost  ;  it  was 


154  RA IL ROAD  A  CCI DENTS. 

vital,  almost,  that  every  wheel  should  be  kept  in 
motion.  Yet,  under  that  very  exigency,  the  wheels 
stopped  almost  as  a,matter  of  necessity.  How  could 
it  be  otherwise  P-^Here  was  a  crowded  line,  more 
than  half  of  which  was  equipped  with  but  a  single 
track,  in  operating  which  no  reliance  was  placed 
upon  the  telegraph.  With  trains  running  out  of 
their  schedule  time  and  out  of  their  schedule  place, 
engineers  and  conductors  were  left  to  grope  their 
way  along  as  best  they  could  in  the  light  of  rules, 
the  essence  of  which  was  that  when  in  doubt  they 
were  to  stand  stock  still.  ^>Then,  in  the  absence 
of  the  telegraph,  a  block  occurred  almost  at  the 
mouth  of  the  terminal  station  ;  and  there  the  trains 
stood  for  hours  in  stupid  obedience  to  a  stupid 
rule,  because  the  one  man  who,  with  a  simple  re- 
gard to  the  dictates  of  common  sense,  was  habitu- 
ally accustomed  to  violate  it  happened  to  be  sick. 
Trains  commonly  left  a  station  out  of  time  and  out 
of  place  ;  and  the  engineer  of  an  express  train  was 
sent  out  to  run  a  gauntlet  the  whole  length  of  the 
road  with  a  simple  verbal  injunction  to  look  out  for 
some  one  before  him.  Then,  at  last,  when  this  ex- 
press train  through  all  this  chaos  got  to  chasing  an 
accommodation  train,  much  as  a  hound  might  course 
a  hare,  there  was  not  a  pretence  of  a  signal  to  in- 
dicate the  time  which  had  elapsed  between  the  pas- 
sage of  the  two,  and  employes,  lanterns  in  hand, 
gaped  on  in  bewilderment  at  the  awful  race,  con^ 
eluding  that  they  could  not  at  any  rate  do  anything 


HARE  AND   HOUND.  155 

to  help  matters,  but  on  the  whole  they  were  inclined 
to  think  that  those  most  immediately  concerned 
must  know  what  they  were  about.  Finally,  even 
when  the  disaster  was  imminent,  when  deficiency  in 
organization  and  discipline  had  done  its  worst,  its 
consequences  might  yet  have  been  averted  through 
the  use  of  better  appliances ;  had  the  one  train  been 
equipped  with  the  Westinghouse  brake,  already 
largely  in  use  in  other  sections  of  the  country,  it 
might  and  would  have  been  stopped  ;  or  had  the 
other  train  been  provided  with  reflecting  tail-lights 
in  place  of  the  dim  hand-lanterns  which  glimmered 
on  its  rear  platform,  it  could  hardly  have  failed  to 
make  its  proximity  known.  Any  one'  of  a  dozen 
things,  every  one  of  which  should  have  been  but  was 
not,  ought  to  have  averted  the  disaster.  Obviously 
its  immediate  cause  was  not  far  to  seek.  It  lay  in 
the  carelessness  of  a  conductor  who  failed  to  consult 
his  watch,  and  never  knew  until  the  crash  came  that 
his  train  was  leisurely  moving  along  on  the  time  of 
another.  Nevertheless,  what  can  be  said  in  extenua- 
tion of  a  system  under  which,  at  this  late  day,  a  rail- 
road is  operated  on  the  principle  that  each  employe" 
under  all  circumstances  can  and  will  take  care  of  him- 
self and  of  those  whose  lives  and  limbs  are  entrusted 
to  his  care  ? 

There  is,  however,  another  and  far  more  attract- 
ive side  to  the  picture.  The  lives  sacrificed  at 
Revere  were  not  lost  in  vain.  Seven  complete  rail- 
road years  passed  by  between  that  and  the  Wollas- 


I $  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

ton   Heights  accident  of  1878.     During  that  time 
not  less  than   two  hundred   and  thirty  millions  of 
persons   were  carried  by  rail  within   the   limits  of 
Massachusetts.     Of  this  vast  number  while  only  50, 
or  about  one  in  each  four  and  a  half  millions,  sus- 
tained  any   injury  from    causes   beyond  their  own 
power  to   control,  the  killed  were  just  two.     This 
certainly  was  a  record  with  which   no   community 
could   well  find  fault ;    and   it  was  due   more  than 
anything  else  to  the  great  disaster  of  August  26, 
1871.      More    than    once,    and    on    more   than   one 
road,   accidents    occurred   which,   but    for   the  im- 
proved appliances  introduced  in  consequence  of  the 
experience  at  Revere,  could  hardly  have  failed  of 
fatal  results.      Not  that  these  appliances  were  in 
all  cases  very  cheerfully  or  very  eagerly  accepted. 
Neither  the  Miller  platform  nor  the  Westinghouse 
brake  won  its  way  into  general  use  unchallenged. 
Indeed,  the  earnestness  and   even   the   indignation 
with   which    presidents    and    superintendents   then 
protested  that  their  car  construction  was  better  and 
stronger  than  Miller's  ;    that  their  antiquated  hand- 
brakes  were   the   most    improved    brakes, — better, 
much   better,   than    the   Westinghouse  ;    that  their 
crude  old  semaphores  and  targets  afforded  a  protec- 
tion  to   trains  which   no  block-system   would   ever 
equal, — all  this  certainly  was  comical  enough,  even  in 
the  very  shadow  of  the  great  tragedy.     Men  of  a  cer- 
tain type  always  have  protested  and  will  always  con- 
tinue to  protest  that  they  have  nothing  to  learn  ; 


THE  LESSON  LEARNED.  1 57 

yet,  under  the  heavy  burden  of  responsibility,  learn 
they  still  do.  They  dare  not  but  learn.  On  this 
point  the  figures  of  the  Massachusetts  annual  re- 
turns between  the  year  1871  and  the  year  1878 
speak  volumes.  At  the  time  of  the  Revere  disaster, 
with  one  single  honorable  exception, — that  of  the 
Boston  &  Providence  road, — both  the  atmospheric 
train-brake  and  the  Miller  platform,  the  two  greatest 
modern  improvements  in  American  car  construc- 
tion, were  practically  unrecognized  on  the  railroads 
of  Massachusetts.  Even  a  year  later,  but  93  loco- 
motives and  415  cars  had  been  equipped  even  with 
the  train-brake.  In  September,  1873,  the  number 
had,  however,  risen  to  194  locomotives  and  709  cars  ; 
and  another  twelve  months  carried  these  numbers 
up  to  313  locomotives  and  997  cars.  Finally  in 
1877  tne  state  commissioners  in  their  report  for 
that  year  spoke  of  the  train-brake  as  having  been 
then  generally  adopted,  and  at  the  same  time  called 
attention  to  the  very  noticeable  fact  "  that  the  only 
railroad  accident  resulting  in  the  death  of  a  passen- 
ger from  causes  beyond  his  control  within  the  state 
during  a  period  of  two  years  and  eight  months,  was 
caused  by  the  failure  of  a  company  to  adopt  this 
improvement  on  all  its  passenger  rolling-stock." 
The  adoption  of  Miller's  method  of  car  construc- 
tion had  meanwhile  been  hardly  less  rapid.  Almost 
unknown  at  the  time  of  the  Revere  catastrophe  in 
September,  1871,  in  October,  1873,  when  returns  on 
the  subject  were  first  called  for  by  the  state  com- 


1 5  8  RAILROAD  A  CCIDENTS. 

missioners,  eleven  companies  had  already  adopted 
it  on  778  cars  out  of  a  total  number  of  1548  re- 
ported. In  1878  it  had  been  adopted  by  twenty- 
two  companies,  and  applied  to  1685  cars  out  of  a 
total  of  1792.  In  other  words  it  had  been  brought 
into  general  use. 


THE  AMERICAN  LOCOMOTIVE  ENGINEER.    I $9 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

THE    AUTOMATIC   ELECTRIC    BLOCK   SYSTEM. 

A  REALIZING  sense  of  the  necessity  of  ultimately- 
adopting  some  system  of  protection  against  the 
danger  of  rear-end  collisions  was,  above  all  else, 
brought  directly  home  to  American  railroad  mana- 
gers through  the  Revere  disaster.  In  discussing  and 
comparing  the  appliances  used  in  the  practical  oper- 
ation of  railroads  in  different  countries,  there  is  one 
element,  however,  which  can  never  be  left  out  of 
the  account.  The  intelligence,  quickness  of  per- 
ception and  capacity  for  taking  care. of  themselves 
—that  combination  of  qualities  which,  taken  to- 
gether, constitute  individuality  and  adaptability 
to  circumstance — vary  greatly  among  the  railroad 
employe's  of  different  countries.  The  American 
locomotive  engineer,  as  he  is  called,  is  especially 
gifted  in  this  way.  He  can  be  relied  on  to  take  care 
of  himself  and  his  train  under  circumstances  which 
in  other  countries  would  be  thought  to  insure  disas- 


1 60  RAILROAD  A  CCI DENTS. 

ter.  Volumes  on  this  point  were  included  in  the  fact 
that  though  at  the  time  of  the  Revere  disaster  many 
of  the  American  lines,  especially  in  Massachusetts, 
were  crowded  with  the  trains  of  a  mixed  traffic,  the 
necessity  of  making  any  provision  against  rear-end 
collisions,  further  than  by  directing  those  in  imme- 
diate charge  of  the  trains  to  keep  a  sharp  look  out 
and  to  obey  their  printed  orders,  seemed  hardly  to 
have  occurred  to  any  one.  The  English  block  sys- 
tem was  now  and  then  referred  to  in  a  vague,  gen- 
eral way ;  but  it  was  very  questionable  whether  one 
in  ten  of  those  referring  to  it  knew  anything  about 
it  or  had  ever  seen  it  in  operation,  much  less  in- 
vestigated it.  A  characteristic  illustration  of  this 
was  afforded  in  the  course  of  those  official  investi- 
gations which  followed  the  Revere  disaster,  and 
have  already  more  than  once  been  alluded  to.  Prior 
to  that  disaster  the  railroads  of  Massachusetts 
had,  as  a  rule,  enjoyed  a  rather  exceptional  free- 
dom from  accidents,  and  there  was  every  reason 
to  suppose  that  their  regulations  were  as  exact 
and  their  system  as  good  as  those  in  use  in  other 
parts  of  the  country.  Yet  it  then  appeared  that 
in  the  rules  of  very  few  of  the  Massachusetts  roads 
had  any  provision,  even  of  the  simplest  character, 
been  made  as  to  the  effect  of  telegraphic  orders, 
or  the  course  to  be  pursued  by  employe's  in  charge 
of  trains  on  their  receipt.  The  appliances  for 
securing  intervals  between  following  trains  were 
marked  by  a  quaint  simplicity.  They  were,  indeed, 


A  NECESSITY  OF  THE  FUTURE.  l6l 

"  singularly  primitive,"  as  the  railroad  commission- 
ers on  a  subsequent  occasion  described  them,  when 
it  appeared  that  on  one  of  the  principal  roads  of  the 
state  the  interval  between  two  closely  following 
trains  was  signalled  to  the  engineer  of  the  second 
train  by  a  station-master's  holding  up  to  him  as  he 
passed  a  number  of  ringers  corresponding  to  the 
number  of  minutes  since  the  first  train  had  gone 
by.  For  the  rest  the  examination  revealed,  as  the 
nearest  approach  to  a  block  system,  a  queer  collec- 
tion of  dials,  sand-glasses,  green  flags,  colored  lan- 
terns and  hand-targets.  The  climax  in  the  course 
of  that  investigation  was,  however,  reached  when 
some  reference,  involving  a  description  of  it,  was 
made  to  the  English  block.  This  was  met  by  a 
protest  on  the  part  of  one  veteran  superintendent, 
who  announced  that  it  might  work  well  under 
certain  circumstances,  but  for  himself  he  could 
not  be  responsible  for  the  operation  of  a  road 
running  the  number  of  trains  he  had  charge  of  in 
reliance  on  any  such  system.  The  subject,  in  fact, 
was  one  of  which  he  knew  absolutely  nothing ; — • 
not  even  that,  through  the  block  system  and 
through  it  alone,  fourteen  trains  were  habitually 
and  safely  moved  under  circumstances  where  he 
moved  one.  This  occurred  in  1871,  and  though 
eight  years  have  since  elapsed  information  in  regard 
to  the  block  system  is  not  yet  very  widely  dissem- 
inated inside  of  railroad  circles,  much  less  outside 
of  them.  It  is  none  the  less  a  necessity  of  the 


1 62  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

future.  It  has  got  to  be  understood,  and,  in  some 
form,  it  has  got  to  be  adopted ;  for  even  in  Amer- 
ica there  are  limits  to  the  reliance  which,  when  the 
lives  and  limbs  of  many  are  at  stake,  can  be  placed 
on  the  "  sharp  look  out  "  of  any  class  of  men,  no 
matter  how  intelligent  they  may  be. 

The  block  system  is  of  English  origin,  and  it 
scarcely  needs  to  be  said  that  it  was  adopted  by  the 
railroad  corporations  of  that  country  only  when  they 
were  driven  to  it  by  the  exigencies  of  their  traffic. 
But  for  that  system,  indeed,  the  most  costly  portion 
of  the  tracks  of  the  English  roads  must  of  neces- 
sity have  been  duplicated  years  ago,  as  their  traffic 
had  fairly  outgrown  those  appliances  of  safety 
which  have  even  to  this  time  been  found  sufficient 
in  America.  There  were  points,  for  instance,  where 
two  hundred  and  seventy  regular  trains  of  one  line 
alone  passed  daily.  On  the  London  &  North- 
Western  there  are  more  than  sixty  through  down 
trains,  taking  no  account  of  local  trains,  each  day 
passing  over  the  same  line  of  tracks,  among  which 
are  express  trains  which  stop  nowhere,  way  trains 
which  stop  everywhere,  express-freight,  way-freight, 
mineral  trains  and  parcel  trains.  On  the  Midland 
road  there  are  nearly  twice  as  many  similar  trains  on 
each  track.  On  the  Metropolitan  railway  the  ave- 
rage interval  is  three  and  one-third  minutes  between 
trains.  In  one  case  points  were  mentioned  where  270 
regular  trains  of  one  line  alone  passed  a  given  June- 
tion  during  each  twenty-four  hours,-where  470  trains 


LONDON  TRAIN-MOVEMENT.  163 

passed  a  single  station,  the  regular  interval  between 
them  being  but  five-eighths  of  a  mile, — where  132 
trains  entered  and  left  a  single  station  during  three 
hours  of  each  evening  every  day,  being  one  train  in 
eighty-two  seconds.  In  1870  there  daily  reached  or 
left  the  six  stations  of  the  Boston  roads  some  385 
trains  ;  while  no  less  than  650  trains  a  day  were  in  the 
same  year  received  and  despatched  from  a  single  one 
of  the  London  stations.  On  one  single  exception- 
al occasion  1,111  trains,  carrying  145,000  persons, 
were  reported  as  entering  and  leaving  this  station 
in  the  space  of  eighteen  hours,  being  rather  more 
than  a  train  a  minute.  Indeed  it  may  well  be  ques- 
tioned whether  the  world  anywhere  else  furnishes  an 
illustration  so  apt  and  dramatic  of  the  great  me- 
chanical achievements  of  recent  times  as  that  to  be 
seen  during  the  busy  hours  of  any  week-day  from 
the  signal  and  interlocking  galleries  which  span  the 
tracks  as  they  enter  the  Charing  Cross  or  Cannon 
street  stations  in  London.  Below  and  in  front  of 
the  galleries  the  trains  glide  to  and  fro,  coming  sud- 
denly into  sight  from  beyond  the  bridges  and  as 
suddenly  disappearing, — winding  swiftly  in  and  out, 
and  at  times  four  of  them  running  side  by  side  on 
as  many  tracks  but  in  both  directions,  —the  whole 
making  up  a  swiftly  shifting  maze  of  complex  move- 
ment under  the  influence  of  which  a  head  unaccus- 
tomed to  the  sight  grows  actually  giddy.  Yet  it  is 
all  done  so  quietly  and  smoothly,  with  such  an  ab- 
sence of  haste  and  nervousness  on  the  part  of  the 


164  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

stolid  operators  in  charge,  that  it  is  not  easy  to  de- 
cide which  most  to  wonder  at,  the  almost  incon- 
ceivable magnitude  and  despatch  of  the  train-move- 
ment or  the  perfection  of  the  appliances  which  make 
it  possible.  No  man  concerned  in  the  larger  manage- 
ment of  railroads,  who  has  not  passed  a  morning  in 
those  London  galleries,  knows  what  it  is  to  handle 
a  great  city's  traffic. 

Perfect  as  it  is  in  its  way,  however,  it  may  well  be 
questioned  whether  the  block  system  as  developed 
in  England  is  likely  to  be  generally  adopted  on 
American  railroads.  Upon  one  or  two  of  them,  and 
notably  on  the  New  Jersey  Central  and  a  division 
of  the  Pennsylvania,  it  has  already  been  in  use  for 
a  number  of  years.  From  an  American  point  of 
view,  however,  it  is  open  to  a  number  of  objections. 
That  in  itself  it  is  very  perfect  and  has  been  success- 
fully elaborated  so  as  to  provide  for  almost  every 
possible  contingency  is  proved  by  the  results  daily 
accomplished  by  means  of  it.*  The  English  lines 
are  made  to  do  an  incredible  amount  of  work  with 
comparative  few  accidents.  The  block  system  is, 
however,  none  the  less  a  very  clumsy  and  compli- 
cated one,  necessitating  the  constant  employment 
of  a  large  number  of  skilled  operators.  Here  is  the 
great  defect  in  it  from  the  American  point  of  view. 
In  this  country  labor  is  scarce  and  capital  costly. 
The  effort  is  always  towards  the  perfecting  of 

*  An  excellent  popular  description  of  this  system  will  be  found  in 
Barry's  Railway  Appliances,  Chapter  V. 


THE  AMERICAN  BLOCK.  1 65 

labor-saving  machines.  Hitherto  the  pressure  of 
traffic  on  the  lines  has  not  been  greater  than  could 
be  fairly  controlled  by  simpler  appliances,  and  the 
expense  of  the  English  system  is  so  heavy  that  its 
adoption,  except  partially,  would  not  have  been 
warranted.  As  Barry  says  in  his  treatise  on  the  sub- 
ject, "one  can  'buy  gold  too  dear';  for  if  every 
possible  known  precaution  is  to  be  taken,  regardless 
of  cost,  it  may  not  pay  to  work  a  railway  at  all." 

It  is  tolerably  safe,  therefore,  to  predict  that  the 
American  block  system  of  the  future  will  be  essen- 
tially different  from  the  present  English  system. 
The  basis — electricity — will  of  course  be  the  same  ; 
but,  while  the  operator  is  everywhere  in  the  English 
block,  his  place  will  be  supplied  to  the  utmost  possi- 
ble degree  by  automatic  action  in  the  American.  It 
is  in  this  direction  that  the  whole  movement  since 
the  Revere  disaster  has  been  going  on,  and  the  ad- 
vance has  been  very  great.  From  peculiarities  of 
condition  also  the  American  block  must  be  made  to 
cover  a  multitude  of  weak  points  in  the  operation  of 
roads,  and  give  timely  notice  of  dangers  against 
which  the  English  block  provides  only  to  a  limited 
degree,  and  always  through  the  presence  of  yet 
other  employes.  For  instance,  as  will  presently 
be  seen,  many  more  accidents  and,  in  Europe  even, 
far  greater  loss  of  life  is  caused  by  locomotives 
coming  in  contact  with  vehicles  at  points  where 
highways  cross  railroad  tracks  at  a  level  therewith 
than  by  rear-end  collisions ;  meanwhile  throughout 


1 66  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

America,  even  in  the  most  crowded  suburban  neigh, 
borhoods,  these  crossings  are  the  rule,  whereas  in 
Europe  they  are  the  exception.  The  English  block 
affords  protection  against  this  danger  by  giving 
electric  notice  to  gatemen ;  but  gatemen  are  al- 
ways supposed.  So  also  as  respects  the  movements 
of  passengers  in  and  about  stations  in  crossing 
tracks  as  they  come  to  or  leave  the  trains,  or  pre- 
pare to  take  their  places  in  them.  The  rule  in 
Europe  is  that  passenger  crossings  at  local  stations 
are  provided  over  or  under  the  tracks ;  in  Amer- 
ica, however,  almost  nowhere  is  any  provision  at 
all  made,  but  passengers,  men,  women  and  children, 
are  left  to  scramble  across  tracks  as  best  they  can 
in  the  face  of  passing  trains.  They  are  expected 
to  take  care  of  themselves,  and  the  success  with 
which  they  do  it  is  most  astonishing.  Having  been 
brought  up  to  this  self-care  all  their  lives,  they  do 
not,  as  would  naturally  be  supposed,  become  con- 
fused and  stumble  under  the  wheels  of  locomotives ; 
and  the  statistics  seem  to  show  that  no  more  acci- 
dents from  this  cause  occur  in  America  than  in 
Europe.  Nevertheless  some  provision  is  manifestly 
desirable  to  notify  employes  as  well  as  passengers 
that  trains  are  approaching,  especially  where  way- 
stations  are  situated  on  curves. 

Again,  it  is  well  known  that,  next  to  collisions,  the 
greatest  source  of  danger  to  railroad  trains  is  due 
to  broken  tracks.  It  is,  of  course,  apparent  that 
tracks  may  at  any  time  be  broken  by  accident,  as  by 


IS  A  UTOMA  TIC  A  C  TION  RE  LI  A  BLE  ?  1 67 

earth-slides,  derailment  or  the  fracture  of  rails.  This 
danger  has  to  be  otherwise  provided  for ;  the  block 
has  nothing  to  do  with  it  further  than  to  prevent  a 
train  delayed  by  any  such  break  from  being  run  into 
by  any  following  train.  The  broken  track  which  the 
perfect  block  should  give  notice  of  is  that  where  the 
break  is  a  necessary  incident  to  the  regular  operation 
of  the  road.  It  is  these  breaks  which,  both  in  Am- 
erica and  elsewhere,  are  the  fruitful  source  of  the 
great  majority  of  railroad  accidents,  and  draw-bridges 
and  switches,  or  facing  points  as  they  are  termed  in 
the  English  reports,  are  most  prominent  among 
them.  Wherever  there  is  a  switch,  the  chances  are 
that  in  the  course  of  time  there  will  be  an  accident. 
Four  matters  connected  with  train  movement 
have  now  been  specified,  in  regard  to  which  some 
provision  is  either  necessary  or  highly  desirable : 
these  are  rear  collisions,  tracks  broken  at  draw- 
bridges or  at  switches,  highway  grade  crossings, 
and  the  notification  of  agents  and  passengers  at 
stations.  The  effort  in  America,  somewhat  in  ad- 
vance of  that  crowded  condition  of  the  lines  which 
makes  the  adoption  of  something  a  measure  of  pres- 
ent necessity,  has  been  directed  towards  the  inven- 
tion of  an  automatic  system  which  at  one  and  the 
same  time  should  cover  all  the  dangers  and  provide 
for  all  the  needs  which  have  been  referred  to,  elim- 
inating the  risks  incident  to  human  forgetfulness, 
drowsiness  and  weakness  of  nerves.  Can  reliable 
automatic  provision  thus  be  made  ? — The  English 


1 68  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

authorities  are  of  opinion  that  it  cannot.  They  in- 
sist that  "  if  automatic  arrangements  be  adopted, 
however  suitable  they  may  be  to  the  duties  which 
they  have  to  perform,  they  should  in  all  cases  be 
used  as  additions  to,  and  not  as  substitutions  for, 
safety  machinery  worked  by  competent  signal-men. 
The  signal-man  should  be  bound  to  exercise  his  ob- 
servation, care  and  judgment,  and  to  act  thereon ; 
and  the  machine,  as  far  as  possible,  be  such  that  if 
he  attempts  to  go  wrong  it  shall  check  him." 

It  certainly  cannot  be  said  that  the  American 
electrician  has  as  yet  demonstrated  the  incorrect- 
ness of  this  conclusion,  but  he  has  undoubtedly 
made  a  good  deal  of  progress  in  that  direction.  Of 
the  various  automatic  blocks  which  have  now  been 
experimented  with  or  brought  into  practice,  the  Hall 
Electric  and  the  Union  Safety  Signal  Company  sys- 
tems have  been  developed  to  a  very  marked  degree 
of  perfection.  They  depend  for  their  working  on 
diametrically  opposite  principles :  the  Hall  signals 
being  worked  by  means  of  an  electric  circuit  caused 
by  the  action  of  wheels  moving  on  the  rails,  and 
conveyed  through  the  usual  medium  of  wires; 
while,  under  the  other  system,  the  wires  being 
wholly  dispensed  with,  a  continuous  electric  cir- 
cuit is  kept  up  by  means  of  the  rails,  which 
are  connected  for  the  purpose,  and  the  signals  are 
then  acted  upon  through  the  breaking  of  this  noi- 
mal  circuit  by  the  movement  of  locomotives  and 
cars.  So  far  as  the  signals  are  concerned,  there  is 


HALLS  ELECTRIC  SYSTEM.  169 

no  essential  difference  between  the  two  systems, 
except  that  Hall  supplies  the  necessary  motive 
force  by  the  direct  action  of  electricity,  while  in 
the  other  case  dependence  is  placed  upon  suspended 
weights.  Of  the  two  the  Hall  system  is  the  oldest 
and  most  thoroughly  elaborated,  having  been  com- 
pelled to  pass  through  that  long  and  useful  ten- 
tative process  common  to  all  inventions,  during 
which  they  are  regarded  as  of  doubtful  utility  and 
are  gradually  developed  through  a  succession  of 
partial  failures.  So  far  as  Hall's  system  is  con- 
cerned this  period  may  now  fairly  be  regarded  as 
over,  for  it  is  in  established  use  on  a  number  of  the 
more  crowded  roads  of  the  North,  and  especially 
of  New  England,  while  the  imperfections  neces- 
sarily incident  to  the  development  of  an  appliance 
at  once  so  delicate  and  so  complicated,  have  for 
certain  purposes  been  clearly  overcome.  Its  signal 
arrangements,  for  instance,  to  protect  draw-bridges, 
stations  and  grade-crossings  are  wholly  distinct  from 
its  block  system,  through  which  it  provides  against 
dangers  from  collision  and  broken  tracks.  So  far 
as  draw-bridges  are  concerned,  the  protection  it  af- 
fords is  perfect.  Not  only  is  its  interlocking  appa- 
ratus so  designed  that  the  opening  of  the  draw 
blocks  all  approach  to  it,  but  the  signals  are  also 
reciprocal ;  and  if  through  carelessness  or  automatic 
derangement  any  train  passes  the  block,  the  draw- 
tender  is  notified  at  once  of  the  fact  in  ample  time 
to  stop  it. 


17°  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

In  the  case  of  a  highway  crossing  at  a  level,  the 
electric  bell  under  Hall's  system  is  placed  at  the 
crossing,  giving  notice  of  the  approaching  train 
from  .the  moment  it  is  within  half  a  mile  until  it 
passes ;  so  that,  where  this  appliance  is  in  use, 
accidents  can  happen  only  through  the  gross  care- 
lessness of  those  using  the  highway.  When  the 
electric  bell  is  silent  there  is  no  train  within  half 
a  mile  and  the  crossing  is  safe ;  it  is  not  safe  while 
the  bell  is  ringing.  As  it  now  stands  the  law 
usually  provides  that  the  prescribed  signals,  either 
bell  or  whistle,  shall  be  given  from  the  locomotive 
as  it  approaches  the  highway,  and  at  a  fixed  dis- 
tance from  it.  The  signal,  therefore,  is  given  at  a 
distance  of  several  hundred  yards,  more  or  less, 
from  the  point  of  danger.  The  electric  system  im- 
proves on  this  by  placing  the  signal  directly  at  the 
point  of  danger, — the  traveller  approaches  the  bell, 
instead  of  the  bell  approaching  the  traveller.  At 
any  point  of  crossing  which  is  really  dangerous, — 
that  is  at  any  crossing  where  trees  or  cuttings  or 
buildings  mask  the  railroad  from  the  highway, — 
this  distinction  is  vital.  In  the  one  case  notice 
of  the  unseen  danger  must  be  given  arid  cannot  be 
unobserved  ;  in  the  other  case  whether  it  is  really 
given  or  not  may  depend  on  the  condition  of  the 
atmosphere  or  the  direction  of  the  wind. 

Usually,  however,  in  New  England  the  level 
crossings  of  the  more  crowded  thoroughfares,  per- 
haps one  in  ten  of  the  whole  number,  are  protected 


HIGHWAY-CROSSING    SIGNALS.  I?l 

by  gates  or  flag-men.  Under  similar  circumstances 
in  Great  Britain  there  is  an  electric  connection 
between  a  bell  in  the  cabin  of  the  gate-keeper  and 
the  nearest  signal  boxes  of  the  block  system  on 
each  side  of  the  crossing,  so  that  due  notice  is 
given  of  the  approach  of  trains  from  either  direc- 
tion. In  this  country  it  has  heretofore  been  the 
custom  to  warn  gate-keepers'  by  the  locomotive 
whistle,  to  the  intense  annoyance  of  all  persons 
dwelling  near  the  crossing,  or  to  make  them  depend 
for  notice  on  their  own  eyes.  Under  the  Hall 
system,  however,  the  gate-keeper  is  automatically 
signalled  to  be  on  the  look  out,  if  he  is  attending 
to  his  duty;  or,  if  he  is  neglecting  it,  the  electric 
bell  in  some  degree  supplies  his  place,  without  re- 
leasing the  corporation  from  its  liability.  In  Amer- 
ica the  heavy  fogs  of  England  are  almost  unknown, 
and  the  brilliant  head  lights,  heavy  bells  and  shrill 
high  whistles  in  use  on  the  locomotives  would  at 
night,  it  might  be  supposed,  give  ample  notice  to 
the  most  careless  of  an  approaching  train.  Con- 
tinually recurring  experience  shows,  however,  that 
this  is  not  the  case.  Under  these  circumstances 
the  electric  bell  at  the  crossing  becomes  not  only  a 
matter  of  justice  almost  to  the  employe  who  is 
stationed  there,  but  a  watchman  over  him. 

This,  however,  like  the  other  forms  of  signals 
which  have  been  referred  to,  is,  in  the  electric  sys- 
tem, a  mere  adjunct  of  its  chief  use,  which  is  the 
block, — they  are  all  as  it  were  things  thrown  into 


1/2  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

the  bargain.  As  contradistinguished  from  the 
English  block,  which  insures  only  an  unoccupied 
track,  the  automatic  blocks  seek  to  insure  an  un- 
broken track  as  well, — that  is  not  only  is  each  seg- 
ment into  which  a  road  is  divided,  protected  as  res- 
pects following  trains  by,  in  the  case  of  Hall's 
system,  double  signals  watching  over  each  other, 
the  one  at  safety,  the  other  at  danger, — both  having 
to  combine  to  open  the  block, — but  every  switch  or 
facing  point,  the  throwing  of  which  may  break  the 
main  track,  is  also  protected.  The  Union  Signal 
Company's  system  it  is  claimed  goes  still  further 
than  this  and  indicates  any  break  in  the  track,  though 
due  to  accidental  fracture  or  displacement  of  rails. 
Without  attempting  this  the  Hall  system  has  one 
other  important  feature  in  common  with  the  En- 
glish block,  and  a  very  important  feature,  that  of 
enabling  station  agents  in  case  of  sudden  emergency 
to  control  the  train  movement  within  half  a  mile  or 
more  of  their  stations  on  either  side.  Within  the 
given  distance  they  can  stop  trains  either  leaving  or 
approaching.  The  inability  to  do  this  has  been 
the  cause  of  some  of  the  most  disastrous  collisions 
on  record,  and  notably  those  at  Revere  and  at 
Thorpe. 

The  one  essential  thing,  however,  in  every  perfect 
block  system,  whether  automatic  or  worked  by 
operators,  is  that  in  case  of  accident  or  derangement 
or  doubt,  the  signal  should  rest  at  danger.  This  the 
Hall  system  now  fully  provides  for,  and  in  case  even 


THE  COST  OF  A  SMALL  ECONOMY.  173 

of  the  wilful  displacement  of  a  switch,  an  occurrence 
by  no  means  without  precedent  in  railroad  experi- 
ence, the  danger  signal  could  not  but  be  displaye/d, 
even  though  the  electric  connection  had  been  tam- 
pered with.  Accidents  due  to  wilfullness,  however, 
can  hardly  be  provided  for  except  by  police  pre- 
cautions. Train  wrecking  is  not  to  be  taken  into 
account  as  a  danger  incident  to  the  ordinary  opera- 
tion of  a  railroad.  Carelessness  or  momentary  in- 
advertence, or,  most  dangerous  of  all,  that  reckless- 
ness— that  unnecessary  assumption  of  risk  some- 
where or  at  some  time,  which  is  almost  inseparable 
from  a  long  immunity  from  disaster — these  are  the 
great  sources  of  peril  most  carefully  to  be  guarded 
against.  The  complicated  and  unceasing  train 
movement  depends  upon  many  thousand  employes, 
all  of  whom  make  mistakes  or  assume  risks  some- 
times ; — and  did  they  not  do  so  they  would  be  either 
more  or  less  than  men.  Being,  however,  neither 
angels  nor  machines,  but  ordinary  mortals  whose 
services  are  bought  for  money  at  the  average  mar- 
ket rate  of  wages,  it  would  certainly  seem  no  small 
point  gained  if  an  automatic  machine  could  be 
placed  on  guard  over  those  whom  it  is  the  great 
effort  of  railroad  discipline  to  reduce  to  automatons. 
Could  this  result  be  attained,  the  unintentional 
throwing  of  a  lever  or  the  carelessness  which  leaves 
it  thrown,  would  simply  block  the  track  instead  of 
leaving  it  broken.  An  example  of  this,  and  at  the 
same  time  a  most  forcible  illustration  of  the  possible 


1/4  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

cost  of  a  small  economy  in  the  application  of  a  safe- 
guard, was  furnished  in  the  case  of  the  Wollaston 
disaster.  At  the  time  of  that  disaster,  the  Old 
Colony  railroad  had  for  several  years  been  partially 
equipped  on  the  portion  of  its  track  near  Boston, 
upon  which  the  accident  occurred,  with  Hall's  sys- 
tem. It  had  worked  smoothly  and  easily,  was  well 
understood  by  the  employe's,  and  the  company  was 
sufficiently  satisfied  with  it  to  have  even  then  made 
arrangements  for  its  extension.  Unfortunately,  with 
a  too  careful  eye  to  the  expenditure  involved,  the 
line  had  been  but  partially  equipped  ;  points  where 
little  danger  was  apprehended  had  not  been  pro- 
tected. Among  these  was  the  "  Foundry  switch," 
so  called,  near  Wollaston.  Had  this  switch  been 
connected  with  the  system  and  covered  by  a  signal- 
target,  the  mere  act  of  throwing  it  would  have  auto- 
matically blocked  the  track,  and  only  when  it  was 
re-set  would  the  track  have  been  opened.  The 
switch  was  not  connected,  the  train  hands  were 
recklessly  careless,  and  so  a  trifling  economy  cost  in 
one  unguarded  moment  some  fifty  persons  life  and 
limb,  and  the  corporation  more  than  $300,000. 

One  objection  to  the  automatic  block  is  gen- 
erally based  upon  the  delicacy  and  complicated 
character  of  the  machinery  on  which  its  action 
necessarily  depends ;  and  this  objection  is  especially 
urged  against  those  other  portions  of  the  Hall 
system,  covering  draws  and  level  crossings,  which 
have  been  particularly  described.  It  is  argued  that 


"  PRE TTY  AND  INGENIO US;  B UT—  "          1 75 

it  is  always  liable  to  get  out  of  order  from  a  great 
multiplicity  of  causes,  some  of  which  are  very  diffi- 
cult to  guard  against,  and  that  it  is  sure  to  get  out 
of  order  during  any  electric  disturbance ;  but  it  is 
during  storms  that  accidents  are  most  likely  to 
occur,  and  especially  is  this  the  case  at  highway 
grade-crossings.  It  is  comparatively  easy  to  avoid 
accidents  so  long  as  the  skies  are  clear  and  the 
elements  quiet ;  but  it  is  exactly  when  this  is  not 
the  case  and  when  it  becomes  necessary  to  use 
every  precaution,  that  electricity  as  a  safeguard  fails 
or  runs  mad,  and,  by  participating  in  the  general 
confusion,  proves  itself  worse  than  nothing.  Then 
it  will  be  found  that  those  in  charge  of  trains  and 
tracks,  who  have  been  educated  into  a  reliance 
upon  it  under  ordinary  circumstances,  will  from 
force  of  habit,  if  nothing  else,  go  on  relying  upon 
it,  and  disaster  will  surely  follow. 

This  line  of  reasoning  is  plausible,  but  none  the 
less  open  to  one  serious  objection ;  it  is  sustained 
neither  by  statistics  nor  by  practical  experience. 
Moreover  it  is  not  new,  for,  slightly  varied  in  phrase- 
ology, it  has  been  persistently  urged  against  the  in- 
troduction of  every  new  railroad  appliance,  and,  in- 
deed, was  first  and  most  persistently  of  all  urged 
against  the  introduction  of  railroads  themselves. 
Pretty  and  ingenious  in  theory,  practically  it  is  not 
feasible  ! — for  more  than  half  a  century  this  for- 
mula has  been  heard.  That  the  automatic  electric 
signal  system  is  complicated,  and  in  many  of  its 


I?  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

parts  of  most  delicate  construction,  is  undeniable. 
So  also  is  the  locomotive.  In  point  of  fact  the 
whole  railroad  organization  from  beginning  to  end 
—from  machine-shop  to  train-movement — is  at  once 
so  vast  and  complicated,  so  delicate  in  that  action 
which  goes  on  with  such  velocity  and  power,  that  it 
is  small  cause  for  wonder  that  in  the  beginning  all 
plain,  sensible,  practical  men  scouted  it  as  the  fanci- 
ful creation  of  visionaries.  They  were  wholly  just- 
ified in  so  doing  ;  and  to-day  any  sane  man  would 
of  course  pronounce  the  combined  safety  and  rapid- 
ity of  ordinary  railroad  movement  an  utter  impos- 
sibility, did  he  not  see  it  going  on  before  his  eyes. 
So  it  is  with  each  new  appliance.  It  is  ever  sug- 
gested that  at  last  the  final  result  has  already 
been  reached.  It  is  but  a  few  years,  as  will  pres- 
ently be  seen,  since  the  Westinghouse  brake  en- 
countered the  old  "  pretty  and  ingenious  "  formula. 
f  Going  yet  a  step  further,  and  taking  the  case  of 
electricity  itself,  the  bold  conception  of  operating 
an  entire  line  of  single  track  road  wholly  as  respects 
one  half  of  its  train  movement. by  telegraph,  and 
without  the  use  of  any  time  table  at  all,  would  once^- 
have,  been  condemned  as  mad.  Yet  to-day^lialf 
of  the  vast  freight  movement  of  this  continent  is 
carried  on  in  absolute  reliance  on  the  telegraph, 
Nevertheless  it  is  still  not  uncommon  to  hear 
among  the  class  of  men  who  rise  to  the  height  of 
their  capacity  in  themselves  being  automaton  super- "^^ 
intendents  that  they  do  not  believe  in  deviating 


EXPERIENCE  vs.    THEORY.  177 

from  their  time  tables  and  printed  rules ;  that, 
acting  under  them,  the  men  know  or  ought  to 
know  exactly  what  to  do,  and  any  interference 
by  a  train  despatcher  only  relieves  them  of  re- 
sponsibility, and  is  more  likely  to  lead  to  accidents 
than  if  they  were  left  alone  to  grope  their  own 
way  out. 

Another  and  very  similar  argument  frequently 
urged  against  the  electric,  in  common  with  all  other 
block  systems  by  the  large  class  who  prefer  to  ex- 
ercise their  ingenuity  in  finding  objections  rather 
than  in  overcoming  difficulties,  is  that  they  breed 
dependence  and  carelessness  in  employes  ; — that 
engine-drivers  accustomed  to  rely  on  the  signals, 
rely  on  them  implicitly,  and  get  into  habits  of  reck- 
lessness which  lead  inevitably  to  accidents,  for  which 
they  then  contend  the  signals,  and  not  they  them- 
selves, are  responsible.  This  argument  is,  indeed, 
hardly  less  familiar  than  the  "  pretty  and  ingenious" 
formula  just  referred  to.  It  has,  however,  been  met 
and  disposed  of  by  Captain  Tyler  in  his  annual  re- 
ports to  the  Board  of  Trade  in  a  way  which  can 
hardly  be  improved  upon  : — 

It  is  a  favorite  argument  with  those  who  oppose  the 
introduction  of  some  of  these  improvements,  or  who 
make  excuses  for  the  want  of  them,  that  their  servants 
are  apt  to  become  more  careless  from  the  use  of  them,  in 
consequence  of  the  extra  security  which  they  are  be- 
lieved to  afford  ;  and  it  is  desirable  to  consider  seriously 
how  much  of  truth  there  is  in  this  assertion.  *  *  * 
Allowing  to  the  utmost  for  these  tendencies  to  confide 


178  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

too  much  in  additional  means  of  safety,  the  risk  is 
proved  by  experience  to  be  very  much  greater  without 
them  than  with  them  ;  and,  in  fact,  the  negligence  and 
mistakes  of  servants  are  found  to  occur  most  frequently, 
and  generally  with  the  most  serious  results,  not  when  the 
men  are  over-confident  in  their  appliances  or  apparatus, 
but  when,  in  the  absence  of  them,  they  are  habituated 
to  risk  in  the  conduct  of  the  traffic.  In  the  daily  prac- 
tice of  railway  working  station-masters,  porters,  signal- 
men, engine-drivers  or  guards  are  frequently  placed  in 
difficulties  which  they  have  to  surmount  as  best  they  can. 
The  more  they  are  accustomed  to  incur  risk  in  order  to 
perform  their  duties,  the  less  they  think  of  it,  and  the 
more  difficult  it  is  to  enforce  discipline  and  obedience 
to  regulations.  The -personal  risk  which  is  encountered 
by  certain  classes  of  railway  servants  is  coming  to  be 
more  precisely  ascertained.  It  is  very  considerable  ;  and 
it  is  difficult  to  prevent  men  who  are  in  constant  danger 
themselves  from  doing  things  which  may  be  a  source  of 
danger  to  others,  or  to  compel  them  to  obey  regulations 
for  which  they  do  not  see  altogether  the  necessity,  and 
which  impede  them  in  their  work.  This  difficulty  in- 
creases with  the  want  of  necessary  means  and  appliances  ; 
and  is  diminished  when,  with  proper  means  and  appli- 
ances, stricter  discipline  becomes  possible,  safer  modes  of 
working  become  habitual,  and  a  higher  margin  of  safety 
is  constantly  preserved.* 

In  Great  Britain  the  ingenious  theory  that  supe- 
rior appliances  or  greater  personal  comfort  in  some 
indefinable  way  lead  to  carelessness  in  employe's 
was  carried  to  such  an  extent  that  only  within  the 
last  few  years  has  any  protection  against  wind,  rain 
and  sunshine  been  furnished  on  locomotives  for  the 
engine-drivers  and  stokers.  The  old  stage-coach 

*  Reports  ;  1872,  page  23,  and  1873,  page  39. 


DUTY  UNDER   TORTURE.  1 79 

driver  faced  the  elements,  and  why  should  not  his 
successor  on  the  locomotive  do  the  same? — If  made 
too  comfortable,  he  would  become  careless  and  go 
to  sleep ! — This  was  the  line  of  argument  advanced, 
and  the  tortures  to  which  the  wretched  men  were 
subjected  in  consequence  of  it  led  to  their  fortifying 
nature  by  drink.  They  had  to  be  regularly  in- 
spected and  examined  before  mounting  the  foot- 
board, to  see  that  they  were  sober.  It  took  years 
in  Great  Britain  for  intelligent  railroad  managers  to 
learn  that  the  more  protected  and  comfortable  a  man 
is  the  better  he  will  attend  to  his  duty.  And  even 
when  the  old  argument,  refuted  by  long  experience, 
was  at  last  abandoned  as  respected  the  locomotive 
cab,  it,  with  perfect  freshness  and  confidence  in  its 
own  novelty  and  force,  promptly  showed  its  brutal 
visage  in  opposition  to  the  next  new  safeguard. 

For  the  reasons  which  Captain  Tyler  has  so 
forcibly  put  in  the  extracts  which  have  just 
been  quoted,  the  argument  against  the  block  sys- 
tem from  the  increased  carelessness  of  employes, 
supposed  to  be  induced  by  it,  is  entitled  to  no 
weight.  Neither  is  the  argument  from  the  deli- 
cacy and  complication  of  the  automatic,  electric 
signal  system  entitled  to  any  more,  when  urged 
against  that.  Not  only  has  it  been  too  often 
refuted  under  similar  conditions  by  practical  re- 
sults, but  in  this  case  it  is  based  on  certain  assump- 
tions of  fact  which  are  wholly  opposed  to  experi- 
ence. The  record  does  not  show  that  there  is  any 


ISO  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

peculiar  liability  to  railroad  accidents  during  pe 
riods  of  storm  ;  perhaps  because  those  in  charge 
of  train  movements  or  persons  crossing  tracks  are 
under  such  circumstances  more  especially  on  the 
look  out  for  danger.  On  the  contrary  the  full  aver- 
age of  accidents  of  the  worst  description  appear 
to  have  occurred  under  the  most  ordinary  condi- 
tions of  weather,  and  usually  in  the  most  unantic- 
ipated way.  This  is  peculiarly  true  of  accidents 
at  highway  grade  crossings.  These  commonly  oc- 
cur when  the  conditions  are  such  as  to  cause  the 
highway  travelers  to  suppose  that,  if  any  danger 
existed,  they  could  not  but  be  aware  of  it.  In  the 
next  place,  the  question  in  regard  to  automatic 
electric  signals  is  exactly  what  it  was  in  regard  to 
the  Westinghouse  brake,  with  its  air-pump,  its  valves 
and  connecting  tubes ; — it  is  the  purely  practical 
question, — Does  the  thing  work? — The  burden  of 
proof  is  properly  on  the  inventor.  The  presump- 
tion is  all  against  him.  In  the  case  of  the  elec- 
tric signals  they  have  for  years  been  in  limited 
but  constant  use,  and  while  thus  in  use  they  have 
been  undergoing  steady  improvement.  Though 
now  brought  to  a  considerable  degree  of  compar- 
ative perfection  they  are,  of  course,  still  in  their 
earlier  stage  of  development.  In  use,  however, 
they  have  not  been  found  open  to  the  practical 
objections  urged  against  them.  At  first  much  too 
complicated  and  expensive,  requiring  more  machin- 
ery than  could  by  any  reasonable  exertions  be  kept 


DOES  THE  THING  WORK?  l8l 

in  order  and  more  care  than  they  were  worth,  they 
have  now  been  simplified  until  a  single  battery 
properly  located  can  do  all  the  necessary  work  for  a 
road  of  indefinite  length.  As  a  system  they  are 
effective  and  do  not  lead  to  accidents ;  nor  are  they 
any  more  subject  than  telegraph  wires  to  derange- 
ment from  atmospheric  causes.  When  any  disturb- 
ance does  take  place,  until  it  can  be  overcome  it 
amounts  simply  to  a  general  signal  for  operating  the 
road  with  extreme  caution.  But  with  railroads,  as 
everywhere  else  in  life,  it  is  the  normal  condition  of 
affairs  for  which  provision  must  be  made,  while  the 
dangers  incident  to  exceptional  circumstances  must 
be  met  by  exceptional  precautions.  As  long  as 
things  are  in  their  normal  state,  that  is,  probably, 
during  ninteen  days  out  of  twenty,  the  electric  sig- 
nals have  now  through  several  years  of  constant 
trial  proved  themselves  a  reliable  safeguard.  It  can 
hardly  admit  of  doubt  that  in  the  near  future 
they  will  be  both  further  perfected  and  generally 
adopted. 


1 82  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

INTERLOCKING. 

IN  their  management  of  switches,  especially  at 
points  of  railroad  convergence  where  a  heavy  traffic 
is  concentrated  and  the -passage  of  trains  or  move- 
ment of  cars  and  locomotives  is  unceasing,  the  Eng- 
lish are  immeasurably  in  advance  of  the  Americans  ; 
and,  indeed,  of  all  other  people.  In  fact,  in  this  re- 
spect the  American  managers  have  shown  them- 
selves slow  to  learn,  and  have  evinced  an  indisposi^ 
tion  to  adopt  labor-saving  appliances  which,  con- 
sidering their  usual  quickness  of  discernment  in  that 
regard,  is  at  first  sight  inexplicable.  Having  always 
been  accustomed  to  the  old  and  simple  methods, 
just  so  long  as  they  can  through  those  methods 
handle  their  traffic  with  a  bearable  degree  of  incon- 
venience and  expense,  they  will  continue  to  do  so. 
That  their  present  method  is  most  extravagant,  just 
as  extravagant  as  it  would  be  to  rent  two  houses  or 
to  run  two  steam  engines  where  one,  if  properly 


THE  CANNON  STREET  STATION.  183 

used,  could  be  made  to  suffice,  admits  of  demon- 
stration ; — but  the  waste  is  not  on  the  surface,  and 
the  necessity  for  economy  is  not  imperative.  The 
difference  of  conditions  and  the  difference  in  results 
may  be  made  very  obvious  by  a  comparison.  Take, 
for  instance,  London  and  Boston — the  Cannon  street 
station  in  the  one  and  the  Beach  street  station  in 
the  other.  The  concentration  of  traffic  at  London 
is  so  great  that  it  becomes  necessary  to  utilize  every 
foot  of  ground  devoted  to  railroad  purposes  to  the 
utmost  possible  extent.  Not  only  must  it  be  pack- 
ed with  tracks,  but  those  tracks  must  never  be  idle. 
The  incessant  train  movement  at  Cannon  street  has 
already  been  referred  to  as  probably  the  most  extra- 
ordinary and  confusing  spectacle  in  the  whole  wide 
circle  of  railroad  wonders.  The  result  is  that  in 
some  way,  at  this  one  station  and  under  this  single 
roof,  more  trains  must  daily  be  made  to  enter  and 
leave  than  enter  and  leave,  not  only  the  Beach 
street  station,  but  all  the  eight  railroad  stations  in 
Boston  combined.* 

*  "  It  has  been  estimated  that  an  average  of  50,000  persons  were, 
in  1869,  daily  brought  into  Boston  and  carried  from  it,  on  three  hun- 
dred and  eighty-five  trains,  while  the  South  Eastern  railway  of  Lon- 
don received  and  despatched  in  1870,  on  an  average,  six  hundred  and 
fifty  trains  a  day,  between  6  A.M.  and  12  P.M.  carrying  from  35,000 
to  40,000  persons,  and  this  too  without  the  occurrence  of  a  single 
train  accident  during  the  year.  On  one  single  exceptional  day  eleven 
hundred  and  eleven  trains,  carrying  145,000  persons,  are  said  to  have 
entered  and  left  this  station  in  the  space  of  eighteen  hours." — Third 
Annual  Report,  [1872]  of  Massachusetts  Railroad  Commissioners,  p. 
141. 

The  passenger  movement  over  the  roads  terminating  in  Boston  was 
probably  as  heavy  on  June  17,  1875,  as  during  any  twenty-four  hours 


1 84  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

During  eighteen  successive  hours  trains  have 
been  made  to  enter  and  leave  this  station  at  the 
rate  of  more  than  one  in  each  minute.  It  con- 
tains four  platforms  and  seven  tracks,  the  longest  of 
which  is  720  feet.  As  compared  with  the  largest  sta- 
tion in  Boston  (the  Boston  &  Providence),  it  has 
the  same  number  of  platforms  and  an  aggregate  of 
1,500  (three-fifths)  more  feet  of  track  under  cover ;  it 
daily  accommodates  about  nine  times  as  many  trains 
and  four  times  as  many  passengers.  Of  it  Barry,  in 
his  treatise  on  Railway  Appliances  (p.  197),  says: 
"  The  platform  area  at  this  station  is  probably  mini- 
mised but,  the  station  accommodates  efficiently  a 
very  large  mixed  traffic  of  long  and  short  journey 
trains,  amounting  at  times  to  as  many  as  40.0  trains 
in  and  400  trains  out  in  a  working  day.*  " 

The  American  system  is,  therefore,  one  of  great 
waste  ;  for,  being  conducted  in  the  way  it  is — that  is 
with  stations  and  tracks  utilized  to  but  a  fractional 
part  of  their  utmost  capacity — it  requires  a  large 
number  of  stations  and  tracks  and  the  services  of 
many  employes.  Indeed  it  is  safe  to  say  that, 

in  their  history.  It  was  returned  at  280,000  persons  carried  in  641 
trains.  About  twice  the  passenger  movement  of  the  "  exceptional 
day"  referred  to,  carried  in  something  more  than  half  the  number  of 
trains,  entering  and  leaving  eight  stations  instead  of  one. 

*  The  Grand  Central  Depot  on  42d  Street  in  New  York  City,  has 
nearly  twice  the  amount  of  track  room  under  cover  of  the  Cannon 
street  station.  The  daily  train  movement  of  the  latter  would  be  pre- 
cisely paralleled  in  New  York,  though  not  equalled  in  amount,  if 
the  42d  street  station  were  at  Trinity  church,  and,  in  addition  to 
the  trains  which  now  enter  and  leave  it,  all  the  city  trains  of  the 
Elevated  road  were  also  provided  for  there. 


PRIMITIVE   WAYS.  1 8$ 

judged  by  the  London  standard,  not  more  than  two 
of  the  eight  stations  in  Boston  are  at  this  time  util- 
ized to  above  a  quarter  part  of  their  full  working 
capacity ;  and  the  same  is  probably  true  of  all  other 
American  cities.  Both  employes  and  the  travelling 
public  are  accustomed  to  a  slow  movement  and  abun- 
dance of  room  ;  land  is  comparatively  cheap,  and  the 
pressure  of  concentration  has  only  just  begun  to 
make  itself  felt. ,  Accordingly  any  person,  who  cares 
to  pass  an  hour  during  the  busy  time  of  day  in  front 
of  an  American  city  station,  cannot  but  be  struck, 
while  watching  the  constant  movement,  with  the 
primitive  way  in  which  it  is  conducted.  Here  are 
a  multiplicity  of  tracks  all  connected  with  each 
other,  and  cars  and  locomotives  are  being  passed 
from  one  to  another  from  morning  to  night.  A 
constant  shifting  of  switches  is  going  on,  and  the 
little  shunting  engines  never  stand  still.  The 
switches,  however,  as  a  rule,  are  unprovided  with 
signals,  except  of  the  crudest  description ;  they 
have  no  connection  with  each  other,  and  during 
thirty  years  no  change  has  been  made  in  the 
method  in  which  they  are  worked.  When  one  of 
them  has  to  be  shifted,  a  man  goes  to  it  and  shifts 
it.  To  facilitate  the  process,  the  monitor  shunting 
engines  are  provided  with  a  foot-board  in  front  and 
behind,  just  above  the  track,  upon  which  the  yard 
hands  jump,  and  are  carried  about  from  switch  to 
switch,  thus  saving  the  time  they  would  occupy  if 
they  had  to  walk.  A  simpler  arrangement  could 


OF   THE 

•JNIVERSITY- 


1 86  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

not  be  imagined  ;  anyone  could  devise  it.  The  only 
wonder  is  that  even  a  considerable  traffic  can  be 
conducted  safely  in  reliance  upon  it. 

Turning  from  Beach  to  Cannon  street,  it  is  ap- 
parent that  the  train  movement  which  has  there  to 
be  accommodated  would  fall  into  inextricable  con- 
fusion if  it  was  attempted  to  manage  it  in  the  way 
which  has  been  described.  The  number  of  trains  is 
so  great  and  the  movement  so  rapid  and  intricate, 
that  not  even  a  regiment  of  employes  stationed  here 
and  there  at  the  signals  and  switches  could  keep 
things  in  motion.  From  time  to  time  they  would 
block,  and  then  the  whole  vast  machine  would  be 
brought  to  a  standstill  until  order  could  be  re-estab- 
lished. The  difficulty  is  overcome  in  a  very  simple 
way,  by  means  of  an  equally  simple  apparatus.  The 
control  over  the  numerous  switches  and  correspond- 
ing signals,  instead  of  being  divided  up  among 
many  men  stationed  at  many  points,  is  concentrated 
in  the  hands  of  two  men  occupying  a  single  gallery, 
which  is  elevated  across  the  tracks  in  front  of  the 
station  and  commanding  the  approaches  to  it,  much 
as  the  pilot-house  of  an  American  steamer  com- 
mands  a  view  of  the  course  before  it.  From  this 
gallery,  by  means  of  what  is  known  as  the  interlock- 
ing system,  every  switch  and  signal  in  the  yard  be- 
low is  moved  ;  and  to  such  a  point  of  perfection  has 
the  apparatus  been  carried,  that  any  disaster  from 
the  misplacement  of  a  switch  or  the  display  of  a 
wrong  signal  is  rendered  impossible.  Of  this  Can- 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  INTERLOCKING.  l8£ 

non  street  apparatus  Barry  says,  "  there  are  here 
nearly  seventy  point  and  signal  levers  concentrated 
in  one  signal  house;  the  number  of  combinations' 
which  would  be  possible  if  all  the  signal  and  point 
levers  were  not  interlocked  can  be  expressed  only 
by  millions.  Of  these  only  808  combinations  are 
safe,  and  by  the  interlocking  apparatus  these  808 
combinations  are  rendered  possible,  and  all  the 
others  impossible. "^ 

It  is  not  proposed  to  enter  at  any  length  into  the 
mechanical  details  of  this  appliance,  which,  however, 
must  be  considered  as  one  of  the  three  or  four  great 
inventions  which  have  marked  epochs  in  the  history 
of  railroad  traffic.f  As,  however,  it  is  but  little 
known  in  America,  and  will  inevitably  within  the 
next  few  years  find  here  the  widest  field  for  its  in- 
creased use,  a  slight  sketch  of  its  gradual  develop- 
ment and  of  its  leading  mechanical  features  may  not 
be  out  of  place.  Prior  to  the  year  1846  the  switches 
and  signals  on  the  English  roads  were  worked  in  the 
same  way  that  they  are  now  commonly  worked  in 
this  country.  As  a  train  drew  near  to  a  junction, 
for  instance,  the  switchman  stationed  there  made 
the  proper  track  connection  and  then  displayed  the 
signal  which  indicated  what  tracks  were  opened  and 
what  closed,  and  which  line  had  the  right  of  way ; 

*  Railway  Appliances,  p.  113. 

•f-  A  sufficiently  popular  description  of  this  apparatus  also,  illustrated 
by  cuts,  will  be  found  in  Barry's  excellent  little  treatise  on  Railway 
Appliances,  already  referred  to,  published  by  Longmans  &  Co.  as  one 
of  their  series  of  text-books  of  science. 


1 88  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

and  the  engine-drivers  acted  accordingly.  As  the 
number  of  trains  increased  and  the  movement  at  the 
junctions  became  more  complicated,  the  danger  of 
the  wrong  switches  being  thrown  or  the  wrong  sig- 
nals displayed,  increased  also.  Mistakes  from  time 
to  time  would  happen,  even  when  only  the  most 
careful  and  experienced  men  were  employed  ;  and 
mistakes  in  these  matters  led  to  serious  consequences. 
It,  therefore,  became  the  practice,  instead  of  having 
the  switch  or  signal  lever  at  the  point  where  the 
switch  or  signal  itself  was,  as  is  still  almost  univer- 
sally the  case  in  this  country,  to  connect  them  by 
rods  or  wires  with  their  levers,  which  were  concen- 
trated at  some  convenient  point  for  working,  and 
placed  under  the  control  of  one  man  instead  of  sev- 
eral. So  far  as  it  went  this  change  was  an  improve- 
ment, but  no  provision  yet  existed  against  the  dan- 
ger of  mistake  in  throwing  switches  and  displaying 
signals.  The  blunder  of  first  making  one  combina- 
tion of  tracks  and  then  showing  the  signal  for  an- 
other was  less  liable  to  happen  after  the  concentra- 
tion of  the  levers  under  one  hand  than  before,  but 
it  still  might  happen  at  any  time,  and  certainly 
would  happen  at  some  time.  If  all  danger  of  ac- 
cident from  human  fallibility  was  ever  to  be  elim- 
inated a  far  more  complicated  mechanical  appa- 
ratus must  be  devised.  In  response  to  this  need 
the  system  of  interlocking  was  gradually  developed, 
though  not  until  about  the  year  1856  was  it  brought 
to  any  considerable  degree  of  perfection.  The  whole 


THE  ELIMINA  TION  OF  BL  UNDER  S.  I  89 

object  of  this  system  is  to  render  it  impossible  for  a 
switchman,  whether  because  he  is  weary  or  agitated 
or  actually  malicious  or  only  inexperienced,  to  give 
contrary  signals,  or  to  break  his  line  in  one  way  and 
to  give  the  signal  for  its  being  broken  in  another 
way.  To  bring  this  about  the  levers  are  concentrated 
in  a  cabin  or  gallery,  and  placed  side  by  side  in  a 
frame,  their  lower  ends  connecting  with  the  switch- 
points  and  signals  by  means  of  rods  and  wires.  Be- 
neath this  frame  are  one  or  more  long  bars,  extend- 
ing its  entire  length  under  it  and  parallel  with  it. 
These  are  called  locking  bars ;  for,  being  moved  to 
the  right  or  left  by  the  action  of  the  levers  they 
hold  these  levers  in  certain  designated  positions,  nor 
do  they  permit  them  to  occupy  any  other.  In  this 
way  what  is  termed  the  interlocking  is  effected. 
The  apparatus,  though  complicated,  is  simplicity  it- 
self compared  with  a  clock  or  a  locomotive.  The 
complication,  also,  such  as  it  is,  arises  from  the  fact 
that  each  situation  is  a  problem  by  itself,  and  as 
such  has  to  be  studied  out  and  provided  for  sepa- 
rately. This,  however,  is  a  difficulty  affecting  the 
manufacturer  rather  than  the  operator.  To  the  lat- 
ter the  apparatus  presents  no  difficulty  which  a 
fairly  intelligent  mechanic  cannot  easily  master ; 
while  for  the  former  the  highly  complicated  nature 
of  the  problem  may,  perhaps,  best  be  inferred 
from  the  example  given  by  Mr.  Barry,  the  sim- 
plest that  can  offer,  that  of  an  ordinary  junction 
where  a  double-track  branch-road  connects  with 


1 90  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

its  double-track  main  line.  There  would  in  this 
case  be  of  necessity  two  switch  levers  and  four 
signal  levers,  which  would  admit  of  sixty-four 
possible  combinations.  "  The  signal  might  be  ar- 
ranged in  any  of  sixteen  ways,  and  the  points 
might  occupy  any  of  four  positions,  irrespective  of 
the  position  of  the  signals.  Of  the  sixty-four  com- 
binations thus  possible  only  thirteen  are  safe,  and 
the  rest  are  such  as  might  lure  an  engine-driver 
into  danger." 

Originally  the  locking  bar  was  worked  through 
the  direct  action  of  certain  locks,  as  they  were 
called,  between  which  the  levers  when  moved  played 
to  and  fro.  These  locks  were  mere  bars  or  plates 
of  iron,  some  with  inclined  sides,  and  others  with 
sides  indented  or  notched.  At  one  end  they  were 
secured  on  a  pivot  to  "a  fixed  bar  opposite  to  and 
parallel  with  the  movable  locking  bar,  while  their 
other  ends  were  made  fast  to  the  locking  bar ;  whence 
it  necessarily  followed  that,  as  certain  of  the  levers 
were  pushed  to  and  fro  between  them,  the  action 
of  these  levers  on  the  inclined  sides  of  the  locks 
could  by  a  skilful  combination  be  made  to  throw 
other  levers  into  the  notches  and  indentations  of 
other  locks,  thus  securing  them  in  certain  positions, 
and  making  it  impossible  for  them  to  be  in  any 
other  positions. 

The  apparatus  which  has  been  described,  though 
a  great  improvement  on  anything  which  had  pre- 
ceded it,  was  still  but  a  clumsy  affair,  and  naturally 


THE  SPRING   CATCH-ROD,  IQI 

the  friction  of  the  levers  on  the  locks  was  so  great 
that  they  soon  became  worn,  and  when  worn  they 
could  not  be  relied  upon  to  move  the  switch-points 
with  the  necessary  accuracy.  The  new  appliance 
of  safety  had,  therefore,  as  is  often^the  case,  intro- 
duced a  new  and  very  considerable  danger  of  its 
own.  The  signals  and  switches,  it  was  true,  could 
no  longer  disagree,  but  the  points  themselves  were 
sometimes  not  properly  set,  or,  owing  to  the  great 
exertion  required  to  work  it,  the  interlocking  gear 
was  strained.  This  difficulty  resulted  in  the  next 
and  last  improvement,  which  was  a  genuine  triumph 
of  mechanical  ingenuity.  To  insure  the  proper 
length  of  stroke  being  made  in  moving  the  lever — 
that  is  to  make  it  certain  in  each  case  that  the 
switch  points  were  brought  into  exactly  the  proper 
position — two  notches  were  provided  in  the  slot, 
or  quadrant,  as  it  is  called,  in  which  the  lever 
moved,  and,  when  it  was  thrown  squarely  home, 
and  not  until  then,  a  spring  catch  caught  in  one  or 
other  of  these  notches.  This  spring  was  worked 
by  a  clasp  at  the  handle  of  the  lever,  and  the  whole 
was  called  the  spring  catch-rod.  By  a  singularly  in- 
genious contrivance,  the  process  of  interlocking  was 
transferred  from  the  action  of  the  levers  and  the 
keys  to  these  spring  catch-rods,  which  were  made  to 
work  upon  each  other,  and  thus  to  become  the  me- 
dium through  which  the  whole  process  is  effected. 
The  result  of  this  improvement  was  that,  as  the 
switchman  cannot  move  any  lever  until  the  spring- 


I Q2  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

catch  rod  is  fastened,  except  for  a  particular  move- 
ment, he  cannot,  do  what  he  will,  even  begin  any 
other  movement  than  that  one,  as  the  levers  cannot 
be  started.  On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  said  that, 
by  means  of  this  improvement,  the  mere  "  intention 
of  the  signal-man  to  move  any  lever,  expressed  by 
his  grasping  the  lever  and  so  raising  the  spring 
catch-rod,  independently  of  his  putting  his  inten- 
tion in  force,-  actuates  all  the  necessary  locking.*  " 

*  In  regard  to  the  interlocking  system  as  then  in  use  in  England, 
Captain  Tyler  in  his  report  as  head  of  the  railway  inspecting  depart- 
ment of  the  Board  of  Trade,  used  the  following  language  in  his  re- 
port on  the  accidents  during  1870.  "  When  the  apparatus  is  properly 
constructed  and  efficiently  maintained,  the  signalman  cannot  make  a 
mistake  in  the  working  of  his  points  and  signals  which  shall  lead  to 
accident  or  collision,  except  only  by  first  lowering  his  signal  and 
switching  his  train  forward,  then  putting  up  his  signal  again  as  it  ap- 
proaches, and  altering  the  points  as  the  driver  comes  up  to,  or  while 
he  is  passing  over  them.  Such  a  mistake  was  actually  made  in  one 
of  the  cases  above  quoted.  It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  provide  com- 
pletely for  cases  of  this  description  ;  but  the  locking  apparatus,  as 
now  applied,  is  already  of  enormous  value  in  preventing  accidents  ; 
and  it  will  have  a  still  greater  effect  on  the  general  safety  of  railway 
travelling  as  it  becomes  more  extensively  applied  on  the  older  lines. 
Without  it,  a  signalman  in  constantly  working  points  and  signals  is 
almost  certain  sooner  or  later  to  make  a  mistake,  and  to  cause  an 
accident  of  a  more  or  less  serious  character  ;  and  it  is  inexcusable  in 
any  railway  company  to  allow  its  mail  or  express  trains  to  run  at  high 
speed  through  facing  points  which  are  not  interlocked  efficiently  with 
the  signals,  by  which  alone  the  engine-drivers  in  approaching  them 
can  be  guided.  There  is  however,  very  much  yet  to  be  effected  in 
different  parts  of  the  country  in  this  respect.  And  it  is  worth  while 
to  record  here,  in  illustration  of  the  difficulties  that  are  sometimes 
met  with  by  the  inspecting  officers,  that  the  Midland  Railway  Com- 
pany formally  protested  in  June,  1866,  against  being  compelled  to 
apply  such  apparatus  before  receiving  sanction  for  the  opening  of 
new  lines  of  railway.  They  stated  that  in  complying  with  the  re- 
quirements in  this  respect  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  they  '  were  act- 
ing in  direct  opposition  to  their  own  convictions,  and  they  must, 
so  far  as  lay  in  their  poiuer,  decline  the  responsibility  of  the  locking 
system?" 


DOES  IT  WORK?  1 93 

In  spite  of  any  theoretical  or  fanciful  objections 
which  may  be  urged  against  it,  this  appliance  will 
be  found  an  indispensable  adjunct  to  any  really 
heavy  junction  or  terminal  train  movement.  For 
the  elevated  railroads  of  New  York,  for  instance,  its 
early  adoption  proved  a  necessity.  As  for  ques- 
tions of  temperature,  climate,  etc.,  as  affecting  the 
long  connecting  rods  and  wires  which  are  an  essen- 
tial part  of  the  system,  objections  based  upon  them 
are  purely  imaginary.  Difficulties  from  this  source 
were  long  since  met  and  overcome  by  very  simple 
compensating  arrangements,  and  in  practice  occa- 
sion no  inconvenience.  That  rods  may  break,  and 
that  wires  are  at  all  times  liable  to  get  out  of  gear, 
every  one  knows  ;  and  yet  this  fact  is  urged  as  a 
novel  objection  to  each  new  mechanical  improve- 
ment. That  a  broken  or  disordered  apparatus  will 
always  occasion  a  serious  disturbance  to  any  heavy 
train  movement,  may  also  be  admitted.  The  fact 
none  the  less  remains  that  in  practice,  and  daily 
subjected  through  long  periods  of  time  to  incom- 
parably the  heaviest  train  movement  known  to  rail- 
road experience,  the  rods  of  the  interlocking  appa- 
ratus do  not  break,  nor  do  it's  wires  get  out  of 

To  still  further  perfect  the  appliance  a  simple  mechanism  has  since 
1870  been  attached  to  the  rod  actuating  the  switch-bolt,  which  pre- 
vents the  signal-man  from  shifting  the  switch  under  a  passing  train 
in  the  manner  suggested  by  Captain  Tyler  in  the  above  extract.  In 
fact  it  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  the  interlocking  system  has  now 
been  so  studied,  and  every  possible  contingency  so  thoroughly  pro- 
vided for,  that  in  using  it  accidents  can  only  occur  through  a  wilful 
intention  to  bring  them  about. 


194  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

gear;  while  by  means  of  it,  and  of  it  alone,  this 
train  movement  goes  unceasingly  on  never  knowing 
any  serious  disturbance.* 

It  is  not,  however,  alone  in  connection  with  ter- 
minal stations  and  junctions  that  the  interlocking 
apparatus  is  of  value.  .  It  is  also  the  scientific  sub- 
stitute for  the  law  or  regulation  compelling  trains  to 
stop  as  a  measure  of  precaution  when  they  approach 
grade-crossings  or  draw-bridges.  It  is  difficult  in- 
deed to  pass  from  the  consideration  of  this  fine  re- 
sult of  science  and  to  speak  with  patience  of  the 
existing  American  substitute  for  it.  If  the  former 
is  a  feature  in  the  block  system,  the  latter  is  a  sig- 
nal example  of  the  block-head  system.  As  a  device 
to  avoid  danger  it  is  a  standing  disgrace  to  Amer- 
ican ingenuity ;  and,  fortunately,  as  stopping  is  com- 
patible only  with  a  very  light  traffic,  so  soon  as 
the  passage  of  trains  becomes  incessant  a  substi- 
tute for  it  has  got  to  be  devised.  In  this  country, 

*  "  As  an  instance  of  the  possibility  of  preventing  the  mistakes  so 
often  made  by  signal  men  with  conflicting  signals  or  with  facing 
points  I  have  shown  the  traffic  for  a  single  day,  and  at  certain  hours 
of  that  day,  at  the  Cannon  Street  station  of  the  South  Eastern  Rail- 
way, already  referred  to  as  one  of  the  no-accident  lines  of  the  year. 
The  traffic  of  that  station,  with  trains  continually  crossing  one  an- 
other, by  daylight  and  in  darkness,  in  fog  or  in  sunshine,  amounts  to 
more  than  130  trains  in  three  hours  in  the  morning,  and  a  similar 
number  in  the  evening ;  and,  altogether,  to  652  trains,  conveying 
more  than  35,000  passengers  in  the  day  as  a  winter,  or  40,000  passen- 
gers a  day  as  a  summer  average.  It  is  probably  not  too  much  to  say, 
that  without  the  signal  and  point  arrangements  which  have  there  been 
supplied,  and  the  system  of  interlocking  which  has  there  been  so  care- 
fully carried  out,  the  signalmen  could  not  carry  on  their  duties  fo*  one 
hour  without  accident"  Captain  Tyler's  report  on  accidents  for  1870, 
P.  35- 


SWING-BRIDGES  AND  GRADE-CROSSINGS.      IQ5 

as  in  England,  that  substitute  will  be  found  in 
the  interlocking  apparatus.  By  means  of  it  the 
draw-bridge,  for  instance,  can  be  so  connected  with 
the  danger  signals — which  may,  if  desired,  be  gates 
closing  across  the  railroad  tracks — that  the  one  can- 
not be  opened  except  by  closing  the  other.  This 
is  the  method  adopted  in  Great  Britain  not  only  at 
draws  in  bridges,  but  frequently  also  in  the  case 
of  gates  at  level  road  crossings.  It  has  already 
been  noticed  that  in  Great  Britain  accidents  at 
draws  in  bridges  seem  to  be  unknown.  Certainly 
not  one  has  been  reported  during  the  last  nine 
years.  The  security  afforded  in  this  case  by  inter- 
locking would,  indeed,  seem  to  be  absolute ;  as,  if 
the  apparatus  is  out  of  order,  either  the  gates  or  the 
bridge  would  be  closed,  and  could  not  be  opened 
until  it  was  repaired.  So  also  as  respects  the  grade- 
crossing  of  one  railroad  by  another.  Bringing  all 
trains  to  a  complete  stop  when  approaching  these 
crossings  is  a  precaution  quite  generally  observed  in 
America,  either  as  a  matter  of  statute  law  or  run- 
ning regulation ;  and  yet  during  the  six  years 
1873-8  no  less  than  104  collisions  were  reported  at 
these  crossings.  In  Great  Britain  during  the  nine 
years  1870-8  but  nine  cases  of  accidents  of  this 
description  were  reported,  and  in  both  the  years 
1877  and  1878  under  the  head  of  "Accidents  or 
Collisions  on  Level  Crossings  of  Railways,"  the 
chief  inspector  of  the  Board  of  Trade  tersely  stated 
that, — "  No  accident  was  inquired  into  under  this 


196  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

head.*  "  The  interlocking  system  there  affords  the 
most  perfect  protection  which  can  be  devised 
against  a  most  dangerous  practice  in  railroad  con- 
struction to  which  Americans  are  almost  reckless- 
ly addicted.  It  is,  also,  matter  of  daily  eperience 
that  the  interlocking  system  does  ^afford  a  per- 
fect practical  safeguard  in  this  case.  Every  junc- 
tion of  a  branch  with  a  double  track  road  in- 
volves a  grade-crossing,  and  a  grade-crossing  of 
the  most  dangerous  character.  On  the  Metro- 
politan Elevated  railroad  of  New  York,  at  53^ 
street,  there  is  one  of  these  junctions,  where,  all 
day  long,  trains  are  crossing  at  grade  at  the  rate 
of  some  twenty  miles  an  hour.  These  trains 
never  stop,  except  when  signalled  so  to  do.  The 
interlocking  apparatus,  however,  makes  it  impossi- 
ble that  one  track  should  be  open  except  when  the 
other  is  closed.  An  accident,  therefore,  can  hap- 
pen only  through  the  wilful  carelessness  of  the  en- 
gineer in  charge  of  a  train  ; — and  in  the  face  of  wil- 
ful carelessness  laws  are  of  no  more  avail  than  sig- 
nals. If  a  man  in  control  of  a  locomotive  wishes 
to  bring  on  a  collision  he  can  always  do  it.  Un- 

*  "  As  affecting  the  safe  working  of  railways,  the  level  crossing  of 
one  railway  by  another  is  a  matter  of  very  serious  import.  Even 
when  signalled  on  the  most  approved  principles,  they  are  a  source  of 
danger,  and,  if  possible,  should  always  be  avoided.  At  junctions  of 
branch  or  other  railways  the  practice  has  been  adopted  by  some  com- 
panies in  special  cases,  to  carry  the  off  line  under  or  over  the  main 
line  by  a  bridge.  This  course  should  generally  be  adopted  in  the 
case  of  railways  on  which  the  traffic  is  large,  and  more  expressly 
where  express  and  fast  trains  are  run."  Report  on  Accidents  on  Rail- 
ways of  the  United  Kingdon  during  1877, /.  35. 


GIVE  SCIENCE  A  CHANCE  t  IQ? 

less  he  wishes  to,  however,  the  interlocking  appa- 
ratus not  only  can  prevent  him  from  so  doing,  but  as 
a  matter  of  fact  always  does.  The  same  rule 
which  holds  good  at  junctions  would  hold  good  at 
level  crossings.  There  is  no  essential  difference  be- 
tween the  two.  By  means  of  the  interlocking  appa- 
ratus the  crossing  can  be  so-  blocked  at  any  desired 
distance  from  it  in  such  a  way  that  when  one  track 
is  open  the  other  must  be  closed  ; — unless,  indeed, 
the  apparatus  is  out  of  order,  and  then  both  would 
be  closed.  The  precaution  in  this  case,  also,  is  ab- 
solute. Unlike  the  rule  as  to  stopping,  it  does  not 
depend  on  the  caution  or  judgment  of  individuals ; 
— there  are  the  signals  and  the  obstructions,  and  if 
they  are  not  displayed  on  one  road  they  are  on  the 
other.  So  superior  is  this  apparatus  in  every  respect 
— as  regards  safety  as  well  as  convenience — to  the 
precaution  of  coming  to  a  stop,  that,  as  an  induce- 
ment to  introduce  an  almost  perfect  scientific  appli- 
ance, it  would  be  very  desirable  that  states  like 
Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  compelling  the  stop, 
should  except  from  the  operation  of  the  law  all  draw- 
bridges or  grade-crossings  at  which  suitable  inter- 
locking apparatus  is  provided.  Surely  it  is  not  un- 
reasonable that  in  this  case  science  should  have  a 
chance  to  assert  itself. 

In  any  event,  however,  the  general  introduction 
of  the  interlocking  apparatus  into  the  American 
railroad  system  may  be  regarded  as  a  mere  question 
of  the  value  of  land  and  concentration  of  traffic.  So 
long  as  every  road  terminating  in  our  larger  cities 


198  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

indulges,  at  whatever  unnecessary  cost  to  its  stock, 
holders,  in  independent  station  buildings  far  remov- 
ed from  business  centres,  the  train  movement  can 
most  economically  be  conducted  as  it  now  is.  The 
expense  of  the  interlocking  apparatus  is  avoided  by 
the  very  simple  process  of  incurring  the  many  fold 
heavier  expense  of  several  station  buildings  and  vast 
disconnected  station  grounds.  If,  however,  in  the 
city  of  Boston,  for  instance,  the  time  should  come 
when  the  financial  and  engineering  audacity  of  the 
great  English  companies  shall  be  imitated, — when 
some  leading  railroad  company  shall  fix  its  central 
passenger  station  on  Tremont  street  opposite  the 
head  of  Court  street,  just  as  in  London  the  South 
Eastern  established  itself  on  Cannon  street,  and  then 
this  company  carrying  its  road  from  Pemberton 
Square  by  a  tunnel  under  Beacon  Hill  and  the  State- 
house  should  at  the  crossing  of  the  Charles  radiate 
out  so  as  to  afford  all  other  roads  an  access  for  their 
trains  to  the  same  terminal  point,  thus  concentrating 
there  the  whole  daily  movement  of  that  busy  popu- 
lation which  makes  of  Boston  its  daily  counting-room 
and  market-place, — then,  when  this  is  attempted,  the 
time  will  have  come  for  utilizing  to  its  utmost 
capacity  every  available  inch  of  space  to  render  pos- 
sible the  incessant  passage  of  trains.  Then  also  will 
it  at  last  be  realized  that  it  is  far  cheaper  to  use  a 
costly  and  intricate  apparatus  which  enables  two 
companies  to  be  run  into  one  convenient  station, 
than  it  is  to  build  a  separate  station,  even  at  an  in- 
convenient point,  to  accommodate  each  company. 


THE  QUARTERLY  REVIEWER  OF  1825.         199 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

THE    WESTINGHOUSE   BRAKE. 

IN  March,  1825,  there  appeared  in  the  pages  of 
the  Quarterly  Review  an  article  in  which  the  writer 
discussed  that  railway  system,  the  first  vague  an- 
ticipation of  which  was  then  just  beginning  to  make 
the  world  restless.  He  did  this,  too,  in  a  very  in- 
telligent and  progressive  spirit,  but  unfortunately 
secured  for  his  article  a  permanence  of  interest  he 
little  expected  by  the  use  of  one  striking  illustra- 
tion. He  was  peculiarly  anxious  to  draw  a  distinct 
line  of  demarcation  between  his  own  very  rational 
anticipations  and  the  visionary  dreams  of  those  en- 
thusiasts who  were  boring  the  world  to  death  over 
the  impossibilities  which  they  claimed  that  the  new 
invention  was  to  work.  Among  these  he  referred  to 
the  proposition  that  passengers  would  be  "  whirled 
at  the  rate  of  eighteen  or  twenty  miles  an  hour  by 
means  of  a  high  pressure  engine,"  and  then  con- 
temptuously added, — "  We  should  as  soon  expect 


200  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

the  people  of  Woolwich  to  suffer  themselves  to  be 
fired  off  upon  one  of  Congreve's  ricochet  rockets,  as 
trust  themselves  to  the  mercy  of  such  a  machine, 
going  at  such  a  rate ;  their  property  perhaps  they 
may  trust." 

Under  the  circumstances,  the  criticism  was  a  per- 
fectly reasonable  one.  The  danger  involved  in 
going  at  such  a  rate  of  speed  and  the  impossi- 
bility of  stopping  in  time  to  avoid  a  sudden  danger, 
would  naturally  suggest  themselves  to  any  one  as 
insuperable  objections  to  the  new  system  for  any 
practical  use.  Some  means  of  preserving  a  sudden 
and  powerful  control  over  a  movement  of  such  un- 
heard of  rapidity  would  almost  as  a  matter  of  course 
be  looked  upon  as  a  condition  precedent.  Yet  it 
is  a  most  noticeable  fact  in  the  history  of  railroad 
development  that  the  improvement  in  appliances 
for  controlling  speed  by  no  means  kept  pace  with 
the  increased  rate  of  speed  attained.  Indeed,  so 
far  as  the  possibility  of  rapid  motion  is  concerned, 
there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  Rocket 
could  not  have  held  its  own  very  respectably  by 
the  side  of  a  passenger  locomotive  of  the  present 
day.  It  will  be  remembered  that  on  the  occasion  of 
the  Manchester  &  Liverpool  opening,  Mr.  Huskisson 
after  receiving  his  fatal  injury  was  carried  seventeen 
miles  in  twenty-five  minutes.  Since  then  the  details 
of  locomotive  construction  have  been  simplified  and 
improved  upon,  but  no  great  change  has  been  or 
probably  will  be  effected  in  the  matter  of  velocity ; — 


SPEED  AND  CONTROL  OVER  IT.  2OI 

as  respects  that  the  maximum  was  practically  reached 
at  once.  Yet  down  to  the  year  1870  the  brake  sys- 
tem remained  very  much  what  it  was  in  1830.  Im- 
provements in  detail  were  effected,  but  the  essential 
principles  were  the  same.  In  case  of  any  sudden 
emergency,  the  men  in  charge  of  the  locomotive  had 
no  direct  control  over  the  vehicles  in  the  train  ;  they 
communicated  with  them  by  the  whistle,  and  when 
the  signal  was  heard  the  brakes  were  applied  as  soon 
as  might  be.  When  a  train  is  moving  at  the  rate 
of  forty  miles  an  hour,  by  no  means  a  great  speed 
for  it  while  in  full  motion,  it  passes  over  fifty-eight 
feet  each  second ; — at  sixty  miles  an  hour  it  passes 
over  eighty-eight  feet.  Under  these  circumstances, 
supposing  an  engine  driver  to  become  suddenly  aware 
of  an  obstruction  on  the  track,  as  was  the  case  at 
Revere,  or  of  something  wrong  in  the  train  behind 
him,  as  at  Shipton,  he  had  first  himself  to  signal 
danger,  and  to  this  signal  the  brakemen  throughout 
the  train  had  to  respond.  Each  operation  required 
time,  and  every  second  of  time  represented  many 
feet  of  space.  It  was  small  matter  for  surprise, 
therefore,  that  when  in  1875  they  experimented 
scientifically  in  England,  it  was  ascertained  that  a 
train  of  a  locomotive  and  thirteen  cars  moving  at  a 
speed  of  forty-five  miles  an  hour  could  not  be  brought 
to  a  stand  in  less  than  one  minute,  or  before  it  had 
traversed  a  distance  of  half  a  mile.  The  same  re- 
sult it  will  be  remembered  was  arrived  at  by  prac- 
tical experience  in  America,  where  both  at  Angola 


202  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

and  at  Port  Jet-vis,*  it  was  found  impossible  to  stop 
the  trains  in  less  than  half-a-mile,  though  in  each 
case  two  derailed  cars  were  dragging  and  plunging 
along  at  the  end  of  them. 

The  need  of  a  continuous  train-brake,  operated 
from  the  locomotive  and  under  the  immediate  con- 
trol of  the  engine-driver,  had  been  emphasized  through 
years  by  the  almost  regular  recurrence  of  accidents  of 
the  most  appalling  character.  In  answer  to  this  need 
almost  innumerable  appliances  had  been  patented  and 
experimented  with  both  in  Europe  and  in  America. 
Prior  to  1869,  however,  these  had  been  almost  ex- 
clusively what  are  known  as  emergency  brakes  ; — 
that  is,  although  the  trains  were  equipped  with  them 
and  they  were  operated  from  the  locomotives,  they 
were  not  relied  upon  for  ordinary  use,  but  were  held 
in  reserve,  as  it  were,  against  special  exigencies.  The 
Hudson  River  railroad  train  at  the  Hamburg  acci- 
dent was  thus  equipped.  Practically,  appliances 
which  in  the  operation  of  railroads  are  reserved  for 
emergencies  are  usually  found  of  little  value  when 
the  emergency  occurs.  Accordingly  no  continuous 
brake  had,  prior  to  the  development  of  Westing- 
house's  invention,  worked  its  way  into  general  use. 
Patent  brakes  had  become  a  proverb  as  well  as  a 
terror  among  railroad  mechanics,  and  they  had.ceased 
to  believe  that  any  really  desirable  thing  of  the  sort 
would  ever  be  perfected.  Westinghouse,  therefore, 
had  a  most  unbelieving  audience  to  encounter,  and 

*Aute,  pp.  15,  119. 


A  PRETTY  TOY!  2O3 

his  invention  had  to  fight  hard  for  all  the  favor  it 
won ;  nor  did  his  experience  with  master  mechanics 
differ,  probably,  much  from  Miller's.  His  first 
patents  were  taken  out  in  1869,  and  he  early  se- 
cured the  powerful  aid  of  the  Pennsylvania  road 
for  his  invention.  The  Pullman  Car  Company, 
also,  always  anxious  to  avail  themselves  of  every 
appliance  of  safety  as  well  as  of  comfort,  speedily 
saw  the  merits  of  the  new  brake  and  adopted  it ; 
but,  as  they  merely  furnished  cars  and  had  nothing 
to  do  with  the  locomotives  that  pulled  them,  their 
support  was  not  so  effective  as  that  of  the  great 
railroad  company.  Naturally  enough,  also,  great 
hesitation  was  felt  in  adopting  so  complicated  an 
appliance.  It  added  yet  another  whole  apparatus 
to  a  thing  which"  was  already  overburdened  with 
machinery.  There  was,  also,  something  in  the  deli- 
cacy and  precision  of  the  parts  of  this  new  contriv- 
ance,— in  its  air-pump  and  reservoirs  and  long  con- 
necting tubes  with  their  numerous  valves, — which 
was  peculiarly  distasteful  to  the  average  practical  rail- 
road mechanic.  It  was  true  that  the  idea  of  trans- 
mitting power  by  means  of  compressed  air  was 
by  no  means  new, — that  thousands  of  drills  were 
being  daily  driven  by  it  wherever  tunnelling  was 
going  on  or  miners  were  at  work, — yet  the  ap- 
plication of  this  familiar  power  to  the  wheels  of 
a  railroad  train  seemed  no  less  novel  than  it  was 
bold.  It  was,  in  the  first  place,  evident  that  the 
new  apparatus  would  not  stand  the  banging  and 


2O4  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

hammering  to  which  the  old-fashioned  hand-brake 
might  safely  be  subjected  ;  not  indeed  without  de- 
ranging that  simple  appliance,  but  without  incur- 
ring any  very  heavy  bill  for  repairs  in  so  doing. 
Accordingly  the  new  brake  was  at  first  carelessly 
examined  and  patronizingly  pushed  aside  as  a 
pretty  toy, — nice  in  theory  no  doubt,  but  wholly 
unfitted  for  rough,  every-day  use.  As  it  was 
tersely  expressed  during  a  discussion  before  the 
Society  of  Arts  in  London,  as  recently  as  May, 
1877, — "  It  was  no  use  bringing  out  a  brake  which 
could  not  be  managed  by  ordinary  officials, — which 
was  so  wonderfully  clever  that  those  who  had  to  use 
it  could  not  understand  it."  A  line  of  argument  by 
the  way,  which,  as  has  been  already  pointed  out, 
may  with  far  greater  force  be  applied  to  the  loco- 
motive itself;  and,  indeed,  unquestionably  was  so 
applied  about  half  a  century  ago  by  men  of  the  same 
calibre  who  apply  it  now,  to  the  intense  weariness 
and  discouragement  no  doubt  of  the  late  George 
Stephenson.  Whether  sound  or  otherwise,  however, 
few  more  effective  arguments  against  an  appliance 
can  be  advanced ;  and  against  the  Westinghouse 
brake  it  was  advanced  so  effectively,  that  even  as 
late  as  1871,  although  largely  in  use  on  western 
roads,  it  had  found  its  way  into  Massachusetts  only 
as  an  ingenious  device  of  doubtful  merit.  It  was  in 
August,  1871,  that  the  Revere  disaster  occurred, 
and  the  Revere  disaster,  as  has  been  seen,  would 
unquestionably  have  been  averted  had  the  colliding 


HAND-BRAKES  vs.    TRAIN-BRAKES.  2O$ 

train  been  provided  with  proper  brake  power.  This 
at  last  called  serious  attention  there  to  the  new 
appliance.  Even  then,  however,  the  mere  sug- 
gestion of  something  better  being  in  existence  than 
the  venerable  hand-brakes  in  familiar  use  did  not 
pass  without  a  vigorous  protest ;  and  at  the  meet- 
ing of  railroad  officials,  which  has  already  been 
referred  to  as  having  been  called  by  the  state  com- 
missioners after  the  accident,  one  prominent  gentle- 
man, when  asked  if  the  road  under  his  charge  was 
equipped  with  the  most  approved  brake,  indig- 
nantly replied  that  it  was, — that  it  was  equipped 
with  the  good,  old-fashioned  hand-brake ; — and  he 
then  proceeded  to  vehemently  stake  his  profes- 
sional reputation  on  the  absolute  superiority  of  that 
ancient  but  somewhat  crude  appliance  over  any- 
thing else  of  the  sort  in  existence.  Nevertheless,  on 
this  occasion  also,  the  great  dynamic  force  which 
is  ever  latent  in  first-class  railroad  accidents  again 
asserted  itself.  Even  the  most  opinionated  of  pro- 
fessional railroad  men,  emphatically  as  he  might 
in  public  deny  it,  quietly  yielded  as  soon  as  might 
be.  In  a  surprisingly  short  time  after  the  exhi- 
bition of  ignorance  which  has  been  referred  to,  the 
railroads  in  Massachusetts,  as  it  has  already  been 
shown,  were  all  equipped  with  train-brakes.* 

In  its  present  improved  shape  it  is  safe  to  say 
that  in  all  those  requisites  which  the  highest  au- 
thorities known  on  the  subject  have  laid  down  as 

*Page  157. 


2O6  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

essential  to  a  model  train  brake,  the  Westinghouse 
stands  easily  first  among  the  many  inventions  of  the 
kind.  It  is  now  a  much  more  perfect  appliance 
than  it  was  in  1871,  for  it  was  then  simply  atmos- 
pheric and  continuous  in  its  action,  whereas  it  has 
since  been  made  automatic  and  self-regulating.  So 
far  as  its  fundamental  principle  is  concerned,  that 
is  too  generally  understood  to  call  for  explana- 
tion. By  means  of  an  air-pump,  attached  to ,  the 
boiler  of  the  locomotive  and  controlled  by  the  en- 
gine-driver, an  atmospheric  force  is  brought  to  bear, 
through  tubes  running  under  the  cars,  upon  the 
break  blocks,  pressing  them  against  the  wheels.  The 
hand  of  the  engine-driver  is  in  fact  on  every  wheel 
in  the  train.  This  application  of  power,  though  un- 
questionably ingenious  and,  like  all  good  things, 
most  simple  and  obvious  when  once  pointed  out, 
was  originally  open  to  one  great  objection,  which 
was  persistently  and  with  great  force  urged  against 
it.  The  parts  of  the  apparatus  were  all  delicate,  and 
some  injury  or  derangement  of  them  was  always 
possible,  and  sometimes  inevitable.  The  chief  ad- 
vantage claimed  for  the  brake  was,  however,  that 
complete  dependence  could  be  placed  upon  it  in 
the  regular  movement  of  trains.  It  was  obvious, 
therefore,  that  if  such  dependence  was  placed  upon 
it  and  any  derangement  did  occur,  the  first  intima- 
tion those  in  charge  of  the  train  would  have  that 
something  was  wrong  might  well  come  in  the  shape 
of  a  failure  of  the  brake  to  act,  and  a  subsequent 


THE  A  CCIDEN  TAT  CO  MM  UNIPA  W  FERR  K.     2O/ 

disaster.  Both  in  Massachusetts  and  in  Connecti- 
cut, at  the  crossing  of  one  railroad  by  another  at 
the  same  level  in  the  former  state  and  in  the  ap- 
proach to  draws  in  bridges  in  the  latter,  a  number 
of  cases  of  this  failure  of  the  original  Westinghouse 
non-automatic  brake  to  act  did  in  point  of  fact 
occur.  Fortunately  they,  none  of  them,  resulted 
in  disaster.  This,  however,  was  mere  good  luck, 
as  was  illustrated  in  the  case  of  the  accident  of 
November  n,  1876,  at  the  Communipaw  Ferry 
on  the  New  Jersey  Central.  The  train  was  there 
equipped  with  the  ordinary  train  brake.  It  reached 
Jersey  City  on  time  shortly  after  4  P.M.,  but,  instead 
of  slacking  up,  it  ran  directly  through  the  station 
and  freight  offices,  carrying  away  the  walls  and  sup- 
ports, and  the  locomotive  then  plunged  into  the 
river  beyond.  The  baggage  and  smoking  car  fol- 
lowed but  fortunately  lodged  on  the  locomotive, 
thus  blocking  the  remainder  of  the  train.  Fortu- 
nately no  one  was  killed,  and  no  passengers  were 
seriously  injured. 

Again,  on  the  Metropolitan  Elevated  railroad  in 
New  York  city,  on  the  evening  of  June  23,  1879, 
one  of  the  trains  was  delayed  for  a  few  moments 
at  the  Franklin  street  station.  Meanwhile  the  next 
train  came  along,  and,  though  the  engine-driver  of 
this  following  train  saw  the  danger  signals  and  en- 
deavored to  stop  in  time,  he  found  his  brake  out  of 
order,  and  a  collision  ensued  resulting  in  the  injury 
of  one  employe*  and  the  severe  shattering  of  a  pas- 


208  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

senger  coach  and  locomotive.  It  was  only  a  piece 
of  good  fortune  that  the  first  of  these  accidents  did 
not  result  in  a  repetition  of  the  Norwalk  disaster 
and  the  second  in  that  of  Revere. 

It  so  chanced  that  it  was  the  Smith  vacuum 
brake  which  failed  to  work  at  Communipaw,  and 
the  Eames  vacuum  which  failed  to  work  at  Franklin 
street.  This,  however,  was  wholly  immaterial.  It 
might  just  as  well  have  been  the  original  Westing- 
house.  The  difficulty  lay,  not  in  the  maker's 
name,  but  in  the  imperfect  action  of  the  brake; 
and  such  significant  intimations  are  not  to  be  dis- 
regarded. The  chances  are  naturally  large  that 
the  failure  of  the  continuous  brake  to  act  will 
not  at  once  occur  under  just  those  circumstances 
which  will  entail  a  serious  disaster  and  heavy  loss 
of  life  ;  that,  however,  if  such  intimations  as  these 
are  disregarded,  it  will  sooner  or  later  so  occur  does 
not  admit  of  doubt. 

But  the  possibility  that  upon  some  given  occasion 
it  might  fail  to  work  was  not  the  only  defect  in  the 
original  Westinghouse  ;  it  might  well  be  in  perfect 
order  and  in  full  action  even,  and  then  suddenly,  as 
the  result  of  derailment  or  separation  of  parts,  the 
apparatus  might  be  broken,  and  at  once  the  shoes 
would  drop  from  the  wheels,  and  the  vehicles  of  the 
disabled  train  would  either  press  forward,  or,  on  an 
incline,  stop  and  run  backwards  until  their  un- 
checked momentum  was  exhausted.  This  appears 
to  have  been  the  case  at  Wollaston,  and  contri- 


THE  TRIPLE    VALVE.  2OQ 

buted  some  of  its  most  disastrous  features  to  that 
accident. 

To  obviate  these  defects  Westinghouse  in  1872 
invented  what  he  termed  a  triple  valve  attachment, 
by  means  of  which,  if  the  thing  can  be  so  expressed, 
his  brake  was  made  to  always  stand  at  danger. 
That  is,  in  case  of  any  derangement  of  its  parts,  it 
was  automatically  applied  and  the  train  stopped. 
The  action  of  the  brake  was  thus  made  to  give 
notice  of  anything  wrong  anywhere  in  the  train. 
A  noticeable  case  of  this  occurred  on  the  Midland 
railway  in  England,  w'hen  on  the  November  22, 
1876,  as  the  Scotch  express  was  approaching  the 
Heeley  station,  at  a  speed  of  some  sixty  miles  an 
hour,  the  hind-guard  felt  the  automatic  brake  sud- 
denly self-applied.  The  forward  truck  of  a  Pullman 
car  in  the  middle  of  the  train  had  left  the  rails  ;  the 
front  part  of  the  train  broke  the  couplings  and 
went  on,  while  the  rear  carriages,  acted  upon  by 
the  automatic  brakes,  came  to  a  stand  immediately 
behind  the  Pullman,  which  finally  rested  on  its  side 
across  the  opposite  track.  There  was  no  loss  of 
life.  On  the  other  hand,  as  the  Scotch  express  on 
the  North  Eastern  road  was  approaching  Morpeth, 
on  March  25,  1877,  at  a  speed  of  some  twenty-five 
miles  an  hour,  the  locomotive  for  some  reason  left 
the  track.  The  train  was  not  equipped  with  an 
automatic  brake,  and  the  carriages  in  it  accordingly 
pressed  forward  upon  each  other  until  three  of 
them  were  so  utterly  destroyed  as  to  be  indis- 


2IO  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

tinguishable.  Five  passengers  lost  their  lives  ;  the 
remains  of  one  of  whom,  together  with  the  wheels 
of  a  carriage,  were  afterwards  taken  out  from  the 
tank  of  the  tender,  into  which  they  had  been  driven 
by  the  force  of  the  shock. 

The  theoretical  objection  to  the  automatic  brake 
is  obvious.  In  case  of  any  derangement  of  its  ma- 
chinery it  applies  itself,  and,  shquld  these  derange- 
ments be  of  frequent  occurrence,  the  consequent 
stoppage  of  trains  would  prove  a  great  annoyance, 
if  not  a  source  of  serious  danger.  This  objection 
is  not  sustained  by  practical  experience.  The 
triple  valve,  so  called,  is  the  only  complicated  por- 
tion of  the  automatic  brake,  and  this  valve  is  well 
protected  and  not  liable  to  get  out  of  order.* 
Should  it  become  deranged  it  will  stop  the  work- 
ing of  the  brake  on  that  car  alone  to  which  it  be- 
longs ;  and  it  will  become  deranged  so  as  to  set  the 
brake  only  from  causes  which  would  render  the  non- 
automatic  brake  inoperative.  When  anything  of  this 

*  Speaking  of  the  modifications  introduced  into  his  brake  by  West- 
inghouse  since  1874,  Mr.  Thomas  E.  Harrison,  civil  engineer  of  the 
North  Eastern  Railway  Company  in  a  communication  to  the  directors 
of  that  company  of  April  24,  1879,  recommending  the  adoption  by  it 
of  the  Westinghouse,  and  subsequently  ordered  to  be  printed  for 
the  use  of  Parliament,  thus  referred  to  the  triple  valve  :  "  As  the 
most  important  [of  these  modifications]  I  will  particularly  draw  your 
attention  to  the  "  triple-valve"  which  has  been  made  a  regular  bug- 
bear by  the  opponents  of  the  system,  and  has  been  called  complicated, 
delicate,  and  liable  to  get  out  of  order,  etc.  *  *  *  It  is,  in  fact, 
as  simple  a  piece  of  mechanism  as  well  can  be  imagined,  certain  in 
its  action,  of  durable  materials,  easily  accessible  to  an  ordinary  work- 
man for  examination  or  cleaning,  and  there  is  nothing  about  it  that 
can  justify  the  term  complication  ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  a  model  of 
ingenuity  and  simplicity." 


"A  REGULAR  BUG-JBEAK."  211 

• 

sort  occurs,  it  stops  the  train  until  the  defect  is 
remedied.  The  returns  made  to  the  English  Board 
of  Trade  enable  us  to  know  just  how  frequently  in 
actual  and  regular  service  these  stoppages  occur, 
and  what  they-  amount  to.  Take,  for  instance,  the 
North  Eastern  and  the  Caledonian  railways.  Both 
use  the  automatic  brake.  During  the  last  six 
months  of  1878  the  first  ran  138,000  train  miles  with 
it,  in  the  course  of  which  there  were  eight  delays 
or  stoppages  of  some  three  to  five  minutes  each 
occasioned  by  the  action  of  the  triple-valve ;  being 
in  round  numbers  one  occasion  of  delay  in  17,000 
miles  of  train  movement.  On  the  Caledonian  rail- 
way, during  the  same  period,  four  brake  failures, 
due  to  the  action  of  the  triple-valve,  were  reported 
in  runs  aggregating  over  62,000  miles,  being  about 
one  failure  to  15,000  miles.  These  failures  more- 
over occasioned  delays  of  only  a  few  minutes  each, 
and,  where  the  cause  of  the  difficulty  was  not 
so  immediately  apparent  that  it  could  at  once 
be  remedied,  the  brake-tubes  of  the  vehicle  on 
which  the  difficulty  occurred  were  disconnected, 
and  the  trains  went  on.*  One  of  these  stop- 

*  During  the  six  months  ending  June  30,  1879,  some  300  stops  due 
to  some  derangement  of  the  apparatus  of  the  Westinghouse  brake 
were  reported  by  ten  companies  in  runs  aggregating  about  two  million 
miles.  Being  one  stop  to  6,600  miles  run.  Very  many  of  these 
stops  were  obviously  due  to  the  want  of  familiarity  of  the  employes 
with  an  apparatus  new  to  them,  but  as  a  rule  the  delays  occasioned 
did  not  exceed  a  very  few  minutes  ;  of  82  stoppages,  for  instance,  re- 
ported on  the  London,  Brighton  &  South  Coast  road,  the  two  longest 
were  ten  minutes  each  and  the  remainder  averaged  some  three  or  four 
minutes. 


2 1 2  RAILROAD 

pages,  however,  resulted  in  a  serious  accident.     As 
a  train  on   the  Caledonian   road   was   approaching 
the    Wemyss    Bay    junction    on    December    I4th, 
in   a  dense   fog,  the  engine  driver,  seeing  the  sig- 
nals   at    danger,    undertook    to    apply    his    brake 
slightly,  when   it  went  full   on,  stopping  the  train 
between    the   distant    and    home   signals,    as    they 
are  called  in  the  English  block  system.     After  the 
danger   signal  was   lowered,  but   before  the   brake 
could  be  released,  the  signal-man  allowed  a  follow- 
ing train  to  enter  upon  the  same  block  section,  and 
a    collision  followed  in   which   some  thirteen   pas- 
sengers were  slightly  injured.     This  accident,  how- 
ever, as  the  inspecting  officer  of  the  Board  of  Trade 
very  properly  found,  was  due  not  at  all  to  the  auto- 
matic brake,  but  to  "  carelessness  on  the  part  of  the 
signal-man,  who  disregarded  the  rules  for  the  work- 
ing of  the  block  telegraph  instruments,"  and  to  the 
driver  of  the  colliding  train,   who   "  disobeyed  the 
company's  running  regulations."    It  gives  an  Ameri- 
can, however,  a  realizing  sense  of  one  of  the  difficul- 
ties under  which   those  crowded    British   lines  are 
operated,  to  read  that  in  this  case  the  fog  was  "  so 
thick  that  the  tail-lamp  was  not  visible  from  an  ap- 
proaching train  for  more  than  a  few  yards." 

After  the  application  of  the  triple  valve  had  made 
it  automatic,  there  remained  but  one  further  im- 
provement necessary  to  render  the  Westinghouse  a 
well-nigh  perfect  brake.  A  superabundance  of  self- 
acting  power  had  been  secured,  but  no  provision  was 


THE  MAXIMUM  OF  RE  TARDING  PO  WER.     2 1 3 

yet  made  for  graduating  the  use  of  that  power  so 
that  it  should  be  applied  in  the  exact  degree,  neither 
more  nor  less,  which  would  soonest  stop  the  train. 
This  for  two  reasons  is  mechanically  a  matter  of  no 
little  importance.  As  is  well  known  a  too  severe 
application  of  brakes,  no  matter  of  what  kind  they 
are,  causes  the  wheels  to  stand  still  and  slide  upon 
the  rails.  This  is  not  only  very  injurious  to  rolling 
stock,  the  wheels  of  which  are  flattened  at  the  points 
which  slide,  but,  as  has  long  been  practically  well- 
known  to  those  whose  business  it  is  to  run  locomo- 
tives, when  once  the  wheels  begin  to  slide  the  retard- 
ing power  of  the  brakes  is  seriously  diminished.  In 
order,  therefore,  to  secure  the  maximum  of  retarding 
power,  the  pressure  of  the  brake-blocks  on  the  revolv- 
ing wheels  should  be  very  great  when  first  applied, 
and  just  sufficient  not  to  slide  them  ;  and  should 
then  be  diminished,  part  passu  with  the  momen- 
tum of  the  train,  until  it  wholly  stops.  Familiar  as 
all  this  has  long  been  to  engine-drivers  and  practical 
railroad  mechanics,  yet  it  has  not  been  conceded  in 
the  results  of  many  scientific  inquiries.  In  the  re- 
port of  one  of  the  Royal  Commissions  on  Acci- 
dents, for  instance,  it  was  asserted  that  the  mo- 
mentum of  a  train  was  retarded  more  by  the  ac- 
tion of  sliding  than  of  slowly  revolving  wheels ; 
and  again,  as  recently  as  in  May,  1877,  in  a 
scientific  discussion  in  London  at  one  of  the  meet- 
ings of  the  Society  of  Arts,  a  gentleman,  with 
the  letters  C.  E.  appended  to  his  name,  ventured 


214  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

the  surprising  assertion  that  "no  brake  could  do 
more  than  skid  the  wheels  of  a  train,  and  all 
continuous  brakes  professed  to  do  this,  and  he 
believed  did  so  about  equally  well."  Now,  what  it 
is  here  asserted  no  brake  can  do  is  exactly  what  the 
perfect  brake  will  be  made  to  do, — and  what  West- 
inghouse's  latest  improvement,  it  is  claimed,  enables 
his  brake  to  do.  It  much  more  than  "  skids  the 
wheels,"  by  measuring  out  exactly  that  degree  of 
power  necessary  to  hold  the  wheels  just  short  of 
the  skidding  point,  and  in  this  way  always  exerts 
the  maximum  retarding  force.  This  is  brought 
about  by  means  of  a  contrivance  which  allows  the 
air  to  leak  out  of  the  brake  cylinders  so  as  to  ex- 
actly proportion  the  pressure  of  the  blocks  on  the 
wheels  to  the  speed  with  which  the  latter  are  re- 
volving. In  other,  and  more  scientific,  language 
the  force  with  which  the  brake-blocks  are  pressed 
upon  the  wheels  is  made  to  adjust  itself  auto- 
matically as  the  "  coefficient  of  dynamic  friction 
augments  with  the  reduction  of  train  speed."  It 
hardly  needs  to  be  said  that  in  this  way  the  power 
of  the  brake  is  enormously  increased. 

In  America  the  superiority  of  the  Westinghouse 
over  any  other  description  of  train-brake  has  long 
been  established  through  that  large  preponderance 
of  use  which  in  such  matters  constitutes  the  final 
and  irreversible  verdict.*  In  Europe,  however,  and 

*  In  Massachusetts,  for  instance,  where  no  official  pressure  in  favor 
of  any  particular  brake  was  brought  to  bear,  out  of  473  locomotives 


THE  BA  TTLE  OF  THE  BRAKES.  2 1 5 

especially  in  Great  Britain,  ever  since  the  Shipton- 
on-Cherwell  accident  in  1874,  the  battle  of  the 
brakes,  as  it  may  not  inappropriately  be  called,  has 
waxed  hotter  and  hotter;  and  not  only  has  this 
battle  been  extremely  interesting  in  a  scientific  way, 
but  it  has  been  highly  characteristic,  and  at  times 
enlivened  by  touches  of  human  nature  which  were 
exceedingly  amusing. 

equipped  with  train-brakes  361  have  the  Westinghouse,  which  is  also 
applied  to  1,363  out  of  1,669  cars-  Qf  these,  however,  79  locomotives 
and  358  cars  are  equipped  with  both  the  atmospheric  and  the  vacuum 
brakes. 


2l6  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  BRAKES. 

THE  English  battle  of  the  brakes  may  be  said 
to  have  fairly  opened  with  the  official  report  from 
Captain  Tyler  on  the  Shipton  accident,  in  refer- 
ence to  which  he  expressed  the  opinion,  which  has 
already  been  quoted  in  describing  the  accident, 
that  "  if  the  train  had  been  fitted  with  continuous 
brakes  throughout  its  whole  length  there  is  no 
reason  why  it  should  not  have  been  brought 
to  rest  without  any  casuality."  The  Royal  Com- 
mission on  railroad  accidents  then  took  the  mat- 
ter up  and  called  for  a  series  of  scientifically  con- 
ducted experiments.  These  took  place  under  the 
supervision  of  two  engineers  appointed  by  the 
Commission,  who  were  aided  by  a  detail  of  officers 
and  men  from  the  royal  engineers.  Eight  brakes 
competed,  and  a  train,  consisting  of  a  locomotive 
and  thirteen  cars,  was  specially  prepared  for  each. 
With  these  trains  some  seventy  runs  were  made,  and 


THE  NEWARK  BRAKE   TRIALS.  2 1/ 

their  results  recorded  and  tabulated ;  the  experi- 
ments were  continued  through  six  consecutive  work- 
ing days.  Of  the  brakes  experimented  with  three 
were  American  in  their  origin, — Westinghouse's  au- 
tomatic and  vacuum,  and  Smith's  vacuum.  The  re- 
mainder were  English,  and  were  steam,  hydraulic, 
and  air  brakes ;  among  them  also  was  one  simple 
emergency  brake.  The  result  of  the  trials  was  a 
very  decided  victory  for  the  Westinghouse  auto- 
matic, and  upon  its  performances  the  Commission 
based  its  conclusion  that  trains  ought  to  be  so 
equipped  that  in  cases  of  emergency  they  could  be 
brought  to  rest,  when  travelling  on  level  ground  at 
50  miles  an  hour,  within  a  distance  of  275  yards ; 
with  an  allowance  of  distance  in  cases  of  speed 
greater  or  less  than  50  miles  nearly  proportioned 
to  its  square.  These  allowances  they  tabulated  as 
follows  : — 

At  60  miles  per  hour,  stopping  distance  within  400  yards. 
"  55  "  "  "  340      " 

"  5o  "  "  275       " 

"  45  22°       " 

"  40  "  "  "  1 80       " 

"  35  "  "  "  135       " 

"  30  100       " 

To  appreciate  the  enormous  advance  in  what  may 
be  called  stopping  power  which  these  experiments 
revealed,  it  should  be  added  that  the  first  series  of 
experiments  made  at  Newark  were  with  trains 
equipped  only  with  the  hand-brake.  The  average 


2I&  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

speed  in  these  experiments  was  47  miles,  and  with 
the  train-brake,  according  to  the  foregoing  tabula- 
tion, the  stop  should  have  been  made  in  about  250 
yards  ;  in  reality  it  was  made  in  a  little  less  than 
five  times  that  distance,  or  1120  yards;  in  other 
words  the  experiments  showed  that  the  improved 
appliances  had  more  than  quadrupled  the  control 
over  trains.  It  has  already  been  noticed  that  in 
the  cases  of  the  Angola  and  the  Port  Jervis  disas- 
ters, as  well  as  in  that  at  Shipton,  the  trains  ran 
some  2,700  feet  before  they  could  be  stopped.  Un- 
der the  English  tabulations  above  given,  in  the  re- 
sults of  which  certain  recent  improvements  do  not 
enter,  a  train  runnin,g  into  the  42d  Street  Station 
in  New  York,  at  a  speed  of  forty-five  miles  an  hour 
when  under  the  entrance  arches,  would  be  stopped 
before  it  reached  the  buffers  at  the  end  of  the 
covered  tracks. 

The  Royal  Commission  experiments  were  follow- 
ed in  May  and  June,  1877,  by  yet  others  set  on 
foot  by  the  North  Eastern  Railway  Company  for  the 
purpose  of  making  a  competitive  test  of  the  West- 
inghouse  automatic  and  the  Smith's  vacuum  brakes. 
At  this  trial  also  the  average  stop  at  a  speed  of  50 
miles  an  hour  was  effected  in  15  seconds,  and  within 
a  distance  of  650  feet.  Other  series  of  experiments 
with  similar  results  were,  about  the  same  time,  con- 
ducted under  the  auspices  of  the  Belgian  and  Ger- 
man governments,  of  which  elaborate  official  reports 
were  made.  The  result  was  that  at  last,  under  date 


THE  PERFECT  TRAIN-BRAKE.  2ig 

of  August  30,  1877,  the  Board  of  Trade  issued  a 
circular  to  the  railway  companies  in  which  it  called 
attention  to  the  fact  that,  notwithstanding  all  the 
discussion  which  had  taken  place  and  the  elaborate 
official  trials  which  the  government  had  set  qp  foot, 
there  had  "  apparently  been  no  attempt  on  tffe  part 
of  the  various  companies  to  take  the  first  step  of 
agreeing  upon  what  are  the  requirements  which,  in 
their  opinion,  are  essential  to  a  good  continuous 
brake."  In  other  words,  the  Board  found  that,  in- 
stead of  becoming  better,  matters  were  rapidly  be- 
coming worse.  Each  company  was  equipping  its 
rolling  stock  with  that  appliance  in  which  its  officers 
happened  to  be  interested  as  owners  or  inventors, 
and  when  carriages  thus  equipped  passed  from  the 
tracks  of  one  road  onto  those  of  another  the  result 
was  a  return  to  the  old  hand-brake  system  in  a  con- 
dition of  impaired  efficiency.  The  Board  accord- 
ingly now  proceeded  to  narrow  down  the  field  of  se- 
lection by  specifying  the  following  as  what  it  con- 
sidered the  essentials  of  a  good  continuous  brake  : — 

a.  "  The  brakes  to  be  efficient  in  stopping  trains,  in- 
stantaneous in  their  actions,  and  capable  of  being  applied 
without  difficulty  by  engine-drivers  or  guards. 

b.  "  In    case   of  accident,    to  be    instantaneously   self- 
acting. 

c.  "  The  brakes  to  be  put  on  and  taken  off  (with  facil- 
ity) on  the  engine  and  on  every  vehicle  of  a  train. 

d.  "  The  brakes  to  be  regularly  used  in  daily  working. 

e.  "  The  materials  employed  to  be  of  a  durable  char- 
acter, so  as  to  be  easily  maintained  and  kept  in  order." 


220  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

These  requirements  pointed  about  as  directly  as 
they  could  to  the  Westinghouse,  to  the  exclusion  of 
all  competing  brakes.  Not  more  than  one  other  com- 
plied with  them  in  all  respects,  and  many  made  no 
pretence  of  complying  at  all.  Then  followed  what 
may  be  termed  the  battle  royal  of  the  brakes,  which 
as  yet  shows  no  signs  of  drawing  to  a  close.  As  the 
avowed  object  of  the  Board  of  Trade  was  to  intro- 
duce, one  brake,  to  the  necessary  exclusion  of  all 
others,  throughout  the  railroad  system  of  Great 
Britain,  the  magnitude  of  the  prize  was  not  easy 
to  over-estimate.  The  weight  of  scientific  and 
official  authority  was  decidedly  in  favor  of  the  West- 
inghouse automatic,  but  among  the  railroad  men 
the  Smith  vacuum  found  the  largest  number  of  ad- 
herents. It  failed  to  meet  three  of  the  requirements 
of  the  Board  of  Trade,  in  that  it  was  neither  auto- 
matic nor  instantaneous  in  its  action,  while  the  ma- 
terials employed  in  it  were  not  of  a  durable  char- 
acter. It  was,  on  the  other  hand,  a  brake  of  un- 
questioned excellence,  while  it  commended  itself 
to  the  judgment  of  the  average  railroad  official  by 
its  simplicity,  and  to  that  of  the  average  railroad 
director  by  its  apparent  cheapness.  Any  one  could 
understand  it,  and  its  first  cost  was  temptingly 
small.  The  real  struggle  in  Great  Britain,  therefore, 
has  been,  and  now  is,  between  these  two  brakes ;  and 
the  fact  that  both  of  them  are  American  has  been 
made  to  enter  largely  into  it,  and  in  a  way  also 
which  at  times  lent  to  the  discussion  an  element  of 
broad  humor. 


THE  BRITISH   CONTROVERSIALIST.  221 

For  instance,  the  energetic  agent  of  the  Smith 
vacuum,  feeling  himself  aggrieved  by  some  state- 
ment which  appeared  in  the  Times,  responded  there- 
to in  a  circular,  in  the  composition  of  which  he  cer- 
tainly evinced  more  zeal  than  either  judgment  or 
literary  skill.  This  circular  and  its  author  were  then 
referred  to  by  the  editors  of  Engineering,  a  London 
scientific  journal,  in  the  following  slightly  de  haut 
en  bas  style  : — 

"  It  is  not  a  little  remarkable,  and  it  is  a  fact  not  har- 
monious with  the  feelings  of  English  engineers,  that  the 
two  brakes  recommending  themselves  for  adoption  are  of 
American  origin.  *  *  *  Now  we  cannot  wonder, 
considering  what  our  past  experience  has  been  in  many 
of  our  dealings  with  Americans,  that  this  feeling  of  dis- 
trust and  prejudice  exists.  It  is  not  merely  sentimental, 
it  is  founded  on  many  and  untoward  and  costly  experi- 
ences of  the  past,  and  the  fear  of  similar  experiences  in 
the  future.  And  when  we  see  the  representative  of  one 
of  these  systems  adopting  the  traditional  policy  of  his 
country,  and  meeting  criticism  with  abuse — abuse  of  men 
pre-eminent  in  the  profession,  and  journals  which  he  ap- 
parently forgets  are  neither  American  nor  venal — we  do 
not  wonder  that  our  railway  engineers  feel  a  repugnance 
to  commit  themselves." 

The  superiority  of  the  British  over  the  American 
controversialist,  as  respects  courtesy  and  restraint 
in  language,  being  thus  satisfactorily  established,  it 
only  remained  to  illustrate  it.  This,  however,  had 
already  been  done  in  the  previous  May ;  for  at  that 
time  it  chanced  that  Captain  Tyler,  having  retired 
from  his  position  at  the  head  of  the  railway  inspec- 


222  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

tors  department  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  was  consid- 
ering an  offer  which  Mr.  Westinghouse  had  made 
him  to  associate  himself  with  the  company  owning 
the  brakes  known  by  that  name.  Before  accepting 
this  offer,  Captain  Tyler  took  advantage  of  a  meet- 
ing of  the  Society  of  Arts  to  publicly  give  notice 
that  he  was  considering  it.  This  he  did  in  a  really 
admirable  paper  on  the  whole  subject  of  continuous 
brakes,  at  the  close  of  which  a  general  discussion 
was  invited  and  took  place,  and  in  the  course  of  it 
the  innate  superiority  of  the  British  over  any  other 
kind  of  controversialist,  so  far  at  least  as  courtesy 
and  a  delicate,  refraining  from  imputations  is  con- 
cerned, received  pointed  illustration. 

No  sooner  had  Captain  Tyler  finished  than  Mr. 
Houghton,  C.  E.,  took  occasion  to  refer  to  the 
paper  he  had  read  as  "  an  elaborate  puff  to  the 
Westinghouse  brake,  with  which  he  [Tyler]  was,  as 
he  told,  connected,  or  about  to  be."  Subsequently 
Mr.  Steele  proceeded  to  say  that:— 

"  On  receiving  the  invitation  to  be  present  at  the 
meeting,  he  had  been  somewhat  afraid  that  Captain 
Tyler  was  going  to  lose  his  fine  character  for  impartiality 
by  throwing  in  his  lot  with  the  brake-tinkers,  but  it  came 
out  that  not  only  was  he  going  to  do  that,  but  actually 
going  to  be  a  partner  in  a  concern.  *  *  *  The 
speaker  then  proceeded  to  discuss  the  Westinghouse 
brake,  which  he  called  the  Westinghouse  and  Tyler 
brake,  designating  it  as  a  jack-in-the-box,  a  rattle  trap, 
to  please  and  decoy,  and  not  an  invencion  at  all.  No 
engineer  had  a  hand  in  its  manufacture.  It  was  the  dis- 
covery of  some  Philadelphia  barber  or  some  such  thing. 


"A  BATTLE-TRAP."  22$ 

He  had  spoken  of  honest  brakes.  This  was  a  brake 
which  had  all  sorts  of  pretensions.  It  had  not  worked 
well,  but  whenever  there  was  any  row  about  its  not  work- 
ing well,  they  got  the  papers  to  praise  it  up,  and  that  was 
how  the  papers  were  under  the  thumb,  and  would  not 
speak  of  any  other.  *  *  *  He  thought  it  would  not 
do  for  railway  companies  to  take  a  bad  brake,  and  Cap- 
tain Tyler  and  Mr.  Westinghouse  be  able  to  make  their 
fortunes  by  floating  a  limited  company  for  its  introduc- 
tion. They  had  heard  of  Emma  mines  and  Lisbon 
tramways,  and  such  like,  and  he  felt  it  would  not  be  well 
to  stand  by  and  allow  this  to  be  done." 

All  of  which  was  not  only  to  the  point,  but  finely 
calculated  to  show  the  American  inventors  and 
agents  who  were  present  the  nice  and  mutually 
respectful  manner  in  which  such  discussions  were 
carried  on  by  all  Englishmen. 

Though  the  avowed  adhesion  of  Sir  Henry  Tyler 
to  the  Westinghouse  was  a  most  important  move 
in  the  war  of  the  brakes,  it  did  not  prove  a  decisive 
one.  The  complete  control  of  the  field  was  too 
valuable  a  property  to  be  yielded  in  deference  to 
that,  or  any  other  name  without  a  struggle ;  and,  so  to 
speak,  there  were  altogether  too  many  irrs  and  outs 
to  the  conflict.  Back  door  influences  had  every- 
where to  be  encountered.  The  North  Western,  for 
instance,  is  the  most  important  of  the  railway  com- 
panies of  the  United  Kingdom.  The  locomotive 
superintendent  of  that  company  was  the  part  in- 
ventor and  proprietor  of  an  emergency  brake  which 
had  been  extensively  adopted  by  it  on  its  rolling 
stock,  but  which  wholly  failed  to  meet  the  re- 


224  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

quiremenfs  laid  down  in  its  circular  by  the  Board 
of  Trade.  Immediately  after  issuing  that  circular 
the  Board  of  Trade  called  the  attention  of  the 
company  to  this  fact  in  connection  with  an  ac- 
cident which  had  recently  occurred,  and  in  very 
emphatic  language  pointed  out  that  the  brakes  in 
question  could  not  "  in  any  reasonable  sense  of 
the  word  be  called  continuous  brakes,"  and  that  it 
was  clear  that  the  circular  requirements  were  "  not 
complied  with  by  the  brake-system  of  the  Lon- 
don &  North  Western  Railway  Company ;"  in  case 
that  company  persisted  in  the  use  of  that  brake, 
the  secretary  of  the  Board  wen!  on  to  say,  "  in  the 
event  of  a  casualty  occurring,  which  an  efficient 
system  of  brakes  might  have  prevented,  a  heavy 
personal  responsibility  will  rest  upon  those  who  are 
answerable  for  such  neglect."  This  was  certainly 
language  tolerably  direct  in  its  import.  As  such  it 
was  calculated  to  cause  those  to  whom  it  was  ad- 
dressed to  pause  in  their  action.  The  company, 
however,  treated  it  with  a  superb  disregard,  all  the 
more  contemptuous  because  veiled  in  language  of 
deferential  civility.  They  then  quietly  went  on  ap- 
plying their  locomotive  superintendent's  emergency 
brake  to  their  equipment,  until  on  the  3Oth  of  June, 
1879,  they  returned  no  less  than  2,052  carriages 
fitted  with  it ;  that  being  by  far  the  largest  number 
*  returned  by  any  one  company  in  the  United  King- 
dom. 

A  more  direct  challenge  to  the  Board  of  Trade 


A  DIRECT  CHALLENGE.  22$ 

and  to  Parliament  could  not  easily  have  been  de- 
vised. To  appreciate  how  direct  it  was,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  bear  in  mind  that  in  its  circular  of  Au- 
gust 30,  1877,  in  which  the  requirements  of  a  satis- 
factory train-brake  were  laid  down,  the  Board  of 
Trade  threw  out  to  the  companies  the  very  signifi- 
cent  hint,  that  they  "  would  do  well  to  reflect  that 
if  a  doubt  should  arise  that  from  a  conflict  of  inter- 
est or  opinion,  or  from  any  other  cause,  they  [the 
companies]  are  not  exerting  themselves,  it  is  obvious 
that  they  will  call  down  upon  themselves  an  inter- 
ference which  the  Board  of  Trade,  no  less  than  the 
companies,  desire  to  avoid."  In  his  general  report 
on  the  accidents  of  the  year  1877,  the  successor  of 
Captain  Tyler  expressed  the  opinion  that  "  suffici- 
ent information  and  experience  would  now  appear 
to  be  available,  and  the  time  is  approaching  when 
the  railway  companies  may  fairly  be  expected  to 
come  to  a  decision  as  to  which  of  the  systems  of 
continuous  brakes  is  best  calculated  to  fulfil  the 
requisite  conditions,  and  is  most  worthy  of  general 
adoption."  At  the  close  of  another  year,  however, 
the  official  returns  seemed  to  indicate  that,  while 
but  a  sixth  part  of  the  passenger  locomotives  and  a 
fifth  part  of  the  carriages  in  use  on'  the  railroads  of 
the  United  Kingdom  were  yet  equipped  with  con- 
tinuous brakes  at  all,  a  concurrence  of  opinion  in 
favor  of  any  one  system  was  more  remote  than 
ever.  During  the  six  months  ending  December 
31,  1878,  but  127  additional  locomotives  out  of 


226  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

about  4000,  and  1,200  additional  carriages  out  of 
some  32,000  were  equipped;  of  which  70  locomo- 
tives and  530  carriages  had  been  equipped  with 
the  Smith  vacuum,  which  in  three  most  important 
respects  failed  to  comply  with  the  Board  of  Trade 
requirements.  Under  these  circumstances  the  Board 
of  Trade  was  obviously  called  upon  either  to  with- 
draw from  the  position  it  had  taken,  or  to  invite 
that  "  interference  '*  in  its  support  to  which  in  its 
circular  of  August,  1877  it  had  so  portentously  re- 
ferred. It  decided  to  do  the  latter,  and  in  March, 
1879  *ne  government  gave  an  intimation  in  the 
House  of  Lords  that  early  Parliamentary  action 
was  contemplated.  As  it  is  expressed,  the  rail- 
way companies  are  to  "  be  relieved  of  their  inde- 
cision." 

In  Great  Britian,  therefore,  the  long  battle  of  the 
brakes  would  seem  to  be  drawing  to  its  close.  The 
final  struggle,  however,  will  be  a  spirited  one,  and 
one  which  Americans  will  watch  with  considerable 
interest, — for  it  is  in  fact  a  struggle  between  two 
American  brakes,  the  Westinghouse  and  the  Smith 
vacuum.  Of  the  907  locomotives  hitherto  equip- 
ped with  the  continuous  brakes  no  less  than  819  are 
equipped  with  one  or  the  other  of  these  American 
patents,  besides  over  4,464  of  the  9,919  passenger 
carriages.  The  remaining  3,857  locomotives  and 
30,000  carriages  are  the  prize  of  victory.  As  the 
score  now  stands  the  vacuum  brake  is  in  almost  ex- 
actly twice  the  use  of  its  more  scientific  rival. 


THE  BA LANCE  OF  AD  VANTA  G£S.  227 

The  weight  of  authority  and  -experience,  and  the 
requirements  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  are,  however, 
on  the  opposite  side. 

As  deduced  from  the  European  scientific  tests  and 
the  official  returns,  the  balance  of  advantages  would 
seem  to  be  as  follows : — In  favor  of  the  vacuum 
are  its  superficial  simplicity,  and  possible  economy 
in  first  cost  : — In  favor  of  the  Westinghouse  auto- 
matic are  its  superior  quickness  in  application,  .tjie 
greater  rapidity  in  its  stopping  power,  the  m0re 
durable  nature  of  its  materials,  the  smaller  cost  in 
renewal,  its  less  liability  to  derangement,  and  above 
all  its  self-acting  adjustment.  The  last  is  the  point 
upon  which  the  final  issue  of  the  struggle  must 
probably  turn.  The  use  of  any  train-brake  which 
is  not  automatic  in  its  action,  as  has  already  been 
pointed  out,  involves  in  the  long  run  disaster, — and 
ultimate  serious  disaster.  The  mere  fact  that  the 
brake  is  generally  so  reliable, — that  ninety-nine 
times  out  of  the  hundred  it  works  perfectly, — sim- 
ply makes  disaster  certain  by  the  fatal  confidence  it 
inspires.  Ninety-nine  times  in  a  hundred  the  brake 
proves  reliable ; — nine  times  in  the  remaining  ten  of 
the  thousand,  in  which  it  fails,  a  lucky  chance  averts 
disaster  ; — but  the  thousandth  time  will  assuredly 
come,  as  it  did  at  Communipaw  and  on  the  New 
York  Elevated  railway,  and,  much  the  worst  of  all 
yet,  at  Wollaston.  Soon  or  late  the  use  of  non- 
automatic  continuous  brakes  will  most  assuredly,  if 
they  are  not  sooner  abandoned,  be  put  an  end  to 


228  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

by  the  occurrence  of  some  not-to-be  forgotten  cat- 
astrophe of  the  first  magnitude,  distinctly  traceable 
to  that  cause.  Meanwhile  that  automatic  brakes 
are  complicated  and  sometimes  cause  inconvenience 
in  their  operation  is  most  indisputable.  This  is  an 
objection,  also,  to  which  they  are  open  in  common 
with  most  of  the  riper  results  of  human  ingenuity ; 
—but,  though  sun-dials  are  charmingly  simple,  we 
do  not,  therefore,  discard  chronometers  in  their 
favor ;  neither  do  we  insist  on  cutting  our  harvests 
with  the  scythe,  because  every  man  who  may  be 
called  upon  to  drive  a  mowing  machine  may  not 
know  how  to  put  one  together.  But  what  Sir 
Henry  Tyler  has  said  in  respect  to  this  oldest  and 
most  fallacious,  as  well  as  most  wearisome,  of  ob- 
jections covers  the  whole  ground  and  cannot,  be 
improved  upon.  After  referring  to  the  fact  that 
simplicity  in  construction  and  simplicity  in  working 
were  two  different  things,  and  that,  almost  invari- 
ably, a  certain  degree  of  complication  in  construc- 
tion is  necessary  to  secure  simplicity  in  working, — 
after  pointing  this  out  he  went  on  to  add  that, — 

"  Simplicity  as  regards  the  application  of  railway  brakes 
is  not  obtained  by  the  system  now  more  commonly 
employed  of  brake-handles  to  be  turned  by  different  men 
in  different  parts  of  the  train  ;  but  is  obtained  when,  by 
more  complicated  construction  an  engine-driver  is  able 
easily  in  an  instant  to  apply  ample  brake-power  at  pleas- 
ure with  more  or  less  force  to  every  wheel  of  his  train  ; 
is  obtained  when,  every  time  an  engine-driver  starts,  or 
attempts  to  start  his  train,  the  brake  itself  informs  him  if 


TRUE  SIMPLICITY  DEFINED. 

it  is  out  of  order  ;  and  is  still  more  obtained  when,  on 
the  occasion  of  an  accident  and  the  separation  of  a 
coupling,  the  brakes  will  unfailingly  apply  themselves  on 
every  wheel  of  the  train  without  the  action  of  the  engine- 
driver  or  guards,  [brakemen],  and  before  even  they  have 
time  to  realize  the  necessity  for  it.  This  is  true  sim- 
plicity in  such  a  case,  and  that  system  of  continuous 
brakes  which  best  accomplishes  such  results  in  the  short- 
est space  of  time  is  so  far  preferable  to  all  others." 


230  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 


CHAPTER    XXI. 

THE    RAILROAD    JOURNEY    RESULTING    IN    DEATH. 

ONE  day  in  May,  1847,  as  the  Queen  of  Belgium 
was  going  from  Verviers  to  Brussels  by  rail,  the 
train  in  which  she  was  journeying  came  into  col- 
lision with  another  train  going  in  the  opposite 
direction.  There  was  naturally  something  of  a 
panic,  and,  as  royalty  was  not  then  accustomed  to 
being  knocked  about  with  railroad  equality,  some  of 
her  suite  urged  the  queen  to  leave  the  train  and  to 
finish  her  journey  by  carnage.  The  contempor- 
aneous court  reporter  then  went  on  to  say,  in  that 
language  which  is  so  peculiarly  his  own, — "  But  her 
Majesty,  as  courageously  as  discreetly,  declined  to 
set  that  example  of  timidity,  and  she  proceeded  to 
Brussels  by  the  railway."  In  those  days  a  very  ex- 
aggerated idea  was  universally  entertained  of  the 
great  danger  incident  to  travel  by  rail.  Even  then, 
however,  had  her  Majesty,  who  was  doubtless  a  very 
sensible  woman,  happened  to  be  familiar  with  the 


THE  DA  YS  OF  STAGE  COACHES.  2$l 

statistics  of  injuries  received  by  those  traveling  res- 
pectively by  rail  and  by  carnage,  she  certainly  never 
on  any  plea  of  danger  would  have  been  induced  to 
abandon  her  railroad  train  in  order  to  trust  herself 
behind  horse-flesh.  By  pursuing  the  course  urged 
upon  her,  the  queen  would  have  multiplied  her 
chances  of  accident  some  sixty  fold.  Strange  as  the 
statement  sounds  even  now,  such  would  seem  to 
have  been  the  fact.  In  proportion  to  the  whole 
number  carried,  the  accidents  to  passengers  in  "  the 
good  old  days  of  stage-coaches  "  were,  as  compared 
to  the  present  time  of  the  railroad  dispensation, 
about  as  sixty  to  one.  This  result,  it  is  true,  cannot 
be  verified  in  the  experience  either  of  England  or 
of  this  country,  for  neither  the  English  nor  we  pos- 
sess any  statistics  in  relation  to  the  earlier  period ; 
but  they  have  such  statistics  in  France,  stretching 
over  the  space  of  more  than  forty  years,  and  as  re- 
liable as  statistics  ever  are.  If  these  French  statis- 
tics hold  true  in  New  England, — and  considering  the 
character  of  our  roads,  conveyances,  and  climate, 
their  showing  is  more  likely  to  be  in  our  favor  than 
against  us, — if  they  simply  hold  true,  leaving  us  to 
assume  that  stage-coach  traveling  was  no  less  safe 
in  Massachusetts  than  in  France,  then  it  would  fol- 
low that  to  make  the  dangers  of  the  rail  of  the  pres- 
ent day  equal  to  those  of  the  highway  of  half  a 
century  back,  some  eighty  passengers  should  annu- 
ally be  killed  and  some  eleven  hundred  injured 
within  the  limits  of  Massachusetts  alone.  These 


232  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

figures,  however,  represent  rather  more  than  fifty 
times  the  actual  average,  and  from  them  it  would 
seem  to  be  not  unfair  to  conclude  that,  notwith- 
standing the  great  increase  of  population  and  the 
yet  greater  increase  in  travel  during  the  last  half- 
century,  there  were  literally  more  persons  killed  and 
injured  each  year  in  Massachusetts  fifty  years  ago 
through  accidents  to  stage-coaches  than  there  are 
now  through  accidents  to  railroad  trains. 

The  first  impression  of  nine  out  of  ten  persons  in 
no  way  connected  with  the  operations  of  railroads 
would  probably  be  found  to  be  the  exact  opposite 
to  this.  A  vague  but  deeply  rooted  conviction  com- 
monly prevails  that  the  railroad  has  created  a  new 
danger;  that  because  of  it  the  average  human 
being's  hold  on  life  is  more  precarious  than  it  was. 
The  first  point-blank,  bald  statement  to  the  contrary 
would  accordingly  strike  people  in  the  light  not  only 
of  a  paradox,  but  of  a  somewhat  foolish  one.  In- 
vestigation, nevertheless,  bears  it  out.  The  fact  is 
that  when  a  railroad  accident  comes,  it  is  apt  to 
come  in  such  a  way  as  to  leave  no  doubt  whatever 
in  relation  to  it.  It  is  heralded  like  a  battle  or  an 
earthquake ;  it  fills  columns  of  the  daily  press  with 
the  largest  capitals  and  the  most  harrowing  details, 
and  thus  it  makes  a  deep  and  lasting  impression  on 
the  minds  of  many  people.  When  a  multitude  of 
persons,  traveling  as  almost  every  man  now  daily 
travels  himself,  meet  death  in  such  sudden  and  such 
awful  shape,  the  event  smites  the  imagination.  Peo- 


ACCIDENTS  THEN  AND  NOW.  233 

pie  seeing  it  and  thinking  of  it,  and  hearing  and 
reading  of  it,  and  of  it  only,  forget  of  how  infrequent 
occurrence  it  is.  It  was  not  so  in  the  olden  time. 
Every  one  rode  behind  horses, — if  not  in  public  then 
in  private  conveyances, — and  when  disaster  came  it 
involved  but  few  persons  and  was  rarely  accompanied 
by  circumstances  which  either  struck  the  imagina- 
tion or  attracted  any  great  public  notice.  In  the 
first  place,  the  modern  newspaper,  with  its  perfect 
machinery  for  sensational  exaggeration,  did  not  then 
exist, — having  itself  only  recently  come  in  the  train 
of  the  locomotive  ; — and,  in  the  next  place,  the  circle 
of  those  included  in  the  consequences  of  any  disas- 
ter was  necessarily  small.  It  is  far  otherwise  now. 
For  weeks  and  months  the  vast  machinery  moves 
along,  doing  its  work  quickly,  swiftly,  safely  ;  no  one 
pays  any  attention  to  it,  while  millions  daily  make 
use  of  it.  It  is  as  much  a  necessity  of  their  lives  as 
the  food  they  eat  and  the  air  they  breathe.  Sud- 
denly, somehow,  and  somewhere, — at  Versailles,  at 
Norwalk,  at  Abergele,  at  New  Hamburg,  or  at  Re- 
vere,— at  some  hitherto  unfamiliar  point  upon  an  in- 
significant thread  of  the  intricate  iron  web,  an  ob- 
struction is  encountered,  a  jar,  as  it  were,  is  felt,  and 
instantly,  with  time  for  hardly  an  ejaculation  or  a 
thought,  a  multitude  of  human  beings  are  hurled 
into  eternity.  It  is  no  cause  for  surprise  that  such 
an  event  makes  the  community  in  which  it  happens 
catch  its  breadth  ;  neither  is  it  unnatural  that  people 
should  think  more  of  the  few  who  are  killed,  of 


234  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

whom  they  hear  so  much,  than  of  the  myriads  who 
are  carried  in  safety  and  of  whom  they  hear  nothing. 
Yet  it  is  well  to  bear  in  mind  that  there  are  two  sides 
to  that  question  also,  and  in  no  way  could  this  fact 
be  more  forcibly  brought  to  our  notice  than  by  the 
assertion,  borne  out  by  all  the  statistics  we  possess, 
that,  irrespective  of  the  vast  increase  in  the  number 
of  those  who  travel,  a  greater  number  of  passengers 
in  stage-coaches  were  formerly  each  year  killed  or 
injured  by  accidents  to  which  they  in  no  way  con- 
tributed through  their  own  carelessness,  than  are 
now  killed  under  the  same  conditions  in  our  railroad 
cars.  In  other  words,  the  introduction  of  the  mod- 
ern railroad,  so  far  from  proportionately  increasing 
the  dangers  of  traveling,  has  absolutely  diminished 
them.  It  is  not,  after  all,  the  dangers  but  the  safety 
of  the  modern  railroad  which  should  excite  our 
special  wonder. 

What  is  the  average  length  of  the  railroad  jour- 
ney resulting  in  death  by  accident  to  a  prudent 
traveler  ? — What  is  the  average  length  of  one  re- 
sulting in  some  personal  injury  to  him  ? — These  are 
two  questions  which  interest  every  one.  Few  per- 
sons, probably,  start  upon  any  considerable  journey, 
implying  days  and  nights  en  the  rail,  without  al- 
most unconsciously  taking  into  some  consideration 
the  risks  of  accident.  Visions  of  collision,  derail- 
ment, plunging  through  bridges,  will  rise  unbidden. 
Even  the  old  traveler  who  has  enjoyed  a  long  im- 
munity is  apt  at  times,  with  some  little  apprehen- 


AFFECT  A  TION  IN  STA  TISTICS.  235 

sion,  to  call  to  mind  the  musty  adage  of  the  pitcher 
and  the  well,  and  to  ask  himself  how  much  longer 
it  will  be  safe  for  him  to  rely  on  his  good  luck.  A 
hundred  thousand  miles,  perhaps,  and  no  accident 
yet  ! — Surely,  on  every  doctrine  of  chances,  he  now 
owes  to  fate  an  arm  or  a  leg ; — perhaps  a  life. 
The  statistics  of  a  long  series  of  years  enable  us, 
however,  to  approximate  with  a  tolerable  degree  of 
precision  to  an  answer  to  these  questions,  and  the 
answer  is  simply  astounding; — so  astounding,  in 
fact,  that,  before  undertaking  to  give  it,  the  ques- 
tion itself  ought  to  be  stated  with  all  possible 
precision.  It  is  this; — Taking  all  persons  who  as 
passengers  travel  by  rail, — and  this  includes  all 
dwellers  in  civilized  countries, — what  number  of 
journeys  of  the  average  length  are  safely  accom- 
plished, to  each  one  which  results  in  the  death 
or  injury  of  a  passenger  from  some  cause  over 
which  he  had  no  control  ? — The  cases  of  death  or 
injury  must  be  confined  to  passengers,  and  to  those 
of  them  only  who  expose  themselves  to  no  un- 
necessary risk. 

When  approaching  a  question  of  this  sort,  statis- 
ticians are  apt  to  assume  for  their  answers  an  ap- 
pearance of  mathematical  accuracy.  It  is  needless 
to  say  that  this  is  a  mere  affectation.  The  best  re- 
sults which  can  be  arrived  at  are,  after  all,  mere 
approximations,  and  they  also  vary  greatly  year  by 
year.  The  body  of  facts  from  which  conclusions  are 
to  be  deduced  must  cover  not  only  a  definite  area 


236  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

of  space,  but  also  a  considerable  lapse  of  time. 
Even  Great  Britain,  with  its  17,000  miles  of  track 
and  its  hundreds  of  millions  of  annual  passenger 
journeys,  shows  results  which,  one  year  with  another, 
vary  strangely.  For  instance,  during  the  four  years 
anterior  to  1874,  but  one  passenger  was  killed, 
upon  an  average,  to  each  11,000,000  carried;  while 
in  1874  the  proportion,  under  the  influence  of  a 
succession  of  disasters,  suddenly  doubled,  rising  to 
one  in  every  5,500,000;  and  then  again  in  1877,  a 
year  of  peculiar  exemption,  it  fell  off  to  one  in  every 
50,000,000.  The  percentage  of  fatal  casualties  to 
the  whole  number  carried  was  in  1847-9  ^ve  fold 
what  it  was  in  1878.  If  such  fluctuations  reveal 
themselves  in  the  statistics  of  Great  Britain,  those 
met  with  in  the  narrower  field  of  a  single  state  in 
this  country  might  well  seem  at  first  glance  to  set 
all  computation  at  defiance.  During  the  ten  years, 
for  example,  between  1861  and  1870,  about 
200,000,000  passengers  were  returned  as  carried  on 
the  Massachusetts  roads,  with  135  cases  of  injury  to 
individuals.  Then  came  the  year  of  the  Revere 
disaster,  and  out  of  26,000,000  carried,  no  less  than 
115  were  killed  or  injured.  Seven  years  of  compar- 
ative immunity  then  ensued,  during  which,  out  of 
240,000,000  carried,  but  two  were  killed  and  forty-five 
injured.  In  other  words,  through  a  period  of  ten 
years  the  casualties  were  approximately  as  one  to 
1,500,000;  then  during  a  single  year  they, rose  to 
.one  in  250,000,  or  a  seven-fold  increase;  and  then 


THE   ATORMAL    AVERAGE. 

through  a  period  of  seven  years  they  diminished  to 
one  in  3,400,000,  a  decrease  of  about  ninety  per 
cent. 

Taking,  however,  the  very  worst  of  years, — the 
year  of  the  Revere  disaster,  which  stands  unparal- 
leled in  the  history  of  Massachusetts, — it  will  yet 
be  found  that  the  answer  to  the  question  as  to 
the  length  of  the  average  railroad  journey  result- 
ing in  death  or  in  injury  will  be  expressed,  not  in 
thousands  nor  in  hundreds  of  thousands  of  miles, 
but  in  millions.  During  that  year  some  26,000,000 
passenger  journeys  were  made  within  the  limits  of 
the  state,  and  each  journey  averaged  a  distance  of 
about  13  miles.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that, 
even  in  that  year,  the  average  journey  resulting  in 
death  was  11,000,000  miles,  while  that  resulting 
either  in  death  or  personal  injury  was  not  less 
than  3,300,000. 

The  year  1871,  however,  represented  by  no 
means  a  fair  average.  On  the  contrary,  it  indi- 
cated what  may  fairly  be  considered  an  excessive 
degree  of  danger,  exciting  nervous  apprehensions 
in  the  breasts  of  those  even  who  were  not  consti- 
tutionally timid.  To  reach  what  may  be  consider- 
ed a  normal  average,  therefore,  it  would  be  more 
proper  to  include  a  longer  period  in  the  computa- 
tion. Take,  for  instance,  the  nine  years,  1871-79, 
during  which  alone  has  any  effort  been  made  to 
reach  statistical  accuracy  in  respect  to  Massachusetts 
railroad  accidents.  During  those  nine  years,  speak- 


238  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

ing  in  round  numbers  and  making  no  pretence 
at  anything  beyond  a  general  approximation,  some 
303,000,000  passenger  journeys  of  13  miles  each 
have  been  made  on  the  railroads  and  within  the 
state.  Of  these  51  have  resulted  in  death  and  308 
in  injuries  to  persons  from  causes  over  which  they 
had  no  control.  The  average  distance,  therefore, 
traveled  by  all,  before  death  happened  to  any 
one,  was  about  80,000,000  miles,  and  that  travelled 
before  any  one  was  either  injured  or  killed  was 
about  10,800,000. 

The  Revere  disaster  of  1871,  however,  as  has 
been  seen,  brought  about  important  changes  in  the 
methods  of  operating  the  railroads  of  Massachu- 
setts. Consequently  the  danger  incident  to  railroad 
traveling  was  materially  reduced  ;  and  in  the  next 
eight  years  (1872-9)  some  274,000,000  passenger 
journeys  were  made  within  the  limits  of  the  state. 
The  Wollaston  disaster  of  October,  1878,  was  in- 
cluded in  this  period,  during  which  223  persons 
were  injured  and  21  were  killed.  The  average 
journey  for  these  years  resulting  in  any  injury  to  a 
passenger  was  close  upon  15,000,000  miles,  while 
that  resulting  in  death  was  170,000,000. 

But  it  may  fairly  be  asked, — What,  after  all,  do 
these  figures  mean  ? — They  are,  indeed,  so  large  as 
to  exceed  comprehension  ;  for,  after  certain  compar- 
atively narrow  limits  are  passed  the  practical  infinite 
is  approached,  and  the  mere  adding  of  a  few  more 
ciphers  after  a  numeral  conveys  no  new  idea.  On 


WHA  T  THE  STA  TISTICS  MEAN.  239 

the  contrary,  the  piling  up  of  figures  rather  tends  to 
weaken  than  to  strengthen  a  statement,  for  to  many 
it  suggests  an  idea  of  ridiculous  exaggeration.  In- 
deed, when  a  few  years  ago  a  somewhat  similar 
statement  to  that  just  made  was  advanced  in  an 
official  report,  a  critic  undertook  to  expose  the 
fallacy  of  it  in  the  columns  of  a  daily  paper  by  re- 
ferring to  a  case  within  the  writer's  own  observation 
in  which  a  family  of  three  persons  had  been  killed 
on  their  very  first  journey  in  a  railroad  car.  It  is 
not,  of  course,  necessary  to  waste  time  over  such  a 
criticism  as  this.  Railroad  accidents  continually 
take  place,  and  in  consequence  of  them  people  are 
killed  and  injured,  and  of  these  there  may  well  be 
some  who  are  then  making  their  first  journey  by 
rail ;  but  in  estimating  the  dangers  of  railroad  travel- 
ing the  much  larger  number  who  are  not  killed  or 
injured  at  all  must  likewise  be  taken  into  considera- 
tion. Any  person  as  he  may  be  reading  this  page  in 
a  railroad  car  may  be  killed  or  injured  through  some 
accident,  even  while  his  eye  is  glancing  over  the  fig- 
ures which  show  how  infinitesimal  his  danger  is  ;  but 
the  chances  are  none  the  less  as  a  million  to  one 
that  any  particular  reader  will  go  down  to  his  grave 
uninjured  by  any  accident  on  the  rail,  unless  it  be 
occasioned  by  his  or  her  own  carelessness. 

Admitting,  therefore,  that  ill  luck  or  hard  fortune 
must  fall  to  the  lot  of  certain  unascertainable  per- 
sons, yet  the  chances  of  incurring  that  ill  fortune 
are  so  small  that  they  are  not  materially  increased 


240  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

by  any  amount  of  traveling  which  can  be  accom- 
plished within  the  limits  of  a  human  life.  So  far 
from  exhausting  a  fair  average  immunity  from  acci- 
dent by  constant  traveling,  the  statistics  of  Massa- 
chusetts during  the  last  eight  years  would  seem  to 
indicate  that  if  any  given  person  were  born  upon  a 
railroad  car,  and  remained  upon  it  traveling  500 
miles  a  day  all  his  life,  he  would,  with  average  good 
fortune,  be  somewhat  over  80  years  of  age  before 
he  would  be  involved  in  any  accident  resulting  in 
his  death  or  personal  injury,  while  he  would  attain 
the  highly  respectable  age  of  930  years  before  be- 
ing killed.  Even  supposing  that  the  most  excep- 
tional average  of  the  Revere  year  became  usual, 
a  man  who  was  killed  by  an  accident  at  70  years  of 
age  should,  unless  he  were  fairly  to  be  accounted 
unlucky,  have  accomplished  a  journey  of  some  440 
miles  every  day  of  his  life,  Sundays  included, 
from  the  time  of  his  birth  to  that  of  his  death  ; 
while  even  to  have  brought  him  within  the  fair  lia- 
bility of  any  injury  at  all,  his  daily  journey  should 
have  been  some  120  miles.  Under  the  conditions 
of  the  last  eight  years  his  average  daily  journey 
through  the  three  score  years  and  ten  to  entitle  him 
to  be  killed  in  an  accident  at  the  end  of  them 
would  be  about  600  miles. 


STATISTICS  OF  VITALITY.  24! 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

THE  RAILROAD  DEATH  RATE. 

IN  connection  with  the  statistics  of  railroad 
casualties  it  is  not  without  interest  to  examine 
the  general  vital  statistics  of  some  considerable 
city,  for  they  show  clearly  enough  what  a  large  de- 
gree of  literal  truth  there  was  in  the  half  jocose 
proposition  attributed  to  John  Bright,  that  the 
safest  place  in  which  a  man  could  put  himself 
was  inside  a  first-class  railroad  carriage  of  a  train 
in  full  motion.  Take  the  statistics  of  Boston,  for 
instance,  for  the  year  1878.  During  the  four  years 
1875-8,  it  will  be  remembered,  a  single  passenger 
only  was  killed  on  the  railroads  of  Massachusetts 
in  consequence  of  an  accident  to  which  he  by  his 
own  carelessness  in  no  way  contributed.*  The 
average  number  of  persons  annually  injured,  not 
fatally,  during  those  years  was  about  five. 

*  This  period  did  not  include  the  Wollaston  disaster,  as  the  Massa- 
chusetts railroad  year  closes  on  the  last  day  of  September.  The 
Wollaston  disaster  occurred  on  the  8th  of  October,  1878,  and  was 
accordingly  included  in  the  next  railroad  year. 


242  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS, 

Yet  during  the  year  1878,  excluding  all  cases  of 
mere  injury  of  which  no  account  was  made,  no 
less  than  53  persons  came  to  their  deaths  in  Boston 
from  falling  down  stairs,  and  37  more  from  falling 
out  of  windows  ;  seven  were  scalded  to  death  in 
1878  alone.  In  the  year  1874  seventeen  were  killed 
by  being  run  over  by  teams  in  the  streets,  while 
the  pastime  of  coasting  was  carried  on  at  a  cost  of 
ten  lives  more.  During  the  five  years  1874-8  there 
were  more  persons  murdered  in  the  city  of  Boston 
alone  than  lost  their  lives  as  passengers  through  the 
negligence  of  all  the  railroad  corporations  in  the 
whole  state  of  Massachusetts  during  the  nine  years 
1871-8;  though  in  those  nine  years  were  included 
both  the  Revere  and  the  Wollaston  disasters,  the 
former  of  which  resulted  in  the  death  of  29,  and 
the  latter  of  21  persons.  Neither  are  the  compara- 
tive results  here  stated  in  any  respect  novel  or  pe- 
culiar to  Massachusetts.  Years  ago  it  was  officially 
announced  in  France  that  people  were  less  safe  in 
their  own  houses  than  while  traveling  on  the  rail- 
roads; and,  in  support  of  this  somewhat  startling 
proposition,  statistics  were  produced  showing  four- 
teen cases  of  death  of  persons  remaining  at  home 
and  there  falling  over  carpets,  or,  in  the  case  of  fe- 
males, having  their  garments  catch  fire,  to  ten  deaths 
on  the  rail.  Even  the  game  of  cricket  counted 
eight  victims  to  the  railroad's  ten. 

It  will  not,  of  course,   be  inferred  that  the  cases 
of  death  or  injury  to  passengers  from  causes  beyond 


CASUALTIES  TO  EMPLOYEES.  243 

their  control  include  by  any  means  all  the  casualities 
involved  in  the  operation  of  the  railroad  system. 
On  the  contrary,  they  include  but  a  very  small  por- 
tion of  them.  The  experience  of  the  Massachusetts 
roads  during  the  seven  years  between  September 
30,  1871,  and  September  30,  1878,  may  again  be 
cited  in  reference  to  this  point.  During  that  time 
there  were  but  52  cases  of  injury  to  passengers 
from  causes  over  which  they  had  no  control,  but  in 
connection  with  the  entire  working  of  the  railroad 
system  no  less  than  1,900  cases  of  injury  were  re- 
ported, of  which  i, 008  were  fatal;  an  average  of  144 
deaths  a  year.  Of  these  cases,  naturally,  a  large 
proportion  were  employes,  whose  occupation  not 
only  involves  much  necessary  risk,  but  whose  famil- 
iarity with  risk  causes  them  always  to  incur  it  even 
in  the  most  unnecessary  and  foolhardy  manner. 
During  the  seven  years  293  of  them  were  killed  and 
375  were  reported  as  injured.  Nor  is  it  supposed 
that  the  list  included  by  any  means  all  the  cases  of 
injury  which  occurred.  About  one  half  of  the  acci- 
dents to  employes  are  occasioned  by  their  falling 
from  the  trains  when  in  motion,  usually  from  freight 
trains  and  in  cold  weather,  and  from  being  crushed 
between  cars  while  engaged  in  coupling  them 
together.  From  this  last  cause  alone  an  average 
of  27  casualties  are  annually  reported.  One  fact, 
however,  will  sufficiently  illustrate  how  very  diffi- 
cult it  is  to  protect  this  class  of  men  from  danger, 
or  rather  from  themselves.  As  is  well  known,  on 


244  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

freight  trains  they  are  obliged  to  ride  on  the  tops  of 
the  cars ;  but  these  are  built  so  high  that  their  roofs 
come  dangerously  near  the  bottoms  of  the  highway 
bridges,  which  cross  the  track  sometimes  in  close 
proximity  to  each  other.  Accordingly  many  un- 
fortunate brakemen  were  killed  by  being  knocked 
off  the  trains  as  they  passed  under  these  bridges. 
With  a  view  to  affording  the  utmost  possible  pro- 
tection against  this  form  of  accident,  a  statute  was 
passed  by  the  Massachusetts  legislature  compelling 
the  corporations  to  erect  guards  at  a  suitable  dis- 
tince  from  every  overhead  bridge  which  was  less 
than  eighteen  feet  in  the  clear  above  the  track. 
These  guards  were  so  arranged  as  to  swing  lightly 
across  the  tops  of  the  cars,  giving  any  one  standing 
upon  them  a  sharp  rap,  warning  him  of  the  danger 
he  was  in.  This  warning  rap,  however,  so  annoyed 
the  brakemen  that  the  guards  were  on  a  number  of 
the  roads  systematically  destroyed  as  often  as  they 
were  put  up ;  so  that  at  last  another  law  had  to  be 
passed,  making  their  destruction  a  criminal  offense. 
The  brakemen  themselves  resisted  the  attempt  to 
divest  their  perilous  occupation  of  one  of  its  most 
insidious  dangers. 

In  this  respect,  however,  brakemen  differ  in  no 
degree  from  the  rest  of  the  community.  On  all 
hands  railroad  accidents  seem  to  be  systematically 
encouraged,  and 'the  wonder  is  that  the  list  of  cas- 
ualities  is  not  larger.  In  Massachusetts,  for  instance, 
even  in  the  most  crowded  portions  of  the  largest 


CHALLENGING  DANGER.  245 

cities  and  towns,  not  only  do  the  railroads  cross  the 
highways  at  grade,  but  whenever  new  thoroughfares 
are  laid  out  the  people  of  the  neighborhood  almost 
invariably  insist  upon  their  crossing  the  railroads  at 
a  grade  and  not  otherwise.  Not  but  that,  upon 
theory  and  in  the  abstract,  every  one  is  opposed  to 
grade-crossings  ;  but  those  most  directly  concerned 
always  claim  that  their  particular  crossing  is  excep- 
tional in  character.  In  vain  do  corporations  protest 
and  public  officials  argue ;  when  the  concrete  case 
arises  all  neighborhoods  become  alike  and  strenu- 
ously insist  on  their  right  to  incur  everlasting  danger 
rather  than  to  have  the  level  of  their  street  broken. 
During  the  last  seven  years  to  September  30,  1878; 
191  persons  have  been  injured,  and  98  of  them  fa- 
tally injured,  at  these  crossings  in  Massachusetts, 
and  it  is  certain  as  fate  that  the  number  is  destined 
to  annually  increase.  What  the  result  in  a  remote 
future  will  be,  it  is  not  now  easy  to  forecast.  One 
thing  only  would  seem  certain :  the  time  will  come 
when  the  two  classes  of  traffic  thus  recklessly  made 
to  cross  each  other  will  at  many  points  have  to 
be  separated,  no  matter  at  what  cost  to  the  com- 
munity which  now  challenges  the  danger  it  will  then 
find  itself  compelled  to  avoid. 

The  heaviest  and  most  regular  cause  of  death  and 
injury  involved  in  the  operation  of  the  railroad  sys- 
tem yet  remains  to  be  referred  to ;  and  again  it  is 
recklessness  which  is  at  the  root  of  it,  and  this  time 
recklessness  in  direct  violation  of  law.  The  railroad 


246  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

tracks  are  everywhere  favorite  promenades,  and  ap- 
parently even  resting-places,  especially  for  those 
who  are  more  or  less  drunk.  In  Great  Britain  physi- 
cal demolition  by  a  railroad  train  is  also  a  somewhat 
favorite  method  of  committing  suicide,  and  that,  too, 
in  the  most  deliberate  and  cool-blooded  manner. 
Cases  have  not  been  uncommon  in  which  persons 
have  been  seen  to  coolly  lay  themselves  down  in 
front  of  an  advancing  train,  and  very  neatly  effect 
their  own  decapitation  by  placing  their  necks  across 
the  rail.  In  England  alone,  during  the  last  seven 
years,  there  have  been  no  less  than  280  cases  of 
death  reported  under  the  head  of  suicides,  or  an 
average  of  40  each  year,  the  number  in  1878  rising 
to  60.  In  America  these  cases  are  not  returned  in 
a  class  by  themselves.  Under  the  general  head  of 
accidents  to  trespassers,  however,  that  is,  accidents 
to  men,  women  and  children,  especially  the  latter, 
illegally  lying,  walking,  or  playing  on  the  tracks 
or  riding  upon  the  cars, — under  this  head  are  regu- 
larly classified  more  than  one  third  of  all  the  cas- 
ualties incident  to  working  the  Massachusetts  rail- 
roads. During  the  last  seven  years  these  have 
amounted  to  an  aggregate  of  724  cases  of  injury,  no 
less  than  494  of  which  were  fatal.  Of  course,  very 
many  other  cases  of  this  description,  which  were  not 
fatal,  were  never  reported.  And  here  again  the 
recklessness  of  the  public  has  received  further  illus- 
tration, and  this  time  in  a  very  unpleasant  way. 
Certain  corporations  operating  roads  terminating  in 


TRESPASSERS. 

Boston  endeavored  at  one  time  to  diminish  this 
slaughter  by  enforcing  the  laws  against  walking  on 
railroad  tracks.  A  few  trespassers  were  arrested  and 
fined,  and  then  the  resentment  of  those  whose 
wonted  privileges  were  thus  interfered  with  began 
to  make  itself  felt.  Obstructions  were  found  placed 
in  the  way  of  night  trains.  The  mere  attempt  to 
keep  people  from  risking  their  lives  by  getting  in 
the  way  of  locomotives  placed  whole  trains  full  of 
passengers  in  imminent  jeopardy. 

Undoubtedly,  however,  by  far  the  most  effective 
means  of  keeping  railroad  tracks  from  becoming 
foot-paths,  and  thus  at  once  putting  an  end  to  the 
largest  item  in  the  grand  total  of  the  expenditure  of 
life  incident  to  the  operation  of  railroads,  is  that 
secured  by  the  Pennsylvania  railroad  as  an  unin- 
tentional corollary  to  its  method  of  ballasting 
That  superb  organization,  every  detail  of  whose 
wonderful  system  is  a  fit  subject  for  study  to  all 
interested  in  the  operation  of  railroads,  has  a  road- 
way peculiar  to  itself.  A  principal  feature  in  this  is 
a  surface  of  broken  stone  ballast,  covering  not  only 
the  space  between  the  rails,  but  also  the  interval 
between  the  tracks  as  well  as  the  road-bed  on  the 
outside  of  each  track  for  a  distance  of  some  three 
feet.  It  resembles  nothing  so  much  as  a  newly 
macadamized  highway.  That,  too,  is  its  permanent 
condition.  To  walk  on  the  sharp  and  uneven  edges 
of  this  broken  stone  is  possible,  with  a  sufficient 
expenditure  of  patience  and  shoe-leather ;  but  cer- 


248  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

tainly  no  human  being  would  ever  walk  there  from 
preference,  or  if  any  other  path  could  be  found.  Not 
only  is  it  in  itself,  as  a  system  of  ballasting,  looked 
upon  as  better  than  any  other,  but  it  confounds  the 
tramp.  Its  systematic  adoption  in  crowded,  sub- 
urban neighborhoods  would,  therefore,  answer  a 
double  purpose.  It  would  secure  to  the  corpora- 
tions permanent  road-beds  exclusively  for  their  own 
use,  and  obviate  the  necessity  of  arrests  or  futile 
threats  to  enforce  the  penalties  of  the  law  against 
trespassers.  It  seems  singular  that  this  most  obvious 
and  effective  way  of  putting  a  stop  to  what  is  both 
a  nuisance  and  a  danger  has  not  yet  been  resorted 
to  by  men  familiar  with  the  use  of  spikes  and 
broken  glass  on  the  tops  of  fences  and  walls. 

Meanwhile,  taken  even  in  its  largest  aggregate, 
the  loss  of  life  incident  to  the  working  of  the  rail- 
road system  is  not  excessive,  nor  is  it  out  of  propor- 
tion to  what  might  reasonably  be  expected.  It  is 
to  be  constantly  borne  in  mind,  not  only  that  the 
railroad  performs  a  great  function  in  modern  life, 
but  that  it  also  and  of  necessity  performs  it  in  a  very 
dangerous  way.  A  practically  irresistible  force 
crashing  through  the  busy  hive  of  modern  civili- 
zation at  a  wild  rate  of  speed,  going  hither  and 
thither,  across  highways  and  by-ways  and  along  a 
path  which  is  in  itself  a  thoroughfare, — such  an 
agency  cannot  be  expected  to  work  incessantly  and 
yet  never  to  come  in  contact  with  the  human  frame. 
Naturally,  however,  it  might  be  a  very  car  of 


ARE  THE  CASUALTIES  EXCESSIVE?  249 

gernaut.  Is  it  so  in  fact  ? — To  demonstrate  that  it  is 
not,  it  is  but  necessary  again  to  recur  to  the  compar- 
ison between  the  statistics  of  railroad  accidents  and 
those  which  necessarily  occur  in  the  experience  of 
all  considerable  cities.  "Take  again  those  of  Boston 
and  of  the  railroad  system  of  Massachusetts.  These 
for  the  purpose  of  illustration  are  as  good  as  any, 
and  in  their  results  would  only  be  confirmed  in  the 
experience  of  Paris  as  compared  with  the  railroad 
system  of  France,  or  in  that  of  London  as  compared 
with  the  railroad  system  of  Great  Britain.  During 
the  eight  years  between  September  30,  1870,  and 
September  30,  1878,  the  entire  railroad  system  of 
Massachusetts  was  operated  at  a  cost  of  1,165  lives, 
apart  from  all  cases  of  injury  which  did  not  prove 
fatal.  The  returns  in  this  respect  also  may  be 
accepted  as  reasonably  accurate,  as  the  deaths  were 
all  returned,  though  the  cases  of  merely  personal 
injury  probably  were  not.  The  annual  average  was 
146  lives.  During  the  ten  years,  1868-78,  2,587 
cases  of  death  from  accidental  causes,  or  259  a  year, 
were  recorded  as  having  taken  place  in  the  city  of 
Boston.  In  other  words,  the  annual  average  of 
deaths  by  accident  in  the  city  of  Boston  alone  ex- 
ceeds that  consequent  on  running  all  the  railroads 
of  the  state  by  eighty  per  cent.  Unless,  therefore, 
the  railroad  system  is  to  be  considered  as  an  excep- 
tion to  all  other  functions  of  modern  life,  and  as 
such  is  to  be  expected  to  do  its  work  without  injury 
to  life  or  limb,  this  showing  does  not  .constitute  a 
very  heavy  indictment  against  it. 


RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 


CHAPTER   XXIII. 

AMERICAN    AS   COMPARED    WITH    FOREIGN    RAILROAD 
ACCIDENTS. 

UP  to  this  point,  the  statistics  and  experience  of 
Massachusetts  only  have  been  referred  to.  This  is 
owing  to  the  fact  that  the  railroad  returns  of  that 
state  are  more  carefully  prepared  and  tabulated  than 
are  those  of  any  other  state,  and  afford,  therefore, 
more  satisfactory  data  from  which  to  draw  conclu- 
sions. The  territoral  area  from  which  the  statistics 
are  in  this  case  derived  is  very  limited,  and  it  yet 
remains  to  compare  the  results  deduced  from  them 
with  those  derived  from  the  similar  experience  of 
other  communities.  This,  however,  is  not  an  easy 
thing  to  do  ;  and,  while  it  is  difficult  enough  as  res- 
pects Europe,  it  is  even  more  difficult  as  respects 
America  taken  as  a  whole.  This  last  fact  is  es- 
pecially unfortunate  in  view  of  the  circumstance 
that,  in  regard  to  railway  accidents,  the  United 
States,  whether  deservedly  or  not,  enjoy  a  most 
undesirable  reputation.  Foreign  authorities  have  a 


ARBITRARY  COMPUTATIONS.  2$l 

way  of  referring  to  our  "  well-known  national  dis- 
regard of  human  life,"  with  a  sort  of  compla- 
cency, at  once  patronizing  and  contemptuous,  which 
is  the  reverse  of  pleasing.  Judging  by  the  tone 
of  their  comments,  the  natural  inference  would 
be  that  railroad  disasters  of  the  worst  description 
were  in  America  matters  of  such  frequent  occur- 
rence as  to  excite  scarcely  any  remark.  As  will 
presently  be  made  very  apparent,  this  impression, 
for  it  is  only  an  impression,  can,  so  far  as  the 
country  as  a  whole  is  concerned,  neither  be  proved 
nor  disproved,  from  the  absence  of  sufficient  data 
from  which  to  argue.  As  respects  Massachusetts, 
however,  and  the  same  statement  may  perhaps 
be  made  of  the  whole  belt  of  states  north  of  the 
Potomac  and  the  Ohio,  there  is  no  basis  for  it. 
There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  railroad  travel- 
ing is  throughout  that  region  accompanied  by  any 
peculiar  or  unusual  degree  of  danger. 

The  great  difficulty,  just  referred  to,  in  comparing 
the  results  deduced  from  equally  complete  statistics 
of  different  countries,  lies  in  the  variety  of  the  arbi- 
trary rules  under  which  the  computations  in  making 
them  up  are  effected.  As  an  example  in  point,  take 
the  railroad  returns  of  Great  Britain  and  those  of 
Massachusetts.  They  are  in  each  case  prepared 
with  a  great  deal  of  care,  and  the  results  deduced 
from  them  may  fairly  be  accepted  as  approximately 
correct.  As  respects  accidents,  the  number  of 
cases  of  death  and  of  personal  injury  are  annually 


RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

reported,  and  with  tolerable  completness,  though  in 
the  latter  respect  there  is.  probably  in  both  cases 
room-  for  improvement.  The  whole  comparison 
turns,  however,  on  the  way  in  which  the  entire 
number  of  passengers  annually  carried  is  computed. 
In  Great  Britain,  for  instance,  in  1878,  these  were 
returned,  using  round  numbers  only,  at  565,000,000, 
and  in  Massachusetts  at  34,000,000.  By  dividing 
these  totals  by  the  number  of  cases  of  death  and 
injury  reported  as  occurring  to  passengers  from 
causes  beyond  their  control,  we  shall  arrive  appa- 
rently at  a  fair  comparative  showing  as  to  the  relative 
safety  of  railroad  traveling  in  the  two  communities. 
The  result  for  that  particular  year  would  have  been 
that  while  in  Great  Britain  one  passenger  in  each 
23,500,  ooo  was  killed,  and  one  in  each  481,600  in- 
jured from  causes  beyond  their  control,  in  Massa- 
chusetts none  were  killed  and  only  one  in  each 
14,000,000  was  in  any  way  injured.  Unfortunately, 
however,  a  closer  examination  reveals  a  very  great 
error  in  the  computation,  affecting  every  compara- 
tive result  drawn  from  it.  In  the  English  returns 
no  allowance  whatever  is  made  for  the  very  large 
number  of  journeys  made  by  season-ticket  or  com- 
mutation passengers,  while  in  Massachusetts,  on  the 
contrary,  each  person  of  this  class  enters  into  the 
grand  total  as  making  two  trips  each  day,  156  trips 
on  each  quarterly  ticket,  and  626  trips  on  each  an- 
nual. Now  in  1878  more  than  418,000  holders  of 
season  tickets  were  returned  by  the  railway  com- 


SEA  SON-  TICKE  T  PA  SSA  GES.  2$$ 

panics  of  Great  Britain.  How  many  of  these  were 
quarterly  and  how  many  were  annual  travelers,  does 
not  appear.  If  they  were  all  annual  travelers,  no 
less  than  261,000,000  journeys  should  be  added  to  the 
565,000,000  in  the  returns,  in  order  to  arrive  at  an 
equal  basis  for  a  comparison  between  the  foreign 
and  the  American  roads :  this  method,  however, 
would  be  manifestly  inaccurate,  so  it  only  remains, 
in  the  absence  of  all  reliable  data,  and  for  the  pur- 
pose of  comparison  solely,  to  strike  out  from  the 
Massachusetts  returns  the  8,320,727  season-ticket 
passages,  which  at  once  reduces  by  over  3,000,000 
the  number  of  journeys  to  each  case  of  injury.  As 
season-ticket  passengers  do  travel  and  are  exposed 
to  danger  in  the  same  degree  as  trip-ticket  passen- 
gers, no  result  is  approximately  accurate  which 
leaves  them  out  of  the  computation.  At  present, 
however,  the  question  relates  not  to  the  positive 
danger  or  safety  of  traveling  by  rail,  but  to  its  relat- 
ive danger  in  different  communities. 

Allowance  for  this  discrepancy  can,  however, 
be  made  by  adding  to  the  English  official  results 
an  additional  nineteen  per  cent.,  that,  according  to 
the  returns  of  1877  and  1878,  being  the  proportion 
of  the  season-ticket  to  other  passengers  on  the 
roads  of  Great  Britain.  Taking  then  the  Board  of 
Trade  returns  for  the  eight  years  1870-7,  it  will  be 
found  that  during  this  period  about  one  passenger 
in  each  14,500,000  carried  in  that  country  has  been 
killed  in  railroad  accidents,  and  about  one  in  each 


254  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

436,000  injured.  This  may  be  assumed  as  a  fair 
average  for  purpose  of  comparison,  though  it  ought 
to  be  said  that  in  Great  Britain  the  percentage  of 
casualties  to  passengers  shows  a  decided  tendency 
to  decrease,  and  during  the  years  1877-8  the  per- 
centages of  killed  fell  from  one  in  15,000,000  to  one 
in  38,000,000  and  those  of  injured  from  one  in 
436,000  to  one  in  766,000.  The  aggregates  from 
which  these  results  are  deduced  are  so  enormous, 
rising  into  the  thousands  of  millions,  that  a  certain 
degree  of  reliance  can  be  placed  on  them.  In  the 
case  of  Massachusetts,  however,  the  entire  period 
during  which  the  statistics  are  entitled  to  the  slight- 
est weight  includes  only  eight  years,  1872-9,  and 
offers  an  aggregate  of  but  274,000,000  journeys,  or 
but  about  forty  per  cent,  of  those  included  in  the 
British  returns  of  the  single  year  1878.  During 
these  years  the  killed  in  Massachusetts  were  one 
in  each  13,000,000  and  the  injured  one  in  each  1,230, 
OOO ; — or,  while  the  killed  in  the  two  cases  were  very 
nearly  in  the  same  proportion, — respectively  one  in 
14.5,  and  one  in  13,  speaking  in  millions, — the  Brit- 
ish injured  were  really  three  to  one  of  the  Massa- 
chusetts. 

The  equality  as  respects  the  killed  in  this  compari- 
son, and  the  marked  discrepancy  as  respects  the  in- 
jured is  calculated  at  first  sight  to  throw  doubts  on 
the  fullness  of  the  Massachusetts  returns.  There 
seems  no  good  reason  why  the  injured  should  in  the 
one  case  be  so  much  more  numerous  than  in  the  other. 


THIRD- CLA SS  PA SSENGERS. 

This,  however,  is  susceptible  on  closer  examination 
of  a  very  simple  and  satisfactory  explanation.  In 
case  of  accident  the  danger  of  sustaining  slight  per- 
sonal injury  is  not  so  great  in  Massachusetts  as  in 
Great  Britain.  This  is  due  to  the  heavier  and  more 
solid  construction  of  the  American  passenger 
coaches,  and  their  different  interior  arrangement. 
This  fact,  and  the  real  cause  of  the  large  number 
of  slightly  injured, — "  shaken  "  they  call  it, — in  the 
English  railroad  accidents  is  made  very  apparent  in 
the  following  extract  from  Mr.  Calcroft's  report  for 
1877  ;- 

"  It  is  no  doubt  a  fact  that  collisions  and  other  acci- 
dents to  railway  trains  are  attended  with  less  serious  con- 
sequences in  proportion  to  the  solidity  of  construction  of 
passenger  carriages.  The  accomodation  and  internal 
arrangements  of  third-class  carriages,  however,  especially 
those  used  in  ordinary  trains,  are  defective  as  regards 
safety  and  comfort,  as  compared  with  many  carriages  of 
the  same  class  on  foreign  railways.  The  first-class  pas- 
senger, except  when  thrown  against  his  opposite  compan- 
ion, or  when  some  luggage  falls  upon  him,  is  generally 
saved  from  severe  contusion  by  the  well-stuffed  or  padded 
linings  of  the  carriages  ;  whilst  the  second-class  and  third- 
class  passenger  is  generally  thrown  with  violence  against 
the  hard  wood-work.  If  the  second  and  third-class  car- 
riages had  a  high  padded  back  lining,  extending  above 
the  head  of  the  passenger,  it  would  probably  tend  to  les- 
son the  danger  to  life  and  limb  which,  as  the  returns  of 
accidents  show,  passengers  in  carriages  of  this  class  are 
much  exposed  to  in  train  accidents."  * 

*  General  Report  to  the  Boaid  of  Trade  upon  the  accidents  -which 
have  occiirred  on  the  Railways  of  the  United  Kingdom  during  tht 
year  1877.  p.  37. 


2 $6  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

In  1878  the  passenger  journeys  made  in  the 
second  and  third  class  carriages  of  the  United 
Kingdom  were  thirteen  to  one  of  those  made 
in  first  class  carriages  ; — or,  expressed  in  millions, 
there  were  but  41  of  the  latter  to  523  of  the  former. 
There  can  be  very  little  question  indeed  that  if,  dur- 
ing the  last  ten  years,  thirteen  out  of  fourteen  of  the 
passengers  on  Massachusetts  railroads  had  been  car- 
ried in  narrow  compartments  with  wooden  seats  and 
unlined  sides  the  number  of  those  returned  as 
slightly  injured  in  the  numerous  accidents  which 
occurred  would  have  been  at  least  three-fold  larger 
than  it  was.  If  it  had  not  been  ten-fold  larger  it 
would  have  been  surprising. 

The  foregoing  comparison,  relates  however,  simply 
to  passengers  killed  in  accidents  for  which  they 
are  in  no  degree  responsible.  When,  however,  the 
question  reverts  to  the  general  cost  in  life  and 
limb  at  which  the  railroad  systems  are  worked  and 
the  railroad  traffic  is  carried  on  to  the  entire  com- 
munities served,  the  comparison  is  less  favorable  to 
Massachusetts.  Taking  the  eight  years  of  1871—8, 
the  British  returns  include  30,641  cases  of  injury, 
and  9,1 13  of  death  ;  while  those  of  Massachusetts  for 
.  the  same  years  included  1,165  deaths,  with  only 
1,044  cases  of  injury;  in  the  one  case  a  total  of 
39,745  casualties,  as  compared  with  2,209  m  tne 
other.  It  will,  however  be  noticed  that  while  in  the 
British  returns  the  cases  of  injury  are  nearly  three- 
fold those  of  death,  in  the  Massachusetts  returns 


GRADE-CROSSINGS  AND  TRESPASSERS. 

the  deaths  exceed  the  cases  of  injury.  This  fact  in 
the  present  case  cannot  but  throw  grave  suspicion 
on  the  completeness  of  the  Massachusetts  returns. 
As  a  matter  of  practical  experience  it  is  well  known 
that  cases  of  injury  almost  invariably  exceed  those 
of  death,  and  the  returns  in  which  the  disproportion 
is  greatest,  if  no  sufficient  explanation  presents  itself, 
are  probably  the  most  full  and  reliable.  Taking, 
therefore,  the  deaths  in  the  two  cases  as  the  better 
basis  for  comparison,  it  will  be  found  that  the  roads 
of  Great  Britain  in  the  grand  result  accomplished 
seventeen-fold  the  work  of  those  of  Massachusetts 
with  less  than  eight  times  as  many  casualties ;  had 
the  proportion  between  the  results  accomplished  and 
the  fatal  injuries  inflicted  been  maintained,  but  536 
deaths  instead  of  1,165  would  have  appeared  in  the 
Massachusetts  returns.  The  reason  of  this  differ- 
ence in  result  is  worth  looking  for,  and  fortunately 
the  statistical  tables  are  in  both  cases  carried  suffi- 
ciently into  detail  to  make  an  analysis  possible ;  and 
this  analysis,  when  made,  seems  to  indicate  very 
clearly  that  while,  for  those  directly  connected  with 
the  railroads,  either  as  passengers  or  as  employes, 
the  Massachusetts  system  in  its  working  involves 
relatively  a  less  degree  of  danger  than  that  of  Great 
Britain,  yet  for  the  outside  community  it  involves 
very  much  more.  Take,  for  instance,  the  two  heads 
of  accidents  ^at  grade-crossings  and  accidents  to  tres- 
passers, which  have  been  already  referred  to.  In 
Great  Britain  highway  grade-crossings  are  discour- 


258  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

aged.  In  Massachusetts  they  are  practically  insisted 
upon.  The  results  of  the  policy  pursued  may  in 
each  case  be  read  with  sufficient  distinctness  in  the 
bills  of  mortality.  During  the  years  1872-7,  of 
1,929  casualties  to  persons  on  the  railroads  of  Mass- 
achusetts, no  less  than  200  occurred  at  highway 
grade  crossings.  Had  the  accidents  of  this  descrip- 
tion in  Great  Britain  been  equally  numerous  in  pro- 
portion to  the  larger  volume  of  the  traffic  of  that 
country,  they  would  have  resulted  in  over  3,000 
cases  of  death  or  personal  injury ;  they  did  in  fact 
result  in  586  such  cases.  In  Massachusetts,  again, 
to  walk  at  will  on  any  part  of  a  railroad  track  is 
looked  upon  as  a  sort  of  prescriptive  and  inalienable 
right  of  every  member  of  the  community,  irrespect- 
ive of  age,  sex,  color,  or  previous  condition  of  ser- 
vitude. Accordingly,  during  the  six  years  referred 
to,  this  right  was  exercised  at  the  cost  of  life  or  limb 
to  591  persons, — one  in  four  of  all  the  casualties 
which  occurred  in  connection  with  the  railroad  sys- 
tem. In  Great  Britain  the  custom  of  using  the 
tracks  of  railroads  as  a  foot-path  seems  to  exist,  but, 
so  far  from  being  regarded  as  a  right,  it  is  practiced 
in  perpetual  terror  of  the  law.  Accordingly,  instead 
of  some  9,000  cases  of  death  or  injury  from  this 
cause  during  these  six  years,  which  would  have 
been  the  proportion  under  like  conditions  in  Mass- 
achusetts, the  returns  showed  only  2,379.  These 
two  are  among  the  most  constant  and  fruitful  causes 
of  accident  in  connection  with  the  railroad  system 


FOOD  FOR  LEGISLATIVE  THOUGHT.          259 

of  America.  In  great  Britain  their  proportion  to 
the  whole  number  of  casualties  which  take  place  is 
scarcely  a  seventh  part  of  what  it  is  in  Massachusetts. 
Here  they  constitute  very  nearly  fifty  per  cent,  of  all 
the  accidents  which  occur;  there  they  constitute 
but  a  little  over  seven.  There  is  in  this  comparison 
a  good  deal  of  solid  food  for  legislative  thought,  if 
American  legislators  would  but  take  it  in ;  for  this 
is  one  matter  the  public  policy  in  regard  to  which 
can  only  be  fixed  by  law. 

When  we  pass  from  Great  Britain  to  the  conti- 
nental countries  of  Europe,  the  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  any  fair  comparison  of  results  become 
greater  and  greater.  The  statistics  do  not  enter 
sufficiently  into  detail,  nor  is  the  basis  of  com- 
putation apparent.  It  is  generally  conceded  that, 
where  a  due  degree  of  caution  is  exercised  by 
the  passenger,  railroad  traveling  in  continental 
countries  is  attended  with  a  much  less  degree  of 
danger  than  in  England.  When  we  come  to  the 
returns,  they  hardly  bear  out  this  conclusion ; 
at  least  to  the  degree  commonly  supposed.  Take 
France,  for  example.  Nowhere  is  human  life  more 
carefully  guarded  than  in  that  country ;  yet  their 
returns  show  that  of  866,000,000  passengers  trans- 
ported on  the  French  railroads  during  the  eleven 
years  1859-69,  no  less  than  65  were  killed  and  1,285 
injured  from  causes  beyond  their  control ;  or  one  in 
each  13,000,000  killed  as  compared  with  one  in 
10,700,000  in  Great  Britain;  and  one  in  every 


260  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

674,000  injured  as  compared  with  one  in  each 
330,000  in  the  other  country.  During  the  single 
year  1859,  about  111,000,000  passengers  were  car- 
ried on  the  French  lines,  at  a  general  cost  to  the 
community  of  2,416  casualties,  of  which  295  were 
fatal.  In  Massachusetts,  during  the  four  years 
1871-74,  about  95,000,000  passengers  were  carried, 
at  a  reported  cost  of  1,158  casualties.  This  show- 
ing might  well  be  considered  favorable  to  Massa- 
chusetts did  not  the  single  fact  that  her  returns  in- 
cluded more  than  twice  as  many  deaths  as  the 
French,  with  only  a  quarter  as  many  injuries,  make 
it  at  once  apparent  that  the  statistics  were  at  fault. 
Under  these  circumstances  comparison  could  only 
be  made  between  the  numbers  of  deaths  reported ; 
which  would  indicate  that,  in  proportion  to  the 
work  done,  the  railroad  operations  of  Massachusetts 
involved  about  twice  and  a  half  more  cases  of  in- 
jury to  life  and  limb  than  those  of  the  French  ser- 
vice. As  respects  Great  Britain  the  comparison  is 
much  more  favorable,  the  returns  showing  an  almost 
exactly  equal  general  death-rate  in  the  two  countries 
in  proportion  to  their  volumes  of  traffic ;  the  vol- 
ume of  Great  Britain  being  about  four  times  that 
of  France,  while  its  death-rate  by  railroad  accidents 
was  as  1,100  to  295. 

With  the  exception  of  Belgium,  however,  in  which 
country  the  returns  cover  only  the  lines  operated  by 
the  state,  the  basis  hardly  exists  for  a  useful  com- 
parison between  the  dangers  of  injury  from  accident 


THE  A  ME  RICA  N  DATA.  26 1 

on  the  continental  railroads  and  on  those  of  Great 
Britain  and  America.  The  several  systems  are  oper- 
ated on  wholly  different  principles,  to  meet  the 
needs  of  communities  between  whose  modes  of  life 
and  thought  little  similarity  exists.  The  conti- 
nental trains  are  far  less  crowded  than  either  the 
English  or  the  American,  and,  when  accidents  oc- 
cur, fewer  persons  are  involved  in  them.  The 
movement,  also,  goes  on  under  much  stricter  regula- 
tion and  at  lower  rates  of  speed,  so  that  there  is  a 
grain  of  truth  in  the  English  sarcasm  that  on  a  Ger- 
man railway  "  it  almost  seems  as  if  beer-drinking 
at  the  stations  were  the  principal  business,  and 
traveling  a  mere  accessory." 

Limiting,  therefore,  the  comparison  to  the  railroads 
of  Great  Britain,  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the 
evil  reputation  of  the  American  roads  as  respects  ac- 
cidents is  wholly  deserved.  Is  it  indeed  true  that 
the  danger  to  a  passenger's  life  and  limbs  is  so  much 
greater  in  this  country  than  elsewhere  ? — Locally, 
and  so  far  as  Massachusetts  at  least  is  concerned,  it 
certainly  is  not.  How  is  it  with  the  country  taken 
as  a  whole  ? — The  lack  of  all  reliable  statistics  as  re- 
spects this  wide  field  of  inquiry  has  already  been  re- 
ferred to.  We  have  no  trustworthy  data.  We  do 
not  know  with  accuracy  even  the  number  of  miles 
of  road  operated  ;  much  less  the  number  of  passen- 
gers annually  carried.  As  respects  accidents,  and 
the  deaths  and  injuries  resulting  therefrom,  some 
information  may  be  gathered  from  a  careful  and  very 


262  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

valuable,  because  the  only,  record  which  has  been 
preserved  during  the  last  six  years  in  the  columns  of 
the  Railroad  Gazette.  It  makes,  of  course,  no  pre- 
tence at  either  official  accuracy  or  fullness,  but  it  is 
as  complete  probably  as  circumstances  will  permit 
of  its  being  made.  During  the  five  years  1874-8 
there  have  been  included  in  this  record  4,846  acci- 
dents, resulting  in  1,160  deaths  and  4,650  cases  of 
injury  ; — being  an  average  of  969  accidents  a  year, 
resulting  in  232  deaths  and  930  cases  of  injury. 
These  it  will  be  remembered  are  casualties  directly 
resulting  either  to  passengers  or  employes  from  train 
accidents.  No  account  is  taken  of  injuries  sustained 
by  employes  in  the  ordinary  operation  of  the  roads, 
or  by  members  of  the  community  not  passengers. 
In  Massachusetts  the  accidents  to  passengers  and 
employe's  constitute  one-half  of  the  whole,  but  a 
very  small  portion  of  the  injuries  reported  as  sus- 
tained by  either  passengers  or  employes  are  the  con- 
sequence of  train  accidents, — not  one  in  three  in  the 
case  of  passengers  or  one  in  seven  in  that  of  em- 
ploye's. In  fact,  of  the  2,350  accidents  to  persons 
reported  in  Massachusetts  in  the  nine  years  1870-8, 
but  271,  or  less  than  twelve  per  cent.,  belonged  to 
the  class  alone  included  in  the  reports  of  the  Rail- 
road Gazette.  In  England  during  the  four  years 
1874-7  the  proportion  was  larger,  being  about  twenty- 
five  instead  of  twelve  per  cent.  For  America  at 
large  the  Massachusetts  proportion  is  undoubtedly 
the  most  nearly  correct,  and  the  probabilities  would 


UNIVERSITY   }] 


GUESSING  A  T  STA  TISTICS.  263 

seem  to  be  that  the  annual  average  of  injuries  to  per- 
sons incident  to  operating  the  railroads  of  the  United 
States  is  not  less  than  10,000,  of  which  at  least  1,200 
are  due  to  train  accidents.  Of  these  about  two- 
thirds  may  be  set  down  as  sustained  by  passengers, 
or,  approximately,  800  a  year. 

It  remains  to  be  ascertained  what  proportion  this 
number  bears  to  the  whole  number  carried.  There 
are  no  reliable  statistics  on  this  head  any  more  than 
on  the  other.  Nothing  but  an  approximation  of  the 
most  general  character  is  possible.  The  number  of 
passengers  annually  carried  on  the  roads  of  a  few  of 
the  states  is  reported  with  more  or  less  accuracy, 
and  averaging  these  the  result  would  seem  to  indi- 
cate that  there  are  certainly  not  more  than  350,000,- 
OOO  passengers  annually  carried  on  the  roads  of  all 
the  states.  There  is  something  barbarous  about 
such  an  approximation,  and  it  is  disgraceful  that  at 
this  late  day  we  should  in  America  be  forced  to  es- 
timate the  passenger  movement  on  our  railroads  in 
much  the  same  way  that  we  guess  at  the  population 
of  Africa.  Such,  however,  is  the  case.  We  are  in 
in  this  respect  far  in  the  rear  of  civilized  commu- 
nities. Taking,  however,  350,000,000  as  a  fair  ap- 
proximation to  our  present  annual  passenger  move- 
ment, it  will  be  observed  that  it  is  as  nearly  as  may 
be  half  that  of  Great  Britain.  In  Great  Britain,  in 
1878,  there  were  1,200  injuries  to  passengers  from 
accidents  to  trains,  and  675  in  1877.  The  average 
of  the  last  eight  years  has  been  1,226.  If,  therefore, 


264  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

the  approximation  of  800  a  year  for  America  is  at 
all  near  the  truth,  the  percentage  would  seem  to  be 
considerably  larger  than  that  arrived  at  from  the  sta- 
tistics of  Great  Britain.  Meanwhile  it  is  to  be  noted 
that  while  in  Great  Britain  about  25  cases  of  injury 
are  reported  to  each  one  of  death,  in  America  but 
four  cases  are  reported  to  each  death — a  discrepancy 
which  is  extremely  suggestive.  Perhaps,  however, 
the  most  valuable  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from 
these  figures  is  that  in  America  we  as  yet  are  abso- 
lutely without  any  reliable  railroad  statistics  on  this 
subject  at  all. 

Taken  as  a  whole,  however,  and  under  the  most 
favorable  showing,  it  would  seem  to  be  a  matter  of 
fair  inference  that  the  dangers  incident  to  railroad 
traveling  are  materially  greater  in  the  United  States 
than  in  any  country  of  Europe.  How  much  greater 
is  a  question  wholly  impossible  to  answer.  So  that 
when  a  statistical  writer  undertakes  to  show,  as  one 
eminent  European  authority  has  done,  that  in  a 
given  year  on  the  American  roads  one  passenger  in 
every  286,179  was  killed,  and  one  in  every  90,737 
was  injured,  it  is  charitable  to  suppose  that  in  re- 
gard to  America  only  is  he  indebted  to  his  imagina- 
tion for  his  figures. 

Neither  is  it  possible  to  analyze  with  any  satisfac- 
tory degree  of  precision  the  nature  of  the  accidents 
in  the  two  countries,  with  a  view  to  drawing  infer- 
ences from  them.  Without  attempting  to  do  so  it 
may  be  said  that  the  English  Board  of  Trade  re- 


CA  USES  OF  A  CCIDEN TS.  265 

ports  for  the  last  five  years,  1874-8,  include  inquiries 
into  755  out  of  11,585  accidents,  the  total  number 
of  every  description  reported  as  having  taken  place. 
Meanwhile  the  Railroad  Gazette  contains  mention 
of  4,846  reported  train  accidents  which  occurred 
in  America  during  the  same  five  years.  Of  these 
accidents,  1,310  in  America  and  81  in  Great  Britain 
were  due  to  causes  which  were  either  unexplained 
or  of  a  miscellaneous  character,  or  are  not  common 
to  the  systems  of  the  two  countries.  In  so  far  as 
the  remainder  admitted  of  classification,  it  was 
somewhat  as  follows  : — 

GREAT  BRITAIN.       AMERICA. 

Accidents  due  to 

Defects  in  permanent  way     13  per  cent.     24  per  cent. 

"       "     rolling-stock       -    10    "      "  „       8    "      " 
Misplaced  switches     -         -     16    "      "         14    "      " 
Collisions 

Between    trains    going    in 

opposite  directions  -      3    "      "         18    "      " 

Between     trains    following 

each  other     -  5    "      "        30    "     " 

At  railroad  grade  crossings*     0.6  "      "  3    "     " 

At  junctions      -  -    1 1    "      " 

At  stations  or  sidings  within 

fixed  stations  -    40    "      "  6 

Unexplained      -  -  2    "      " 

*  During  these  five  years  there  were  in  Great  Britain  four  cases  of 
collision  between  locomotives  or  trains  at  level  crossings  of  one  rail- 
road by  another  ;  in  America  there  were  79.  The  probable  cause  of 
this  discrepancy  has  already  been  referred  to  (ante pp.  194-7). 


266  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

The  above  record,  though  almost  valueless  for 
any  purpose  of  exact  comparison,  reveals,  it  will 
be  noticed,  one  salient  fact.  Out  of  755  English 
accidents,  no  less  than  406  came  under  the  head  of 
collisions — whether  head  collisions,  rear  collisions, 
or  collisions  on  sidings  or  at  junctions.  In  other 
words,  to  collisions  of  some  sort  between  trains 
were  due  considerably  more  than  half  (54  per  cent.) 
of  the  accidents  which  took  place  in  Great  Britain, 
while  only  88,  or  less  than  13  per  cent,  of  the  whole, 
were  due  to  derailments  from  all  causes.  In  America 
on  the  other  hand,  while  of  the  3,763  accidents  re- 
corded, 1,324,  or  but  one-third  part  (35  per  cent.) 
were  due  to  collisions,  no  less  than  586,  or  24  per 
cent.,  were  classed  under  the  head  of  derailments, 
due  to  defects  in  the  permanent  way.  During  the 
the  six  years  1873-8  there  were  in  all  1698  cases  of 
collision  of  every  description  between  trains  re- 
ported as  occurring  in  America  to  1495  in  the 
United  Kingdom ;  but  while  in  America  the  derail- 
ments amounted  to  no  less  than  4016,  or  more  than 
twice  the  collisions,  in  the  United  Kingdom  they 
were  but  817,  or  a  little  more  than  half  their  num- 
ber. It  has  already  been  noticed  that  the  most  dis- 
astrous accidents  in  America  are  apt  to  occur  on 
bridges,  and  Ashtabula  and  Tariffville  at  once  sug- 
gest themselves.  This  is  not  the  case  in  Great 
Britain.  Under  the  heading  of  "  Failures  of  Tun- 
nels, Bridges,  Viaducts  or  Culverts,"  there  were  re- 
turned in  that  country  during  the  six  years  1873-8 


THE  COST  OF  ACCIDENTS.  26? 

only  29  accidents  in  all ;  while  during  the  same  time 
in  America,  under  the  heads  of  broken  bridges  or 
tressels  and  open  draws,  the  Gazette  recorded  no  less 
than  165.  These  figures  curiously  illustrate  the  dif- 
erent  manner  in  which  the  railroads  of  the  two 
countries  have  been  constructed,  and  the  different 
circumstances  under  which  they  are  operated.  The 
English  collisions  are  -distinctly  traceable  to  con- 
stant overcrowding ;  the  American  derailments  and 
bridge  accidents  to  inferior  construction  of  our  road- 
beds. 

Finally,  what  of  late  years  has  been  done  to  di- 
minish the  dangers  of  the  rail  ? — What  more  can  be 
done  ? — Few  persons  realize  what  a  tremendous 
pressure  in  this  respect  is  constantly  bearing  down 
upon  those  whose  business  it  is  to  operate  railroads. 
A  great  accident  is  not  only  a  terrible  blow  to  the 
pride  and  prestige  of  a  corporation,  not  only  does  it 
practically  ruin  the  unfortunate  officials  involved  in 
it,  but  it  entails  also  portentous  financial  conse- 
quences. Juries  proverbially  have  little  mercy  for 
railroad  corporations,  and,  when  a  disaster  comes, 
these  have  practically  no  choice  but  to  follow  the 
scriptural  injunction  to  settle  with  their  adversaries 
quickly.  The  Revere  catastrophe,  for  instance,  cost 
the  railroad  company  liable  on  account  of  it  over 
half  a  million  of  dollars  ;  the  Ashtabula  accident  over 
$600,000 ;  the  Wollaston  over  $300,000.  A  few  years 
ago  in  England  a  jury  awarded  a  sum  of  $65,000  for 
damages  sustained  through  the  death  of  a  single  in- 


268  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

dividual.  During  the  five  years,  1867-71,  the  rail- 
road corporations  of  Great  Britain  paid  out  over 
$11,000,000  in  compensation  for  damages  occasioned 
by  accidents.  In  view,  merely,  of  such  money  conse- 
quences of  disaster,  it  would  be  most  unnatural  did 
not  each  new  accident  lead  to  the  adoption  of  bet- 
ter appliances  to  prevent  its  recurrence.* 

To  return,  however,  to  the  subject  of  railroad  ac- 
cidents, and  the  final  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from 
the  statistics  which  have  been  presented.  That  con- 
clusion briefly  stated  is  that  the  charges  of  reckless- 
ness and  indifference  so  generally  and  so  widely 
advanced  against  those  managing  the  railroads  can- 
not for  an  instant  be  sustained.  After  all,  as  was 
said  in  the  beginning  of  the  present  volume,  it 
is  not  the  danger  but  the  safety  of  the  railroad 
which  should  excite  our  special  wonder.  If  any 

*  The  other  side  of  this  proposition  has  been  argued  with  much 
force  by  Mr.  William  Gait  in  his  report  as  one  of  the  Royal  Com- 
mission of  1874  on  Railway  Accidents.  Mr.  Gait's  individual  report 
bears  date  February  5,  1877,  and  in  it  he  asserts  that,  as  a  matter  of 
actual  experience,  the  principle  of  self-interest  on  the  part  of  the 
railway  conjpanies  has  proved  a  wholly  insufficient  safeguard  against 
accidents.  However  it  may  be  in  theory,  he  contends  that,  taking 
into  consideration  the  great  cost  of  the  appliances  necessary  to  insure 
safety  to  the  public  on  the  one  side,  and  the  amount  of  damages  in- 
cident to.  a  certain  degree  of  risk  on  the  other  side,  the  possible 
saving  in  expenditure  to  the  companies  by  assuming  the  risk  far  ex- 
ceeds the  loss  incurred  by  an  occasional  accident.  The  companies 
become,  in  a  word,  insurers  of  their  passengers , — the  premium 
being  found  in  the  economies  effected  by  not  adopting  improved  ap- 
pliances of  recognized  value,  and  the  losses  being  the  damages  in- 
curred in  case  of  accident.  He  treats  the  whole  subject  at  great 
length  and  with  much  knowledge  and  ability.  His  report  is  a  most 
valuable  compendium  for  those  who  are^in  favor  of  a  closer  govern- 
ment supervision  over  railroads  as  a  means  of  securing  an  increased 
safety  from  accident. 


AND   YET  IT  IS  SAFE!  269 

one  doubts  this,  it  is  very  easy  to  satisfy  himself 
of  the  fact, — that  .is,  if  by  nature  he  is  gifted 
with  the  slightest  spark  of  imagination.  It  is  but 
necessary  to  stand  once  on  the  platform  of  a  way- 
station  and  to  look  at  an  express  train  dashing 
by.  There  are  few  sights  finer ;  ,  few  better  cal- 
culated to  quicken  the  pulse.  It  is  most  striking 
at  night.  The  glare  of  the  head-light,  the  rush 
and  throb  of  the  locomotive, — the  connecting  rod 
and  driving-wheels  of  which  seem  instinct  with 
nervous  life, — the  flashing  lamps  in  the  cars,  and  the 
final  whirl  of  dust  in  which  the  red  tail-lights  vanish 
almost  as  soon  as  they  are  seen, — all  this  is  well  cal- 
culated to  excite  our  admiration ;  but  the  special 
and  unending  cause  for  wonder  is  how,  in  case  of 
accident,  anything  whatever  is  left  of  the  train. 
As  it  plunges  into  the  darkness  it  would  seem  to 
be  inevitable  that  something  must  happen,  and 
that,  whatever  happens,  it  must  necessarily  involve 
both  the  train  and  every  one  in  it  in  utter  and 
irremediable  destruction.  Here  is  a  body  weighing 
in  the  neighborhood  of  two  hundred  tons,  moving 
over  the  face  of  the  earth  at  a  speed  of  sixty  feet 
a  second  and  held  to  its  course  only  by  two  slender 
lines  of  iron  rails  ; — and  yet  it  is  safe  ! — We  have 
seen  how  when,  half  a  century  ago,  the  possibility  of 
something  remotely  like  this  was  first  discussed,  a 
writer  in  the  British  Quarterly  earned  for  himself  a 
lasting  fame  by  using  the  expression  that  "  We 
should  as  soon  expect  people  to  suffer  themselves 


2/0  RAILROAD  ACCIDENTS. 

to  be  fired  off  upon  one  of  Congreve's  ricochet 
rockets,  as  to  trust  themselves  to  the  mercy  of 
such  a  machine,  going  at  such  a  rate  ; " — while  Lord 
Brougham  exclaimed  that  "  the  folly  of  seven  hund- 
red people  going  fifteen  miles  an  hour,  in  six  trains, 
exceeds  belief."  At  the  time  they  wrote,  the 
chances  were  ninety-nine  in  a  hundred  that  both 
reviewer  and  correspondent  were  right ;  and  yet, 
because  reality,  not  for  the  first  nor  the  last  time,  saw 
fit  to  outstrip  the  wildest  flights  of  imagination,  the 
former  at  least  blundered,  by  being  prudent,  into 
an  immortality  of  ridicule.  The  thing,  however,  is 
still  none  the  less  a  miracle  because  it  is  with  us 
matter  of  daily  observation.  That,  indeed,  is  the 
most  miraculous  part  of  it.  At  all  hours  of  the  day 
and  of  the  night,  during  every  season  of  the  year, 
this  movement  is  going  on.  It  never  wholly  stops. 
It  depends  for  its  even  action  on  every  conceivable 
contingency,  from  the  disciplined  vigilance  of  thou- 
sands of  employes  to  the  condition  of  the  atmos- 
phere, the  heat  of  an  axle,  or  the  strength  of  a 
nail.  The  vast  machine  is  in  constant  motion, 
and  the  derangement  of  a  single  one  of  a  myriad 
of  conditions  may  at  any  moment  occasion  one  of 
those  inequalities  of  movement  which  are  known 
as  accidents.  Yet  at  the  end  of  the  year,  of  the 
hundreds  of  millions  of  passengers  fewer  have  lost 
their  lives  through  these  accidents  than  have  been 
murdered  in  cold  blood.  Not  without  reason, 
therefore,  has  it  been  asserted  that,  viewing  at 


A  CREDITABLE  MONUMENT.  2/1 

once  the  speed,  the  certainty,  and  the  safety  with 
which  the  intricate  movement  of  modern  life  is 
carried  on,  there  is  no  more  creditable  monument 
to  human  care,  human  skill,  and  human  foresight 
than  the  statistics  of  rairoad  accidents. 


INDEX.  273 


INDEX. 


Abergele,  accident  at.    72. 

Accidents,  railroad,  about  stations,  166. 

at  highway  crossings,  165. 

level  railroad  crossings,  94,  165,  245,  258. 
aggravated  by  English  car  construction  and  stoves,  14,  41, 

106,  255. 

comments  on  early,  9. 
damages  paid  for  certain,  267. 
due  to  bndges,  99,  206,  266. 
broken  tracks,  166. 
car  couplings,  117. 
collisions,  265. 

derailments,  13,  16,  23,  54,  79,  84. 
in  Great  Britain,  266. 

America,  266. 
draw-bridges,  82,  266. 
fire  in  train,  31. 
oil-tanks,  72. 
oscillation,  50. 
telegraph,  66. 
telescoping,  43. 
want  of  bell-cords,  32. 

brake  power,  12,  119. 

increased  safety  resulting  from,  2,  29,  135,  205. 
precautions  against  early,  10. 
statistics  of,  in  America,  263. 
Belgium,  260. 
France,  260. 

Great  Britain,  236,  252,  257,  263. 
Massachusetts,  232-60. 
general,  228-70. 


2/4  INDEX. 

List  of  Accidents  specially  described  or  referred  to  ;— 
Abergele  August  20,  1868,  72. 
Angola^  December  18,  1867,  12. 
Ashtabula,  December  29,  1876,  100. 
Brainerd,  July  27,  1875,  108. 
Brimfiela,  October,  1874,  56. 
Bristol,  March  7,  1865,  150. 
Carr's  Rock,  April  14,  1867,  120. 
Camphill,  July  17,  1856,  61. 
Charlestoivn  Bridge,  November  21,  1862,  95. 
Claypole,  June  21,  1870,  85. 
Communipaw  Ferry,  November  n.  1876.  207. 
Croydon  Tunnel,  August  25,  1861,  146. 
Des  Jardines  Canal,  March  17,  1857,  112. 
Foxboro,  July  15,  1872,  53. 

Franklin  Street,  New  York  city,  June,  1879,  207. 
Gasconade  River,  November  i,  1855,  108. 
On  Great  Western  Railway  of  Canada,  October,  1856,  55. 
On  Great  Western  Railway  of  England,  December 

24,  1841,  43. 

Heeley,  November  22.  1876,  209. 
Helmshire,  September  4,  1860,  121. 
On  Housatonic  Railroad,  A  ugust  16,  1865,  151. 
Huskisson,  William,  death  of,  September  15,  1830,  5. 
Lackawaxen,  July  15,  1864,  63. 
Morpeth,  March  25,  1877,  209. 
New  Hamburg,  February  6,  1871,  78. 
Noriualk,  May  6,  1853,  89. 
Penruddock,  September  2,  1870,  143. 
Port  Jervis,  June  17,  1858,  118. 
Prospect,  N.  Y.,  December  24,  1872,  106. 
Rainhill,  December  23,  1832,  10. 
Randolph,  October  13,  1876,  24. 
Revere,  August  26,  1871,  125. 
Richelieu  River,  June  29,  1864,  91. 
Shipton,  December  24,  1874,  16. 
Shrewsbury  River,  A  ugust  9,  1877,  96. 


INDEX.  2/5 

Tarijffville \  January  15,  1878,  107. 

Thorpe,  September  10,  1874,  66. 

Tyrone,  April  4,  1875,  69. 

Versailles,  May  8,  1842,  58. 

Weliuyn  Tunnel,  June  10,  1866,  149. 

Wemyss  Bay  Junction,  December  14,  1878,  313. 

Wollaston,  October  8,  1878,  20. 


American  railroad  accidents,  statistics  of,  97,  260-6. 
locomotive  engineers,  intelligence  of,  159. 
method  of  handling  traffic,  extravagance  of,  182. 

Angola,  accident  at,  12,  201,  218. 

Ashtabula,  accident  at,  100,  267. 

Assaults  in  English  railroad  carriages,  32,  35,  38. 

Automatic  electric  block,  159, 

reliability  of,  168, 
objections  to,  174. 
train-brake,  essentials  of,  219. 

necessity  for,  202,  227. 

Bell-cord,  need  of  any,  questioned,  29. 
accidents  from  want  ot,  31. 
assaults,  etc.,  in  absence  of,  32-41. 
Beloeil,  Canada,  accident  at,  92. 
Block  system,  American,  165. 

automatic  electric,  159. 

objections  to,  174. 
cost  of  English,  165. 
English,  why  adopted,  162. 

accident  in  spite  of,  145. 
ignorance  of,  in  America,  160. 
importance  of.  145. 

Boston,  passenger  travel  to  and  from,  183. 
possible  future  station  in,  198. 
some  vital  .statistics  of.  241,  249. 
Boston  &  Albany  railroad,  accident  on,  56. 

Boston  station  of,  183. 
Boston  &  Maine  railroad,  accident  on,  96. 
Boston  &  Providence  railroad,  accident  on,  53. 

Boston  station  of,  183. 
Brainerd,  accident  at,  108. 


2/6  INDEX. 

Brakes,  original  and  improved,  200. 
the  battle  of  the,  216. 
true  simplicity  in,  228. 
inefficiency  of  hand,  201,  204. 

emergency,  202. 

necessity  of  automatic,  continuous,  202,  227. 
See  Train-brake. 

Bridge  accidents,  98,  266. 

Bridges,  insufficient  safeguards  at,  98. 

protection  of,  m. 

Bridge-guards,  destroyed  by  brakemen,  244. 
Bristol,  accident  at,  150. 

Brougham,  Lord,  comments  on  death  of  Mr.  Huskisson,  7,  270. 
Buffalo,  Correy  &  Pittsburg  railroad,  accident  on,  106. 
Burlington  &  Missouri  River  railroad,  accident  on,  70. 
Butler,  B.  F.,  on  Revere  accident,  142. 
Calcoft,  Mr.,  extract  from  reports  of,  196,  255. 

Caledonian  railway,  accident  on,  return  of  brake  stoppages  by,  211. 
Camden  &  Amboy  railroad,  accident  on,  151. 
Car  construction,  American  and  English,  255. 
Carr's  Rock,  accident  at,  120. 
Central  Railroad  of  New  Jersey,  accident  on,  96. 
Charlestown  bridge,  accident  on,  95. 
Claypole  accident,  83. 
Collisions,  head,  61-2. 

in  America,  265. 

Great  Britain,  265. 
occasioned  by  use  of  telegraph,  66. 
rear-end,  144-52. 

Communipaw  Ferry,  accident  at,  207. 
Cannon  Street  Station  in  London,  traffic  at,  163,  183,  194. 
Connecticut  law  respecting  swing  draw-bridges,  82,  94,  193. 
Connecticut  Western  railroad,  accident  on,  107. 
Conservatism,  British  railroad,  29. 

American  railroad,  41,  52,  65,  161,  205. 
Coupling,  accidents  due  to,  117. 

the  original,  49. 
Crossings,  level,  of  railways,  accidents  at,  165. 

need  of  interlocking  apparatus  at,  195. 
stopping  trains  at,  95,  195. 


INDEX.  277 


Croydon  Tunnel  collision,  146. 
Deodand,  43. 

Derailments,  accidents  from,  13,  16,  23,  54,  79,  84. 
statistics  of,  265. 

Des  Jardines  Canal  accident,  112. 

Draw-bridge  accidents,  82,  97,  114. 

stopping  as  a  safeguard  against,  95. 
need  of  interlocking  apparatus  at,  195. 

Eames  vacuum  brake,  208. 
Eastern  railroad,  accident  on,  125, 

Economy,  cost  of  a  small,  174. 

at  risk  of  accident,  268. 

0 

Employes  railroad,  casualties  to,  243. 
Engineering,  on  American  inventions,  221. 
English  railways,  train  movement  on,  162,  194. 
Erie  railroad,  accidents  on,  63,  118,  120. 
France,  statistics  of  accidents  in,  259. 

panic  produced  in,  by  Verseilles  accident,  60. 
Franklin  Street,  New  York  city,  accident  at,  207. 
Gait,  William,  report  by,  on  accidents,  268. 
Gasconade  river  accident,  108. 
Germany,  railroad  accidents  in,  261. 
Grand  Trunk  railway,  accident  on,  91. 
Great  Eastern  railway,  accident  on,  66. 
Great  Northern  railway,  accidents  on,  84,  149. 
Great  Western  railway,  accidents  on,  16,  43,  112. 

of  Canada,  accidents  on,  31,  112. 

Hall's  system  of  electric  signals,  168. 

Harrison,  T.  E.,  extract  from  letter  of,  210. 

Heeley,  accident  at,  209. 

Helmshire  accident,  121. 

Highway  crossings  at  level,  accidents  at,  165,  170,  244,  258. 

interlocking  at,  195. 
Housatonic  railroad,  accident  on,  151. 
Hudson  River  railroad,  accident  on,  78. 
Huskisson,  William,  death  of,  3,  200. 
Inclines,  accidents  upon,  74,  no,  121. 


2/8  INDEX. 

Interlocking,  chapter  relating  to,  182. 
at  draw-bridges,  97,  195. 

level  crossings,  195. 
practical  simplicity  of,  189. 
use  made  of  in  England,  192. 
Investigation  of  accidents,  no  systematic,  in  America,  86. 

English,  85. 

Lake  Shore  railroad,  accident  on,  n. 

Lake  Shore  &  Michigan  Southern  railroad,  accident  on,  100. 
Lancashire  &  Yorkshire  railroad,  accident  on,  121. 
Legislation  against  accidents,  futility  of  94,  109. 
as  regards  use  of  telegraphs,  64. 

interlocking  at  draws,  97. 

level  crossingsm97. 
London  passenger  traffic,  162,  183. 
London  &  Brighton  railway,  accident  on,  145. 
London  &  North  Western  railway,  assaults  on,  32,  38. 

accidents  on,  72,  143. 
train  brake  used  by,  222. 
Manchester  &  Liverpool  railway,  accidents  on,  10,  n,  45. 

opening  of,  3. 
Massachusetts,  statistics  of  accidents  in,  156,  232-60. 

train-brakes  in  use  in,  157,  214. 
Metropolitan  Elevated  railroad,  accident  on,  207. 

interlocking  apparatus  used  by,  196. 
Midland  railway,  accident  on,  209. 

protests  against  interlocking,  192. 
Miller's  Platform  and  Buffer,  chapter  on,  49-57. 

accidents  avoided  by,  19,  53,  56,  70. 
in  Massachusetts,  157. 

Mohawk  Valley  railroad,  pioneer  train  on,  48. 
Morpeth,  accident  at,  209. 

Murders,  number  of,  compared  with  the  killed  by  railroad  accidents,  242. 
New  York  City,  passenger  travel  of,  184. 
New  York,  Providence  &  Boston  railroad,  accident  on,  106. 
New  York  &  New  Haven  railroad,  accident  on,  89. 
Newark,  brake  trials  at,  in  1874,  217. 
North  Eastern  railway,  accident  in,  209. 

brake  trials  on,  218. 
returns  of  brake-stoppages  by,  211. 
Northern  Pacific  railroad,  accident  on,  108. 


INDEX.  279 

Norwalk  accident,  89. 

Oil-tank  accidents,  72,  150. 

Old  Colony  railroad  accidents  on,  20,  24,  174. 

Oscillation,  accidents  occasioned  by,  50. 

Pacific  railroad  of  Missouri,  accident  on,  108. 

Pennsylvania  railroad,  ballasting  of,  248. 

English  block  in  use  on,  164. 

Penruddock,  accident  at,  143. 

Phillips,  Wendell,  on  Revere  accident,  141. 

Port  Jervis  accident,  118,  202,  218. 

Quarterly  Review  of  1825,  article  in,  199,  269. 

Railroad  Gazette^  records  of  accidents  kept  by,  261. 

Rear-end  collisions  in  America,  144,  151. 

Europe,  143. 
necessity  of  protection  against,  159. 

Revere  accident,  125,  172. 

improvements  caused  by,  153. 

lessons  taught  by,  159. 

meeting  in  consequence  of,  161,  205. 

Richelieu  River,  accident  at,  92. 

Shipton  accident,  16,  216. 

Shrewsbury  River  draw,  accident  at,  96. 

Smith's  vacuum  brake,  208,  220,  226. 

popularity  of  in  Great  Britain,  220,  226. 
compared  with  Westinghouse,  218,  227. 

Statistics  of  railroad  accidents,  230-70. 

Stopping  trains,  an  insufficient  safeguard  at  draw-bridges  and  level  crossings, 

94»  97>  J95- 

Stage-coach  travelling,  accidents  in,  231. 
Stoves  in  case  of  accidents,  15,  41,  106. 
Suicides  on  railroads,  246. 
Tariffville  accident,  107. 
Telegraph,  accidents  occasioned  by  use  of,  66. 

use  of,  should  be  made  compulsory,  64. 
Telegraphic  signals,  chapter  on,  159. 
Telescoping,  accidents  from,  43. 
Thorpe,  collision  at,  67,  172. 


280  INDEX. 

Train-brake,  chapters  on,  199,  216. 

Board  of  Trade  specifications  relating  to,  219. 
doubts  concerning,  28. 
failures  of,  to  work,  in  Great  Britain,  an. 
introduced  on  English  roads,  29,  216. 
kinds  of,  used  in  Massachusetts,  157.  214. 
Sir  Henry  Tyler  on,  222,  228. 
want  of,  occasioned  Shipton  accident,  19,  216. 
Trespassers  on  railroads,  accidents  to,  245. 

means  of  preventing,  245,  258. 
Tunnels,  collisions  in,  146,  149. 

Tyler,  Captani  H.  W.,  investigated  Claypole  accident,  85. 
on  Penruddock  accident,  143. 

train-brakes,  222,  228. 
extracts  from  reports  by,  192, 194,  228. 
Union  Safety  Signal  Company,  168. 
United  States,  accidents  In,  261. 

no  investigation  of,  86. 

Vermont  &  Massachusetts  railroad,  accident  on,  112. 
Versailles,  the,  accident  of  1842,  58. 

Wellington,  Duke  of,  at  Manchester  &  Liverpool  opening,  3. 
Welwyn  Tunnel,  accident  in,  149. 
Wemyss  Bay  Junction,  accident  at,  212. 
Westinghouse  brake,  chapter  on,  199. 

accidents  avoided  by,  19,  209. 

in  Newark,  experiments,  217. 

objections  urged  against,  176. 

stoppages  by,  occasioned  by  triple  valve,  su 

use  of,  in  Great  Britain,  226. 

Massachusetts,  157,  214. 
Wollaston  accident,  18,  20,  155,  172,  227. 


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